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INTRODUCTION 
 Reynolds spends a staggering portion of its brief “re-telling” the 
factual narrative—accepted completely by the Business Court—that it 
acted in good faith and had good reasons to sell RAI to BAT.  However, 
those lengthy facts are totally irrelevant to the legal errors made by the 
court below.   The only facts relevant to address the legal errors made by 
the court below are undisputed: 
 BAT was a 42% shareholder and insider with membership on the 
RAI Board and access to material nonpublic information about 
Reynolds; 
 
 When BAT announced its unsolicited offer for Reynolds, it 
simultaneously announced that it would not support a sale of the 
Company to anyone else; 
 
 As a result, the Board never attempted to sell the Company to 
anyone else and no third-party purchasers were solicited to make 
bids; 
 
 Despite the absence of a market check, the Court accepted as fair 
value the deal price ultimately agreed to by the Reynolds Board; 
 
 That price was set in January 2017, six months before the July 
2017 closing; 
 
 Neither the Board or its Financial Advisors attempted to value the 
Company at the July 2017 closing date; 
 
 The court below likewise conducted no independent valuation as of 
the July 2017 closing date; 
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 Impending corporate tax reform resulted in material increases in 
the value of U.S. corporations between the deal date and the 
closing date, including material increases in the S&P 500 and 
Altria; and 
 
 As a result, the value of the merger consideration itself had 
increased from $59.64 at the deal date to $65.87 at the Transaction 
Date. 
 
These undisputed facts give rise to the core legal errors made by the court 
below: 
 Despite quoting the appraisal statute—which requires valuation at 
the Transaction Date—the Business Court used as its sole 
determinant of “fair value” the deal price struck in January; 
 
 Despite the fact that there was no “market check,” the Business 
Court relied on Delaware law (itself distinguishable) that allows 
deference to the deal price only when there has been a robust 
market check; 
 
 Despite being required to make an independent valuation of the fair 
value of the Company, the Business Court never did so; 
 
 Despite the absence of evidence to support the existence of an 
efficient market for RAI stock—and certainly not a fully efficient 
market in which there is no material non-public information about 
a company that could impact the price of stock—the Business Court 
relied on unaffected stock price as purported corroboration of its 
deal-price-based valuation; and 
 
 Despite recognizing that there was an increase in value prior to the 
Transaction Date, the Business Court estimated that the 
unaffected stock price would have likely increased to a price very 
close to the deal price, but failed to account for a “control premium” 
and, therefore, awarded a price that reflected the minority status 
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of publicly traded shares in contravention of the language of the 
statute. 
 
Reynolds’s brief is predictable in the sense that it follows the same 
strategy used successfully below:  convince the court that the RAI Board 
did a good job and made a reasonable judgment.  But that is the stuff of 
fiduciary duty law, not appraisal.  Fair value for appraisal purposes is 
not concerned with the conduct of the RAI Board but with the use of 
accepted valuation methodologies to determine the value of a Company 
at the time of closing.  That the Appellants here did not even get the value 
of the merger consideration on the Transaction Date should raise serious 
concerns about the Business Court’s compliance with the statute.  
Indeed, if a 42% insider can prevent third-party bids, negotiate 
exclusively with the company and no independent valuation will be 
conducted to ensure the price is fair, what is point of the statutory 
appraisal remedy?  And if the primary focus in subsequent proceedings 
is whether the Board acted in good faith and exercised reasonable 
business judgment, why have any statutory remedy beyond common law 
fiduciary duty? 
We demonstrate below that the Business Court’s “fair value” 
determination was not and could not have been made as of the 
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Transaction Date because the “value evidence” that it relied upon was 
dated as of the deal date and not the Transaction Date; that, despite 
Reynolds’s arguments to the contrary, the Business Court did, in fact, 
defer—to the penny—to the January deal price in contravention of the 
applicable statute; that, even if it could have deferred to deal price under 
the appraisal statute, no court has deferred to deal price in the absence 
of a market check (and here BAT prevented one); that neither RAI’s 
unaffected stock price, nor Gompers’s “adjusted unaffected stock price,” 
could serve as reliable indicators of fair value because the evidence before 
the Business Court was legally insufficient to establish an efficient 
market—let alone a “fully efficient market”—for RAI stock and because 
the Business Court improperly declined to add a “control premium.”  
These legal errors were exacerbated by the Business Court’s error in 
allowing the admission of the testimony of Reynolds’s expert, despite its 
numerous flaws, and the Business Court’s failure to calculate interest as 
the appraisal statute required. 
 For these and other reasons set forth below and in Appellants’ 
opening brief, the Business Court’s decision must be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT1 
I. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE AN 
INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE 
OF RAI AS OF THE TRANSACTION DATE, AS REQUIRED 
BY THE NORTH CAROLINA APPRAISAL STATUTE 
 
Although the principal issues on appeal involve the Business 
Court’s interpretation and application of N.C.G.S. § 55-13 et seq—issues 
that are reviewed by this Court de novo—Reynolds spills considerable 
ink regurgitating the Business Court’s factual findings and accusing 
Appellants of ignoring them.  Indeed, it is not until page 85 of its brief 
that RAI finally turns to the key issues on appeal in a discussion 
remarkably captioned other “criticisms” of the Business Court’s decision.  
(PB 7, 85).  However, even the Business Court’s lengthy factual and 
evidentiary findings do not change the fact that it did not make an 
independent determination of the fair value of RAI as of the Transaction 
Date, as required by the North Carolina Appraisal Statute, and, as such, 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized or abbreviated terms have the meaning 
set forth in Defendants-Appellants’ Brief (“DB”), filed with this Court on September 
21, 2020.  All references to “PB” are to Plaintiff-Appellee’s Brief, filed with this Court 
on November 16, 2020.   
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its decision must be reversed.2  RAI’s arguments to the contrary, when it 
finally makes them, are without merit. 
A. The Business Court Erred in Failing to Value RAI as 
of the Transaction Date 
 There is no dispute that, “[b]y statute, the Business Court below 
was charged with determining the fair value of the shares owned by 
Dissenters on the Transaction Date”—25 July 2017.  (PB 3-4).  Reynolds’s 
argument that the Business Court satisfied that obligation is 
unsupported.  According to Reynolds, because the Business Court 
accurately described the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5), and 
then asserted that it complied with them, it must have done so.  (PB 85-
88).  It did not.  The Business Court relied on the price negotiated by the 
Transaction Committee with BAT.  That price was approved in January 
2017—seven months before the closing.  The Board acted on the advice 
of its Financial Advisors.  They rendered their fairness opinions as of 
                                                 
2 The fact that some (but not all) of the Appellants “are hedge funds that first acquired 
RAI stock after BAT’s” public offer is in no way relevant to the statutory inquiry.  (PB 
3, 11 n.2).  The statute does not distinguish between stockholders who purchased 
stock before and stockholders who purchase stock after a public merger 
announcement and for good reason.  Studies have shown that “a credible threat of an 
appraisal action can sometimes constitute a valuable vehicle for augmenting 
shareholder value,” making so-called appraisal arbitragers an important part of the 
merger negotiation process.  Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, & Eric Talley, Appraisal 
Arbitrage and Shareholder Value, 3 J. of Law, Fin. & Acct. 147, 150 (2018). 
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January 2017.  The Financial Advisors relied on management projections 
that were updated as of October 2016.  None of the information used to 
support the fairness of the deal price took into account anything that 
occurred after January 2017. 
It is beyond obvious that in relying on the deal price, the Business 
Court’s fair value “determination,” did not value RAI as of the 
Transaction Date.  Reynolds does not and cannot dispute that: 
1. The value of the consideration RAI’s Transaction Committee 
agreed to accept from BAT in January 2017 was $59.64 per 
share.  (PB 36); 
 
2. Prior to the Transaction Date, events took place that may 
have increased RAI’s standalone value, including the 
increased likelihood of corporate tax reform and an 
accommodative regulatory climate for the US tobacco 
industry.  (PB 87);3 and 
 
                                                 
3 Evidencing the impact of those events, between October 2016 and July 2017, “the 
S&P 500 . . . rose 17.15%,” and “Altria, the only other major U.S. tobacco company, 
rose 20.44%.”  (R p 227 ¶ 188 (emphasis added)).  As explained in Appellants’ opening 
brief, if the value of RAI cash flows increased prior to the Transaction Date as a result 
of the above-described events (which it unquestionably did), and the value of RAI 
correspondingly increased, the value of BAT common stock—which traded with the 
expectant value of RAI after the Merger was approved in January 2017—and thus 
the value of the merger consideration, increased.  Logically, BAT would not have 
separately benefited from changes to US tax laws as it had no sales in or income from 
the US markets.  The increase in the value of BAT stock was a direct result of the 
increased value of Reynolds—and every single shareholder of RAI got the benefit of 
that increased value as the total value of the merger consideration increased from 
$59.64 to $65.87.  (DB 70-71). 
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3. As a result, the value of the merger consideration itself as of 
the Transaction Date was $65.87.  (PB 88). 
 
It follows, then, that:  (a) if Appellants were due the value of their shares 
as of the Transaction Date (which they were), Appellants should have, at 
the very least, received the same amount paid to every other stockholder 
on the Transaction Date ($65.87) and the value of RAI shares as of the 
Transaction Date was—as a matter of both law and logic—more than 
$59.64. 
 Despite this incontrovertible evidence, and the logical conclusions 
that stem from it, Reynolds argues that the Business Court’s  
fair value determination was nevertheless made as of the Transaction 
Date based on an undefined “totality of the evidence” before the Business 
Court.  However, the “indicators of value” that supported the Business 
Court’s valuation were: 
 RAI’s October 20, 2016 unaffected stock price, and Gompers’s 
“adjusted unaffected stock price;” 
 
 the deal price negotiated by RAI’s Transaction Committee in 
January 2017;  
 
 the DCF calculations, and “various other” analyses to “cross-check 
the reasonableness of the DCF” calculations, performed by RAI’s 
Financial Advisors in fairness opinions dated January 2017; 
and  
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 analyst price targets analyzed by the Financial Advisors in 
fairness opinions dated January 2017.   
 
(PB at 56-58 (emphasis added).). 
 
Putting aside the issues of whether deal price, in these circumstances, 
was an appropriate measure of fair value (it was not), and whether the 
Financial Advisors possessed the necessary information to properly value 
RAI (they did not)4, none of this value “evidence” took into account 
economic events after the deal was approved and prior to the Transaction 
Date.  Indeed, unless the Financial Advisors and RAI’s Transaction 
Committee had a crystal ball that allowed them to determine the changes 
in the market that would occur after January 2017, they had no ability 
to value RAI in July 2017.  Impending corporate tax reform—which 
substantially increased the expected cash flows of US corporations—
meant that U.S. equities did not remain in stasis during the six-month 
period that preceded the Transaction Date.  Equity markets in the US 
                                                 
4 Reynolds does not dispute that the Financial Advisors did not receive Reynolds’s 
ten-year cash flow projections—without which it would not be possible to conduct a 
DCF analysis.  Even if the “Financial Advisors received all the information they 
believed they needed for their work,” (PB 62 (emphasis added) (quoting R p 257 ¶ 
257)), that means nothing if they did not actually have possession of this key piece of 
value-relevant information.  (See Reply App. 32; T p 1504:5-18 (the 2016 Strategy 
Day presentation did not provide “sufficient underlying detail to perform a DCF” and 
Mr. Clark did not “believe creating an accurate discounted cash flow analysis from 
[the Adjusted Operating Income Outlook] chart alone [would be] reasonable”). 
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rose at a blistering pace and the value of other major domestic tobacco 
companies in the US did as well.  None of this “evidence” was taken into 
account in a valuation of RAI as of the Transaction Date.   
 Indeed, the DCF analyses conducted by the Financial Advisors 
were based on outdated five-year management projections prepared in 
October 2016.  (PB 60).  While those may have been the “most current 
[five-year] financial projections” available when they were provided to 
the Financial Advisors, after RAI entered into the merger agreement, 
RAI continued its monthly updates of its financial projections in the 
ordinary course of business, including in the month the Merger closed.  
RAI’s July 2017 LE Forecast contained the most up-to-date management 
projections available prior to the Transaction Date, and the only DCF 
analysis performed using those projections was that of Appellants’ expert 
Dr. Zmijewski.  (See DB 111; T p 540:24-541:16; Reply App. 4-5).   
The Financial Advisors’ “various other” analyses to “cross-check the 
reasonableness” of their DCFs, were all contained in their fairness 
opinions, which were dated in January 2017 and conducted before then.  
Moreover, in addition to being dated as of January 2017, the Business 
Court properly gave “no weight” to the Financial Advisors’ comparable 
- 11 - 
 
companies analyses and considered their precedent transactions 
analyses of “limited value” in determining the fair value of RAI shares.  
(R pp 242-43 ¶ 224, 247 ¶ 233).  And, with respect to analyst price targets, 
they were also reviewed by the Financial Advisors in January 2017.  
Stock market analysts not only did not take (and could not have taken) 
into account the increase in the value of RAI in the six-month period that 
preceded the Transaction Date, but were conducted based on an 
information deficit.  Unlike RAI and BAT, the market had no forward 
guidance as to RAI’s “step change” growth prospects after the Lorillard 
Transaction.  Markets were unaware that RAI management was 
projecting high, single-digit growth over the next ten years.  Investors 
likewise were unaware that internal valuations conducted by 
management valued the stock at $65 per share in July 2016 (a full year 
before the Transaction Date) or that management had “highly 
confidential” Top-Side Adjustments amounting to hundreds of millions of 
dollars.  Without the benefit of this material non-public information, 
analysts could not have accurately assessed the fair value of RAI shares 
as of the Transaction Date.  (See DB 25-35, 41).  Indeed, the undisputed 
evidence at trial demonstrated that analysts were underestimating 
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Reynolds’s growth even in the immediate short term relative to what 
insiders expected—specifically because analysts lacked visibility into 
RAI’s actual plans and projections.  (T pp 1035:52-1040:23; Reply App. 
24-29).5 
 The only value “evidence” RAI points to that was arguably current 
as of the Transaction Date, and relied upon by the Business Court, is the 
so-called “adjusted unaffected stock price” calculated by RAI’s expert 
Paul Gompers.  (See PB 57).  As discussed in Appellants’ opening brief, 
and in Section I.D. and E., infra, that metric supports the fact that there 
was value accretion after the deal was struck.  Gompers concludes that if 
RAI stock rose in conformity with the stock market and Altria, the 
unaffected stock price at the Transaction Date would have been about the 
same as the deal price.  However, to use the unaffected stock price as a 
proxy for fair value would mean that BAT would not pay a control 
premium and that RAI public stock was “fully efficient” reflecting all 
                                                 
5 The Business Court’s apparent belief that RAI had no material non-public 
information is ludicrous and should be reversed as inconsistent with the evidence and 
with logic.  Farm Bureau v. Cully's Motorcross Park, 366 N.C. 505, 512 (2013) (trial 
court’s findings of fact upheld on appeal only if supported by substantial evidence).  
Even BAT, which had numerous board seats, attended days-long strategy day 
sessions and had technology-sharing agreements with RAI had to conduct dozens of 
due diligence sessions with RAI managers before it could finalize a price for the 
Company.  (T pp 843:1-845:8; Reply App. 8-10). 
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information knowable about the Company.  Given the absence of any 
reliable evidence of the value of RAI shares as of the Transaction Date, 
and the uncontested evidence that the value of RAI shares increased 
between January and July 2017, the Business Court could not have 
valued RAI shares as of the Transaction Date.  As such, its decision 
should be reversed. 
B. The Business Court Erred by Failing to Make an 
Independent Determination of Fair Value Using 
“Customary and Current Valuation Concepts and 
Techniques Generally Employed” to Value 
Corporations 
 
Reynolds effectively admits that the Business Court did not make 
an independent fair value determination.  According to Reynolds, 
because RAI had already paid Appellants $59.64 for their shares under 
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25(a), and because the statute does not provide for 
refunds in the event of overpayment, once the Business Court apparently 
determined that the fair value of RAI shares on the Transaction Date was 
some number equal to or less than $59.64, it did not need to make a more 
precise fair value determination.  (PB 91).  Despite that $59.64 is 
equivalent to the January deal price, to the penny, Reynolds contends 
that the Business Court’s decision does not reflect a deference to the 
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value of the merger consideration agreed upon by RAI and BAT six 
months prior to the Transaction Date.  (PB 92).  According to Reynolds, 
regardless of whether the Business Court pinned the fair value of RAI 
shares as of the Transaction Date to a specific number, it derived its 
determination not just from the January deal price but from the other 
“customary and current” valuation concepts and techniques introduced 
at trial.  (PB 92-93).   That argument is belied by the language of Business 
Court’s decision itself.  Specifically, “the [Business] Court f[ound] that 
the deal price [wa]s entitled to substantial, if not determinative, 
weight in determining the fair value of Dissenters’ shares of RAI” 
because it was reached through arm’s-length negotiations between BAT 
and “a fully independent and well-informed transaction committee.”  (R 
p 186 ¶ 102 (emphasis added)).  The Business Court did not 
independently evaluate, and accord separate weight to, the “other 
evidence of value” that Reynolds contends demonstrates the Business 
Court’s consideration of other “‘customary and current’ valuation 
concepts and techniques” in its fair value determination.  (See PB 93-94; 
see also, e.g., R pp 243 ¶ 224 (according comparable companies analyses 
“no weight . . . in assessing the deal price as fair value for RAI’s 
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shares” (emphasis added)), 246-47 ¶ 233, 228 ¶ 198).  Thus, while the 
Business Court might not have relied on deal price to the exclusion of all 
other evidence, the only other evidence it considered was the very same 
valuation material the Board itself relied upon in agreeing to the deal 
price.  To be clear, in order to comply with its fiduciary duties, every 
board hires financial advisors to render fairness opinions that support 
the reasonable, good faith of the board in agreeing to a deal price.  Simple 
deference to that process as the sole evidence of fair value cannot 
substitute for the statutory mandate to use customary valuation 
techniques to check a deal made with an insider, and requires reversal of 
the Business Court’s decision.  
To be clear, Appellants’ position is not, as Reynolds’s brief implies, 
that the only valuation concept or technique that is statutorily compliant 
is the DCF.  (PB 51).  It is not.  Deference to deal price without more, 
however, also is not.  This position is entirely consistent with the 
appraisal cases in other Model Act states on which Reynolds relies.  See, 
e.g., TWC I, L.L.C v. Damos, 870 N.W.2d 274, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) 
(“We note the court did not exclusively rely on the purchase price but 
instead considered both experts’ opinions in light of the facts and 
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circumstances the companies were experiencing at that time.”).  In fact, 
the court in Ely, Inc. v. Wiley, 587 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1998) rejected an 
expert’s testimony because that expert used the transaction price itself 
to determine value, which was not valid where the transaction was not a 
“market-based transaction” because “the corporation was acting under 
some compulsion” to sell.  Id. at 469.  Here, as detailed in Appellants’ 
opening brief and below, the deal price suffers from the same flaw:  it was 
not the product of a market check.  Given BAT’s announcement that it 
would not support a sale to any other company, RAI was compelled to 
deal only with BAT. 
C. The Business Court Erred in its Interpretation of 
Delaware Law to Rely on Deal Price Absent a Market 
Check 
There are important differences between the Delaware appraisal 
statute—which applies to all transactions—and the North Carolina 
statute (which deals only with transactions with insiders) and we will not 
repeat them here.  However, even assuming that Delaware cases were 
deemed as somehow authoritative, the Business Court completely failed 
to appreciate Delaware case law on appraisal.  As the Business Court 
acknowledged, and Reynolds admits, “the persuasiveness of the deal 
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price depends on the reliability of the sales process that generated it.”  
(PB 97 (quoting R p 286 ¶ 326 (citation omitted))); see also Merlin 
Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 
2015) (“The dependability of a transaction price is only as strong as the 
process by which it was negotiated.”).  A process in which the deal price 
is negotiated by an insider, who invariably knows more about the 
company than outsiders and who openly stated that it would not support 
(with its votes) or sell its shares to any bidder who might come in with a 
higher bid to top its price, is not reliable. 
While Reynolds is correct that Delaware courts have not set a floor 
for the minimum sales process requirements that must be met for a court 
to rely on the deal price as evidence of fair value, Reynolds does not, and 
cannot, dispute that no Delaware court has deferred to deal price 
where, as here, there was no market check.  (See PB 97).  That is because 
it is the presence of additional bidders in an open, competitive auction or 
sales process that forces the deal price to converge on intrinsic value and 
instills confidence in the reliability of the resulting deal price.  The fact 
that the Business Court found that “there were few (if any) companies in 
the tobacco industry or adjacent industries that could have made an offer 
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for RAI” may mean the directors of the RAI Board could deal exclusively 
with BAT and not breach their fiduciary duties.  (R p 293 ¶ 340; PB 100).  
However, it underscores the absence of a market check in which third 
parties can provide evidence of market value.  The uncontested facts are 
that:  (1) Reynolds and its Financial Advisors did not solicit other bids or 
hold an auction; and (2) bidders did not come forward.  That means there 
was no market check and, under Delaware law, the resulting deal price 
is not sufficiently reliable to defer exclusively to the negotiated deal price.  
In re Dole Food Co. Inc. S’holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214 at *32-33 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (holding that go-shop process, financial advisor that 
“diligently sought  out  other  bidders”  and  “low  break-
up  fee”  were  merely  “cosmetic”  where  insider “controlled over 40% of 
the company’s voting power, and “made [it] clear” that he “was not a 
seller”). 
Undeterred by the unflagging requirement in Delaware case law 
that there be a market check, Reynolds emphasizes the supposed “other 
indicia” of the reliability of the sale process identified by the Business 
Court in relying on deal price, which effectively boil down to the 
following:  (1) the deal price was negotiated by an independent 
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Transaction Committee (and experienced advisors); and (2) the 
Transaction Committee did not surrender to BAT’s first offer.  (PB 98).6  
However, these are “process” points more relevant to fiduciary duty than 
statutory appraisal.  Reynolds also points to commentary in the Model 
Business Corporation Act stating that “[a] court determining fair value . 
. . should give great deference to the aggregate consideration accepted or 
approved by a disinterested board of directors for an appraisal-triggering 
transaction.”  (PB 52-53).  However, even assuming that North Carolina 
was aware of that dated commentary or relied upon it (rather than the 
plain language of the statute) in adopting its statute (and there is no such 
statutory history), that comment presumably assumes that a board 
markets the Company by soliciting bids from other would-be purchasers.  
Indeed, that commentary acknowledges that there are circumstances in 
which even “an arm’s-length transaction” does not yield fair value.  A 
                                                 
6 As detailed in Appellants’ opening brief, (DB 84-89), a transaction may be a 
reasonable exercise of business judgment that does not give rise to liability to 
stockholders for breach of fiduciary duty, but more (i.e., a market check) is required 
for a court to rely on deal price in an appraisal proceeding.   See, e.g.,   Merion Capital 
L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 7324170, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 
2016) (“Because the two inquiries are different, a sale process might pass muster for 
purposes of a breach of fiduciary claim and yet still constitute a sub-optimal process 
of an appraisal.”) (emphasis added)). 
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transaction like this—where a large insider prevents a market check—is 
clearly outside the typical transactions contemplated in the commentary 
to the Model Act.  More specifically, Reynolds points out that the 
Business Court found each of the indicia of reliability identified in the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in In re Appraisal of Panera Bread 
Co., 2020 WL 506684 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) to be present in the RAI-
BAT sale process.  (PB 98).  A comparison to Panera, however, illustrates 
that exclusive deference to deal price was wholly improper.  In Panera, 
the purchaser was not an insider but an independent third-party who 
had no ability to prevent other bidders.  Accordingly, it had to convince 
the Company that it was paying a price sufficiently high to warrant 
exclusive dealing.  However, before agreeing to exclusive dealing the 
Company authorized its financial advisors to contact potential 
bidders to create the tension of a competitive sales process and a 
market check.  Panera, 2020 WL 506684, at *22 (“Panera solicited all 
logical buyers consistent with its knowledge of the Company’s value and 
the market.”).  Here, BAT was not a third-party purchaser but a 42% 
shareholder who said it would not sell its shares if the Company obtained 
a higher bid.  Knowing that any transaction would not be supported by 
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BAT, the Board did not solicit any bidders and the few bidders who could 
have purchased the Company did not make an approach.  Having totally 
suppressed a market check, Reynolds cannot now rely on the deal price 
it struck.  To the extent Delaware law applies at all, the Delaware 
Supreme Court has said that a large shareholder must support an 
auction if it wishes to rely on deal price.  Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, 
Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 508 (Del. Ch.) (“Golden Telecom I”) (“In a situation 
such as this, . . .  if [the Transaction Committee] was relying on a 
market check . . . , [it] should have affirmatively sought 
guarantees from [insider purchaser] that [it] would support a 
higher bid and used those guarantees to attract bidders.” 
(emphasis added)),  aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).   
Reynolds’s argument also ignores all of the other objective indicia 
of reliability recognized by Delaware courts (and definitively not present 
in this transaction), including the following:  (i) “[e]asy access to . . . 
nonpublic information . . . [and] no discrimination between potential 
buyers;” (ii) “[m]any parties with . . . a chance to bid, meaning that there 
was a robust market check with outreach to all logical buyers and a go-
shop;” and (iii) “the company purchased by a third party in an arm’s 
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length sale and no hint of self-interest.”  In re Appraisal of Solera 
Holdings, Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted).  This Merger resulted from a 
42% stockholder unwilling to support an alternative transaction; 
Financial Advisors who were not authorized to even look for other bidders 
and who were deprived of material, value-relevant information; a “no-
shop” clause; and a $1 billion termination fee.  The lack of competition 
(and correspondingly lower price) was exacerbated by BAT’s substantial 
ownership position and announcement that it “ha[d] no interest in selling 
any of the [RAI] shares it owns, nor would [it] . . . support any alternative 
sale, merger or similar transaction involving [RAI].”  (R p 188 ¶ 108 
(second and fourth alterations in original)).  To mitigate these obstacles, 
RAI should have invited other parties to bid on the Company (and 
conduct due diligence) or demanded that BAT support an alternative 
transaction if it wanted to rely on deal price as an indicator of fair value.  
Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 508.  It did not, and, therefore, the deal 
price could not, as a matter of law, be a reliable indicator of the fair value 
of RAI shares even under Delaware law, and the Business Court’s 
decision must be reversed. 
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D. The Business Court Erred By Relying On Gompers’ 
“Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price” Analysis  
Reynolds does not dispute that reliance on unaffected stock price 
requires, in the first instance, the establishment of an efficient market 
for RAI stock such that the price quickly incorporates available 
information.  (See PB 110-11).  As detailed in Appellants’ opening brief, 
that necessary predicate was not properly established before the 
Business Court.  (DB 89-106).  In response, Reynolds places its focus on 
the factual findings that supported the Business Court’s determination, 
rather than Appellants’ contention that that factual evidence is 
insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish an efficient market.  (PB 110-
15).      
As the Business Court acknowledged, an efficient market cannot be 
presumed or assumed.   (R p 232 ¶ 202).  A market is said to be efficient 
with respect to an information set if the price “fully reflects” that 
information set, i.e. if the price would be unaffected by revealing the 
information set to all market participants.  There is no stock for which 
the market is “fully” efficient because no company discloses every piece 
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of material, value-relevant information.7  If they did, there would be no 
such thing as insider trading and purchasers would not need to conduct 
extensive due diligence.  Given that, the courts have distinguished 
between semi-strong market efficiency and strong (i.e., full) market 
efficiency, with the key distinction being that “the semi-strong version 
assumes that markets reflect only all publicly available information 
whereas the strong version assumes that markets reflect all information, 
and are therefore, by extension, more likely to reflect fundamental 
value.”  Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 
A.3d 128, 138 n.53 (Del. 2019).  Here, though the Business Court 
purported to find only sufficient evidence “to determine that the market 
for RAI’s stock was semi-strong form efficient,” it also found that none of 
the material nonpublic value-relevant information identified by 
Appellants “warrants disregarding RAI’s Unaffected Stock Price as 
evidence of value,” implicitly finding the market for RAI stock to be fully 
efficient—a conclusion that defies logic.  (R pp 232-234 ¶¶ 202-03).  As 
                                                 
7 Some in the academic community debate whether markets are efficient at all.  See 
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Proving Marks Inefficient:  The Variability of Federal 
Court Decisions on Market Efficiency in Cammer v. Bloom and Its Progeny, 10 U. 
Miami Bus. L. Rev. 303, 321-27 (2014); William O Fisher, Does the Efficient Market 
Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness, 54 Emory L.J. 843, 898-973 (2005). 
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explained in Appellants’ opening brief, Gompers’ testimony, too, was 
predicated on the unproven assumption that RAI traded in a “semi-
strong” efficient market.  As a matter of law, the Business Court erred in 
accepting that predicate (and with it, Gompers’ testimony) for several 
independent reasons.   
First, RAI retained Shivdasani—not Gompers—as an expert on 
market efficiency, but decided not to call him to testify at the eleventh 
hour.  The reason RAI did so was that Shivdasani’s “event study” 
analyzing market efficiency demonstrated that the market for RAI stock 
actually was inefficient at multiple relevant times.  Indeed, as noted by 
Shivdasani, equity analysts who followed RAI noted at one point that 
investors were looking a “gift horse” in the mouth by selling in reaction 
to what the analyst believed was net-positive news announced by RAI.  
The decision to eschew Shivdasani should have carried a consequence—
application of the “missing witness rule” and imposition of an adverse 
inference against RAI.  Instead, the Business Court declined to apply the 
missing witness rule for two reasons: (i) its conclusion that Shivdasani 
was “equally available” to Appellants so as to moot the missing witness 
rule and (ii) its conclusion that the missing witness rule was inapplicable 
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to experts.  (R p 327 ¶¶ 18-19).  Both conclusions were legally erroneous, 
and RAI’s attempt to defend them in its brief misses the mark. 
RAI, like the Business Court, claims that Shivdasani was “equally 
available” to Appellants because his deposition testimony could have 
been presented at trial.  RAI makes the further claim—beyond the 
Business Court’s evidentiary rulings—that Shivdasani could have been 
subpoenaed to appear at trial.  (PB 128-29).  Neither point withstands 
scrutiny.  The notion of “availability” in the context of the missing witness 
rule is not about whether it was possible for Appellants to somehow put 
Shivdasani’s testimony before the Business Court.  As stated by Professor 
McCormick in his canonical discussion of the missing witness rule:  
“[T]he [adverse] inference may be allowed when the witness could easily 
be called or subpoenaed by either party.”  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
264.   
The “availability” inquiry in the context of the missing witness rule 
is not about physical or practical availability; instead, the relevant 
question is whether the witness is likely to be neutral as between the 
parties (in which case no inference should be drawn) or whether the 
witness should be favorably disposed to the party that nonetheless 
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refused to call him (in which case the inference is appropriate).  See id.; 
see also Simmons v. Univ. of Chicago Hosp. & Clinics, 642 N.E.2d 107, 
111 (Ill. 1994) (“A witness is not equally available to a party if there is a 
likelihood that the witness would be biased against him”) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).8  Accordingly, the theoretical 
ability of Appellants to present deposition testimony from Shivdasani or 
to subpoena him for trial is irrelevant to the “availability” inquiry for 
purposes of the missing witness rule. 
RAI’s arguments regarding the applicability of the missing witness 
rule to experts fall equally flat.  Appellants acknowledged below, in their 
opening brief, and again here that courts are split regarding the 
applicability of the rule to expert witnesses.  (PB 125).  RAI, like the 
                                                 
8 RAI claims that one of the cases cited by Appellants says otherwise, but RAI 
misrepresents the holding at issue.  In the portion of People v. Gonzalez, 502 N.E.2d 
583, 586 (N.Y. 1986) quoted by RAI, the New York Court of Appeals was addressing 
the requirement that a witness be practically available to the party against whom the 
inference is drawn.  The decision goes on to state:  “On the other hand, if a witness, 
although theoretically ‘available’ to both sides, is favorable to or under the influence 
of one party and hostile to the other, the witness is said to be in the ‘control’ of the 
party to whom he is favorably disposed, and an unfavorable inference may be drawn 
from the failure to call the witness.  This conclusion results from the notion that 
the witness' testimony is, in a pragmatic sense . . . unavailable to the opposing 
party regardless of physical availability.  Thus, the fact that a witness is “equally 
available” to both sides, standing alone, is insufficient to defeat a timely request for 
the [inference].”  Id. at 587 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
- 28 - 
 
Business Court, cites to two decisions from states who have declined to 
apply the missing witness rule to experts while ignoring entirely contrary 
decisions and refusing to engage with Appellants’ arguments regarding 
why application of the rule to experts makes even more sense than its 
application to fact witnesses.   
Parties cannot choose who the relevant fact witnesses are.  That die 
is cast based on historical events—who was present to witness the 
relevant events and thus has first-hand knowledge to offer the court 
about relevant facts.  Parties can, however, choose their expert(s).  The 
missing witness rule is a close cousin of the spoliation doctrine.  See 
McLain v. Taco Bell Corp., 527 S.E.2d 712, 715-16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(quoting Yarborough v. Hughes, 51 S.E. 904 (N.C. 1905)).  In both 
instances, where a party declines to present relevant evidence within its 
control, there is an inference that the evidence would be unfavorable to 
its case.  A party that retains an expert, pays him handsomely for his 
services, submits a report prepared by that expert, presents the expert 
for deposition, and then at the last possible moment disavows the need 
for the expert and refuses to call him at trial (all of which RAI did here) 
is sending as clear a signal as possible that the expert’s testimony would 
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be harmful if presented.  That is exactly the situation the missing witness 
rule is intended to address.   
RAI’s pretext for declining to bring Shivdasani to trial—namely, 
that RAI concluded his testimony was unnecessary—is preposterous on 
its face.  The fact witnesses that RAI claims made Shivdasani’s testimony 
moot were within RAI’s control from the outset.  RAI knew what they 
would say and nonetheless retained Shivdasani and until the eve of trial 
indicated that RAI planned to call Shivdasani to the stand.  It strains 
credulity to think that RAI realized only at the last possible instant that 
it had no need for Shivdasani’s testimony, as opposed to recognizing that 
Shivdasani would undermine the “efficient market” predicate for 
Gompers’s testimony. 
RAI, like the Business Court, cites Washington v. Perez, 98 A.3d 
1140 (N.J. 2014) for the proposition that the missing witness rule ought 
not apply to experts, but Washington did not categorically reject the 
application of the rule to experts.  Instead, Washington applied a four-
part test drawn from a prior New Jersey Supreme Court decision to 
determine whether an adverse inference should apply to a party’s failure 
to call an expert, and ruled that the factors weighed against an adverse 
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inference given the facts of that case.  Id. at 1155-57.  The Business Court 
did not apply the Washington four-part test and Appellants do not 
understand the Business Court to have adopted that aspect of 
Washington as the law of North Carolina.  Instead, the Business Court 
(like RAI in its appellate brief) treated Washington as having reached a 
holding that it never did—the rejection of the missing witness rule as 
ever applicable to experts.  In re Gonzalez, 763 S.E.2d 210, 216-17 (S.C. 
2014) is equally inapposite.  There, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
rejected application of the missing witness rule to a psychiatric expert, 
reasoning that the expert’s testimony was not likely to present a binary 
conclusion supporting one side or the other.  Here, in contrast, the 
question addressed by Shivdasani was binary—either RAI’s market was 
efficient during the relevant times, or it was not. 
RAI mocks Appellants for arguing that decisions such as Taylor v. 
Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 467 (Ill. 1994) are “better reasoned” than Washington 
and Gonzalez, but neither side’s ipse dixit carries the day and the 
relevant decisions from North Carolina’s sister states speak for 
themselves, as does the logic of Appellants’ position.  The missing witness 
rule exists to deal with situations where one party tactically attempts to 
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withhold a witness’ testimony from the court, in circumstances where 
that ought to be favorably disposed to the party that declines to call the 
witness.  That is exactly what happened here. 
Second, regardless of the adverse inference, Gompers himself did 
not analyze—and offered no conclusions regarding—the efficiency of the 
market for RAI stock.  According to Gompers’ own sworn testimony, he 
relied entirely on Shivdasani (RAI’s missing expert witness) for the 
predicate of an efficient market on which Gompers’ testimony was based.  
Without a basis in adequate proof of market efficiency, Gompers’ 
“adjusted unaffected stock price” analysis should not have been admitted.  
This is so because, unless the market for RAI stock was efficient (and 
arguably strong-form efficiency is required for this purpose), the trading 
price of RAI stock is irrelevant to RAI’s fair value.   
To sidestep this problem, the Business Court held, and RAI parrots 
in its appellate brief, that Gompers’ “adjusted unaffected stock price” 
testimony was admissible because (i) expert testimony is not necessary 
to establish market efficiency and (ii) Gompers did not in fact rely on 
Shivdasani’s testimony.  (PB 110-13).  Both RAI and the Business Court 
are wrong. 
- 32 - 
 
As to the necessity of expert testimony to establish market 
efficiency, RAI takes Appellants to task for relying on what RAI calls a 
“rhetorical flourish” in a single Delaware Court of Chancery opinion.  
Despite all of its own rhetorical bravado, RAI fails to cite (as the Business 
Court failed to cite) any decision in which market efficiency was 
established without expert testimony in an appraisal action.  Indeed, 
RAI’s own authorities support Appellants’ position.  RAI string-cites to 
several decisions it claims show the courts have relied on “factual 
criteria” to establish market efficiency.  But each decision cited by RAI 
relied on expert testimony.  The Delaware Supreme Court decision in 
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 177 A.3d 
1, 25 (Del. 2017) lists off various criteria (essentially, the Cammer 
Factors) that it found relevant to the existence of an efficient market.  
The problem for RAI is that, in citing to the record regarding whether the 
factors had been satisfied, Dell cites almost exclusively to the 
corporation’s expert report.  See id. at nn.117-20, 122.9  In Jarden, the 
                                                 
9 The sole exception is a citation to the testimony of Michael Dell for the proposition 
that Dell, Inc. did not have a controlling stockholder.  177 A.3d at 25 n.121.  
Obviously, the absence of a controlling stockholder is not, standing alone, sufficient 
to establish market efficiency for an issuer’s stock. 
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Delaware Court of Chancery’s list of relevant factors is prefaced by “As 
Dr. Hubbard explained . . . .”  2019 WL 3244085, at *27 (Del. Ch. July 19, 
2019), on reargument in part sub nom. In re Jarden Corp., 2019 WL 
4464636 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 2019), and aff’d sub nom. Fir Tree Value 
Master Fund, LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313 (Del. 2020).10  Dr. Glenn 
Hubbard was the corporation’s expert.  Id. at *22.  The citations in Solera 
are slightly more opaque, but there again the satisfaction of the Cammer 
Factors was established by reference to an expert report.  2018 WL 
3625644, at *24 nn.321-26.11  Simply put, neither RAI nor the Business 
Court identified a single instance in which market efficiency in an 
appraisal action was established without expert testimony.  And 
Appellants have identified multiple authorities—including some not 
addressed by RAI at all—that stand for the proposition that expert 
testimony should be required, as a matter of law, in these circumstances. 
                                                 
10 The court in Jarden also recognized that “law-trained judges” should not get “deep 
in the weeds of economics and corporate finance,” as required to adjudicate an 
appraisal under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, without the 
benefit of expert testimony.  2019 WL 3244085, at *1. 
 
11 The citations refer to a specific Joint Exhibit, JX0894.  That exhibit was the expert 
report of Dr. Hubbard.  See, e.g., 2018 WL 3625644, at *17 nn.217-18. 
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Third, as Appellants explained in their opening brief, the Cammer 
Factors on which RAI relied to show market efficiency are not designed 
to test (let alone establish) whether the trading price of a corporation’s 
stock reflects the fair value of a corporation.  Instead, the Cammer 
Factors were developed—and continue to be employed—at the class 
certification stage of securities fraud actions to establish whether a fraud 
on the market presumption is appropriate at that early phase of 
litigation.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 267-
68 (2014).  Notably, at the damages phase of a securities fraud trial, 
plaintiffs must come forward with expert testimony—including an event 
study—proving loss causation and damages.  Fact witnesses (or even 
expert witnesses) providing testimony about market movements in the 
stock price untethered from an event study or other rigorous expert 
analysis simply do not suffice.  See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1272-76 (N.D. Okla. 2007); In re Imperial Credit Indus., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014-16 (C.D. Cal. 2003).12  
                                                 
12 An appraisal action is, in essence, purely an action for damages.  The sole question 
in an appraisal action is the fair value of the subject corporation.  The testimony 
necessary to justify use of market-based valuation metrics in an appraisal action 
logically must be at least as rigorous as that necessary to establish market-based 
damages in a securities fraud action. 
- 35 - 
 
RAI attempts to wave this away by asserting that this Court should 
not “break new ground,” but that argument is makeweight.  This Court 
has never ruled on the contours of the North Carolina appraisal statute, 
so any ruling in this case will break new ground.  It is therefore all the 
more important for the Court to establish a framework that is coherent 
and that accounts for the reality of what class-certification shortcuts like 
the Cammer Factors can and cannot establish when it comes to market 
efficiency and the fair value of a corporation.   
Fourth, even assuming that the Cammer Factor test was 
appropriate for determining market efficiency in this context (which it 
was not), the proof before the Business Court was legally insufficient to 
meet that test.  The inadequacy of the proof before the Business Court is 
most clear in the proof offered for, and relied upon by the Business Court 
to support, Cammer Factor five—“a cause and effect relationship 
between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an 
immediate response in the stock price,” Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 
1264, 1287 (D.N.J. 1989).  Proof of this factor traditionally requires an 
event study demonstrating the reaction of the stock to the introduction 
of new information in the market.  See, e.g., In re Federal Home Loan 
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Mortg. Corp. (Freddie Mac) Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 174, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012); Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *28.  Here, the Court found Cammer 
Factor five satisfied based not on the analysis or testimony of an expert, 
but on Mr. Wajnert’s testimony (following a leading question) that he 
“observe[d] over time the Reynolds stock price reacting to decisions that 
the board had taken in a positive way or negatively” and Mr. de 
Gennaro’s unremarkable testimony that there was “[n]o indication that 
the market wasn’t absorbing news on a regular basis.”  (R p 233 ¶ 202(d) 
(citing T pp 59:10-60:4, 215:15-23); see also Reply App. 1-3).  As a matter 
of law such vague lay witness testimony is not, and cannot be, sufficient 
to establish Cammer Factor five or an efficient market.  (Contra PB 
111).13   
                                                 
13 To the extent the Cammer Factors are deemed relevant to market efficiency in 
appraisal actions at all, factor five should be the sine qua non of market efficiency.  
The other Cammer Factors (and their cousins the Krogman Factors) all essentially 
serve as a proxy for the size of the corporation in question.  See In re Freddie Mac Sec. 
Litig., 281 F.R.D. at 177-78.  That is, large, public corporations invariably will satisfy 
the other Cammer/Krogman factors.  Accordingly, adopting those factors as the 
standard for proof of market efficiency in appraisal actions effectively precludes 
stockholders from ever seeking appraisal of large, public corporations.  Whether to 
permit appraisals of such companies is a question for the Legislature—and North 
Carolina’s Legislature has spoken.  The Legislature expressly authorized appraisal 
of large, public corporations where (as here) a significant preexisting stockholder is 
the acquirer and the transaction is an “interested transaction” under N.C.G.S. § 55-
13-02(b)(4).  That statute should not be invalidated sub silentio through a holding 
that the Cammer/Krogman Factors establish market efficiency, such that the 
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Moreover, the record is undisputed that Gompers relied entirely on 
Shivdasani with respect to market efficiency (not the fact witnesses that 
RAI later introduced at trial).  RAI does not dispute this point in its brief.  
Instead, RAI claims it is irrelevant that Gompers relied on Shivdasani 
because the fact witnesses who testified in Shivdasani’s stead provided 
the necessary predicate to establish market efficiency.  But expert 
testimony does not work like Indiana Jones swapping a bag of rocks for 
the Golden Idol.  Experts rely on the predicate evidence set forth in their 
report and opposing parties are entitled to test the basis of expert 
testimony before trial.  An expert cannot have his report back-filled with 
evidence produced for the first time at trial when the expert did not 
actually rely on that evidence.  See, e.g., Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, 
Inc., 2013 WL 3316186, at *18 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2013) (rejecting attempt 
by expert to retroactively justify conclusions based on evidence 
introduced at trial where “[a]lthough [the expert] identified these sources 
after completing his expert and rebuttal reports, he attempted to use 
                                                 
Business Court should rely on the market price of the corporation’s stock as evidence 
of fair value whenever the subject corporation is a large, publicly-traded entity. 
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them to demonstrate an important assumption underlying the valuation 
reflected in his reports.”) (emphasis in original).   
Absent evidence legally sufficient to establish the necessary 
predicate of an efficient market, the Business Court could not rely on 
unaffected stock price or Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price. 
E. The “Adjusted Unaffected Price” Could not Establish 
the “Fair Value” of RAI Because It Had No “Control 
Premium”. 
 Passing the fact that Gompers failed to demonstrate efficiency, his 
“adjusted unaffected stock price” could not equal “fair value” because it 
failed to apply a control premium.  RAI does not dispute that the Business 
Court failed to apply a control premium in its discussion of the reliability 
of unaffected stock price or Gompers’s adjusted unaffected stock price as 
indicators of fair value.  Nor could it, as the Business Court’s position was 
clear—“evidence relating to whether certain calculations in the record 
need to have a control premium added to them to be reflective of RAI’s 
fair value is neither persuasive nor relevant in determining RAI’s fair 
value here.”  (R p 274 ¶ 301).14  However, the power to control RAI was a 
                                                 
14 RAI criticizes Appellants for “focus[ing] entirely” on Paragraph 354 of the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law below, rather than Paragraphs 298-301.  (PB 116 
n.21).  Of course, Appellants focused on Paragraph 354 because it is the sole 
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value inherent in the corporation that did not come into existence simply 
by virtue of BAT’s bid.  Since the statute requires the court to value the 
whole company as a going concern—and since publicly-traded stock 
trades with an inherent minority discount—a control premium had to be 
paid in order to arrive at “fair value” as required under the statute.  
Deference to unaffected stock price without a control premium was thus 
legal, not factual error.  (PB 115-18).   
“Fair value” in an appraisal action requires the court “to value what 
has been taken from the shareholder: viz. his proportionate interest in a 
going concern.”  Aruba, 210 A.3d at 132-33 (internal quotations omitted); 
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (holding 
the dissenting shareholder’s proportionate interest is determined only 
after the company as an entity has been valued).  The corporation’s value 
as a going concern means valuing the stockholder’s proportional interest 
in the corporation after valuing the corporation as a whole.  See Nw. Inv. 
Corp. v. Wallace, 741 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 2007); Paskill Corp. v. 
Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 557 (Del. 2000). 
                                                 
conclusion of law addressing the issue, rather than attacking factual findings by the 
Business Court (such as Paragraphs 298-301). 
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As discussed in Appellants’ opening brief, the “whole” value of a 
corporation includes its ability to choose its management, determine 
whether and when to issue dividends, when and whether to sell assets 
and the like.  (DB 104-05).  When one purchases a “whole” corporation, 
one also purchases the power to control it.  See, e.g., In re S. Peru Copper 
Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 819 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd 
sub nom. Ams. Min. Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012) (“An 
adjustment in the form of a control premium is generally applied to the 
equity value of the company being valued to take into account the reality 
that healthy, solvent public companies are usually sold at a premium 
to the unaffected trading price of everyday sales of the company's 
stock.”) (emphasis added); see also ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Min. Corp., 396 
B.R. 278, 338 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (holding “in an arm’s-length transaction, 
a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller a premium on top of the 
stock price to acquire a controlling interest in [the company]”); In re 
75,629 Shares of Common Stock of Trapp Family Lodge, Inc., 725 A.2d 
927, 935 (Vt. 1999) (“A controlling interest is of greater value than a 
minority interest because the controlling shareholder has control over 
operation of the corporation.”).   
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It is beyond cavil that a share of publicly-traded stock does not 
confer control on its purchaser, and accordingly trades with an inherent 
minority discount.  Anyone who has ever purchased publicly-traded stock 
for his or her own account recognizes that he or she does not purchase 
control of the corporation by buying a small percentage of the total 
outstanding stock.  The inherent minority discount, which is the flip-side 
of a control premium, is embedded within the minority share price of 
publicly-traded stock.  See, e.g., In re Valuation of Common Stock of 
Penobscot Shoe Co., No. CIV.A. CV-00-65, 2003 WL 21911141, at *17 (Me. 
Super. May 30, 2003) (holding that “the application of a control premium 
is a valid method of countering an ‘imbedded minority discount’ that is 
inherent in a market comparable”); Matthew G. Norton Co. v. Smyth, 51 
P.3d 159, 166 n.5 (Wash Ct. App. 2002) (“If a corporation's value is 
derived by reference to a per share market price, the value should be 
adjusted upward to remove the inherent minority discount embodied in 
market prices.”) (internal quotations omitted); Lawson Mardon Wheaton, 
Inc. v. Smith, 716 A.2d 550, 568 (N.J. Super. Ct. App Div. 1998) (“The 
embedded or inherent minority discount reflects the reduction in the 
overall liquid freely-traded value placed on share value because the 
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traded shares are minority shares”), rev’d on other grounds, 734 A.2d 738 
(N.J. 1999); accord M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 
523 (Del. 1999); see also Wisniewski v. Walsh, No. A-0825-10T4, 2013 WL 
1296067, at *13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 2, 2013) (“On the contrary, 
application of a control premium-in some sense the opposite side of the 
same coin as the minority discount, . . . . insofar as necessary to reflect 
market realities may be considered to ensure that minority shareholders 
duly and proportionately share in the fair value of the entire company.”). 
As a matter of law, “fair value” under the North Carolina appraisal 
statute must be determined without “discounting for…minority 
status.”  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).  That the Legislature expressly 
prohibited any discount for “minority status”  makes clear that fair value 
determinations must eliminate the inherent minority discount in the 
market price of publicly-traded corporate shares by adding a control 
premium.  The Supreme Court of Iowa analyzed an identical provision in 
its appraisal statute and found that it requires the court to eliminate the 
minority discount inherent in the price of publicly-traded stock price.  
Nw. Inv. Corp., 741 N.W.2d at 787.  The Court explained: 
A control premium is the additional consideration 
an investor would pay over the value for a minority 
- 43 - 
 
interest in order to own a controlling interest in 
the common stock of a company.  Shannon P. 
Pratt, Valuing a Business: The Analysis and 
Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 349 (4th 
ed.2000) (quoting Control Premium Study, 4th 
quarter 1999 (Los Angeles: Applied Financial 
Information, LP, 1990), p. ii). “A controlling 
interest is considered to have greater value 
than a minority interest because of the 
purchaser's ability to effect changes in the 
overall business structure and to influence 
business policies.”  Id.  
 
Id. 
  
For further support of its holding, the Supreme Court of Iowa looked to 
the official comment on MBCA subsection 13.01(c), which prohibits 
discounting for lack of marketability or minority status.  Id.  As the Court 
noted, the official comment explains that subsection (c) is “designed to 
adopt a more modern view that appraisal should generally award a 
shareholder his or her proportional interest in the corporation after 
valuing the corporation as a whole, rather than the value of the 
shareholder's shares when valued alone.”  Id. (quoting Model Bus. Corp. 
Act § 13.01 cmt. 2, at 13–10 (emphasis in original)).  The Court found this 
subsection shows that “the legislature made a policy decision when it 
adopted the current definition of ‘fair value.’  By not allowing a discount 
for lack of marketability or minority status, the legislature implicitly 
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required shares to be valued on a marketable, control interest basis.”  Id. 
at 787-88 (emphasis added).  Thus, the Court concluded that a control 
premium should be considered in determining fair value.  Id.   
Other courts have agreed with this rationale.  In In re 75,629 
Shares of Common Stock of Trapp Family Lodge, Inc., the Supreme Court 
of Vermont held that “[a] controlling interest is of greater value than a 
minority interest because the controlling shareholder has control over 
operation of the corporation.”  Id. at 935.  Thus, because the dissenting 
shareholders' expert's valuation of shares for purposes of dissenters' 
rights suit was based on publicly-traded minority interest values, the 
Court found that an application of control premium was proper.  Id.  
Similarly, in Matthew G. Norton Co., in ruling that “fair value” of the 
company’s shares did not include a minority and marketability discount 
at the shareholder level, the Washington Court of Appeals noted:   
In most states, including Washington, the 
dissenters' rights statute applies to both publicly 
held and privately held corporations. In the words 
of one commentator: “It is particularly important 
that courts determining fair value in appraisal 
proceedings be aware of the purposes now served 
by the remedy... If a corporation's value is 
derived by reference to a per share market 
price, the value should be adjusted upward to 
remove the inherent minority discount 
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embodied in market prices . . . . Where shares 
are publicly traded, the market price already 
embodies minority discounts.” (quoting Barry M. 
Wertheimer, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy 
and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 Duke 
L.J. 613 (1998)). 
 
51 P.3d at 166, n.5 (emphasis added).   In Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 63 
P.3d 80 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme Court held that the majority of 
courts that have addressed the issue of minority discounts have held 
“that discounts at the shareholder level are inherently unfair to the 
minority shareholder who did not pick the timing of the transaction and 
is not in the position of a willing seller.” (internal quotations omitted).  
The Court explained that “fair value” entitles dissenting shareholders to 
a “proportionate interest in the corporation, without any discount for 
minority status . . . .”  Id. at 90 (citation omitted); accord Utah Res. Int’l, 
Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 342 P.3d 761, 772-73 (Utah 2014).  
RAI and the Business Court failed to appreciate that whether one 
takes a control premium into account depends on the valuation method 
employed.  When the valuation method is based on the price of publicly-
traded stock, a control premium must be added—as recognized by RAI’s 
Financial Advisors and investors.  (See Doc. Ex. 1917 (Goldman Sachs 
analysis estimating median control premium of 29.4%); Doc. Ex. 7316, 
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7532 (J.P. Morgan estimating the median control premium); see also Doc. 
Ex. 5681 (Mason Capital calculating control premium of 30%)); Doft & 
Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., No. CIV.A. 19734, 2004 WL 1152338, at *10 
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) (holding Delaware law recognizes an inherent 
minority trading discount in a comparable company analysis because the 
valuation method “‘depends on comparisons to market multiples derived 
from trading information for minority blocks of the comparable 
companies’ . . . . Therefore, the court, in appraising the fair value of the 
equity, ‘must correct this minority trading discount by adding back a 
premium designed to correct it’” (quoting Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 
880, 893 (Del. Ch. 2001)); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Penobscot 
Shoe Co., No. CIV.A. CV-00-65, 2003 WL 21911141, at *1 (adopting  
Company’s expert’s use of a 30% control premium to his comparable 
company analysis, because “other courts have held that application of a 
control premium is a valid method of countering an ‘imbedded minority 
discount’ that is inherent in a [publicly-traded] market comparable”); 
accord S. Peru Copper Corp., 52 A.3d at 819.  Conversely, for valuation 
methods that do not rely on the price of publicly-traded stock, such as the 
present discounted value of future cash flows, or DCF, it is not necessary 
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to account for any inherent minority discount.  However, the “adjusted 
unaffected stock price” was the estimated public trading price of RAI at 
closing, and therefore had to be increased to account for a control 
premium. 
RAI relies on the Delaware decision in Fir Tree Value Master Fund, 
LP v. Jarden Corp., 236 A.3d 313 (Del. 2020) for the proposition that a 
court may award unaffected stock price in an appraisal proceeding.  
However, that case was distinguishable because the appellant did not 
challenge the court’s finding that there was no minority discount and the 
legal question over whether an appraisal must eliminate the inherent 
minority discount in publicly-traded shares was never raised or 
challenged on appeal.  Id. at 326 n.62.  Moreover, the court conducted a 
DCF and found that it produced a value virtually equal to, but slightly 
lower than, the unaffected stock price, and accordingly the Court could 
not conclude that the court abused its discretion under a Delaware 
statute that was amended to allow the court to consider “all factors.”15  
                                                 
15 As noted in the opening brief, the Delaware statute is different from the North 
Carolina statute because it applies to all transactions and allows the court to take 
into account “all factors”—language absent from the North Carolina statute.  
Previously, the Delaware courts had applied the rigid and dated Delaware Block 
Method to value shares in an appraisal. 
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Id. Thus, Jarden provides no guidance about whether reliance on 
unaffected market price, without use of an accepted valuation 
methodology, violates the North Carolina statutory requirement that 
“fair value” be determined without an inherent minority discount.   
Similarly, while RAI correctly notes that an academic article cited 
by the Business Court criticizes the notion of an inherent minority 
discount, recent judicial decisions recognize the continued vitality of the 
need to correct for minority discounts in appraisal litigation and reject a 
reflexive adoption of market metrics as a measure of fair value.  See 
Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *33-34 (collecting decisions).  Indeed, the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s Dell decision, cited by RAI, reiterated that 
the imposition of a minority discount is improper even when there is a 
controlling stockholder.  See 177 A.3d at 20-21. 
Ignoring the statutory prohibition on minority discounts, the 
Business Court held that BAT did not have to pay a control premium 
because “control” constituted “appreciation or depreciation in 
anticipation of the corporate action” under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).  (R p 
273 ¶ 299).  In doing so, the Court misinterpreted the statute and 
confused a control premium with a “synergy” or other value anticipated 
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as a result of a merger.  (PB 116-17).  As noted above, corporate control 
inheres in the corporation and does not exist solely as a result of a 
proposed transaction.  Accordingly, courts have expressly rejected the 
proposition that a control premium constitutes appreciation in 
anticipation of the merger, as a matter of law.  See Casey v. Brennan, 780 
A.2d 553, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001), aff’d, 801 A.2d 245 (N.J. 
2002) (holding that while the statute excludes from “fair value” any 
appreciation or depreciation resulting from the merger, “a control 
premium should be considered in order to reflect market realities, 
provided it is not used for the impermissible purpose of including the 
value of anticipated future effects of the merger”); see also Nw. Inv. Corp., 
741 N.W.2d at 793 (rejecting defendant's argument that a control 
premium is an impermissible award of synergistic value); accord Rapid-
Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 805 (Del. 1992).   
It is true that a takeover bid may include some portion of synergies 
that the buyer expects to gain from an acquisition, such as the ability to 
consolidate and eliminate overlapping manufacturing or sales forces.  
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 134.  But such synergistic values, if they exist, are in 
addition to the control premium.   Accordingly, the statutory directive is 
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meant to exclude from the court’s “fair value” determination value that 
derives from the post-closing combined companies, not from the 
company’s operations on a standalone basis.  It was not designed to 
exclude the value of corporate control, the existence of which is 
independent of the transaction at issue.  Neither the Business Court nor 
RAI provide any legal authority (besides the Business Court’s decision 
itself) in support of their theory that the control premium is a merger 
synergy and cases in Delaware that exclude synergies make clear that 
they are values that would not exist but for the unique changes intended 
by the buyer in the newly-combined company.  See id. at 133 (excising 
value that the selling company's shareholders would receive because the 
“buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a stand-alone going 
concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains 
can be extracted”); Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *28 (excising from the 
fair value award portfolio company revenue synergies, private company 
cost savings, and the tax benefits of incremental leverage).  To conflate a 
control premium with appreciation in anticipation of the merger would 
be inconsistent with long-settled principles of appraisal law. 
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To allow BAT to purchase RAI at the “adjusted unaffected market 
price” without a control premium resulted in the very harm this Court 
was concerned about when it stated in dissent in Corwin that BAT would 
be able to “get the milk without buying the cow.”  Corwin as Tr. for 
Beatrice Corwin Living Irrevocable Tr. v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 
N.C. 605, 646 (2018).   The majority held that BAT did not owe RAI a 
control premium because BAT was not a controlling shareholder.  See id. 
at 624-25.  The inescapable conclusion is that when RAI is actually sold 
to BAT, as here, it would have to pay a control premium.  The opposite 
occurred here.  Recognizing that the S&P 500 and Altria all increased 
after the deal was struck but prior to closing, Gompers “adjusted” the 
unaffected market price and found it approximated the deal price.  
However, this price did not include a control premium.  RAI’s argument 
that the majority affirmed that BAT was not a controlling shareholder 
misses the point.  Regardless of whether BAT had legal control over RAI 
or not, Appellants’ publicly traded shares still did not confer on them the 
substantial advantages of control.  
Appellants also are not seeking some kind of windfall.  Appellants 
have a statutory right to a judicial determination of the fair value of their 
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shares because they dissented to the transaction.  What they are entitled 
to under the North Carolina Appraisal Statute is their pro rata portion 
of the Company valued as a going concern, and that is not what the 
Business Court awarded.  The stockholders who accepted the merger 
consideration received at least some kind of a control premium—albeit 
based on a deal price set seven months before the closing—and at least 
got some of the post-deal increase in value when they tendered their 
shares for $65.87.   Thus, equity and the North Carolina Appraisal 
Statute require this Court to reverse the Business Court’s decision not to 
apply a control premium. 
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II. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
DEFENDANTS’ DCF TO BE UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE OF 
FAIR VALUE 
 It is neither necessary, nor productive, to rehash the evidentiary 
support for the DCF valuation proposed by Appellants’ expert.  (See DB 
106-117).  Without ever examining the DCF valuation or its inputs the 
Court simply rejected it as producing an output that was “too high.”  It 
was also “inconsistent” with the analyses performed by the Financial 
Analysts—all of whom used five-year projections followed by near-zero 
growth rates in years six through ten and accordingly produced similar 
results.  Rather than debate the conclusory nature of such analysis, it is 
simpler to begin with the items that Reynolds’s brief confirms are 
undisputed:  (1) there is no dispute that a DCF is widely accepted as the 
most reliable methodology for determining fair value; (2) there is no 
material dispute as to the applicable discount rate; and (3) there is no 
dispute that the cash flow projections relied on by Dr. Zmijewski were 
based on the October 2016 LE five-year projections, updated by 
management the month of closing, that did not include the Top-Side 
Adjustments (and were therefore slightly less optimistic than the 
projections relied upon by the Financial Advisors).  (See PB 60-61).  The 
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only point of contention, then, is Dr. Zmijewski’s reliance on the PGR 
calculated by Dr. Flyer that incorporated the high, single-digit growth of 
7-8% predicted by RAI for years six through ten.   
Despite that Dr. Flyer’s PGR calculation was consistent with the 
theory that a long-term perpetuity growth rate should be between the 
rate of long-term inflation and long-term gross domestic product 
(between 2-5%), the Business Court found it to be unreasonable and 
unreliable based, at least in part, on the fact that it was premised on 
management’s ten-year projections (R. p 268 ¶ 282).  The alternative 
PGRs utilized by the Financial Advisors, however, were pure guesswork.  
None of the Financial Advisors were industry experts or conducted any 
analysis of RAI’s expected growth rates, and none of the Financial 
Advisors had possession of the ten-year cash flow projections that formed 
the basis of Dr. Flyer’s calculation (although they undisputedly requested 
them).  Dr. Flyer, by contrast, is an industry expert—precisely the reason 
Dr. Zmijewski looked to him for guidance on the appropriate PGR.  (R p 
266 ¶ 277; see  PB 70).  It cannot be that the guess of an investment bank 
is more persuasive evidence of the viability of a company’s future than 
the company’s own predictions.   
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The Business Court concluded that the Financial Advisors were 
aware of the Company’s expected growth rates and implicitly rejected 
them by using management’s five-year projections.  This inference has 
no factual basis and is directly contradicted by the record.  When the 
Financial Advisors requested ten-year projections, they were provided 
the Strategy Day summary of expected EBIDTA growth over ten years.  
That information cannot be used to calculate cash flow, because 
additional detail is needed to convert earnings to cash flow.  When the 
Financial Advisors requested that detail, it was not provided and—in 
their own internal emails—they said they were instead directed by 
management to use long-term growth rates.  A Financial Advisor paid to 
render a fairness opinion in support of a transaction will not fight with 
management over what projections or growth rates should be assumed.  
The Business Court’s refusal even to consider a DCF based on 
management’s projections was in error, and its decision should be 
reversed.   
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III. RAI’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE BUSINESS COURT’S 
RELIANCE ON GOMPERS’ TESTIMONY FALL SHORT  
Gompers’ testimony was critical to the Business Court’s findings of 
fact and conclusions of law regarding the fair value of RAI.  Without 
Gompers’ testimony, RAI’s effort to use market prices as evidence of fair 
value falls apart.  As explained in Appellants’ opening brief, the Business 
Court’s reliance on Gompers’ testimony was erroneous for multiple 
reasons.  RAI’s response essentially parrots the Business Court’s stated 
rationale, while refusing to engage with the crux of Appellants’ 
arguments.   
As acknowledged by the Business Court, the pre-announcement 
market price of RAI stock is not a reliable indicator of fair value.  (R pp 
235-36 ¶ 208).  In relying on market metrics, the Business Court relied 
entirely on Gompers’ testimony.  Gompers’ testimony regarding the so-
called “adjusted unaffected stock price” of RAI fundamentally was 
predicated on the theory that, during the relevant time, RAI traded in a 
semi-strong efficient market, and the Business Court relied on Gompers’ 
testimony regarding market prices as providing a cross-check on the deal-
price-based valuation reached by the Business Court.  (Id. ¶¶ 196, 209-
11).  As detailed in Section I.D., supra, the necessary predicate—that RAI 
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traded in a semi-strong efficient market—was not established.  Without 
Gompers’ testimony, there was no basis to rely on market prices at all, 
and it was erroneous for the Business Court to rely on Gompers’ 
testimony. 
Moreover, Gompers served other purposes for RAI beyond his 
“adjusted unaffected stock price” analysis.  Gompers was asked to bless 
the valuation work of RAI’s investment bankers and to smuggle 
otherwise-inadmissible hearsay analyst reports into the record.  The 
Business Court overruled Appellants’ evidentiary objections on both 
points, which was erroneous for the reasons explained in Appellants’ 
opening brief.  RAI’s attempt to justify the admission of these categories 
of Gompers’ testimony falls short. 
RAI spills significant ink arguing that Gompers did not “vouch” for 
the Financial Advisors’ work and attempting to distinguish the cases 
cited by Appellants.  But in the midst of that effort, RAI proves 
Appellants’ point by summarizing Gompers’ efforts as follows:  “He did 
not simply repeat the Financial Advisors’ conclusions; he applied his 
training and expertise to form an independent opinion as to the 
soundness of their work.”  (PB 134).  That is precisely the problem—
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Gompers did not perform his own valuation and instead opined as to the 
valuation work of others.  That is textbook “vouching” and it is not the 
proper subject of expert testimony.  FrontFour Capital Grp. LLC, v. 
Taube, 2019 WL 1313408, at *26 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019) (“[A]n expert 
cannot simply vouch for the work of someone else.”).  RAI’s attempt to 
distinguish FrontFour by arguing that Gompers went further than the 
expert in that case by blessing both substance and process—as opposed 
to process alone—is absurd.  If anything, Gompers’ effort to repackage 
the entirety of the Financial Advisors’ work is worse than the expert 
testimony rejected in FrontFour. 
Similarly, RAI offers no coherent response to Appellants’ 
demonstration in the opening brief that Gompers improperly testified to 
hearsay evidence.  RAI argues that experts may rely on analyst reports 
in reaching their conclusions, because analyst reports are relied on by 
valuation experts.  That is true as far as it goes, but also irrelevant.  
Analyst reports are relied on by experts performing corporate valuations.  
Gompers did not perform a valuation.  And there is no evidence (or even 
argument) in the record suggesting that analyst reports are customarily 
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relied upon by experts evaluating the reasonableness of work performed 
by investment bankers. 
RAI claims that witness testimony, including from a 
“representative of one of the” Appellants, supports reliance on analyst 
reports in connection with valuation work.  The actual testimony at issue 
is telling.  The Business Court cited Appellants’ valuation expert, 
Zmijewski, as having acknowledged that analyst reports are relied upon 
by appraisal experts.  (R p 324 ¶ 14).  In the cited portion of the trial 
transcript, Zmijewski was asked on cross-examination whether the 
Financial Advisors’ use of analyst reports in connection with their 
valuations of RAI was reasonable.  (T pp 1380:17-1381:2; Reply App. 30-
31).  And Daniela Constantino, a representative of Mason Capital, 
testified that she uses analyst reports when making investment 
decisions.  (T pp 1790:17-1791:11; Reply App. 33-34).  None of this 
testimony offers even colorable support for Gompers’ reliance on analyst 
reports, given that he neither conducted a valuation of his own nor was 
making an investment decision.  Instead, he was evaluating the work of 
the Financial Advisors—investment banks who may (or may not) have 
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relied on analyst reports in conducting their own valuations but who in 
all events were not called as experts below. 
Gompers also improperly summarized the factual record.  
Ironically, RAI attempts to defend Gompers’ testimony in which he was 
asked whether he agreed with Debra Crew, former RAI CEO, appearing 
at pages 732:24-733:7 as proper, despite the fact that the Business Court 
sustained an objection to the very next question, when Gompers was 
asked if he agreed with a different aspect of Crew’s testimony.  (T p 733:8-
18; Reply App. 33-34).  What is inexplicable is that the Business Court 
overruled Appellants’ other objections to testimony of this sort (namely, 
Gompers being asked to agree or disagree with the testimony of various 
fact witnesses) after having properly sustained such an objection during 
trial. 
IV. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
OF THE INTEREST DUE THE DISSENTERS  
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e)(i) could not be clearer.  Under that statute, 
“[e]ach shareholder made party to the [judicial appraisal action] is 
entitled to judgment . . . . for the amount, if any, by which the court finds 
the fair value of the shareholder’s shares, plus interest, exceeds the 
amount paid by the corporation to the shareholder for the shareholder’s 
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shares.”  The statute is completely clear on its face and the plain text of 
the statute establishes a simple calculation.  The judgment in an 
appraisal action is calculated as (Fair Value + Interest) – (Prior 
Payments).  As explained in Appellants’ opening brief, the plain language 
of the statute controls, and statutory text should be interpreted in 
accordance with the rules of grammar, including the last antecedent rule 
(through which relative and qualifying words and phrases ordinarily 
apply to the word or phrase immediately preceding). HCA Crossroads 
Residential Centers, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., Div. of Facility 
Svcs., 398 S.E.2d 466, 470 (N.C. 1990) (collecting decisions).  Here, as a 
matter of plain English, the phrase “plus interest” in Section 55-13-30(e) 
modifies the full fair value award prior to taking any deduction for 
amounts previously paid.   
Unable to address head-on the language of the statute (or the 
precedents cited in Appellants’ opening brief requiring statutes to be 
implemented according to their plain language), RAI attempts to twist 
the statutory definition of “interest” to re-write the appraisal statute.  
Under the appraisal statute, interest is to be calculated at the rate of 
interest on judgments in North Carolina as of the effective date of the 
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corporate action at issue, and interest runs from the date of corporate 
action until the date of payment.  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(6).  That 
proscription as to the amount and duration of interest, however, does 
nothing to alter the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e)(i), which 
directs that appraisal judgments be calculated by taking the fair value 
determined by the Business Court, adding interest, and deducting any 
amounts previously paid to the dissenting stockholders. That is, Section 
55-13-30 explains how the judgment is calculated, while Section 55-13-
01(6) explains how to arrive at the relevant interest rate that is one 
variable in the judgment calculation.  RAI has never paid Appellants the 
award specified by Section 55-13-30; therefore, there is no “date of 
payment” and the clock has not stopped.   
RAI further argues that various courts have rejected Appellants’ 
interpretation of statutes that track the language of Section 55-13-30, but 
the authorities cited by RAI do not bear that claim out.  In Pueblo 
Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 357 (Colo. 2003), the court 
did not address the proper calculation of interest on the judgment and 
the recitation of facts suggests that the trial court failed to add any 
interest to the judgment, which cannot possibly be the correct result.  
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Compare id. (noting that judgment was entered for the nominal 
difference between amounts previously paid by the corporation and the 
fair value awarded by the trial court, without adding interest) with 
C.R.S.A. § 7-113-301(5)(g) (requiring payment of interest).  Similarly, 
First Western Bank Wall v. Olson recites the interest awarded without 
specifying how it was calculated.  621 N.W.2d 611, 615 (S.D. 2001).16    
Ultimately, RAI’s argument reduces to the contention that 
calculating the judgment due Appellants in accordance with the plain 
text of the appraisal statute would be absurd.  To the extent RAI believes 
the statutory scheme is ill-advised, that is an argument better addressed 
to the Legislature than to this Court.  Further, RAI ignores other 
provisions in the appraisal statute that track the plain-language 
interpretation of Section 55-13-30 offered by Appellants.  Notably, 
                                                 
16 In the other decisions cited by RAI, it appears interest was calculated in the manner 
RAI suggests.  None of the cases cited by either side in this action, however, analyzed 
the question of statutory interpretation presented here. Further, while RAI cites to 
Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware Co., 141 P.3d 673 (Wyo. 2006) for its description 
of how the trial court awarded interest, RAI studiously overlooks the Wyoming 
Supreme Court’s holdings that (i) an appraisal valuation cannot include a minority 
discount, (ii) the valuation is not of the stock as a commodity but of the dissenting 
stockholders’ proportionate interest in the entity, and (iii) “to find fair value, the trial 
court must determine the best price a single buyer could reasonably be expected to 
pay for the corporation as an entirety and prorate this value equally among all shares 
of its common stock. Under this method, all shares of the corporation have the same 
fair value.”  Id. at 687. 
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Section 55-13-28(a) provides that a stockholder paid pursuant to Section 
55-13-25 who is dissatisfied with that payment “must notify the 
corporation in writing of that shareholder’s estimate of the fair value of 
the shares and demand payment of that estimate plus interest (less any 
payment under G.S. 55-13-25)”.  In other words, the entire statutory 
scheme follows the construct of calculating the payment due as fair value 
plus interest before deducting any prior payments by the corporation.  
Further, RAI’s argument as to the absurdity of the statutory text is 
predicated entirely on the fair value award here being equal to the 
amount RAI previously paid.  That result itself is erroneous, for the 
myriad reasons explained in Appellants’ opening brief and again here.  If 
that result is reversed, whatever force RAI’s argument on the calculation 
of interest might otherwise have disappears entirely.   
The decision below should be reversed and this matter remanded 
for calculation of judgment in accordance with the plain text of the 
appraisal statute.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The Court should reverse the Judgement of the Business Court 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s 
decision.    
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Respectfully submitted this the 14th day of December, 2020.  
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the impact that the decisions that you took could have on the 
stock price?
A. We would have the conversations in terms of what --
if there would be a short-term impact, in terms of a 
decision, and what the longer term benefit would be.  Of 
course we would have that conversation but it was always 
about increasing shareholder value over time.  But you had to 
recognize whether it had an immediate impact one way or the 
other.  
Q. And did you observe over time the Reynolds stock
price reacting to decisions that the board had taken in a 
positive way or negatively? 
MS. SADIGHI:   Objection. 
THE COURT:   Overruled.  
A. Yes, we did.  So, for example, the stock price
would have reacted to a stock repurchase agreement, something 
of that nature.  Yes.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And did you observe the stock price of Reynolds
moving positively or negatively in response to external 
events?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Can you give an example of that?
A. Well, in the case of litigation.
So if a court in Mississippi happened to find in
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favor of a plaintiff and it was one of those cases that 
generated hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of 
potential liability, it would have made the news and you 
would have seen an impact immediately on the share price. 
Q. So let me roll back the clock to 2004.  Were there 
any significant transactions that happened that year between 
RJR and another company?
A. In that year, there was a merger between RJ 
Reynolds and Robin Williamson Tobacco.
Q. And were you involved in that transaction?
A. I was involved, yes.  I was chairman I think of the 
Governance Committee at that particular time.
Q. And just at a general level, what was the 
relationship between BAT and RAI at the conclusion of that 
transaction?  
A. Well, at the conclusion of the transaction, BAT 
became a 42 percent shareholder in the new Reynolds American.  
And we created at the time of the merger a governance 
agreement which basically outlined the details of the 
relationship between BAT and the minority shareowners in the 
company.  
Q. Are you okay still on water?  
A. Yes.
Q. Was there a discussion during this transaction as 
to who would control the company after the transaction was 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina
RAI vs. Third Motion, et al, File No. 17CVS7086     Page 60
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
- Reply App. 2 -
there was.
Q. And Speaker Boehner was one of the other directors?
A. That's right.  He was unaffiliated.  
Q. When you said that some of the directors had 
financial experience, were any, to your knowledge, familiar 
with M&A transactions?
A. I think a -- for sure they were familiar.  If only 
because of the transaction that we had just done a couple of 
years before Lorillard, which was actually a really complex 
transaction with, of course the Lorillard transaction, but 
also the disposal of the brands to Imperial.  So that was an 
education for everybody involved.  
And, yeah, there were definitely directors who had 
done M&A in their other capacities for sure.  
Q. Now, when you were looking at the RAI stock price, 
did you form a view as to whether the stock price reacted to 
the recent news about the company into the market?
A. Yes.  It was -- like I said, it was widely -- 
previously I said, it was widely covered by the analyst 
community.  It was a lot of -- it was a very large company, 
very liquid.  Certainly -- yeah.  No indication that the 
market wasn't absorbing news on a regular basis.  So widely 
covered.  Widely held stock.  
Q. So at the end of the day, did Lazard end up 
representing the Transaction Committee?
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A. Yes.
Q. And that continued up until the point that the 
transaction closed?
A. I believe so.  Yes.  
MS. SADIGHI:  Okay.  And if we can bring up DX141, 
please.  We're bringing up the native document so if we look 
at the first -- you have to look at the screen on this.  I 
apologize, Mr. Gilchrist.  This is a native document.  
And as with the other, we'll make sure that the 
Court has it as well.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:  
Q. But do you see in the upper left-hand corner, this 
indicates RAI financial update, July LE 2017?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And like the last 2016 LE that we looked at, 
this has the attendees which -- does that indicate to you 
that you were at a meeting -- if we scroll-up to -- that you 
were at a meeting on June 28th, 2017, where you would have 
reviewed and approved these July LE 2017 forecasts?
A. It indicates that I would have been invited to that 
meeting.  I can't recall if I was at that meeting or not.  
But it would indicate I was involved and would have reviewed 
this.
Q. And you would have reviewed the July LE 2017 
forecast; correct?
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A. I'm sure I did.  
Q. Okay.  And that would have been the most recent 
financial information about Reynolds as of June 28th, 2017; 
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And to your knowledge, is this the most recent 
financial information -- or financial forecast for Reynolds 
before the BAT transaction closed?
A. This was the -- I believe this was the last review 
prior to the transaction closing.
Q. Okay.  And like the other forecasts, this would 
represent the company's best estimates based on what they 
knew at the time for the inputs that went into this financial 
forecast; correct?
A. Based on the assumptions and as a standalone 
company, yes.
Q. Okay.  Thank you.  
MS. SADIGHI:  We would move DX141 into evidence.
MR. BORNSTEIN:  No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(DX141 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. Okay.  Mr. Gilchrist, you talked a little bit today 
about the share repurchase that was approved by the board in 
July of 2016; correct?
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would have been appropriate for her and her team to model in 
what were characterized as speculative events.  Do you 
remember hearing those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember Ms. Crew answering that she did 
not think it was appropriate to do that as a business matter 
so that she could in fact continue to run the business?
A. Yes.
Q. And then she was asked a question about whether it 
would be appropriate to factor in those kinds of risks in a 
situation in which the company was being sold.  Do you recall 
that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember her testimony was that it would 
be appropriate in that case because you needed to value the 
company rather than just run it on a day-to-day business?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection, Your Honor.  Leading and 
mischaracterizes the testimony.
THE COURT:  I'll sustain the -- I'll sustain the 
objection.  The last four questions have been more of a 
memory test than they have been to actually get to the point 
so why don't you get to the point.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. The point I was going to get to was to ask:  Do you 
agree with Ms. Crew's testimony on this subject?
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A. I do.  I mean, to ignore real probable events that 
could occur over some reasonable finite sort of time period 
that could dramatically change the cash flows of the business 
would violate all the principles of value.  And so you need 
to take them into consideration in some way.  
To ignore them and to use projections which do not 
embed them would be 100 percent wrong.  
Q. And do you agree with Ms. Crew that there are 
different considerations in doing projections to run the 
business on a day-to-day basis and doing projections for 
valuation purposes?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection again, Your Honor.  He's 
asking a question that asks whether he agrees with testimony 
that was given and characterizing it.  It's inappropriate.  
We would ask --
THE COURT:  I'll sustain it.  Just ask him the 
question as opposed to the agreement.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Sure.  Absolutely.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. Is it the case that projections that someone does 
in the purpose of managing the business on a day-to-day 
business can be different in this respect from projections 
that someone does for the purpose of valuing the entity as a 
going concern?
A. A hundred percent.  And maybe sort of an example.  
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Q. Okay.  And even in between the time of the first 
offer and the time of the final offer, BAT conducted 
extensive due diligence on Reynolds; isn't that right?
A. I don't know one way or the other.  
Q. Well, let me ask you to take a look at GS-24463.  
THE COURT:  Is that a trial exhibit?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  No, Your Honor.  You beat me to the 
punch.
MR. ROLNICK:  Sorry.  Your Honor, this is one of 
these native documents, but we have it in hard copy as well.
THE COURT:  And is the purpose -- what is the 
purpose for referencing the witness to this document?  
MR. ROLNICK:  He's not recalling how much or what 
the due diligence they did and so I'm showing him the due 
diligence list to see if this refreshes his recollection in 
any way.
THE COURT:  All right.  Received.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. Do you see this list?
A. I see the list, yes.  
Q. And it's a list of a hundred and ten due diligence 
items.  Do you see that?
A. I see a hundred and ten rows in this spreadsheet.
Q. Okay.  Does -- in reviewing this, does this refresh 
your recollection at all about whether or not BAT conducted 
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due diligence on Reynolds?
A. I'm certain if you're going to bid, you know, $80 
billion for a company, at some point you're going to do due 
diligence.  I don't know when they did this due diligence.  
Again, this doesn't reflect -- refresh my recollection in any 
way.  Certainly a company that's going to spend a lot of 
money will do due diligence.
Q. And that due diligence is not publicly known 
information; right?  That's why they're doing it.  
A. Well, generally speaking, anybody, a private equity 
firm or strategic acquirer who's buying a business doesn't 
post their due diligence onto a Google drive that's free 
access to the public.  
Q. So I assume that means yes?
A. I mean, due diligence for a purchase like this by 
its very nature is going to be insight to the company wanting 
to do a bid.
Q. And none of that would be reflected in the 
unaffected stock price; right?
A. That would be true of anybody potentially making a 
bid on an asset.
Q. Okay.  So I just want to be clear.  You're not 
trying to suggest to this court that BAT didn't have material 
information about Reynolds that public shareholders did not 
have?  You're not making that suggestion, are you?
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- Reply App. 9 -
A. Certainly as a board member they'd have access to 
information that the public wouldn't have access to.
Q. And as a result of their due diligence; right?
A. Well, I don't know what these due diligence items 
are, which of them come internal and are material, nonpublic 
information and which ones are information that BAT has from 
internal sources or the like.  So I don't know if any of this 
represents RAI specific material, nonpublic information.  
Q. Okay.  It also doesn't include a control premium; 
correct?
A. What -- I don't know what you're referencing by it 
doesn't control -- it doesn't contain a control premium.
Q. I'm sorry.  My mistake.  The unaffected stock 
price.  I'm talking about the unaffected stock price.  
A. By definition, the control premium is what's paid 
in the merger.  It's the value to the acquirer.  So when you 
think about an asset, the control premium is essentially what 
an acquirer is willing to pay because they can better manage 
that asset, drive additional cash flows from that asset or 
get synergies.
Q. Let me ask you to take a look at DX277.  And in the 
first instance, I'll represent to you that this is the 
fairness presentation that Goldman Sachs made to the board.  
Let me ask you if you've seen this one before.  
A. Okay.
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina
RAI vs. Third Motion, File No. 17CVS7086     Page 845
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
- Reply App. 10 -
returns for what we thought pension returns could be for the 
year since the stock market was ahead of what plan was and 
that would impact future profit and loss statements.  As the 
impact of a higher than expected return during the course of 
the year would have an impact -- have that impact on the 
business.  
That information isn't decided until December 31st 
because one day in time.  So those were all items that are 
out there that are sensitivities.  Some sensitivities are 
more likely to happen than others.  And the decision was made 
to include those overlays and to put it -- to present as 
accurate a picture as we possibly could of what we felt the 
business was capable of performing.  
Q. All right.  And I'm going to get back to the 
management overlays in more detail a little later but want to 
change gears for the moment.  If we could put up JX0140.  I 
believe this one is already in evidence.  And, Mr. Price, 
you're welcome to look in the book, but for a portion of this 
I am going to need the screen because --
MR. BRINSON:  Do you mean DX01 --
MR. SHINDEL:  DX.  I'm sorry.  DX0140.  Thank you.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. All right, Mr. Price.  DX0140 is the June 2016 LE 
from RAI; correct?
A. That is correct.
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- Reply App. 11 -
Q. And these are the ten-year projections created by 
RAI in June of 2016; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And -- 
THE COURT:  Let me ask a clarifying question.  
The -- just so there's no confusion.  DX124 was dated June 
6th and DX140 is dated June 7 and they're both June LE --
MR. SHINDEL:  June -- the DX -- I'm sorry, Your 
Honor.  DX0124 is from June 2017.  It's the following year.
THE COURT:  Oh, I'm sorry.  
MR. SHINDEL:  This one is June 2016 so that's why 
the date -- the date's between them are different.  
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.  
MR. BRINSON:  And is this the complete document?  
MR. SHINDEL:  The -- in the book, there -- I've 
excerpted the tabs I'm going to look at rather than the 66 
full pages of the full exhibit.  What's on the screen is a 
complete document.  I believe it's already in evidence.  I'm 
just trying to be efficient with the witness binder.
THE COURT:  You may proceed.  
MR. SHINDEL:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. Mr. Price, the June 2016 LE was still in Reynolds' 
system in October of 2016; right?
A. Yes.
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- Reply App. 12 -
Q. And it was still in Reynolds' system in November of 
2016; right?
A. Yes.
Q. You had access to it; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Mr. Gilchrist had access to it; right?
A. Yes.
Q. The entire finance team at Reynolds had access to 
it; right?
A. Those that had access to the system would have 
access to it, yes, but not the entire finance team.  I had 
access to it.
Q. Well, Mr. Holland had access to it; right?
A. I don't know if he did or not.  He was in charge 
of -- you know, he was in the treasury function.  I'm not 
sure what the access was that he was granted within the SAP 
system.  But he would have participated in some of our 
meetings.  He was at this meeting, so he would have received 
a hard copy of it.  
Q. All right.  Now, if we look on this first page of 
DX140, Mr. Holland was an attendee at the meeting when it was 
originally discussed; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  So this wasn't information that was 
above his pay grade somehow?
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A. No, it wasn't.  
You asked a specific question whether he had access 
to it in the system and I gave an honest response.  It 
depends on the security that was there.  We have very tight 
security around the financial system and so people have 
different abilities on what they can see within the system.  
Q. And so there are a limited number of people at 
Reynolds even within the finance team that would have access 
to the ten-year projections; right?
A. There were -- I don't know how you want to 
characterize limited.  Can you define the term limited for 
me?  You know, there's probably, you know, 50 people that 
would have access to it.  
Q. Including you and Mr. Gilchrist; right?  
A. Yes.  Well, I would have access to it.  I would 
doubt that Andrew would have access to it within the system.  
But he would be given hard copies of it.  
Q. In the live version of DX140 on the screen, if we 
could scroll over a few tabs to the one titled Yearly 
Cigarette Volume, which I think appears on the spreadsheet as 
YRCIGTVOL.  And for those looking in the book, that's what's 
excerpted here behind the first blue page.  
This tab at the top shows a chart depicting the 
projected volumes of cigarette sales for RAI; correct? 
A. That is correct.  
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- Reply App. 14 -
Q. And it's illustrated with different colors for each 
of RAI's dry brands plus a color for the remaining brands; 
right?
A. Yes.  And a color for Santa Fe.  
Q. And a color for Santa Fe.  
And these are projected for ten years; correct? 
A. That is correct.  
Q. And below the chart is the numerical detail of the 
projected cigarette sales volumes; correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I want to focus over to the right.  In the 
numerical detail you see there's a ten-year CAGR column?
A. Yes.
Q. And you understand CAGR or CAGR is a compound 
annual growth rate?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  And you look at the line for total 
shipments, the row for total shipments, you'll see that the 
ten-year compound annual growth rate for all of Reynolds is a 
1.2 percent decline; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And if we look down a little bit for the overall 
industry, see the ten-year CAGR for that was projected to be 
a 3.7 percent decline; right?
A. That is correct.  But the numbers are based off -- 
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the ten-year CAGR is based off starting year of 2015.  2015, 
not all of the Newport shipments were included in the base.  
So that's also why there's a nine-year CAGR that's presented 
there.  We didn't have a full year until 2016 of Newport 
volumes.  So it's incorrect to be looking on something that 
you only have a partial year of volumes to start it with.  
The good base would be 22nd -- 2016 when we have a full year 
of Newport volumes.  
Q. All right.  Well, you know, I want to be complete 
so if we look at the nine-year CAGR for Reynolds, that's a 
2.8 percent decline; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And for the whole industry it's a 4.0 percent 
decline; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. So when you look at ten years or nine years, 
according to these projections, Reynolds is projected to do 
better than the industry at large; correct?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And that's what management believed at the time 
that these projections were put together; right?
A. That's their best estimate, assuming that the 
industry remains where -- you know, that the environment 
remains where it is.  That there was no outside influences.  
There's a lot of downside to the tobacco industry that are 
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- Reply App. 16 -
not -- that is not included in our projection.  
Q. All right.  And if we scroll down on the screen and 
we flip over in the book.  Here we have a chart depicting 
share of shipments; correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this is a chart depicting market share; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  And below the chart, we also have 
numerical detail, same as the chart for volume that we just 
looked at; right?
A. Can you repeat that question?  Sorry.  
Q. Sorry.  It's not a -- just -- there's a chart with 
a graph depicting the market share.  
A. Correct.
Q. And below that, there's the numbers that are 
depicted in the graph.  
A. Correct.  
Q. All right.  
A. No.  I thought you said ship -- that you were 
talking about shipments but it's actually just share.
Q. Yeah.  This is market share.  If I said shipments, 
I misspoke.  
A. Right. 
Q. This is both the chart and the numbers -- 
A. Correct.
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Q. -- that we're looking at right now -- 
A. Correct.
Q. -- this is about market share.  
All right.  And for this one, you need to keep your 
eye on the screen.  If we can click on cell 78O.  The -- 
78 -- sorry -- N.  78L.  I've got a bad angle on the screen 
here.  Click on the cell for 2025 total share of shipments.  
That's what I want.  79L.  Sorry.  Doing a real bad job 
reading the -- we've got the correct one now.  
So looking at the scene, if you click on that 
cell -- and, Mr. Price, you're familiar with how Microsoft 
Excel works; right? 
A. Yes, I am.
Q. All right.  So if we look at the formula bar, 
you'll see that to calculate the market share for all of 
Reynolds in 2025, what the spreadsheet is doing is there's a 
formula; right?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. And the formula is cell L38 divided by cell L40; 
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And if we scroll up and look at those cells, L38 is 
the total shipments for Reynolds in 2025; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And L40 is total shipments for the industry in 
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- Reply App. 18 -
2025; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So the market share projections in the June 2016 
ten-year plan are based on the volume projections in the June 
2016 ten-year plan?
A. That is correct.  
Q. All right.  The market share projections are not a 
straight line extrapolation; right?
A. No.  
Q. All right.  
A. They're a straight line -- or they're an 
extrapolation of what the shipments were.  
Q. Well, they're not an extrapolation, they're 
calculated based on --
A. They're calculated, but the industry shipments 
themselves are extrapolations, I believe.  
Q. Well, the Reynolds shipments are not 
extrapolations; right?
A. I do not know.  
Q. All right.  Well --
A. Specifically.  
Q. Let's see if we can -- 
A. I mean, typically, when you forecast information 
for the tobacco industry, it's very well known that there's 
going to be a 3 to 4 percent decline, assuming you know 
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- Reply App. 19 -
external factors like FET increases, you know, FDA regulation 
that does things.  So shipments, you can project that pretty 
easily.  So the industry would be projected in total.  You'd 
look at shares and tend to protect -- project shares and so I 
would project shares of brands if I was doing it.  And 
whether those shares were -- you thought shares were going to 
increase or decrease.  Apply that to the industry number to 
arrive at the number of shipments that that brand would 
potentially have in a year and put that together.  
The forecast is not done specifically in this 
spreadsheet.  This is not the -- you know, this is the output 
of a major forecasting system that looks at shares and 
volumes.  And so it's done in another system that then gets 
loaded into the financial LE.  
Q. All right.  Well, let's look at another tab in the 
spreadsheet.  Maybe we can make it more concrete.  
A. Sure.
Q. In the live one if we can scroll over to the tab 
RJRTNAS volume.  And for our purposes, we can scroll over to 
the right.  What we have here is a volume shipment projection 
brand by brand for all of RAI's brands from 2016 to 2025; 
correct?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And at the top, we've got Newport Camel and Pall 
Mall; right?
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- Reply App. 20 -
A. That is correct.
Q. Those are the drive brands; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And below that, we've got some support brands; 
right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And Kool, Winston and Salem are still listed here, 
but at this point they've been divested as part of the 
Lorillard transaction and that's why they're all zeroed out; 
right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And below the support brands, we've got some 
nonsupport brands; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And we have on line 39, the totals for all of 
Reynolds' cigarette, combustible cigarette shipments that are 
being projected here; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. All right.  And if we scroll down a little bit 
more, keep going, and we see -- there's a volume change 
percentage.  You see that section of this spreadsheet?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And if you look at line 62 for RJRT cigarettes, 
what we've got there is the year-over-year change in 
cigarette volumes based on what's been projected and what is 
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depicted above; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. All right.  And if we look, starting in 2022, 
there's a 2.9 percent year-over-year decline, then it jumps 
to a 7.7 percent year-over-year decline, then back down to 
3.1 percent, year-over-year in 2024, down to 2.7 percent in 
2025; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  And so the volume projections in the 
ten-year plan are not simply straight line extrapolations; 
correct?
A. Volume is not a straight line extrapolation.  That 
is correct.  
Q. And if you look at 2023, the reason that there's a 
7.7 percent decline that's out of line with the other 
declines is that in this model, RAI assumed that there would 
be a federal excise tax increase in 2022; correct?
A. I do not know the answer to that question without 
looking at other information in here.  
Q. All right.  Well, we'll see if we can tie that one 
together later.  
A. Okay.  I mean, there's obviously something that 
went on at that point in time.  
THE COURT:  Your reference is to 2022, but your box 
highlighted is in 2023.  Did you misspeak or. . .
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MR. SHINDEL:  I don't think I misspoke.  I think 
the notion, Your Honor, is that the tax increase would occur 
at some point in calendar 2022 -- 
THE COURT:  The effect would be -- 
MR. SHINDEL:  -- and they're projecting the effect 
to be in 2023.  
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. So, Mr. Price, based on what we've just seen, you 
would agree with me, would you not, that if Mr. Gilchrist 
came to this court and testified that the market share and 
volume projections in the 2016 ten-year plan were simply 
straight line extrapolations, that he would have been 
mistaken?
MR. BRINSON:  Objection.  Mischaracterizes 
Mr. Gilchrist's testimony.
THE COURT:  Sustained.  
MR. SHINDEL:  I'll move on, Your Honor.  If we can 
look at DX0234.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. Mr. Price, I believe this one has already been 
moved into evidence and there's no particular significance 
for our purposes today the email.  So if you just -- if we 
can turn to page 2 of the exhibit.  This is a cover page of a 
document.  The title is RAI Strategic Overview, Board 
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that they could not go higher on the price because the deal 
was not accretive to them.  All of our financial models 
showed the deal was accretive to them that our bankers had 
prepared.  And so this wasn't necessarily negotiations about 
the price itself.  So this was sharing information so that 
both banks on both sides understood where the other one was 
coming from in their projections.  Why -- you know, what 
assumptions did Centerview and Deutsche Bank have in their 
projections that would cause them not to show accretion, yet 
all of ours show accretion.  So there was some -- despite 
having, you know, the same information they're coming to 
different -- different conclusions.  
Q. All right.  Let's take a look at DX52.
THE COURT:  If counsel and Mr. Price both could 
speak into their microphones.  I -- it seems like it's not 
quite as robust as it was before.  
MR. SHINDEL:  Apologize, Your Honor.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. Mr. Price, just let me know when you have -- 
A. I got it.
Q. -- DX52 in front of you.  
A. I have it in front of me.
Q. All right.  The top email is from Mr. Gilchrist to 
you on December 29th, 2016; correct?
A. Yes.
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Q. And he's asking you to add an electronic version of 
Morgan Stanley analyst model to the information that you will 
bring with you on Monday.  
A. Yes.
Q. And he attaches a Morgan Stanley RAI model 
spreadsheet; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  Do you know what -- where you were 
taking that information on the Monday following December 
29th, 2016?
A. I would say down to Charlotte where we were meeting 
with BAT advisors.
Q. And why were you going to Charlotte to meet with 
BAT and its advisors at that time?
A. It was a place that BAT could get to.  Those 
meetings started in December when the companies were at an 
impasse on progressing with the deal.  And they figured the 
best route forward would be to share more information, 
specifically forecasts and let BAT and its advisors dig into 
our information at a lower level of detail so that they could 
have a better understanding of our business and what the 
potential synergies could be, so. . .  
Q. And providing additional detail to BAT about RAI's 
financial projections was going to enable BAT to get a better 
understanding of the business?
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A. Yes.  At a higher stock -- at a higher price 
hopefully.  
Q. In an email from Mr. Gilchrist to you -- stay at 
the top, please.  Thank you.  He says he would like to make a 
point on this issue as the opportunity presents itself.  Do 
you know who he's referring to there?
A. He would like to share this information with BAT's 
advisors as a, you know, another source of information on 
Reynolds' projections for the future.  
Q. Do you recall what the point is that Mr. Gilchrist 
wanted to make to BAT?
A. No, I do not.  
Q. All right.  Well, let's focus on the second email.  
See if I can refresh your recollection on that point.  
When Mr. Gilchrist initially forwarded this Morgan 
Stanley analyst model to you, he wrote:  FYI, short story is 
there is no good analyst model for the line items above EPS 
in 2017 forward.  All flawed with major plugs.  We spoke to 
this on Tuesday, but I will reinforce it tomorrow as well; 
correct?  
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  And when he refers to the major plugs, 
do you understand that to refer to plug numbers in the 
analyst models?
A. You know, the analyst models typically do a pretty 
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good job of forecasting EPS going forward, but they don't 
have the line items correct.  There's a lot of things that, 
you know, despite your best efforts, they don't understand or 
they just have wrong.  Some can deal with things like the MSA 
close to where we're facing.  Some to do with, you know, 
their volume projections or independent.  They can be off on 
their volume projections and their share growth objectives 
that they think are attainable versus us without results in 
individual line items of the P&L.  They know where they want 
to get to on the bottom line because we know that PM is going 
to grow at, you know, high single digits.  Reynolds will be 
somewhere below that.  
And so when they put in their detailed models, they 
either project savings in SG&A that aren't really there, you 
know, that aren't going to come forward.  They had a hard 
time understanding the synergies around the Lorillard 
acquisition and that all those synergies were really pretty 
much captured day one.  
So in order for them to get to the bottom line that 
make sense for them, they had to make numbers either larger 
or smaller up above to make the income statement work.  
Q. So fair to say the analysts are focused on EPS and 
they're guessing at the numbers above and manipulating them 
to make the balance sheet work?
A. To make the income statement work, yeah.
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Q. To make the income statement work.  
And the analysts don't have the benefit of all the 
inside information that Reynolds itself has about what its 
projections are going to look like into the future; right? 
A. That is correct.  
Q. All right.  Now, is it fair to say that the point 
that Mr. Gilchrist wanted to make to BAT was that the 
analysts have it wrong and RAI's business in reality is a lot 
better than what the analysts are saying it is?  
MR. BRINSON:  Objection.  Calls for speculation.
THE COURT:  I'll sustain that objection.  
BY MR. SHINDEL:
Q. Well, let's take a look at the spreadsheet that was 
attached, Mr. Price.  All right.  And if we go to the tab 
RJR, what we have here is an RAI forecast for various line 
items that was done by this Morgan Stanley analyst; right?
A. I would assume so, yes.  
Q. And if we look at the net sales line and look at 
2018, what the Morgan Stanley analyst is forecasting is a 1.7 
percent growth in net sales between 2017 and 2018; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  Now, let's go back and take a look at 
what was in the projections that you sent to the bankers 
which is in DX240.  If we look at the net sales line here, in 
2017, to use round numbers, it's $13 billion; right?
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A. Yes.
Q. And in 2018, it's $13.6 billion; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Which means it's a 600 million-dollar increase; 
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And on a percentage basis year over year that's 
about 4.5 percent; right?
A. You've done the math.  I assume you're right.  I 
don't have it sitting here.  
Q. Well, let me put it this way.  If it was -- if it 
had been 12 billion to 12.6, 600 into 12, that would be 5 
percent; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So 600 into 15 is a little less than 5 percent; 
right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  So your projections with the benefit of 
all the information that you had, the management overlays 
added back in, 4.5 percent growth in net sales from 2017 to 
2018, well in excess of what Morgan Stanley thought the 
business would grow at during that same period; correct?
A. Yes.
MR. SHINDEL:  Your Honor, I would move DX52 into 
evidence.
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A. I don't think I said that.  If I did, I didn't mean 
to.
Q. Okay.  In fact sir, analysts are always deprived of 
certain confidential information about the companies they're 
following when they're public companies.  Isn't that right?
A. Absolutely.
Q. And yet, people still manage to glean some value 
from the analyst reports in connection with valuations.  
A. So if you perceived my testimony as saying analyst 
reports are useless, that wasn't what I meant.  What I said 
was it was always in the context of Professor Gomper's 
analysis that he conducted and how he used that analysis to 
evaluate transaction price and how he used that analysis to 
evaluate unaffected stock price.  
There, his analysis doesn't have foundation.  It's 
not useful for that purpose. 
Q. Okay.  Now, is it your understanding that the 
investment -- each of the investment banks also used analyst 
reports in order to inform their valuation?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any criticism of that?
A. No.  It's information they used.
Q. And it's appropriate for an investment banker to 
use that sort of information, isn't it?
A. It's appropriate for investment banker to use all 
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information that they believe is relevant and necessary to 
form their fairness opinion.
Q. Including information about comparable companies?
A. Including information -- any information they deem 
is important.  
Q. And --
A. And relevant.
Q. And prior transactions.  
A. Of course.
Q. And investment bankers would get themselves in a 
lot of trouble if they neglected to look at that type of 
information when giving a fairness opinion in an M&A 
transaction, wouldn't they?
A. I'm not sure what you mean by get into trouble 
but -- could you -- could the investment banker formulate a 
fairness opinion without looking at those data, they would 
look at those data.  The question isn't whether or not they 
would look at them.  I looked at those data.  The question is 
what weight would they put on them, if any.  So you would do 
the analysis and then you decide what weight should that 
give.  I decided that it's worth -- should get a weight of 
zero.  
Q. And did you that with respect to all of the other 
information.  You gave the analyst reports a weight of zero?
A. No.  That's not what I did.  
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A. Yes.
Q. That's -- you recall that that's the bar chart that 
Counsel showed you on your direct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And so the record is clear, this kind of 
information, unlike the information that's provided in the 
five-year projection that you were provided, doesn't give you 
sufficient underlying detail to perform a DCF; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And if anybody came to this courtroom and 
suggested that a reputable financial advisor could create a 
DCF from ten years of adjusted operating income presented in 
this graph, that would be incorrect; right?
A. I don't believe creating an accurate discounted 
cash flow analysis from this chart alone is reasonable.
Q. So if anybody said otherwise, they would be wrong; 
right?
A. In my opinion, yes.  
Q. So going back to DX43, you get -- JPMorgan gets the 
five-year projections from Mr. Price on October 29th, 2016, 
at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And is it fair to say that shortly after Mr. Grant 
got these projections, he shared them with you?
A. That's my assumption and would be likely.  I don't 
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portfolio management and trading.  It was just the two 
founders.  We were a start-up.  It was a little bit of a 
gamble, but they said, you know, if it's successful, then 
this will go well for you.  And if it's not, you're 21, you 
can figure something out.  
So that's how I started.  And after we hired our 
fourth employee and I saw what the research role entailed, I 
thought that was pretty interesting, so I pursued my CFA 
charter.  And by 2004, I was a member of the research team, 
and by 2013, I was a senior member and was made a partner.  
Q. And what is a CFA charter?
A. It's -- the CFA stands for chartered financial 
analyst.  And for the industry, it's almost like an MBA, but 
it's very focused on -- as a financial analyst.  So I went 
that route because it was more cost effective than getting an 
MBA.
Q. And what are your current responsibilities at Mason 
Capital Management in your current role?
A. So like I said, I'm a senior member of our research 
team and because we're event-driven, and we're still a very 
small group -- there's only six people in our research group 
-- we're all generalists.
But as a consequence of having been with the firm 
for as long as I have, I have, over time, gravitated towards 
certain verticals, tobacco being one.  And my mandate 
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primarily is to scour the news wires and look for those kinds 
of trigger words that indicate to us, you know, there's an 
event here that might be worth taking a position in.  
And so then I will kind of dig in and, depending on 
my past familiarity with the companies involved, I'll do more 
or less preliminary work.  And that can involve talking to 
industry experts, sell-side analysts who generally take the 
view that, you know, they've spent a lot of time on the 
specific company so they can help get me up to speed.  Trying 
to, you know, build some kind of financial model and develop 
a thesis as to whether or not it's worth us investing.  
Q. And were you involved in the investment in RAI 
securities that is at issue with this litigation?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was your involvement?
A. So I was directly involved in the decision to buy 
Reynolds.  That stemmed from the fact that one of the first 
tobacco investments that I was directly involved in was 
actually the Lorillard company which had originally been spun 
out of a holding company, the Carolina Group.  And spinout is 
one of those keywords that we look for.  
So I had done work on Lorillard.  You know, it was 
at that point over a decade old.  So I was very well 
acquainted with their company and their Newport brand and the 
value that that company represented.  We had also been 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LAMB, Vice Chancellor.
I.
*1  This is an appraisal action, pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262,
filed as a result of a merger that cashed-out the petitioners'
shares at a price of $28 per share. Both parties presented
expert testimony to determine the fair value of the shares as of
the merger date. For the reasons herein, the court concludes
that the fair value of the shares as of the merger date is $32.76.
II.
A. Background
1. The Parties
Travelocity.com Inc. (“Travelocity”), a Delaware
corporation, is the surviving entity of a merger between it
and Travelocity Holdings Sub Inc. (“Holdings”), a wholly
owned subsidiary of Sabre Holdings Corporation (“Sabre”).1
Because Sabre, through Holdings, owned more than 90% of
the outstanding shares of common stock of Travelocity, the
merger was authorized by Sabre's board of directors pursuant
to 8 Del. C. § 253 and became effective on April 11, 2002
(the “Merger Date”). As a result of the merger, Travelocity is
(again) a wholly owned subsidiary of Sabre.2
The petitioners owned 265,540 shares of Travelocity before
the merger3 and were entitled to demand an appraisal of
those shares pursuant to Section 253(d) of the DGCL.4 The
parties stipulate that the petitioners have complied with the
provisions of 8 Del. C . § 262, in timely filing their petition
for appraisal and in perfecting their right to appraisal.
2. The Online Travel Industry
Travelocity is in the business of providing online travel
services. When Travelocity went public in 2000, the online
travel industry was in nascent form and the future of the online
travel industry was uncertain. By early 2001, the online travel
industry was beginning to show profitability. By that time,
Travelocity was the leading online travel agency.
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The events of September 11, 2001, however, created great
uncertainty in the online travel business. Even though the
industry slowed in the period after September 11, analysts
predicted that the negative effect would be temporary.5
Travelocity, however, also faced strong competition in the
market at this time. Expedia, Travelocity's main competitor,
surpassed Travelocity as the industry leader in early 2002 and
Orbitz, a then brand new travel services provider, had become
the third largest online travel agent in less than a year.
Expedia quickly became more successful than Travelocity
because of its early implementation of the “merchant model.”
The merchant model is a business plan in which travel
agencies purchase the airline tickets, hotel rooms or car
rentals at a negotiated rate from the suppliers and then
resell them directly to consumers at a higher price. In the
traditional agency model then used by Travelocity, the travel
agent merely serves as a liaison between the supplier and
the customer and receives a commission for the sale. The
merchant model generates higher profit margins and much
higher cash flows than the traditional agency model because
the travel agent controls the price and works directly with both
the supplier and the consumer.
*2  In the fourth quarter of 2001, 42% of Expedia's revenues
came from merchant model business while only 3.5% of
Travelocity's revenue was from merchant model business,
specifically merchant airline ticket sales.6
Moreover, Travelocity was limited in its ability to develop
the merchant model business because it was committed
to working in partnerships with other entities to help
build its merchant business. This partnership approach
negatively affected Travelocity's ability to reap the full
benefits of the merchant model business. For example,
Travelocity had an exclusive contract running until 2005
with Hotel Reservations Network (“HRN”). HRN controlled
Travelocity's relationships with hotels, the booking of hotel
rooms and the price markup. Travelocity received only a
commission on sales. Therefore, HRN and not Travelocity
enjoyed the benefits of the merchant model plan.
Travelocity was also partnered with Contour, a small, start-
up software company, to provide vacation package deals to its
customers. Pursuant to its contract with Travelocity, Contour
had control over the technology developed in setting up the
vacation packaging business and Travelocity paid Contour a
fee for changes in the software. Therefore, Travelocity was
also sharing its profits with Contour.7 In addition, Travelocity
was partnered with other entities to facilitate entry into
the international market, and was dependent on third-party
relationships with Internet portals, like AOL and Yahoo!, to
direct consumers to its website.8
Additionally, airlines began reducing the traditional
commissions paid to travel agencies for airline tickets in the
mid–1990s. The airlines specifically targeted online travel
agents in mid–2000 and began actively cutting commissions
for online travel agents.9 In June 2001, in a further effort
to reduce the commissions paid to online travel agencies,
five major airlines created Orbitz to sell discounted airfares
directly to online consumers. Orbitz had exclusive access to
the discounted web fares offered by its owners and online
travel agents were forced to renegotiate their relationships
with major airlines in order to have access to web fares.
Travelocity was hit harder than Expedia by Orbitz's formation
and the resulting competition because it was still heavily
dependent on airline ticket commissions while Expedia
enjoyed substantial revenue from merchant model sales
independent of those commissions.10
Even though Travelocity was facing tough competition from
Expedia in the fourth quarter of 2001, analysts expressed
the belief that the gap in performance was temporary and
that Travelocity would continue to be competitive.11 In
fact, Travelocity's performance in early 2002 was ahead of
the management forecast.12 Commenting on Travelocity's
forecast for 2002, one analyst noted: “Although the addition
of vacation packages comes two quarters after a similar move
by Expedia, we believe that the leisure market remains large
enough to support at least two dominant players, and we
expect Travelocity to narrow the gap between Expedia over
2002.”13
*3  In March 2002, Travelocity purchased Site59, a small
online company with a limited working merchant model
business. Site59 is in the business of providing last minute
travel bookings at a substantial discount for customers who
are flexible in their travel schedules. Travelocity's goal in
acquiring Site59 was to build a merchant model hotel business
and continue Site59's last-minute packaging business.14
Travelocity purchased Site59 with a loan from Sabre.
3. The Merger
In early 2001, Sabre began to consider buying back
the public shares of Travelocity. Sabre launched “Project
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Tango” to examine the online travel business and to make
recommendations on Travelocity's business approach. By
September 2001, Project Tango was finished and resulted
in the conclusion that “it was vital for Sabre to ‘own the
customer,’ to build strong relationships with suppliers and to
grow its online presence.”15
On February 16, 2002, William J. Hannigan, Sabre's
Chairman and CEO, contacted Terrell B. Jones, Travelocity's
President and CEO, and F. William Conner, a Travelocity
director, and advised them that a Sabre board meeting was
scheduled for February 18, 2002 to discuss a $23 per share
cash tender offer to acquire all shares of Travelocity not
already owned by Sabre. Hannigan also informed them that
it was Sabre's intention, pending Sabre's board approval,
to confirm the proposal in writing on February 18, and
then publicly disclose the offer. On February 18, with
the Sabre board's approval, Hannigan advised Travelocity's
board members of its intention to start the $23 per share
cash tender offer. That same evening, the Travelocity board
met and established a special committee comprised of
its two independent directors, Conner and Kathy Misunas
(the “Special Committee”). The Special Committee retained
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (“Salomon”) as its financial
advisor and Locke, Liddell & Sapp LLP as its legal counsel.
On February 19, 2002, Sabre announced that it intended
to make a tender offer for all of the outstanding publicly
held Travelocity shares. The Special Committee then sent
Sabre a letter inquiring if it would be interested in exploring
alternatives to the going private proposal, such as the sale
of some of Sabre's interest in Travelocity to a third party.
Sabre responded the following day that it was not interested
in selling any of its equity interest in Travelocity. On March 4,
2002, the Travelocity board met and the Special Committee
delivered its initial report regarding Sabre's offer of $23 per
share. At the meeting, Salomon representatives advised the
board, orally and in writing, that the $23 per share offer was
inadequate. The Special Committee then presented its report,
concurring that Sabre's initial offer was inadequate.
Nonetheless, on March 5, 2002, Sabre began a $23 per
share cash tender offer for all of Travelocity's publicly held
common shares. On March 18, 2002, Sabre amended the offer
by increasing the offering price to $28 cash per share. On
March 18, 2002, the Special Committee and the Travelocity
board voted to recommend that the Travelocity stockholders
accept Sabre's amended offer and tender their shares.16 Sabre
succeeded in acquiring approximately 95% of the outstanding
shares of common stock by the close of the offer. Then, Sabre
acted to effect the short-form merger under 8 Del. C. § 253.
The merger became effective on April 11, 2002. Pursuant
to the merger, the publicly held shares of Travelocity were
converted into the right to receive $28 per share.
*4  In accordance with 8 Del. C. § 262, the petitioners now
seek a determination of, and payment for, the fair value of the
Travelocity shares they held on the Merger Date.
B. The Experts
The petitioners' trial expert was William H. Purcell. Purcell
has a B.A. in Economics from Princeton University and
an M.B.A. from New York University. He has been an
investment banker for more than 35 years, 24 years of which
are with Dillon, Read & Co. Inc. Over the span of his
career, Purcell has worked on approximately 100 merger
and acquisition related projects. He has performed numerous
financial valuations of private and public companies in
various industries. He also served as advisor to special
committees of boards of directors in connection with
corporate transactions. Purcell has testified many times as an
expert regarding a wide range of investment banking matters,
including a number of valuation issues. He has also testified
as an expert before various regulatory agencies, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Purcell testified that the going concern value of Travelocity
was at least $35 per share as of March 16, 2002.17 Purcell
testified that he relied primarily on the most recent set of
management projections in his valuation analysis. Purcell
also looked to analyses performed by third parties to test the
validity of his conclusions.18
Travelocity's trial expert was Professor Paul A. Gompers
of the Harvard Business School. Gompers has an A.B. in
Biology from Harvard College, a M.Sc. in Economics from
Oxford, and a Ph.D in Business Economics from Harvard
University. He was an assistant professor of Finance and
Business Policy at the Graduate School of Business at the
University of Chicago for two years before joining the
Harvard Business School faculty. He is also the Director of
Research at the Harvard Business School and his research
focuses on financial issues, valuation financing, and the
markets related to young, growing technology companies.
Although Gompers had never before testified as a trial expert,
he had been retained 15 times as an expert in the area of
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finance and valuation of emerging technology companies in
other legal matters.
Gompers reviewed various documents and materials on the
online travel industry in general, as well as internal documents
of Sabre and Travelocity. He also conducted interviews with
some Sabre and Travelocity personnel.19 Gompers reached
the conclusion that the going concern value of Travelocity as
of the Merger Date was $20 per share.20
C. The Valuation Methods Used
Both experts used essentially the same methods to value
Travelocity's stock; i.e. a discounted cash flow analysis
(“DCF”) and a comparable company analysis. In performing
their comparable company analyses, both Purcell and
Gompers used Expedia as the single comparable company.
Despite the similar approaches taken, the results arrived at by
Gompers and Purcell vary widely. Gompers opines that, on
a DCF basis, Travelocity common stock was worth between
$11.38 and $21.29 per share. Using the same methodology,
but using different inputs, Purcell opines that a share of
Travelocity common stock was worth between $33.70 and
$59.95 as of the Merger Date. The two experts' comparable
company analyses also yield significantly divergent results
because they disagree about the appropriate discount to apply
to reflect Travelocity's competitive disadvantages.
III.
*5  Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262, the petitioners are entitled to
their pro rata share of the fair value of Travelocity's common
stock as of the Merger Date.21 Fair value, as used in an
appraisal setting, is defined as “the value of the Company
to the stockholder as a going concern, rather than its value
to a third party as an acquisition.”22 Moreover, section
262(h) requires this court to determine fair value “exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger.”23 “In a statutory appraisal
proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their
respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the
evidence.”24 The court may exercise independent judgment
to assess the fair value of the shares if neither party meets its
burden.25
IV.
In determining the fair value of Travelocity's shares, the court
may consider “proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial
community and otherwise admissible in court.”26 Both parties
used a DCF approach and a comparable company approach
to value the shares. DCF involves projecting operating cash
flows for a determined period, setting a terminal value at the
end of the projected period, and then discounting those values
at a set rate to determine the net present value of a company's
shares.27 It is an exercise in appraising the present value at
a set date of the expected future cash flows earned by the
company. A DCF analysis is a useful tool for valuing shares
and is frequently relied on by this court in appraisal actions.28
The utility of a DCF analysis, however, depends on the
validity and reasonableness of the data relied upon. As this
court has recognized, “methods of valuation, including a
discounted cash flow analysis, are only as good as the inputs
to the model.”29 The problem in this case is that the most
fundamental input used by the experts—the projections of
future revenues, expenses and cash flows—were not shown
to be reasonably reliable.30
Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based on
contemporaneously prepared management projections
because management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.31 Here, management
prepared the 5–year projections for the period 2002–2005 and
gave them to Sabre for use in its routine planning processes.
Often, projections of this sort are shown to be reasonably
reliable and are useful in later performing a DCF analysis. In
this case, however, the court is persuaded from a review of all
the evidence that the Travelocity 5–year plan does not provide
a reliable basis for forecasting future cash flows.
To begin with, Travelocity's management held the strong view
that these projections should not be relied upon because the
industry was so new and volatile that reliable projections
were impossible.32 At trial, Punwani, Travelocity's CFO,
characterized the 5–year projections as “simulations” and
“thought studies” and said that they were never reviewed by
any of the operating departments at Travelocity.33 Punwani
further testified that because of the limited financial history
of Travelocity, together with a rapidly evolving marketplace,
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it was difficult “to forecast the next quarter, let alone five
years out.”34 He also confirmed that the events of September
11 led to more doubt about the future of the industry and
Travelocity's positioning in the market.35
*6  Although it was aware of the 5–year forecasts, Salomon
did not conduct a DCF analysis of Travelocity as part of
its work in connection with the merger.36 The testimony of
Anwar Zakkour, Salomon's managing director, is especially
relevant on this issue:
Q. Did Salomon Smith Barney prepare a discounted
cash flow analysis of Travelocity in connection with this
transaction?
A. Absolutely not.
* * *
Q. Why was no discounted cash flow analysis prepared
in connection with this transaction?
A. Because this was an industry that was in flux. And
the management team itself, which should have been
the team that was most able to put together a set
of projections, would have told you it was virtually
impossible to predict the performance of this company
into any sort of reasonable future term. And they in fact
had very little confidence with even their 2002 forecast
numbers because of that.
September 11th didn't help the pace of migration from
off-line to online. It didn't help. The airlines being very
focused on cutting their distribution costs didn't help.
These were all things that were happening real time.
Travelocity going from being the number one player
to being very unfavorably compared to Expedia and
certainly losing its number one position to them in a very
short time didn't help. These are all things that support
that. And other than maybe God himself, I suspect
nobody could really predict what this business is going
to do in the next five years.
Q. Is a discounted cash flow methodology a
methodology that is commonly used by Salomon Smith
Barney in valuing companies?
A. Valuing mature companies, yes.37
Purcell's DCF relies more or less uncritically on the
Travelocity 5–year plan.38 Purcell justifies his reliance on
these projections because they were provided to Sabre for
its 5–year planning and later used by Goldman Sachs in
its presentations to Sabre. Punwani, however, explained at
trial that these numbers were given to Sabre as a routine
requirement for Sabre's internal planning process and with
express caveats as to their reliability, and that he personally
told both Sabre's CFO and controller that the numbers were
only simulations.39 Moreover, Punwani was presented on
cross-examination with several Sabre documents showing
projections for Travelocity, and testified credibly that he
had never seen the documents before nor was he familiar
with how Sabre used Travelocity's projections in its business
planning.40 Despite the normal preference for management
projections, the court concludes that the petitioners failed to
prove that Purcell's reliance on these projections was justified.
Thus, the court must disregard Purcell's DCF analysis.
Gompers takes a different approach, after concluding that
the 5–year projections were “merely meant as a rough plan
and were considered to be optimistic targets” and not a
reliable basis for a DCF analysis.41 Instead of eschewing
a DCF analysis, however, Gompers sets about to create a
new set of projections, covering periods of 10 and 15 years
into the future, based on his expert analysis of Travelocity
and post-merger discussions with certain members of its
management. As a preliminary matter, this court is inherently
suspicious of post-merger, litigation-driven forecasts because
“[t]he possibility of hindsight bias and other cognitive
distortions seems untenably high.”42 As important, in this
case, Gompers's exercise is strikingly at odds with the views
of Travelocity management and Salomon that no one could
reliably predict Travelocity's future cash flows.
*7  The reliability of Gompers's projections is further
undermined by the fact that he selectively picks and
chooses variables from management's 5–year forecast that
conveniently fit into his exercise in creating less “optimistic”
projections. Although Gompers's valuation is facially more
credible than Purcell's, in that he provides both the numerical
calculations and the academic theories for his assumptions,
his selective reliance on aspects of management's projections
is suspect.43 Gompers starts reasonably by using Travelocity's
2002 revenue projection, adjusted for Travelocity's actual
performance in the first three months of 2002. He then
generates 10–year and 15–year revenue projections by
assuming that the revenue growth rate will (i) decrease in
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a linear fashion to 17.2%, the 2005 revenue growth rate
found in the 5–year forecast, and then (ii) will continue to
slow in a linear fashion until it reaches the “steady state
of growth” in 2011 or 2016.44 Gompers does not explain
why only the 2005 growth rate from the Travelocity 5–year
plan is reliable and ignores that the Travelocity 5–year plan
predicted much higher intervening growth rates.45 Gompers
then uses the operating margins found in the Travelocity 5–
year plan through 2005 and uses the 2005 operating margin
in perpetuity to derive his projections for operating income.46
The respondents argue that this selective use of management
projections is acceptable because “they are reasonable or
somewhat optimistic” and that since the petitioner's valuation
wholly relies on the Travelocity 5–year plan that it is
somehow estopped from arguing that Gompers selective use
is unacceptable. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
The only reasonable conclusion the court can draw from the
record evidence is that no one, including Professor Gompers,
is able to produce a reliable set of long-range projections
for Travelocity, as of the Merger Date. This conclusion is
substantially reinforced by the observation that Gompers's
DCF produced values ranging from $11.38 to $21.29 relative
to a squeeze-out merger in which Travelocity's 70% parent
agreed to pay $28 per share to acquire the minority interest.
For these reasons, the court reluctantly concludes that it
cannot properly rely on either party's DCF valuation. The
goal of the DCF method of valuation is to value future
cash flows. Here, the record clearly shows that, in the
absence of reasonably reliable contemporaneous projections,
the degree of speculation and uncertainty characterizing the
future prospects of Travelocity and the industry in which
it operates make a DCF analysis of marginal utility as a
valuation technique in this case. If no other method of analysis
were available, the court would, reluctantly, undertake a DCF
analysis and subject the outcome to an appropriately high
level of skepticism. The court, however, now turns to the other
method of valuation offered by the parties.
D. The Comparable Company Approach47
*8  The comparable company approach entails the review
of publicly traded competitors in the same industry, then the
generation of relevant multiples from public pricing data of
the comparable companies and finally the application of those
multiples to the subject company to arrive at a value.48 The
true utility of a comparable company approach is dependent
on “the similarity between the company the court is valuing
and the companies used for comparison.”49 Both experts and
Salomon use Expedia as the single comparable company in
their analyses, but disagree on the appropriate discount to
be applied to the multiples derived from their analyses of
Expedia. The court agrees that Expedia is clearly comparable
to Travelocity.
Gompers does not challenge Salomon's valuation, but he
dismisses Purcell's valuation because “it is applied in an
ad hoc manner with little understanding of the proper
measure of comparison and the factors that affect comparable
multiples.”50 Gompers states that the discount to Expedia
should be at least 40%51 and concludes that Travelocity's
valuation as of the merger date is $22.08.
Purcell critiques Gompers's valuation in that it is significantly
lower than any valuation done of Travelocity and, more
importantly, inexplicably less than the $28 paid by Sabre in
the merger.52 Purcell also criticizes Gompers's comparable
company analysis in that it is “wildly divergent” from his
DCF calculation when Gompers states that his comparable
company valuation serves as a check on his DCF.53 Purcell
states that a 10% discount to Expedia is appropriate and
concludes that the value should be no less than $35 a share.
Salomon applies a 20%–30% discount range to Expedia and
concludes that the appropriate value is between $24 and $32
a share.54 The independent valuation performed by Salomon
provides the court with a neutral framework from which to
analyze Purcell and Gompers's divergent values.55
1. The Appropriate Discount
The experts disagree on the appropriate discount that should
be applied to Expedia as a comparable company. Purcell
adopts Salomon's initial discount to Expedia of 10% and
Gompers uses a minimum 40% discount. Salomon derives
its discount range of 20% to 30% comparing the historical
discounts of Travelocity's multiples of firm value to EBITDA
and share price to estimated 2002 earnings per share relative
to corresponding multiples for Expedia. The court finds
Gompers's detailed analysis of Travelocity's risk and expected
future growth rates reasonable. Furthermore, when asked why
Salomon adjusted its initial discount rate, Zakkour testified
at length about discussions with Travelocity's management
as to the difficulties it faced in catching up to Expedia
and successfully implementing a merchant model business.56
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Gompers, like Zakkour, discusses the difference in the
business models of the companies and the significance of this
difference in the comparable company valuation.57
*9  Purcell relies on the early 2002 positive analyst research
reports as proof that Travelocity should only be at a
“moderate,” if any, discount to Expedia.58 Purcell gives
great weight to James Hornthal's testimony about Travelocity
and its potential.59 Hornthal characterized the Expedia–
Travelocity competition as a “cat-and-mouse game” where
the two companies were “jockeying back and forth” in the
market.60 Hornthal relies on the Site59 acquisition as a
beacon of light for Travelocity in its ability to catch up
to Expedia after Expedia had pulled ahead in the fourth
quarter of 2001. Peluso's testimony on Site59's ability
to “transform” Travelocity's business model is persuasive:
the acquisition of Site59 while being a step in the right
direction did not equal a fully operational merchant model
business.61 Hornthal's optimistic view of Travelocity's ease
in catching up to Expedia, on which Purcell relies, is too
speculative when compared to the clear evidence in the
record that Travelocity still faced significant challenges in
the development of its merchant model business. Purcell
also places great importance on the fact that Travelocity was
going to meet or exceed its 2002 expectations, but Punwani
testified that it was only going to meet its projections through
strategic cost-cutting that could not be sustained long-term .62
Moreover, Salomon adjusted its initial 10% discount (on
which Purcell relies) to a 20% to 30% range after discussing
Travelocity's strengths and weaknesses with management.63
Therefore, the record shows that Purcell's assumptions vis-à-
vis the appropriate discount to be applied in comparing the
companies are unduly optimistic.
Gompers concludes that the discount to Expedia should be at
least 40% because Travelocity had a higher cost of capital,
a lower growth rate, and a lesser ability to generate cash.64
He states that at the time of the merger, “Travelocity had
lost momentum and was facing new competition that made
its prospects potentially tenuous.”65 The record is clear that
even though Travelocity was actively working to remedy
its outdated model, it still faced significant challenges at
the time of the merger. The court notes that there was no
evidence presented at trial or in the record to quantify the
actual cost of building a merchant model or any necessary
technological upgrades.66 With all of these factors in mind,
the court concludes that it should apply a 35% discount to the
valuation multiples derived from the analysis of Expedia, to
reflect that competitive obstacles Travelocity confronted as of
the Merger Date. This decision reflects the court's view that
Gompers is substantially correct, albeit unduly pessimistic, in
his critical comparison of Travelocity to Expedia. Instead of
relying on Gompers's assessment that a discount of at least
40% is warranted, the court adopts, instead, the mid-point
of Gompers's 40% and the high end of Salomon's 20%–30%
range.
2. Valuation Multiples
*10  Gompers and Purcell agree that firm value to
EBITDA67 is the most important valuation metric. Purcell
isolates firm value/ EBITDA as “by far the most relevant and
important statistic for comparison purposes.”68 Purcell argues
that this is the most important statistic because Travelocity
has a great deal of noncash expenses, including depreciation,
amortization, and the amortization of intangibles such as
goodwill.69 Gompers agrees with Purcell that the EBITDA
multiples are the “preferred multiple to examine” because
they “are closest to cash flow and are a better proxy for the
firm's on-going concern value.”70
Zakkour testified in his deposition that even though a range
of valuation metrics were used in Salomon's report,71 the
most important valuation metric for comparing the companies
was the price to earnings multiple because Travelocity was
less profitable than Expedia.72 Zakkour further testified that
Travelocity had a lot of work to do to catch up to Expedia, not
only because Expedia was growing faster than Travelocity,
but also because Travelocity had to basically transform its
business model to remain competitive.
Based on the expert reports and Zakkour's testimony, the
court isolates the 2002 EBITDA multiple and the price-
to-earnings multiple as the most important multiples in
calculating Travelocity's firm value. Since Purcell does
not present any calculations to back up his comparable
company valuation, the court looks to Gompers's analysis in
deriving the correct multiples. Gompers provides detailed and
reasonable calculations for both Travelocity and Expedia's
financial multiples, and the court agrees that these multiples
are appropriate in comparing the companies.73
Discounting Expedia's EBITDA multiple (34.8 x) by 35%
produces an EBITDA multiple of 22.62 x. Applying this
multiple to Travelocity's expected 2002 EBITDA of $47.80
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million yields a value of $1,081,236,000. Discounting
Expedia's EPS multiple (50.77 x) by 35% produces an EPS
multiple of 33.00 x. Applying this multiple to Travelocity's
expected 2002 net earnings of $39.45 million yields a value of
$1,301,850,000. The court gives 2/3 weight to the EBITDA
calculation and 1/3 weight to the PE calculation, yielding an
enterprise value of $1,154,774,000. To determine the equity
value, Gompers adds back the cash of $114 million and
subtracts out the debt of $4.03 million. This leads to an equity
valuation of $1,264,744,000, or $25.20 per share.74
E. Application Of A Control Premium
Delaware law recognizes that there is an inherent minority
trading discount in a comparable company analysis because
“the [valuation] method depends on comparisons to market
multiples derived from trading information for minority
blocks of the comparable companies.”75 The equity valuation
produced in a comparable company analysis does not
accurately reflect the intrinsic worth of a corporation on a
going concern basis. Therefore, the court, in appraising the
fair value of the equity, “must correct this minority trading
discount by adding back a premium designed to correct it.”76
*11  The parties are silent on the proper application of a
control premium. Purcell states summarily that if the court
is to accept the theory that “some minority discount from
going concern value” is appropriate in a comparable company
analysis, then the correct valuation would be above his stated
value.77 Salomon conducted a review of precedent minority
squeeze-out transactions and found that the average premium
paid for a control block when compared to the stock price was
approximately 50%.78 Travelocity, however, is not directly
comparable to the companies in Salomon's data survey. In
fact, the online travel industry, as already discussed in great
detail, is unique when compared generally to publicly traded
companies. Moreover, the recent appraisal cases that correct
the valuation for a minority discount by adding back a
premium “that spreads the value of control over all shares
equally” consistently use a 30% adjustment.79
Relying on recent precedents, the court will adjust the $25.20
per share value by adding a 30% control premium.80 This
results in a per share value of $32.76.81
F. Interest
The petitioners are entitled to interest on the fair value of their
shares pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262(h).82 Moreover, section
262(i) states that “[t]he Court shall direct the payment of
fair value of the shares, together with interest, if any, by the
surviving or resulting corporation to the stockholders entitled
thereto. Interest may be simple or compound as the Court may
direct.”83 This court has consistently awarded compound
interest in appraisal proceedings.84
There is no precise formula the court must use in determining
the appropriate rate of interest, and “[e]ach party bears
the burden of proving the appropriate rate under the
circumstances.”85 The petitioners argue that the appropriate
rate of interest to be applied is 9.53%. Purcell reached this
conclusion by averaging the petitioners' lost opportunity costs
at a prudent investor rate (10.95%), and the respondents'
borrowing costs (8.1%).86
Although it is reasonable to base the appropriate rate of
interest on the average of prudent investor rate and a
company's cost of borrowing, the court does not accept
Purcell's calculation of pre-judgment interest. First, Purcell
states that “a prudent investor would likely invest in
a combination of long-or medium-term and short-term
investment vehicles that would generate the highest return
available, such as a mix of treasury and corporate bonds.”87
He then assumes based on his “experience regarding portfolio
mix allocations” that a prudent investor would invest 50%
in three-year treasury bonds and 50% in Baa-rated corporate
bonds.88 He offers no explanation, however, why a “prudent”
investor, such as any of the plaintiffs, would not invest a
portion of available funds in the equity market. Since Purcell
does not provide the court with the necessary details to
support his opinion, the court rejects his calculation of the
prudent investor rate.
*12  Moreover, Purcell inexplicably relies on a 2002 KPMG
Consulting valuation of Travelocity's tangible and intangible
assets to determine Sabre's cost of borrowing.89 Purcell relies
on the cost of debt used in the KPMG report without offering
any evidence as to why the court should adopt this calculation
nor does he address Sabre's actual cost of borrowing.
Since the petitioners have failed to develop a credible record
on the issue, the court looks to the legal rate of interest.90 The
legal rate of interest, as defined by 6 Del. C. § 2301, is 5%
over the Federal Reserve discount rate. Because the court will
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award the legal rate of interest, the appropriate compounding
rate is quarterly.91
The petitioners shall submit a form of final order, on notice,
within 10 days.
All Citations
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 1152338
Footnotes
1 Both Holdings and Sabre are Delaware corporations.
2 Travelocity's common stock began to trade on the public market in the first quarter of 2000 when Sabre, which owned
100% of Travelocity's business as a division, purchased Preview Travel, a publicly traded company. The combined entity
was named Travelocity. Resp'ts Pre–Trial Br. at 5.
3 As of April 11, 2002, petitioner Cede & Co. was the record holder of the 265,540 shares of Travelocity common stock,
for the benefit of: Doft & Co. Inc. (61,500 shares); First Trust Corp., as trustee FBO Alan Doft (3,800 shares); Elisabeth
H. Doft (43,000 shares); Laurence Hoffman (300 shares); Maria Ivkovic (1,000 shares); Shirel Partners (8,000 shares);
Blanche & Romie Shapiro Charitable Remainder Unitrust dated 9/1/95 (4,000 shares); Edna R. Hoffman (600 shares);
Blanche Shapiro 1999 Trust (8,000 shares); MJR Partners (124,340 shares); and, DB Securities, Inc. as custodian FBO
Morton M. Maneker IRA dated 12/03/01 (11,000 shares).
4 8 Del. C. § 253(d).
5 See Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 95.
6 Resp'ts Pre–Trial Br. at 6. Michelle Peluso, Travelocity's COO, described in great detail the benefits of the merchant
model approach for both the stand-alone hotel business and for dynamic packaging and how “being a merchant is really
critical to Travelocity's growth and profitability.” Trial Tr. at 240.
7 Peluso testified that Travelocity should not continue outsourcing its merchant business and packaging business to
Contour. She further testified that Travelocity's management had not as of the time of the merger decided whether it
would continue to use Contour for the merchant model hotel business. Id. at 243.
8 For example, Michael Gilliland, Travelocity's president and CEO as of May 2002, testified that about 15% of Travelocity's
revenue came from its contract with Yahoo! and that Yahoo! Travel was in fact a private label for Travelocity. Id. at 188.
9 For example, Northwest Airlines announced in early 2001 that it would no longer pay commissions to online travel agents.
Id. at 162.
10 Gilliland testified to the extent that the formation of Orbitz and the general commission-cutting by airlines affected
Travelocity because Travelocity, unlike Expedia, had not made progress in diversifying its revenue. Id. at 169.
11 See id. at 44.
12 Id. Ramesh Punwani, Travelocity's executive vice president and CFO until April 2002, however, testified that Travelocity
had actively reduced operating expenses in the first quarter of 2002 in order to meet the proposed budget plan. Punwani's
testimony on whether Travelocity would meet its projections for the year was pessimistic at best. Notably, Punwani and
Brett Little, Travelocity's controller, were the top financial officers at Travelocity before the merger and were responsible
for preparing Travelocity's projections and providing this forward-looking information to Sabre. Id. at 416.
13 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 103, quoting CIBC World Markets, Travelocity, 4Q EPS As Expected; 2002 Growth Of, Jan.
17, 2002, p. 6.
14 Trial Tr. at 197. Gilliland testified that the acquisition of Site59 did not help Travelocity in its competition with Expedia in
the merchant model hotel business. He distinguished the merchant model hotel business from the last-minute packaging
business. Id. Peluso, however, testified that Travelocity was working toward a merchant model hotel business. She
testified that the process was extensive and that the goal was to acquire contracts with 4,000 hotels in an 18–month period.
This number would put Travelocity at half the size of its competitors after 18 months. Peluso's testimony is indicative that
in the purchase of Site59 Travelocity acquired “a team of people who had the ability at any given time with our merchant
business to change the margins by hotel, by city, by chain, by region, depending what the market conditions are.” Id. at
233. Therefore, even though Travelocity was handicapped by its contract with HRN and other partnership relationships,
it was actively working toward regaining its competitive position, as evidenced by its purchase of Site59.
15 Resp'ts Pre–Trial Br. at 9–10.
16 Both Special Committee directors voted in favor, one director voted against, and six directors abstained from the vote.
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17 Purcell's valuation was as of March 16, 2002, the date that Salomon presented its fairness opinion to the Travelocity board
regarding the merger. Therefore, Purcell's valuation, like Salomon's, does not factor in the Site59 acquisition. Notably,
both experts treated the Site59 acquisition on a stand-alone basis because of its proximity to the merger date. Purcell
did not add any incremental value to Travelocity as a result of the acquisition.
18 Specifically, Purcell looked at the Goldman Sachs presentations to Sabre and the Salomon presentations to the Special
Committee. He also looked at analyses by various securities and industry analysts studying Travelocity in 2001 and 2002.
19 Gompers did not interview Peluso or Gilliland in connection with his valuation analyses. Trial Tr. at 355.
20 Gompers did include the incremental value of the Site59 acquisition in his valuation. Gompers valued the acquisition to
Travelocity stockholders at $36.2 million, approximately $0.72 per share in incremental value. Gompers Expert Report
at ¶¶ 30, 203. Purcell stated that he would add at least $0.72 per share of incremental value if he accepted Gompers's
criticism that the acquisition should be factored into the valuation. Purcell Rebuttal Report at ¶ 14(a).
21 Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002).
22 Id. (citation omitted).
23 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
24 Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003), (quoting M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del.1999)).
25 Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *2.
26 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983), aff'd, 497 A.2d 792 (Del.1985).
27 Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *3.
28 See Donald J. Wolfe, Jr, & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery,
§ 8–10[d] (2003 ed.) (discussing how almost all appraisal actions since the Delaware Supreme Court “liberalized the
appraisal valuation process” in Weinberger involve a form of DCF analysis). But cf. Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d
904, 916 (Del. Ch.1999) (acknowledging that even though this court frequently uses DCF as one method of valuation,
“no method of valuation is preferable per se in Delaware”).
29 Neal v. Ala. By–Products Corp., 1990 WL 109243, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (citing S. Pratt, Valuing a Business: The
Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies, 84 (2d. ed.1989)), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del.1991).
30 “Inputs in a discounted cash flow are predictions which are necessarily speculative in nature. The quality of these
predictions is therefore central to the reliability of the underlying methodology.” Harris v. Rapid Am. Corp., 1990 WL
146488, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990), aff'd in relevant part, and rev'd on other grounds, 603 A.2d 796 (Del.1992).
31 See Gilbert v. MPM Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 669 (Del. Ch.1997), aff'd, 731 A.2d 790 (Del.1999) (concluding that
management was in the best position to forecast the company's future before the merger); Gray, 2002 WL 853549, at *8
(rejecting valuation that inexplicably ignored management projections).
32 In Gray, the court relied on management's determination that their projections were reliable even though prepared in an
industry with a high degree of speculation due to the facts that the company's product required regulatory approval and
that there was an unknown market share for drug delivery products. In Gray, management submitted their projections to
Merrill Lynch to use in its independent valuation of the company's shares in connection with a merger. Gray, 2002 WL
853549, at *8. To reflect the inherent risks involved in achieving those projections, Merrill Lynch applied a discount rate
as high as 50%. Id at *11. Those facts are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, Punwani clearly testified
that the projections that he prepared were merely speculative and too unreliable to give to Salomon in their independent
valuation of Travelocity.
33 Trial Tr. at 381.
34 Id. “We were really not in a position to be able to put any credence on the numbers, both on the revenue and on the cost
side. And the only way to get credibility in our numbers would have been to take those models and put them through
reasonability checks ... [that] were never done because, when we built these frameworks, I'll call them, in the year 2000,
we were in a period of explosive growth. We were growing at 150 percent per year.... No one really knew what the right
number was.” Id. at 381–82.
35 Id. at 383. “It was bad enough before when we did the data, and we had this new variable that got thrown into our lap,
which totally destroyed our ability to have any confidence in projections beyond one quarter out.” Id.
36 Purcell notes that “it is very unusual for an investment banking firm not to employ a DCF analysis in a valuation study,
appraisal study or in a fairness opinion.” Purcell Rebuttal Report at ¶ 5.
Goldman Sachs did do a DCF analysis of Travelocity for Sabre. The Goldman Sachs report, however, is not helpful
for this court's inquiry into the fair value of Travelocity as of the Merger Date. First, it was prepared nine months before
the merger and before September 11. Second, it was prepared for Sabre, not Travelocity. Third, there is nothing in
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the record that indicates that Goldman Sachs used Travelocity's management projections in its analysis. In fact, the
record shows the opposite. Punwani testified that Sabre did not have direct access to Travelocity's financial data and
that the projections he did give to Sabre were highly qualified as to their reliability. Trial Tr. at 372–73. Punwani also
testified that he did not have any discussions with Sabre regarding the use of his numbers in Goldman Sach's DCF
analysis. Id. at 415–16. Furthermore, Gilliland testified that these management projections “are about as good as the
weight of the paper they're written on.” Id. at 158.
37 Zakkour Dep. at 35–37
38 Purcell's DCF is flawed for other reasons that the court will not describe in detail. Generally, Purcell makes certain
assumptions and observations that are unsubstantiated in his report or in his testimony. Moreover, his report only provides
the court with only the most skeletal mathematical calculations to back up his analysis.
39 Trial Tr. at 383–84, 410.
40 Id. at 412–16.
41 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 27.
42 Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch.2001).
43 Trial Tr. at 342.
44 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 155. Gompers testified that it is standard practice in both his teaching and his valuation
exercises to project out for a longer period of time when valuing start-up companies or venture capital firms with the goal
of the young industry reaching a steady state of growth: “most of the time when I ask my students to project out, or if
I do it as a board member, or do it as an advisor to people raising capital, I tell them to project out ten years or fifteen
years, to get out to the point where the industry is more mature and their prospects look as though they grow in line with
the overall economy.” Trial Tr. at 277–78.
45 See In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2004 WL1043794, at * 15 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (dismissing
an expert's unsubstantiated adjustments to management projections because the “adjustment amounts to [the expert]
substituting his personal judgment of what [the input] should be for the non-litigation business judgment of [the company's]
management.”).
46 “None of the long-term forecasts were provided to or approved by senior management or the board o[f] directors, much
less the public. Projections beyond 2003 were merely meant as a rough plan and were considered to be optimistic targets,
i.e., they were not the expected cash flows.” Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 27.
47 A comparable company analysis is often used in connection with a DCF analysis. The court, however, may use a
comparable company valuation on a stand-alone basis in an appraisal action when it is the only reliable method of
valuation offered by the parties. In Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int'l, the court relied on a comparable
company analysis because neither expert was comfortable using a DCF analysis to value the company's shares due to
the limited financial data of the company available as of the merger date. 753 A.2d 451, 455 n. 5 (Del. Ch.1999).
48 See Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *7.
49 Gray, 2002 WL 853549, at *9 (quoting In re Radiology Assoc., Inc. Lit., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch.1991)).
50 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 172.
51 Gompers testified that even a 60% discount could be justified. Trial Tr. at 332.
52 Gompers testified that he did not inquire as to why Sabre was willing to pay $28 per Travelocity share as a check against
his significantly lower valuation. Id. at 359.
53 Additionally, the petitioners argue that Gompers's valuation is fatally flawed because he relied on post-merger information
in his valuation. The petitioners rely on Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1988),
where the court held that the expert's DCF analysis was flawed because it relied on actual earning and expense data
from a period after the merger. Gompers use of Expedia's first quarter 2002 results publicly announced on April 23, 2002,
twelve days after the merger, does not implicate the credibility of Gompers's valuation. The court in Cavalier held that
the post-merger data was suspect because it was not available until after the merger and it “could not have been known
or susceptible of proof' at the time of the merger. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713). Here, Expedia's first quarter
performance “could have been known or susceptible of proof' before the actual data was released after the merger date.
In Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., the court allowed the expert's reliance on a balance sheet released after the
merger date and noted that data released on a balance sheet pertains to events that happen before the balance sheet is
released. 1995 WL 376911, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995). Expedia first quarter 2002 information was clearly knowable
or “susceptible of proof” before the actual balance sheet was released only twelve days after the merger. Moreover, trial
testimony clearly shows that Travelocity's management had general knowledge of Expedia's first quarter performance.
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Trial Tr. at 401–02. Therefore, the statutory requirement that the valuation must exclude elements of value “arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger” is clearly not implicated by Gompers's valuation. See 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
54 Salomon also uses two other valuation methodologies in connection with its independent valuation of Travelocity. It looks
at precedent squeeze-out transactions and a Sabre “ability to pay” analysis. The precedent squeeze-out transaction
premiums comparison involves taking a list of 40–plus companies and looking at the premiums paid and then applying
them to Travelocity's various stock prices. This valuation supports a price range of approximately $30 to $35 per share.
The “ability to pay” analysis based on 2002 and 2003 EPS (assuming no multiple expansion) supports a price well in
excess of $35 per share. The “ability to pay” analysis factors merger synergies and is therefore not relevant to the court's
analysis. See Zakkour Dep. at 50.
55 Zakkour testified in his deposition about Salomon's approach to the valuation and discusses the metrics of the valuation
that were emphasized and why. The court adopts Salomon's valuation as a framework, and isolates the valuation metrics
that should be of greater or lesser importance in determining the appropriate value for Travelocity's shares. Notably,
Zakkour's extensive and detailed testimony in his deposition about Travelocity's “lost momentum” to Expedia evidences
Salomon's awareness of Travelocity's positioning in the market vis-à-vis Expedia. See id. at 51–54.
56 Id. at 77–81.
57 Gompers testified that he discussed the business models of the companies and the respective cash flows of each
model with Punwani who verified that this difference must be incorporated in discounting the cash flow multiples in the
comparable company valuation. Trial Tr. at 328–29.
58 “[T]he research analysts discussed Travelocity in January and February of 2002 in such positive terms as a company
with a strong business model that can make money with gross margins of 63% (i.e., Bear Stearns); a company whose
sales are back on track, with a healthy outlook for 2002, and expected solid earnings growth with a possible multiple
(price earning ratio) expansion (i.e., Weisel); a company on target with revenue growth between 20% to 30% in 2002,
with expectations of narrowing the gap with Expedia (i.e., CIBC); and a company with travel-bookings now running close
to pre-September levels (i.e., Untenberg).” Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 41.
59 Hornthal was the founder and chairman of Preview Travel, a travel agency that started with a television platform in
the mid–1980s and later moved online, which went public and then merged with Travelocity in 2000. He became vice
chairman of the combined companies after the merger. See Hornthal Dep. at 10–16.
60 Id. at 91–93.
61 As already discussed, Peluso testified extensively on how Travelocity needed to develop its merchant model business
and the obstacles it faced in doing so. See supra notes 6, 7, 14 and accompanying text.
62 Trial Tr. at 397–401.
63 Salomon used a 10% discount rate in its initial presentations to the Special Committee and the Travelocity board. JX
15 (“Project Roundtrip”—Salomon's February 27, 2002 Presentation on Travelocity). Zakkour explained that this initial
number was more of a preliminary guess by Salomon before it had spent any time with Travelocity's management to
“really understand how Travelocity and Expedia compared.” Zakkour Dep. at 77.
64 Gompers Expert Report at ¶¶ 194, 195.
65 Id. at ¶ 136.
66 See Trial Tr. at 246.
67 EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
68 Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 47.
69 Id. at ¶ 48.
70 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 173.
71 In calculating its reference range for comparison of the two companies, Salomon sets up a table of four statistical
parameters: firm value/estimated 2002 EBITDA; firm value/estimated 2002 EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes);
share price/estimated 2002 EPS; and share price/estimated 2003 EPS. Salomon derived a reference range of $24 to
$32 per Travelocity share by applying 20% to 30% discount on the Expedia multiples. See JX 8 (Letter to shareholders
and SEC Schedule 14D–9 for Travelocity.com).
72 “In this case, which is what I'll comment on, because every situation is unique, in this case, there is no doubt that PE
multiples is by far the most important metric.” Zakkour Dep. at 69. Furthermore, Zakkour testified that Goldman Sachs in
its valuation of Travelocity also considered the PE multiples as the most important valuation metric. Id. Salomon defines
the price/earnings (PE) multiple as earnings per share before noncash expenses. See JX 14 at 36 (Salomon February
25, 2002 Project Roundtrip Presentation).
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73 See Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 197 and Exhibits C25 and C26 thereto.
74 There were approximately 50.19 million shares outstanding.
75 Agranoff, 791 A.2d at 892.
76 Id. at 893.
77 Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 52.
78 Salomon looked at both negotiated and unilateral squeeze-out transactions to determine whether Sabre's initial offer was
adequate. Salomon determined that Sabre's offer was inadequate when compared to other squeeze-out transactions by
acquirers with greater than 50% ownership and transaction values greater than $50 million on completed transactions
announced from January 1999 to February 2002. See JX 16 (Salomon Presentation to the Travelocity Board of Directors,
March 4, 2002); JX 14 (“Project Roundtrip”—Salomon's February 25, 2002 Presentation on Travelocity).
Notably, Salomon's final presentation to the board looked only at the unilateral precedent squeeze-out transactions.
The actual numbers presented by Salomon on March 4, 2002 are: a 52.4% premium over 1 day prior; a 54.3% premium
over 30 days average; and a 51.1% premium over 60 days average. JX 16 (Salomon Presentation to the Travelocity
Board of Directors, March 4, 2002).
79 See Agranoff, 791 A.2d at 887; Borruso, 753 A.2d at 459; Bomarko v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1186 n. 11
(Del. Ch.1999), aff'd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del.2000).
80 See Borruso, 753 A.2d at 458–59 & n. 10.
81 The court will not adjust this figure to reflect any incremental value inherent in the acquisition of Site59. While that
acquisition held significant future promise to allow Travelocity to develop a merchant model for its business, there is no
reason to believe that it was immediately additive to value. Notably, Salomon did not factor the Site59 acquisition in its
valuation for several reasons. First, at the time of the fairness opinion, the deal was still in negotiations. Second, the deal
was relatively small so that the effect on Travelocity stock would be at least in the short term, value-neutral. Third, even
though it was a step in the direction of a merchant model approach, the acquisition of Site59 was only an initial step in
a long process of transforming Travelocity's business model. Fourth, Zakkour stated in his deposition that the decision
not to include the acquisition in the valuation of Travelocity was a “consensus view” by Salomon, the Special Committee,
and management. See Zakkour Dep. at 22–24.
82 “After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair
value ... together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value.” 8 Del.
C. § 262(h) (emphasis added).
83 8 Del. C. § 262(i) (emphasis added).
84 See Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 926 (Del. Ch.1999) (holding that a compound interest award in an appraisal
proceeding is consistent with “fundamental economic reality”).
85 Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 1997 WL 538676, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 28, 1997), aff'd, 708 A.2d 630 (Del.1998).
86 Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 78.
87 Id. at ¶ 79.
88 Id.
89 The KPMG report assumes that Sabre's cost of borrowing is equal to “Moody's Baa Industrial Yield Average Bond Rate.”
Id. at ¶ 83.
90 Chang's Holdings, S.A. v. Universal Chems. & Coatings, Inc., 1994 WL 681091, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 22, 1994) (stating that
the legal rate of interest is “a useful default rate when the parties have inadequately developed the record on the issue”).
91 See Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *13 (holding that the appropriate compounding rate for the legal rate of interest
is quarterly because “the legal rate of interest most nearly resembles a return on a bond, which typically compounds
quarterly”).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
*1  In November 2013, defendant David H. Murdock paid
$13.50 per share to acquire all of the common stock of
Dole Food Company, Inc. (“Dole” or the “Company”) that
he did not already own. Before the transaction, Murdock
owned approximately 40% of Dole's common stock, served
as its Chairman and CEO, and was its de facto controller.
The transaction was structured as a single-step merger (the
“Merger”). The Merger closed on November 1, 2013.
In his initial letter to Dole's board of directors (the “Board”),
Murdock offered to pay $12.00 per share. Informed by then-
Chancellor Strine's decision in MFW,1 Murdock conditioned
his proposal on (i) approval from a committee of the Board
made up of disinterested and independent directors (the
“Committee”) and (ii) the affirmative vote of holders of a
majority of the unaffiliated shares. Despite mimicking MFW
's form, Murdock did not adhere to its substance. He and
his right-hand man, defendant C. Michael Carter, sought to
undermine the Committee from the start, and they continued
their efforts throughout the process.
Before trial, the allegations and evidence regarding Murdock
and Carter's activities, together with the relationships between
certain Committee members and Murdock, were sufficient
to create triable questions of fact regarding the Committee's
independence. The record at trial, however, demonstrated
that the Committee carried out its task with integrity.
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The Committee was assisted in this effort by expert legal
counsel and an investment bank—Lazard Frères & Co. LLC
(“Lazard”)—that likewise acted with integrity. In contrast to
a string of decisions that have criticized financial advisors for
flawed and outcome-driven analyses,2 this opinion can praise
and rely on Lazard's thorough and balanced work product.
*2  Because of the diligence of its members and their
advisors, the Committee overcame most of Murdock and
Carter's machinations. The Committee negotiated an increase
in the price from $12.00 to $13.50 per share, which Lazard
opined fell within a range of fairness. Several market
indicators supported Lazard's opinion. Stockholders approved
the Merger, with the unaffiliated stockholders narrowly
voting in favor in a 50.9% majority.
But what the Committee could not overcome, what the
stockholder vote could not cleanse, and what even an arguably
fair price does not immunize, is fraud. Before Murdock
made his proposal, Carter made false disclosures about
the savings Dole could realize after selling approximately
half of its business in 2012. He also cancelled a recently
adopted stock repurchase program for pretextual reasons.
These actions primed the market for the freeze-out by driving
down Dole's stock price and undermining its validity as a
measure of value. Then, after Murdock made his proposal,
Carter provided the Committee with lowball management
projections. The next day, in a secret meeting that violated
the procedures established by the Committee, Carter gave
Murdock's advisors and financing banks more positive and
accurate data. To their credit, the Committee and Lazard
recognized that Carter's projections were unreliable and
engaged in Herculean efforts to overcome the informational
deficit, but they could not do so fully. Critically for purposes
of the outcome of this litigation, the Committee never
obtained accurate information about Dole's ability to improve
its income by cutting costs and acquiring farms.
By taking these actions, Murdock and Carter deprived the
Committee of the ability to negotiate on a fully informed
basis and potentially say no to the Merger. Murdock and
Carter likewise deprived the stockholders of their ability to
consider the Merger on a fully informed basis and potentially
vote it down. Murdock and Carter's conduct throughout the
Committee process, as well as their credibility problems at
trial, demonstrated that their actions were not innocent or
inadvertent, but rather intentional and in bad faith.
Under these circumstances, assuming for the sake of
argument that the $13.50 price still fell within a range of
fairness, the stockholders are not limited to a fair price. They
are entitled to a fairer price designed to eliminate the ability
of the defendants to profit from their breaches of the duty of
loyalty. This decision holds Murdock and Carter jointly and
severally liable for damages of $148,190,590.18, representing
an incremental value of $2.74 per share. Although facially
large, the award is conservative relative to what the evidence
could support.
The other defendants are not liable. Defendant David A.
DeLorenzo erred by siding with Murdock at the outset
of the Committee process, but he did not participate in
the breaches of duty that led to liability. The plaintiffs
also sought to impose secondary liability on Murdock's
financial advisor and lead financing source, defendants
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG
(jointly “Deutsche Bank”). Deutsche Bank acted improperly
by favoring Murdock and treating him as the bank's real client
in transactions before the Merger, even when Deutsche Bank
was officially representing Dole, but Deutsche Bank did not
participate knowingly in the breaches that led to liability,
and Deutsche Bank's role as Murdock's advisor did not lead
causally to damages.
*3  In addition to the plenary litigation, holders of
17,287,784 shares sought appraisal. This decision likely
renders the appraisal proceeding moot. The parties will confer
on this issue and inform the court of their views.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over nine days. The parties introduced
over 1,800 exhibits. Ten fact witnesses and three experts
testified live. The parties lodged twenty-nine depositions. The
laudably thorough pre-trial order contained 419 paragraphs,
and the pre-trial and post-trial briefs collectively totaled 668
pages.
The voluminous evidence conflicted on many issues. To
facilitate fact-finding under conditions of uncertainty, courts
evaluate evidence against a burden of proof. For this case,
the appropriate standard of proof was straightforward: a
preponderance of the evidence.3 The question of who bore it
was complex.
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For the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the defendants
initially bore the burden of proof under the entire fairness
standard of review. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault,
51 A.3d 1213, 1239 (Del.2012). The Delaware Supreme
Court held in Americas Mining that if defendants believe the
allocation should be different, they must seek and obtain a
pretrial determination in their favor. Id. at 1243. Otherwise,
“the burden of persuasion will remain with the defendants
throughout the trial to demonstrate the entire fairness of
the interested transaction.” Id. The defendants moved for
summary judgment on the standard of review and allocation
of burden, arguing that because they emulated MFW, the
business judgment rule became the operative standard of
review. Alternatively, they argued that if entire fairness
continued to apply, the burden had shifted to the plaintiffs
to prove unfairness. See Emerald P'rs v. Berlin (Emerald II),
787 A.2d 85, 98–99 (Del.2001). I held that the defendants had
not made the showing necessary to change the standard of
review or shift the burden, and so “the burden of persuasion
will remain with the defendants throughout the trial to
demonstrate the entire fairness of the interested transaction.”
Dkt. 585 at 4, 6.
The burden for the aiding and abetting claim differed: it rested
with the plaintiffs. In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 85
(Del. Ch.2014) (appeal pending). The burden for the appraisal
proceeding was different still: each side bore the burden of
proving its contentions. Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v.
Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del.2005).
*4  Although I have tried to adhere to the different burdens
required by the case law, the Delaware Supreme Court has
explained that the real-world benefit of burden-shifting is
“modest” and only outcome-determinative in the “very few
cases” where the “evidence is in equipoise.” Ams. Mining, 51
A.3d at 1242. This was not one of those cases. Had the burden
been allocated to the plaintiffs on all issues, the result would
have been the same.4
A. Murdock's Relationship With Dole
Dole is one of the world's largest producers and marketers
of fresh fruit and vegetables. Murdock became involved
with Dole in 1985 when Flexi–Van Corporation merged
with Castle & Cooke, which had owned all of Dole's
stock since 1961. Both were public companies. Before the
merger, Murdock was the CEO and 33% owner of Flexi–
Van. After the merger, Murdock became Chairman and
CEO of the combined company, which was named Castle
& Cooke. Flexi–Van's stockholders received 45% of the
combined company, giving Murdock a 14% stake. In 1991,
the combined company changed its name to Dole.
In 2003, Murdock took Dole private in a leveraged buyout.
While owned solely by Murdock, Dole felt the effects of the
financial crisis of 2008. Dole had taken on significant debt,
and a large tranche of bonds was scheduled to mature in 2009.
Dole typically refinanced its debt a year before maturity, but
it delayed in the hope that rates would improve. Instead, the
bond markets froze. Dole finally refinanced its debt just sixty
days before the bonds matured. It was forced to pay a very
high interest rate.
Murdock's real estate ventures also suffered. Murdock had
obtained loans that required unanimous approval from all of
the banks in the lending syndicate to waive a covenant or
extend a maturity date. During the financial crisis, several
loans went into default. Some of the more troubled banks
refused to modify the loans. Murdock had provided personal
guarantees and faced the threat of collection actions.
Deutsche Bank and Wells Fargo stepped in to help Murdock.
They had worked with Murdock for years and took a “long
term view [of] the relationship.” JX 1680 at 2. They bought
out the objecting banks and granted the loan modifications
Murdock sought. The plaintiffs accurately observe that this
instance reflects the longevity and depth of Murdock's
relationship with his favored banks, such as Deutsche Bank.
See Murdock 74–76 (describing his relationships with banks
and noting that “most of my banks have been with me for 40
years”).
To pay down the debt on the Company and his real estate
ventures, Murdock considered selling Dole. Late in 2009,
Dole approached Del Monte Packaged Foods Company. The
negotiations stalled with Del Monte offering $700 million and
Murdock asking $1 billion.
Instead of selling Dole entirely, Murdock decided to sell a
portion of Dole's equity to the public. In October 2009, Dole
conducted an initial public offering of approximately 41% of
its shares. The IPO price was $12.50 per share, which valued
Dole at approximately 5.9x estimated 2010 EBITDA.5
*5  Murdock retained sole ownership of Castle & Cooke,
which was spun off before the IPO. Castle & Cooke owned
Murdock's other business ventures and real estate assets,
including the Hawaiian island of Lanai. Murdock became
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CEO of Castle & Cooke. Scott Griswold, who had previously
managed the Castle & Cooke businesses as part of Dole,
became Castle & Cooke's Executive Vice President of
Operations. Griswold was deeply involved in the process
leading to the Merger. When considering his involvement, it is
important to recall that he was not a Dole officer or employee
during the relevant period. Griswold worked for Murdock
in his capacities as the owner of Castle & Cooke and as a
stockholder of Dole.
The newly public Dole operated three business segments:
Fresh Fruit, Fresh Vegetables, and Packaged Foods. Fresh
Fruit was Dole's largest division, with revenue of $4.4
billion in 2012. Fresh Vegetables and Packaged Foods were
significantly smaller, with revenue of $1.1 billion and $1.3
billion respectively. Fresh Fruit focused primarily on bananas
and pineapples with smaller operations for other products,
like kiwifruit. Fresh Vegetables distributed a wide variety of
fresh produce. It also included Dole's fresh berry business
(despite the division's name) and distributed packaged salads
and other packaged vegetables. Packaged Foods produced
products such as canned pineapples, fruits cups, and frozen
fruit.
B. Murdock's Goal Of Taking Dole Private
After Dole became public, Murdock regularly considered the
possibility of taking it private again. As Murdock testified at
trial, he had “never really wanted” to sell equity to the public,
but “it was a necessity” because of the financial issues he
faced. Murdock 98; see id. at 87, 89, 94–95; JX 1680. Others
at Dole recognized that Murdock did not like the public
company model. Sherry Lansing, an outside director and
member of the Committee, testified that Murdock “seemed
frustrated all the time. He seemed frustrated with boards....
He seemed not to like the push back” or the need to “have
[outside directors] there....” Lansing Dep. 15.
Murdock evidenced his distaste for the public company model
in how he ran Dole. Murdock was an old-school, my-way-or-
the-highway controller, fixated on his authority and the power
and privileges that came with it. Murdock testified that he
was “the boss” at Dole, and “[t]he boss does what he wants
to do.”6 In contemporaneous documents, his associates did
not address him by name. They referred to him deferentially
as “the Chairman.” Criticizing Murdock was unthinkable.
On those rare occasions in the record when Murdock was
challenged, he responded aggressively, including by giving
tongue-lashings to outside directors Andrew J. Conrad and
Dennis Weinberg, then forcing Weinberg off the Board.
Murdock's bankers were careful not to offend him, knowing
that he would put them in the “penalty box.”7
*6  The fact that Murdock preferred to see Dole become
a private company did not mean that he was unwilling to
consider other transactions that would enhance his personal
wealth. He is, after all, a highly successful capitalist. One
example was late 2010, when Dole contacted Chiquita Brands
International Inc. about a potential merger. Importantly, the
Chiquita transaction would have expanded Murdock's empire.
In substance, Dole would have acquired Chiquita, with Dole's
stockholders owning 63.5% of the combined company, Dole
designating a proportionate number of the initial board seats,
and the company operating out of Dole's headquarters. The
companies came close to finalizing a deal that would have
valued Dole at $1.256 billion, but Dole ultimately decided not
to go forward because of concerns about payments Chiquita
had made in Colombia to a known terrorist organization.
The next year, Wells Fargo pitched Murdock on selling some
or all of Dole to Hain Celestial Group (“Hain”). Murdock and
DeLorenzo, who had taken the job as Dole's CEO in 2007, met
with Hain. The discussions quickly shifted to Hain purchasing
either Packaged Foods or a combination of Packaged Foods
and Fresh Vegetables. A deal for those businesses seemed
close, but Hain broke off talks in April 2012.
During the discussions with Hain, Murdock asked Dole's
CFO, Joseph Tesoriero, to provide his recommendations
about the strategic alternatives that Dole should pursue.
Tesoriero prepared a two-page memorandum describing
“value creation projects currently under consideration at
Dole ... in the ideal sequence in which they should occur.”
JX 162 at 1 (the “Tesoriero Memo”). As the memo reflected,
these were not hypotheticals; they were projects “currently
under consideration.” Id. Tesoriero sent the document to
Murdock and copied DeLorenzo and Griswold.
The Tesoriero Memo contemplated a three-phase plan. First,
Dole would complete four small transactions then underway.
As it happened, two of the deals were completed, and two
were not.
Next, Dole would sell Packaged Foods and Fresh Vegetables
to Hain, which was the transaction under consideration at
the time. After that deal fell through, Dole explored other
alternatives for Packaged Foods. As events turned out, Dole
- 17 -
In re Dole Food Co., Inc.Stockholder Litigation., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
2015 WL 5052214
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
sold Packaged Foods and the Asian operations of Fresh Fruit
to ITOCHU Corporation of Japan (“ITOCHU”).
Finally, Murdock would “take [the remaining Dole] business
private or ... merge it with another company.” Id. Tesoriero
explained that although the remaining business “contains
valuable assets (e.g. the Hawaii land, idle land in Latin
America, our fleet of ships ...), it may not demand a very high
multiple in the stock market due to the nature of the fresh fruit
business.” Id.
The Tesoriero Memo was a candid assessment of Murdock's
overall strategy. It shows that Murdock's goal was to take
Dole private again, and that Murdock and his team saw some
form of break-up as a key step in the process. The basic
premise was to separate Dole's higher-margin businesses
(predominantly Packaged Foods) from its lower margin
businesses (predominantly Fresh Fruit), realize the value of
the higher-margin businesses, and then pursue a transaction
involving the remainder of the Company. Although Murdock
was open to other ideas for the remainder, the primary option
was for Murdock to buy it.
C. Exploring Alternatives For Packaged Foods
When the Tesoriero Memo was written, the near-term
alternative for generating value from Packaged Foods was
a sale to Hain. After negotiations with Hain broke down,
Murdock and Dole management began considering other
options. One obvious way to separate the businesses was by
spinning off Packaged Foods.
Murdock focused on a spinoff after reaching an agreement on
April 8, 2012, to sell Lanai for $300 million. This transaction
was part of Murdock's effort to generate liquidity and reduce
his overall debt, thereby strengthening his personal balance
sheet for a potential take-private.
*7  Murdock had owned Lanai through Castle & Cooke, and
Griswold was heavily involved in the sale process. Deutsche
Bank served as Castle & Cooke's advisor on the sale. With the
agreement in hand, Murdock told Griswold that he wanted to
focus on splitting Dole into two companies.
During the same period, Deutsche Bank began modeling a
transaction in which Dole would spin off Packaged Foods and
then Murdock would take the remaining company private.
Eric Brook, the Deutsche Bank coverage officer for Dole,
instructed his team to model “[a] separation of the Packaged
Foods business ... with the idea being that the Fruit/vegetable
business would be a privateco.... The Consumer team will
begin the go private analysis.” JX 173 at 1. The overall
structure resembled the plan in the Tesoriero Memo, but with
the separation of Packaged Foods accomplished via a spinoff
rather than a sale to Hain.
Deutsche Bank presented the spinoff-plus-take-private idea
to Murdock on April 27, 2012. After the meeting, Brook
instructed the Deutsche Bank team to work on two separate
projects: a split-off and a refinancing for Dole and a freeze-
out for Murdock. JX 179 at 1. Brook stressed that the latter
was “not to share with Dole mgmt.” Id.
At the time, Wells Fargo was already working with the
Board on a spinoff of Packaged Foods. There were two main
differences between Wells Fargo's plan and Deutsche Bank's.
First, Wells Fargo planned a domestic IPO of Packaged
Foods, while Deutsche Bank had convinced Murdock of
the benefits of an Asian IPO. Second, Deutsche Bank was
working on a follow-on take-private.
With Murdock on board, Deutsche Bank quickly asserted
itself. On April 30, 2012, Deutsche Bank gave Dole
management the presentation on the “Asian split-off and a
refinancing” that Brook had contemplated. JX 183. On May
1, the Deutsche Bank team met again with Murdock. On May
2, the Board was scheduled to consider Wells Fargo's plan for
the spinoff. So advanced was the transaction that the Wells
Fargo presentation contemplated announcing it the next day.
But after Deutsche Bank's meetings with Murdock and Dole
management, the Board decided to conduct a broader strategic
business review. Dole retained both Wells Fargo and Deutsche
Bank as advisors. Wells Fargo considered primarily U.S.-
based transactions. Deutsche Bank explored opportunities in
Asia.
On May 3, 2012, Dole announced the strategic business
review. The defendants tried to spin this announcement as
if Dole was exploring strategic alternatives for the whole
Company, but Dole's announcement was narrower: Dole said
it was reviewing alternatives and evaluating prospects and
options “pertaining to select businesses of the company.”
JX 197. The announcement highlighted the possibility of a
“separation of one or more of our businesses,” which was
consistent with Wells Fargo and Deutsche Bank's earlier
presentations focusing on divesting Packaged Foods. Id. Dole
management considered and rejected a broader description.
JX 196. Moreover, Murdock owned 40% of Dole's stock,
and he was not a seller. Dole was looking primarily to sell
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Packaged Foods or other specific businesses to pay down
debt. If an offer for the whole company had come in, Murdock
and the Board would have considered it, but that was not the
main focus of the exercise.
*8  Wells Fargo contacted seventeen parties about their
interest in potential transactions involving Dole's businesses.
Ten executed nondisclosure agreements and received
confidential information. None proposed a transaction.
Apollo Global Management LLC (“Apollo”) did contact Dole
and expressed interest in purchasing Fresh Vegetables for
$300 million. DeLorenzo told Apollo to offer at least $500
million. After receiving some due diligence, Apollo said it
would raise its price, but would not commit to $500 million.
Meanwhile, Dole and Deutsche Bank reached out to
ITOCHU, a company that had worked with Dole in Asia for
over fifty years. ITOCHU had been Dole's importer of record
in Japan, distributed many of Dole's products, and provided
back-office services for Dole in the region. Dole and Deutsche
Bank thought ITOCHU could serve as a cornerstone investor
for an Asian IPO. ITOCHU was interested, and discussions
began.
In May 2012, the prospect of an Asian IPO became less
attractive after a selloff in the Asian markets. Murdock
suggested that Dole and ITOCHU instead form a joint venture
that would own the Asian operations of Fresh Fruit and
Packaged Foods (“Dole Asia”). Negotiations shifted to that
idea.
On June 14, 2012, Deutsche Bank provided Dole
management with a presentation that analyzed both Apollo's
offer for Fresh Vegetables and the potential ITOCHU joint
venture. Deutsche Bank calculated that if Dole continued to
trade at 6.1x EBITDA, then selling Fresh Vegetables for $500
million would increase Dole's stock price by 8.5%. JX 233
at 16. In contrast, selling half of the Asian joint venture to
ITOCHU would increase Dole's stock price by 35.9%. Id. at
17.
After the meeting, Dole broke off discussions with Apollo to
focus on the ITOCHU joint venture. The transactions were
not mutually exclusive, but DeLorenzo thought continuing
discussions with Apollo would be “too much of a distraction.”
DeLorenzo Dep. 21. The plaintiffs have questioned that
decision, claiming weakly that it was intended to help
Murdock with his eventual buyout. Having considered the
record, I do not see anything problematic about the decision
to focus on the joint venture.
D. Murdock And Deutsche Bank Continue Their Freeze–
Out Discussions.
During the strategic business review, Deutsche Bank acted
as Dole's financial advisor and reported to the Board. While
serving in that role, Deutsche Bank should not have been
secretly helping Murdock plan to acquire Dole. But Deutsche
Bank characterized itself as having a number of different
relationships with Murdock and his companies. Deutsche
Bank used these alternative relationships as conduits for
conversations with Murdock that it should not have been
having as the Board's advisor.
Deutsche Bank's roles included advisor and lender to Castle
& Cooke and Murdock personally. Those roles provided the
context for Deutsche Bank's meetings with Murdock about
a going-private transaction in early 2012. Deutsche Bank
had two separate coverage officers: Brook for Dole, and
Richard Grellier for Castle & Cook and Murdock. To maintain
a façade of separation, Grellier took the lead during the
early 2012 discussions with Murdock. Internally, Brook and
Grellier kept each other informed and planned together.
Other Deutsche Bank roles included purchasing agent
for Murdock's trades in Dole stock and margin lender
to Murdock. In July, Murdock and Deutsche Bank used
these roles as cover for further discussions about a going-
private transaction. An internal Deutsche Bank presentation
described Murdock's plans:
*9  Murdock has requested that [Deutsche Bank] consider
providing debt capital alongside his capital to
— 1) cash settle the remaining 24 [million] shares subject
to forward sale [under the terms of the MACES issued at
the time of the IPO]
— 2) acquire some or all of the 15 [million] shares held by
the top 15 shareholders in Dole
— 3) depending on availability, acquire 90% or all of the
shares of Dole.
JX 260 at 9. The presentation went on to discuss financing
for an acquisition of “100% of the shares of Dole.” Id.
The presentation cited indications that Murdock was serious,
including:
• Murdock was receptive to guaranteeing the debt.
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• Murdock was willing to secure the debt using the $770
million in equity value of his holdings outside Dole.
• Murdock had told Deutsche Bank that “he will continue
to sell real estate assets that were previously considered
lifetime hold assets” to fund the purchase of additional
Dole stock.
• In June 2012, Murdock had sold Madison Warehouse
for $226 million and Castle & Cooke Cold Storage
for $225 million, in addition to his earlier sale of the
island of Lanai. Murdock had told Deutsche Bank that
he was “committed to contribute another $90 million
of proceeds” from those sales “to increase his share
position.”
Id. at 8–9, 14. The internal Deutsche Bank presentation was
consistent with the overall picture that emerges from the
Tesoriero Memo, Murdock's prior discussions with Deutsche
Bank, and Murdock's conduct, including his sales of assets
like Lanai. Murdock was pursuing a long-term strategy
directed towards taking Dole private.
E. The ITOCHU Transaction
In late summer 2012, Dole's discussions with ITOCHU
shifted to the possibility of ITOCHU acquiring Dole Asia
(the “ITOCHU Transaction”). Both sides liked the idea, and
discussions unfolded during August. On September 17, 2012,
ITOCHU formally agreed to acquire Dole Asia for $1.685
billion in cash. Dole announced the agreement the same day.
The price of Dole stock increased to over $14.00 per share.
Shortly after the ITOCHU Transaction was announced,
Grellier and Murdock scheduled another meeting to discuss a
freeze-out. Before the meeting, Brook spoke with DeLorenzo,
who thought it was “best to find a way to get [M]urdock
out of the [D]ole stock.” JX 330 at 1. He recommended
that Deutsche Bank present options that included an “equity
market selldown,” “sell[ing] [Murdock's] stake to [a] [private
equity] or strategic [buyer],” and a cash sale to Chiquita, as
well as a “full take private.” Id.; see JX 325. But when Grellier
met with Murdock the next day, Murdock volunteered that
he wanted to take Dole private himself. Grellier 2123.
Afterwards, Grellier told his team that Murdock was “anxious
to do a deal” and “[e]specially interested in whether to
aggregate assets and do transformational deals before or after
a potential take private.” JX 326 at 1.
On January 11, 2013, Deutsche Bank sent a presentation about
a freeze-out to Dole's Treasurer, Beth Potillo. Deutsche Bank
asked that she review it and “let us know if you catch anything
awry.” JX 394 at 1. The presentation evaluated a freeze-out
funded in part by rolling over Murdock's existing equity and
an additional equity contribution of either $100 million or
$250 million. Id. at 4–7.
*10  The sending of the freeze-out presentation to Potillo
illustrated how difficult it was for Deutsche Bank to maintain
the fiction that it could differentiate between its roles. In
this instance, while working for Dole and reporting to its
Board, Deutsche Bank sent a presentation about Murdock's
acquisition bid to a Dole officer and asked the Dole officer
for comment. No one passed the information on to the Board.
At trial, Deutsche Bank claimed that it was no longer working
for Dole when it began working on a freeze-out, but that was
not accurate. Deutsche Bank began discussing a freeze-out
with Murdock after the sale of Lanai. The spinoff and freeze-
out were part of a two-step plan in which Murdock would
take Dole private in the second step, although the second part
of the strategy was “not to share with Dole mgmt.” JX 179
at 1. Deutsche Bank continued its consideration of a take-
private during the strategic business review, as shown by the
July presentation about Murdock's stock ownership. See JX
260. Moreover, the signing of the agreement for the ITOCHU
Transaction did not mean that Deutsche Bank's engagement
ended. The firm's retention letter specified that its engagement
did not end until that transaction closed, and that event did
not occur until April 1, 2013. During this post-signing, pre-
closing period, Deutsche Bank continued working on the
ITOCHU Transaction, including by fielding calls from third
parties and assisting Dole with regulatory approvals. During
that period, Deutsche Bank continued helping Murdock plan
a freeze-out.
F. Carter Takes Over.
As part of the ITOCHU Transaction, DeLorenzo committed to
leave Dole, join ITOCHU, and run Dole Asia for at least two
years. JX 371 at 9. In anticipation of DeLorenzo's resignation,
the Board agreed that Murdock would start functioning as
CEO, and Carter would start functioning as President and
COO. Both formally assumed their roles in February 2013,
after DeLorenzo resigned. The transition effectively took
place in December 2012. Carter retained his position as Dole's
General Counsel and Corporate Secretary. He also joined
the Board. So did a former Dole director, Rolland Dickson.
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Dickson served on the Committee, and his background is
discussed in connection with that role.
As a practical matter, responsibility for day-to-day
management of Dole passed from DeLorenzo to Carter in
December 2012. Carter was Murdock's only direct report,
which meant that the executive team reported to him. See JX
699 at 2. His job was to carry out Murdock's plans, and he
did so effectively, even ruthlessly. When Carter set a goal
for a division, they fell into line. See Carter 869. Dole's
executives could not envision anyone failing to carry out
Carter's instructions. See Mitchell Dep. 56.
With the ITOCHU Transaction wrapping up, a freeze-out
was the next step in the long-term plan Murdock had been
pursuing. Dole had split off its higher-margin businesses,
achieved a premium valuation, and used the proceeds to pay
down debt. This created an opportunity to take the remaining
business private.
The defendants have contended that Murdock did not decide
to pursue a freeze-out until June 7, 2013, and did not make
any preparations for the transaction before May 2013. That
characterization is not accurate. Murdock had been focusing
on a freeze-out since 2012, as demonstrated by the Tesoriero
Memo, his regular discussions with Deutsche Bank, and his
preparatory sales of assets. Once Carter took the reins, he
began priming Dole for the final step.
1. Carter Guides The Market Downward.
*11  Dole management knew that after the ITOCHU
Transaction, Dole could achieve significant cost savings.
Dole had sold approximately half of its business and could
“right-size” the rest. See JX 1147 at 6. In its fairness
presentation to the Board, Deutsche Bank advised that
Dole could achieve $50 million in annual cost savings.
Deutsche Bank viewed the $50 million per year estimate as
reasonable, had undertaken “due diligence discussions around
it,” evaluated “what triggered the cost savings,” and “stress-
tested” the estimate to “understand what the sources of those
cost savings were to confirm that those made sense in the
context of the separation of Dole Asia.” DiMondi 1464–66.
In a presentation to analysts, DeLorenzo provided the same
$50 million figure, explaining that $20 million of savings
would be implemented immediately at the corporate level
and the remaining $30 million would be implemented at the
division level, with the full run-rate of $50 million per year
achieved by the end of 2013. These estimates were arguably
conservative. An April 2012 analysis by Dole management
estimated annual total cost savings as high as $125 million.
JX 1615 at 3. And in January 2013, Deloitte & Touche had
sent Carter an analysis identifying savings of $50–90 million
per year. JX 389 at 4.
In November 2012, Dole reiterated that it expected to achieve
the full $50 million in annual savings, with $20–25 million
achieved in 2013 and the full $50 million per year starting
in 2014. JX 350 at 11. A Board presentation in December
2012 projected similar figures, although with a one-year
delay before they would be fully achieved. According to that
presentation, $35 million in savings would be achieved in
2014 and the full $50 million achieved in 2015. JX 370 at 8.
Then in January 2013, Carter announced something different.
In a January 2 press release, he told the markets that Dole's
“current expectation” was for adjusted 2013 EBITDA in
the $150–$170 million range, “including 2013 planned cost
savings in the $20 million range.” JX 384. He did not mention
any additional cost savings. Dole's stock price dropped 13%
after the announcement. JX 987 at 5.
Three weeks later, Dole issued another press release. It quoted
Carter as saying, “[W]e expect 2013 Adjusted EBITDA for
the new Dole to be at the low end of the guidance range we
announced on January 2, 2013, assuming no major market
changes.” JX 400 at 3. The January 24 release also lowered
Dole's valuation of certain assets, including 25,000 acres
of land in Hawaii, which was revised down to $175–$200
million from over $500 million just four months prior. Id. at
4; JX 1138 17. And, on February 22, 2013, Carter announced
that “[f]resh fruit performance is continuing its declining
trend, principally due to banana market conditions, and Dole
expects that 2013 Adjusted EBITDA for these businesses will
be at the low end of the previously announced guidance range
of $150—$170 million....” JX 426 at 3.
The defendants have claimed that Carter made these
announcements because he honestly believed that Dole would
not hit its guidance and that $30 million of the $50 million
in savings was not achievable. The $50 million in savings
that DeLorenzo announced, however, was actually lower than
Dole's internal plan, which identified $62 million in specific
cost-cutting initiatives. JX 3069 at 2. As support for the
supposed impossibility of achieving the cuts, Carter argued
that “one of the ideas was to smash together, merge if you
wish, our Vegetables business with our North America Fresh
Fruit business” and that such a move “just could not work in
the market in terms of the people we sold to.” Carter 1105.
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That portion of the cost-saving plan accounted for only $10–
$20 million in cost savings, leaving $42–52 million in other
initiatives. JX 389 at 13. The defendants never went over the
detailed spreadsheet of department-by-department savings
that DeLorenzo prepared. They simply relied on Carter's
testimony, without offering any quantification or support. See
Carter 872, 1105, 1137.
Just as the defendants did not explain where the cost savings
went at trial, Carter did not explain the disappearance of
the cost savings to the market. The loss of $30 million in
savings represented approximately 20% of Dole's forecasted
EBITDA, yet he mentioned it virtually without comment.
The timing of his announcement on January 2 suggests the
real reason. It came just after Deutsche Bank renewed its
discussion with Murdock about the freeze-out and just days
before Deutsche Bank gave a detailed presentation that it
prepared with the assistance of Dole management on January
11. See JX 326, 394. In other words, Carter made the
announcement just as internal discussions about the freeze-
out were heating up.8
2. The Brouhaha Over The Self–Tender
*12  A week after the January 2, 2013, release that guided
the market downward, Murdock, Carter, and Potillo met with
Deutsche Bank, ostensibly about a potential share repurchase
program for Dole. Deutsche Bank's presentation did discuss
Dole repurchasing $25–$200 million of its shares, but also
contained a section on a potential purchase of 100% of
the Company's outstanding stock—a full take-private. JX
392. On January 25, 2013, Deutsche Bank sent Griswold
and Potillo another presentation and discussed in the cover
email how the different programs would affect Murdock's
ownership and his ability to gain majority control. JX 404 at 1.
A presentation prepared by Scotiabank, another Dole lender,
explained how the repurchase program would fit into plans
for Murdock to take Dole private. JX 447 at 6. Scotiabank
projected that the repurchase price would be significantly
lower than what Murdock would pay for the remaining
shares, meaning Murdock would benefit more from a larger
repurchase.
In February 2013, Deutsche Bank provided Dole management
with another presentation, this time analyzing the choice
between a self-tender and a program of open market
purchases. JX 415 at 6–7. The presentation explained that
a self-tender would enable Dole to buy a larger volume of
shares quickly, but that Dole would have to pay a premium
over market. With the open market program, Dole would not
a pay a premium, but there was a “risk of price appreciation
given the long time frame.” Id. at 7. Describing the price
appreciation as a “risk” showed where Deutsche Bank's
loyalties lay. Price appreciation was a risk to Murdock for
taking the company private. It was not a risk for Dole or its
stockholders, who would benefit from the higher price.
Murdock and management decided that that they favored
the self-tender. Dole hired Bank of America Merrill Lynch
(“BAML”), another bank that Dole had worked with
frequently in the past, to advise on the share repurchase.
At Deutsche Bank, Grellier and Brook decided they were
“comfortable” with this development because they thought it
was “[b]etter to hold out for [the] advisory” engagement on
the freeze-out transaction. JX 474 at 1. They just needed to
“[make] sure [the BAML bankers] don't get too close to go
private discussions.” Id.
On May 2, 2013, the Board discussed the potential share
repurchase program. At the time, the Board had nine
members. Three were members of management: Murdock,
Carter, and DeLorenzo. A fourth was Murdock's son Justin.
The other five were outside directors: Conrad, Weinberg,
Lansing, Dickson, and Elaine Chao. The four outside
directors other than Weinberg would later serve on the
Committee, and this decision discusses their backgrounds in
connection with that event.
Conrad and Weinberg opposed the self-tender. They believed
that open market purchases were better for Dole and its
stockholders. Due to their opposition, the Board decided to
revisit the issue in three to five days. Weinberg made plans for
the outside directors to have an executive session with counsel
in the interim.
Meanwhile, the bankers at BAML were becoming concerned.
They advised Carter and Potillo to buy shares in the open
market or wait for the stock price to decline. JX 510
at 1. Internally, the bankers described the self-tender as
“ridiculous and terrible corporate finance” to the point where
“[r]eputational risk of such is [a] real issue....” JX 511 at 1.
But Murdock kept pressing for a self-tender, and he called
Conrad and Weinberg repeatedly about it. Eventually, Conrad
told Murdock bluntly that he thought Murdock was trying to
get a majority of the shares and that Conrad would not let him
do it through a self-tender. Murdock became furious. Conrad
831. On May 4, 2013, he left Conrad the following voicemail:
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Hello, Dr. Conrad. David [Murdock]. I'd like to talk to
you. I'm in New York at [telephone number]. I wanted to
talk with you about what's going on [with] you and Denny
Weinberg. I can't believe that you are opposed to the most,
very good thing for the company, and I cannot imagine why
you would be opposing it, but it sure as hell pisses me off
to think that you didn't call me and tell me what it is going
on with you. I'm not accustomed to having a friend double-
cross me but if that has happened....
*13  JX 518. Murdock continued speaking, but Conrad's
voicemail stopped recording. At trial, Murdock testified
that he ended his threatening message with the suddenly
conciliatory conclusion, then “I'll go your way.” Murdock
415. That testimony was not credible.
On May 6, 2013, the outside directors met in executive
session. They discussed the self-tender and open market
repurchases. They also considered possible defensive
measures against Murdock, but decided not to implement any.
On May 8, 2013, the full Board met. Murdock did not
attend. The directors unanimously approved open market
repurchases.
After the vote, Murdock left a voicemail for Weinberg that
was similar to the one he left for Conrad. Weinberg described
the message as “not for public consumption.” Weinberg Dep.
33. Conrad described it as “stronger than mine.” Conrad Dep.
13. Weinberg recalled Murdock saying, “[I]f you think you're
trying to take over my company, you won't be successful.
Nobody needs you, including me, and we'll talk about that
more when you call me.” Weinberg Dep. 33; cf. Murdock 62–
66 (providing not-credible testimony after viewing video clip
of Weinberg).
Weinberg did not call Murdock back. A few days later, Carter
called Weinberg and asked him to resign, citing a “lack of
collegiality at the board level” due to Weinberg's “personality
clash” with Murdock. Carter Dep. 20. On May 14, 2013,
the Board executed written consents accepting Weinberg's
resignation. Justin Murdock also resigned. This left Dole
with three management directors (Murdock, Carter, and
DeLorenzo) and four non-management directors (Conrad,
Chao, Lansing, and Dickson).9
3. Carter Cancels The Repurchase Plan.
Murdock did not get his way on the self-tender, but he
and Carter made sure that the outside directors did not get
their way either. Two weeks later, Carter used the pretext of
funding new ships to cancel the repurchase program.
Dole shipped most of the bananas destined for North America
on a fleet of three refrigerated vessels. By 2013, the ships
were old and needed replacing. In May, Dole management
recommended commissioning three new ships for $168
million. Management explained the old ships had to be
retired, and Dole would either need to buy new ships or pay
expensive third-party shipping costs. Management estimated
that new ships would save $37 million per year compared to
third-party shipping costs.
The Board approved the new ships, and Carter issued a press
release announcing the decision on May 28, 2013. In the same
press release, he announced that share repurchases had been
“suspended indefinitely.” JX 582. The press release quoted
Carter as stating:
*14  [W]e have decided to use our existing funding
resources to take advantage of this opportune window in
the shipping industry.... With the approximate $165 million
investment in the ships and the drag on earnings due to
significant losses in our strawberry business, the share
repurchase program is being suspended indefinitely.
Id. at 1. After the announcement, Dole's stock price tumbled
10%.
Carter had not informed the Board about his decision to
suspend the repurchase plan, nor had he suggested any
connection between the ships and the repurchase plan. Dole's
outside directors only learned of the plan's cancellation from
public sources. Chao described the press coverage as “pretty
devastating” and asked Carter if he had anticipated the
response. He had, and he testified at trial that he knew the
announcement would drive down the stock price. JX 592;
Carter 1101.
At trial, Carter claimed he cancelled the plan because he was
worried about covenants in Dole's debt, and he performed
a calculation which showed the covenants were at risk if
Dole immediately spent the entire $200 million to repurchase
shares and immediately paid the entire $165 million for the
ships. That calculation was pretextual. Dole was not obligated
to spend the full $200 million on shares, and the program was
authorized to be carried out over a year. The contract for the
ships called for payments spread over four years, with $32.9
million per year due in 2013 and 2014. The Board believed
that the ship acquisition and share repurchase programs were
both feasible. So did BAML, which advised the Board on the
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share repurchase. On cross-examination Carter conceded that
the debt covenants would not have been tripped by pursuing
both initiatives, even if the ships had been paid in full and
all $200 million of share repurchases were completed in May
2013. Carter 1097–1101. In any case, there was no reason
Carter needed to take action immediately without consulting
the Board.
G. Murdock Makes His Proposal.
While these events were unfolding, Murdock was making his
final preparations for the freeze-out. During a meeting on
April 12, 2013, Murdock cautioned Deutsche Bank to provide
feedback “in verbal form only” and “to restrict the working
group to only senior bankers,” which meant the people who
had “been at his breakfast table over the last 90 days.” JX 476
at 1. After the meeting, Deutsche Bank updated its internal
materials. JX 1681 at 1.
On May 15, 2013, Murdock met with senior bankers from
Deutsche Bank and told them he wanted a “highly confident”
letter on May 29 and would “approach the board on the 31st.”
JX 555 at 1. Murdock and Carter spoke with Deutsche Bank
again on May 20. JX 564 at 1. They discussed “arranger fees”
for Deutsche Bank to finance the take-private. Id.
At trial, despite all of his preparations, Murdock testified that
he had not yet decided to propose the Merger. He claimed
that in early June 2013, he visited his friend Lee Kun-hee,
the chairman of Samsung, in South Korea, and that Lee told
him to make up his mind. Murdock supposedly decided on
the flight back to pursue the freeze-out.
That is a nice story, but Murdock did too much planning
over the preceding months, had been considering a freeze-
out for too long, and is too decisive an individual to have
dithered until Lee bucked up his courage. He initially delayed
because he thought the share price was trending down, in
part because of Carter's activities, and a lower price would
make his proposal look better. See JX 1689. Murdock may
well have chosen not to make his proposal formally until after
he returned from Korea, but that was a matter of personal
convenience. It was not because he was at a loss for what to
do.10
H. The Committee
*15  On June 10, 2013, Murdock delivered his initial
proposal to the Board. JX 604. The stock had most recently
traded at $10.20. Murdock's letter contemplated a transaction
at $12.00 per share. Murdock stated that he was “a buyer, not
a seller,” so the Board would not be able seek a higher price
per share from a third party interested in buying the entire
Company. See JX 610; Murdock 460–61; Conrad Dep. 9.
Murdock set a deadline of July 31, 2013, for the Board to
respond to his offer. His letter stated that “time is of the
essence” and that he planned to withdraw his offer if it wasn't
accepted by July 31. JX 604 at 4. Murdock did not set the
deadline because of any particular event that would occur
after July 31. Murdock admitted at trial that he set an artificial
deadline so the Board would have to act quickly. Murdock
459–60.
On June 11, 2013, the Board formed the Committee,
comprising Conrad, Chao, Dickson, and Lansing. Of the four,
Conrad had the most entanglements with Murdock:
• Conrad had a long history as a director for Murdock-
controlled companies. He served as a director of Castle
& Cooke from 2005 to 2009, and as a director of Castle &
Cooke Investments from 2008 to 2009. At the time of the
Merger, he had served as a director of Dole since 2003
and also served as a director of NovaRx Corporation,
another company that Murdock controlled.
• In addition to serving as a director of NovaRx, Conrad
served as a clinical design consultant for NovaRx and
invested $2 million in Prescient Innovations I, LLC, the
affiliate through which Murdock controls NovaRx.
• Conrad and Murdock co-founded the California Health
& Longevity Institute, where Conrad served as the Lab
Director. Conrad owned 70% of the entity, which was
located across the street from Dole's headquarters in
space leased from a Murdock affiliate.
• Conrad was the Chief Scientific Officer of the North
Carolina Research Campus (the “NCRC”), which
Murdock founded in 2005 and to which Murdock gave
$700 million. One of the NCRC's programs is the
David H. Murdock Research Institute (the “Murdock
Institute”). During the time that he served on the
Board, Conrad served as a director of the Murdock
Institute. Since 2007, Murdock and his affiliates made
contributions and extended loans to the Murdock
Institute totaling $243.2 million. On May 8, 2013,
shortly before he made his merger proposal, Murdock
pledged an additional $50 million to the Murdock
Institute.
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• Conrad was the Executive Vice President and Chief
Scientific Officer of LabCorp. In collaboration with
Duke University, LabCorp was commercializing new
biomarkers using data from the MURDOCK Study
(Measure to Understand Reclassification of Disease of
Cabarrus/Kannapolis), funded through a $35 million
grant from Murdock.
In addition to these carrots, Murdock had shown Conrad
the stick. After Conrad and Weinberg led the opposition
to Murdock's self-tender proposal, Murdock left threatening
voicemails for both of them, and Carter secured Weinberg's
resignation.
Dickson's connections to Murdock were not as extensive as
Conrad's, but also deserved a closer look. He was the Emeritus
Director of Development at the Mayo Foundation for Medical
Education and Research. Murdock had contributed to the
Mayo Foundation to fund a professorship called the David
H. Murdock–Dole Food Company Professorship, and the
Mayo Clinic listed Murdock as a principal benefactor. In 2001
and earlier, Dickson served as Murdock's personal physician.
From 1999 to 2003, Dickson served on the Dole Board, and
he was a member of the special committee that approved
Murdock's going-private transaction in 2003. After that deal
closed, Dickson left the Board. Murdock reappointed Dickson
to the Board in February 2013—just months before he made
his proposal. One might be skeptical about the coincidence.
Dickson received $98,000 for serving on the Committee in
2013, which represented approximately one-fourth of his
income.
*16  Lansing was a former actress and successful film studio
executive, having served as Chair and CEO of the Motion
Picture Group of Paramount Pictures from 1992 to 2005.
She was also a philanthropic leader. She co-founded the
California Spirit gala, which raises funds for the American
Cancer Society. In 2009, the California Spirit event honored
Murdock, and Lansing joined the Board later that year. Of a
similar order of magnitude, Lansing had served on the Board
of Regents of the University of California system since 1999
and was Chair from 2011 to 2013. She also served on the
board of the UCLA Foundation, while Murdock has been
a Regents' Professor of Creativity in Business at UCLA's
Anderson Graduate School of Management and presented at
the UCLA Longevity Center Institute Conference. Lansing
also served on the American Red Cross Board of Governors,
which held its All American Award Dinner in 2013 at the
David H. Murdock Core Laboratory at the NCRC.
Chao had the fewest ties to Murdock. She served as a director
of Dole from 1993 to 2001, then rejoined the Board in 2009.
She served as Secretary of Labor in the cabinet of President
George W. Bush from 2001 to 2009. Murdock raised funds for
George W. Bush. She is married to Senator Mitch McConnell,
and Murdock contributed $4,800 to his campaign in 2008.
Murdock, Carter, and DeLorenzo wanted the Board to pick
the Committee's Chair, and they wanted it to be Conrad.
The Committee members wanted to pick their own Chair,
and because they comprised a majority of the Board, they
were able to include this power in the resolutions. Murdock,
Carter, and DeLorenzo voted against that provision. The
disagreement over who should pick the Chair turned out not
to matter, because the Committee chose Conrad anyway.
Before trial, Conrad's role as Chair was not a reassuring fact.
It was reasonable to infer from Conrad's ties to Murdock, the
events surrounding Weinberg's resignation, and the insiders'
desire to have Conrad as Chair that Conrad would be
cooperative, if not malleable, when facing Murdock. But after
hearing Conrad testify and interacting with him in person at
trial, I am convinced that he was independent in fact.
Dickson, Lansing, and Chao did not testify at trial, but
having considered the Committee's performance, I have no
concerns about their independence. That is all the more true
for Lansing, whose connections to Murdock suggested only
that they moved in the same circles and were not themselves
compromising, and for Chao, whose connections to Murdock
were similar in tenor but less extensive.
I. Carter Interferes With The Committee.
With the Committee established, it would have been nice if
Murdock and Carter had stepped aside and let the Committee
do its job. They could have taken the 4–to–3 vote on choosing
the Chair as an indication that the Committee would be
independent. Instead, Carter asserted himself.
The first fight was over the scope of the Committee's
authority. The Committee wanted its mandate to include
considering alternatives to Murdock's proposal, with the
additional authority to continue considering alternatives even
if Murdock withdrew his proposal. Carter objected, telling the
Committee:
The Dole Board created the Special Committee ...
specifically to deal with Murdock's proposal and for no
other purpose. That's the only delegated authority from
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the Board. That's why the resolutions have a termination
provision, so that the Special Committee's mandate ends if
the proposal is withdrawn.... [T]he Board did not replace
itself with a charge to sell the company other than in the
context of the proposal.
JX 651 at 1. As Conrad recalled, Carter “hammered on” these
issues with the “intention to try to limit the scope of what
the Committee could do.” Conrad Dep. 20. The Committee
members decided not to force the issue because they believed
that if push came to shove, they comprised a majority of the
Board and could have a new vote at the Board level.
*17  The next confrontation was over the Committee's ability
to enter into nondisclosure agreements with other potential
bidders. Carter insisted on having control over the terms of
the agreements. He stated that “Dole will not delegate its
authority over its own proprietary confidential information”
to the Committee, and he insisted that “Dole will enter in a
direct confidentiality agreement with that party, starting from
a standard form and tailoring for the specific attributes of that
third party.” JX 651 at 1. On this issue, Carter was clearly in
the wrong, because it was the Committee that was empowered
to exercise Dole's authority, not Carter. But the Committee
decided not to force this issue either. As a result, Carter
always knew whenever the Committee provided confidential
information to an interested party. Carter nominally worked
for Dole, but he really worked for Murdock, so Murdock
knew as well.
The third dispute was over the Committee's choice of
advisors. Conrad took the lead in the selection process,
and he started by reading MFW. With the help of other
Committee members, Conrad compiled a list of law firms
and investment banks. To ensure that their advisors would
be independent, Conrad and the Committee ruled out firms
that had done business with Murdock or Dole, as well as any
firms that Murdock or Dole recommended. After interviewing
several, they retained Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Richards
Layton & Finger, P.A. as their legal counsel, and Lazard as
their financial advisor. The lead attorney from Sullivan &
Cromwell was Alison Ressler. The lead partner for Lazard
was Al Garner.
Carter objected to Lazard. He wanted the Committee to
hire BAML, a bank with a longstanding relationship with
Dole. Carter complained that Conrad had not given him a
draft of Lazard's engagement letter before signing it, that
a twelve-month engagement was too long, and that the
letter contemplated that Lazard would explore alternative
transactions. Returning to his stance on the Committee's
mandate, Carter argued that “Lazard is incentivized to go well
beyond Murdock's Proposal and the Board's intended scope
of the Special Committee.” JX 660 at 3. Carter complained
to Murdock and DeLorenzo as well, explaining that “the
scope of Lazard's engagement goes well beyond the Special
Committee's mandate.” Id. at 1.
In response to Carter's concerns, the Committee and Lazard
removed the reference to a twelve-month engagement and
the detailed description of alternative transactions. Compare
JX 654 with JX 652. At trial, Conrad explained the practical
reasoning behind the concession. Carter was refusing to let
Lazard start conducting due diligence until he signed off on
Lazard's engagement letter, and the clock was ticking on a
response to Murdock's offer.
Meanwhile, Murdock was preparing to launch a hostile tender
offer if the Committee did not respond favorably by the July
31 deadline. On June 28, Murdock told Deutsche Bank that
he was 75% sure he wanted to move forward with a hostile
tender offer if the Committee did not agree to a transaction,
and he told Deutsche Bank to be ready to launch in three to
four weeks. JX 1729 at 1. Murdock indicated that his reserve
price for the tender offer was between $13.00 and $13.50 per
share. Id. Deutsche Bank prepared an internal “hostile offer
memo” describing the offer. JX 1613. A draft press release
contemplated that the offer would be launched during the
Committee's deliberations. It included a proposed quotation
from Murdock which stated that he was making a tender offer
despite “recogniz[ing] that the Dole special committee has not
concluded its study of my initial proposal.” JX 678 at 2. Other
documents confirm that Murdock was preparing to launch a
hostile offer. See, e.g., JX 679; JX 1607; JX 1730; JX 1757.
Carter knew that Murdock was preparing the hostile offer and
consulted with Deutsche Bank and Murdock about it. See JX
1729 at 1; JX 1730 at 1; cf. Carter 966. At trial, Carter argued
that he had no obligation to inform the Committee as long as
Murdock had not yet made a firm decision to launch. Carter
1013.
J. Carter Gives False Financial Information To The
Committee.
*18  The next step in Carter's interactions with the
Committee proved fatal to the process. To be able to negotiate
at arm's length with Murdock, the Committee needed reliable
financial projections from Dole management. Lazard's work,
including any fairness opinion it rendered, likewise depended
on “the accuracy and completeness” of “estimates and
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forecasts provided by the Company.” JX 783 at 2. As Garner
candidly acknowledged, material misinformation from the
Company could undermine the entire exercise. Garner 1311.
Carter used his control over Dole's management to provide
false information to the Committee. In the ordinary course
of business, on an annual basis, Dole prepared three-year
budgets and financial projections using a bottom-up process.
That process typically began in late summer and continued
through the fall. It started with the operating divisions,
which created detailed models and projections for Dole's
management. Management then aggregated the projections,
met with the divisions, and pushed them to refine their figures.
After an iterative process, senior management generated the
final numbers.
Using its standard process, under DeLorenzo's direction, Dole
had prepared a set of three-year projections in December 2012
(the “December Projections”). In April 2013, Dole provided
the December Projections to its lenders for use in refinancing
Dole's debt after the ITOCHU Transaction.
Lazard obtained a copy of the December Projections shortly
after being retained. On July 8, 2013, Lazard met with Dole
management to discuss the December Projections. At the
meeting, Lazard asked for updated projections that reflected
Dole management's “current best views about the prospects
of [the] business.” Garner 1248. Lazard also asked Dole
management to extend the projections from three to five
years.
Carter took charge of revising the December Projections.
He called together Dole's senior management, including the
division heads from foreign offices, for a two-day meeting on
July 9 and 10, 2013. During the meeting, Carter instructed
the division heads to create modified projections from the top
down. Rather than generating a complete set of projections
with supporting profit-loss statements, Carter and his team
created only high-case and low-case adjusted EBITDA
forecasts. Carter told the division heads to reverse engineer
the supporting budgets after the meeting. That process was
not completed until July 22, 2013.
On July 11, 2013, Carter presented the new five-year
projections (the “July Projections”) to the Board and the
Committee. He did not give the Committee or its advisors the
opportunity to meet in person with the division heads.
The July Projections were significantly lower than the
December Projections. For example, the July Projections
reduced the EBITDA in year three of the December
Projections from $211.9 million to $169.2 million, a reduction
of over 20%. JX 783 at 17. The July Projections were so
low that Lazard did not think they would support Murdock's
$12.00 offer, much less provide a basis for negotiating
a higher price. Garner 1249. Conrad concluded that the
projections were not “an accurate representation of the value
of the Company.” Conrad Dep. 25. Garner thought that
“management had taken a meat cleaver to the projections in
a way that it would be very difficult, if not inappropriate,
for a committee to weigh these projections as the basis for
determining the adequacy of a price.” Garner Dep. 32.
Two aspects of the July Projections warrant particular focus.
First, the projections contained only $20 million out of the
$50 million in post-ITOCHU cost savings that Deutsche Bank
had validated and DeLorenzo had originally predicted. Carter
881–82. This decision has already discussed the unsupported
nature of that reduction.
*19  Second, the July Projections did not forecast that
Dole would receive any additional income from purchases
of farms. Carter 985. At the time Carter prepared the July
Projections, Dole management had identified the need to
acquire farms as a strategic imperative. Dole sourced its
fruit in Latin America from both Dole-owned farms and
independent growers, and Dole had embarked on a long-
term strategy of increasing the amount of fruit sourced
from Dole-owned farms. Historically, Dole occupied an
advantageous position as a middleman that bought from
disorganized and unsophisticated growers and sold to a
fragmented distribution market that lacked pricing power.
But in the new millennium, both ends of the equation were
changing. Consolidation in the grocery industry and the entry
of large purchasers like Wal–Mart shifted the balance of
pricing power towards distributors. Meanwhile, the internet
gave growers access to detailed pricing information, and
changes in the transportation market enabled them to bypass
Dole by shipping fruit in refrigerated containers on general
purpose container ships. The logical strategic response for
Dole was to increase the scope of its vertical integration by
acquiring farms, thereby capturing the growers' share of the
profits.
Before the ITOCHU Transaction, Dole had plans to purchase
additional farms in Latin America. In October 2012, the
Board approved the acquisition of 2,328 hectares of banana
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farms in Ecuador for $58.9 million, which Dole estimated
would generate $15 million per year in incremental income.
JX 344 at 71. Dole expected that investing in other new farms
similarly would “improve [Dole's] average fruit cost ... and
margins.” JX 900 at 2.
Dole delayed the farm purchases because of “cash flow
restrictions” before the ITOCHU Transaction. Id. at 2.
The sale to ITOCHU gave Dole the financial resources
to resume its purchases. Id. Dole bought approximately
half of its targeted farms before the remaining purchases
were suspended because of a tax dispute with Ecuadorian
authorities. JX 421 at 7; Acuña 1167.
Although Dole had focused initially on Ecuador, the
Company's interest in farms was not limited to that country.
Dole was engaged in a “permanent search for the most
efficient source mix” in Latin America and beyond. JX 900
at 2. Put simply, Dole was interested in good deals on farms
wherever it could find them, and the capital request for the
Ecuador farms noted that buying farms in Guatemala and
Costa Rica would be advantageous for the same reasons. JX
900 at 2; DeLorenzo 641–43, 680. But the July Projections
did not contain any incremental income from farms.
In contrast to what gave the Committee, Carter provided more
positive information to Murdock's bankers when he met with
them separately the next day. Griswold had asked Carter to
set up a meeting between Dole management and the lenders
for Murdock's freeze-out so that the lenders could conduct
financial due diligence. Having brought Dole's management
together to create the July Projections, Carter had them stay
for a meeting with Murdock's bankers on July 12, 2013 (the
“Lender Meeting”). Multiple representatives from Deutsche
Bank, BAML, and Scotiabank attended, as did Griswold and
Murdock's attorneys from Paul Hastings. At least fourteen
members of Dole's senior management were present. Carter
did not tell the Committee or its advisors that the meeting was
taking place.
Carter claimed at trial that the purpose of the Lender Meeting
was to update Dole's existing lenders about the Company's
performance, not to talk about Murdock's take-private
proposal. Carter 964. That was false, as he conceded when
confronted with contrary evidence on cross-examination.
Carter 1024. Griswold had asked for the meeting, and he was
not a Dole employee. When instructing Dole management
to stay for the meeting, Carter told them explicitly that they
needed to “[p]lan to hold over to make presentations/respond
to questions in a D/D [due diligence] meeting on Friday July
12 ... [to] [a]bout 20+ people from DHM's [Murdock's] four
lead banks re the go-private proposal.” JX 681 (emphasis
added). Deutsche Bank regarded the Lender Meeting as a
“Project Fresh Financing Due Diligence Session,” using the
code name for the freeze-out (“Project Fresh”). JX 3042 at 1.
*20  During the Lender Meeting, Carter told Murdock's
bankers that Dole would outperform the July Projections.
He said that Dole would “beat or meet forecasts of $155
[million in EBITDA]” and that Dole likely could “upsize the
projection by $18–$19 [million].” JX 692 at 1.
During the Lender Meeting, Carter discussed the projected
$50 million in post-ITOCHU Transaction cost savings. The
meeting agenda included a discussion of the “timing and
realization of total cost savings, originally guided at $50
m[illion] at the time of [the] announcement of [the] ITOCHU
transaction.” JX 3042 at 10. In preparing for the meeting,
Carter did not simply stick to the lowered guidance he had
given the market in January. He instead instructed Tesoriero to
send him the original analysis that supported “well over $50
[million in cost savings]” on July 2. JX 1697 at 1. According
to notes by Deutsche Bank representative, Carter said Dole
already had achieved “just $20 [million] of cost savings” in
the $154 million EBITDA for 2013. JX 692 at 3.
Carter also told Murdock's bankers during the Lender
Meeting that Dole would be able to substantially increase its
income by buying more farms. Notes taken by a Deutsche
Bank representative reflect that Dole's farm purchases
“[e]asily could be $100 [million] ($15 [million] initial return
or 20% EBITDA margin).” JX 692 at 3. Dole was “[t]rying
to reach a competitive advantage in Guatemala” and hence
“buying its own farms for the first time.” Id. at 2. Ecuador
remained at the top of the list, but Dole “could capture a buck
on pricing anywhere by buying farms.” Id. at 3. Notes taken
by a BAML representative confirm Dole's plan to “[a]cquire
more land to have more Dole owned bananas and pineapples.”
JX 699 at 5.
The Committee and its advisors never found out about the
full scope of the Lender Meeting. They did learn the next
day that Deutsche Bank had met with Dole management
without them, and they were informed that Deutsche Bank
had access to the Committee's data room. JX 700 at 3. But
until this litigation, the Committee and its advisors never
knew that BAML, Scotiabank, Wells Fargo, Paul Hastings,
and Griswold had also attended the Lender Meeting, or that
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Murdock's advisors had the opportunity to meet in person
with and question Dole's international management. Id.;
Conrad 816. By the time the Committee learned about the
meeting, Dole's international management team had already
dispersed throughout the world, so the Committee could not
obtain equivalent information for itself. See Conrad 813.
The Lender Meeting was an obvious violation of the
procedures that the Committee had established. On June
24, 2013, Conrad had sent letters to Murdock and Carter
setting forth the procedures to be followed for confidential
information about Dole in connection with Murdock's
proposal. JX 646 (the “Process Letter”). The Process Letter
instructed Murdock and his advisors to go through the
Committee when interacting with Dole on matters relating to
Murdock's proposal. It stated clearly that “all communications
by you or any of your advisors concerning [the proposed take-
private] ... should be strictly limited to myself, as Chairman of
the Committee, or our advisors, [Sullivan & Cromwell] and
Lazard.” Id. at 2.
*21  If the Committee had known about the planned Lender
Meeting, it would not have permitted the meeting to take
place. Garner 1323–24. If the Committee had authorized
some form of due diligence meeting for Murdock's lenders,
then Lazard and possibly the Committee members themselves
would have attended. Id. Lazard and the Committee never
learned what Carter told Murdock's lenders about the cost
savings and the farms. Conrad 815–16, 819–22. As Conrad
recognized, “[t]his information would have been helpful and
important to us. We should have known this.” Conrad 834.
The Lender Meeting was not the only time that Carter flouted
the Committee's instructions. After learning that Deutsche
Bank had met with Dole management, Sullivan & Cromwell
instructed Carter to “immediately shut down Deutsche Bank's
access to the data room and cease to provide them with any
information.” JX 700 at 3. Carter refused. When Sullivan &
Cromwell responded that providing information to Deutsche
Bank violated the Process Letter, Carter responded, without
explanation, “I am complying with the process letter.” Id. at
1. But he wasn't, and he hadn't.11 Carter also had violated the
Process Letter and his duties to Dole by helping Murdock and
Deutsche Bank to plan a hostile tender offer, and he would
do so again later in the process by advising Murdock and his
team about negotiating with the Committee and the terms of
the eventual merger agreement.
K. The Committee Develops Its Own Projections.
Once the Committee and Lazard realized that they could not
rely on the July Projections, they decided to prepare their own
forecasts. They used the December Projections as a starting
point and made their own adjustments. The Committee
instructed Lazard to attempt to replicate Dole's normal
bottom-up budgeting process and to draw on other sources
within Dole, such as materials used to secure financing, public
statements about value, and Board presentations.
Using these inputs, Lazard prepared the “Committee
Projections.” See JX 783 at 21–22. Conrad personally spent
many hours working with Lazard on the new projections.
Conrad 767. The Committee and Lazard concluded that
the Committee Projections represented an aggressive but
reasonable and achievable forecast. Conrad Dep. 29; Garner
1258.
Notably, because Lazard relied on guidance provided by
Dole management, the Committee Projections did not include
upward adjustments for achieving the final $30 million of
the $50 million in cost savings or from the purchases of
additional farms. Conrad 820–22. Lazard did not include
any additional cost savings associated with the division-
level restructuring plan that was adopted after the ITOCHU
Transaction because management did not advise Lazard
that the remaining initiatives could still be undertaken.
Lazard also did not have access to Tesoriero's analysis that
supported the $50 million in cost savings, even though Carter
consulted with Tesoriero about it in preparation for the Lender
Meeting. Lazard did include a sensitivity case in its analysis
that contemplated an additional $30 million in annual cost
savings. JX 783 at 31. Lazard calculated that achieving these
cost savings would increase Lazard's estimate of Dole's value
by $345 million, or $3.80 per share. Id.
*22  Lazard did not include a sensitivity case for farms
because management had not provided specific guidance on
this issue. Garner 1283–84. By contrast, Carter had told
Murdock's bankers in the Lender Meeting that Dole would
acquire $100 million in farms, generating $15 million in
annual EBITDA improvement. See JX 692 at 3. DeLorenzo
admitted at trial that the Board had never suspended or
terminated the farm purchase program. DeLorenzo 688.
L. The Committee Receives Indications Of Interest From
Other Bidders.
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After the announcement of Murdock's proposal, the
Committee and its advisors received incoming calls from
interested parties. The most serious were from two potential
financial buyers, Platinum Equity and Apollo, and two
potential strategic buyers, ITOCHU and Chiquita. The initial
expressions of interest from ITOCHU and Apollo did not
develop into offers, and no one focused on them at trial.
Platinum Equity floated a figure of $14 per share, but Garner
testified credibly that after questioning Platinum Equity,
Lazard decided that the offer was not serious.
Chiquita, by contrast, was serious about acquiring all of Dole,
including Murdock's stake. Lazard viewed Chiquita as the
most promising bidder, in part because Dole and Chiquita
had previously come close to finalizing a deal. Because of
this view, the Committee and its advisors asked Murdock to
entertain an offer from Chiquita. He refused, confirming that
he was only a buyer, not a seller.
M. The Committee Negotiates With Murdock.
In late July 2013, with Murdock's artificial deadline of July
31 approaching, the Committee decided to send Conrad to
meet with Murdock. The Committee and Lazard had met
with Murdock initially on June 24, shortly after Lazard
was retained, so that Murdock could make his pitch. After
that meeting, Carter's opposition delayed Lazard's access to
confidential information, and then Lazard and the Committee
had to invest significant time and effort preparing the
Committee Projections.
Conrad met with Murdock at his home on July 27, 2013. The
Committee and its advisors agreed beforehand that Conrad
would not make a counteroffer or accept a proposal during
the meeting, and Conrad told Murdock that. He also told
Murdock that the July 31 “deadline was unrealistic unless
there was a sensational offer that would wow the committee”
and that otherwise the Committee was going to continue its
process. Conrad 778–79.
Murdock became upset. He reiterated his demand that the
Committee make a decision by July 31 and criticized the pace
of the Committee's work. Conrad 778. During what Conrad
described as an “arduous” meeting, Murdock pressured
Conrad, but Conrad consistently refused to make a counter-
offer. Conrad 778–79. Frustrated, Murdock began negotiating
against himself, increasing his offer to $12.25, then to $12.50.
Conrad 778. Finally, Conrad thanked Murdock and started
to leave. While Conrad was walking down the driveway,
Murdock called him back and offered $13.05. Conrad 779–
80. Conrad reiterated that he was not authorized to accept an
offer and left. Conrad 779–80.
N. The Committee And Murdock Agree On Price.
The Committee scheduled a second meeting with Murdock
for five days later, on August 1, 2013. This time, Lansing
accompanied Conrad, with the rest of the Committee and its
advisors available by phone.
The meeting took place at Murdock's offices. Murdock
attended with his advisors. Murdock increased his offer to
$13.25 per share, stating “That's it, I'm not going to pay
any more.” Murdock 782. After teleconferencing separately
with their team, Conrad and Lansing countered at $14.00.
Conrad cited the expression of interest from Platinum Equity
at $14 per share as a justification for that price. Murdock met
with his advisors separately and then offered $13.50. Conrad
and Lansing teleconferenced again with their team, and the
Committee decided to accept Murdock's price.
*23  Conrad felt that Murdock “had reached his limit”
and “that there was nothing left for him to pay.” Conrad
784. Lazard's DCF analysis using the Committee Projections
valued Dole at between $11.40 and $14.08, and the $13.50
price fell closer to the top of the range than the midpoint.
See JX 783 at 29. The price also exceeded the ranges of
values generated by Lazard's public company and precedent
transaction analyses. Id. The Committee's advisors believed
that it was a good outcome. Conrad 784. At the time, the
Committee and its advisors did not know that the projections
Lazard had used lacked material information about planned
cost savings and farm purchases.
O. The Terms Of The Merger Agreement
After reaching agreement on price, the Committee and its
advisors negotiated the terms of the Agreement and Plan
of Merger among DFC Holdings, LLC, DFC Merger Corp.,
Murdock, and Dole (the “Merger Agreement”). Murdock
pushed for a two-step transaction with strong deal protections,
and he claimed (inaccurately) that the Committee's agreement
on price had encompassed those terms. See JX 759. The
Committee stood firm and insisted on a one-step transaction, a
go-shop period, a small breakup fee, and an additional equity
commitment from Murdock to ensure the transaction would
close.
During the negotiations, without receiving permission from
the Committee, Carter and other members of Dole's
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senior management advised Murdock. They took steps
to conceal their involvement by minimizing their written
communications, but the record contains sufficient examples
to suggest that the communications were more extensive. For
example, Carter, Potillo, and Jeff Conner, Dole's Associate
General Counsel, helped Murdock's counsel revise an
agreement with Murdock's lenders. JX 770. Carter also spoke
with Murdock's attorneys about the deal by phone. JX 778.
Carter even advised Murdock's attorneys about pro-Murdock
terms to obtain in the Merger Agreement. See JX 759 at 1. He
also consulted with Murdock's attorneys about how to deal
with the Committee on other matters. See JX 635.
P. The New Budget
While negotiations over the Merger Agreement were
ongoing, Carter started Dole's annual budgeting process and
instructed Dole's divisions to correct certain unreasonable
assumptions made weeks earlier for purposes of the
July Projections. On August 8, 2014, acting on Carter's
instructions, Dole's Controller sent a memo to management
about creating their forecasts. JX 773. The memorandum
noted that all operating divisions except Europe would
“easily” exceed 4% EBITDA margins, that the new base
case EBITDA projections needed to be “at the high end
of the EBITDA projections” from the July Projections, and
stated that the EBITDA margins therefore “must meet a
minimum 4% target for 2014, with improvements each
year thereafter.” Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). The memo
told management to ignore the EBITDA forecasts for years
four and five in the July Projections because those forecasts
“need to be reassessed, as these years' projections were kept
flat from 2016.” Id. The new projections were supposed
to be more favorable in other areas as well, with annual
capital expenditures to be forecasted “at no more than 1.25%
of divisional revenues,” compared to the 1.5% of revenue
forecast in the July Projections. Id.; JX 783 at 15. The memo
emphasized that the materials attached to the email for use
in preparing the new projections were “not to be circulated
outside of this distribution group.” JX 773 at 2 (emphasis
in original).
If the Committee had seen the new budget or knew about the
different assumptions, it might have upended the agreement
on price and reset the valuation expectations for Dole. On
August 11, 2013, it seemed possible that the Committee
might find out. Murdock's and Dole's attorneys were resisting
Sullivan & Cromwell on some final points. The Committee
had been scheduled to meet to consider the Merger Agreement
that day, but on the morning of August 11, Ressler of Sullivan
& Cromwell suggested that the Committee would hold off.
She cited a Board meeting scheduled for the next day at which
Dole's management would present updated information on the
budget, and she observed that the Committee could take that
information into account. JX 782 at 2.
*24  Ressler sent her email to other lawyers who were
working on the Merger for Dole. When they asked Carter
about the budget meeting, he lied. Despite having started the
budgeting process and given instructions to Dole's controller
about the changes to convey to management, Carter claimed
to “know nothing about a management team meeting next
week.” JX 782 at 1. He also wrote that “[t]here are no changes
to the operating budget—I had conversations with Lazard
yesterday about our timing of payments in 2013 to husband
cash for the closing in light of bank requirements, that's
all.” Id. He concluded, “I don't believe there is any need to
delay the merger agreement consideration.” Id. Carter also
forwarded his response to Murdock's attorneys, who used it
to push Sullivan & Cromwell to have the Committee vote on
the deal. See JX 780; JX 782 at 1.
Later that morning, Murdock called Conrad and left one of
his signature voicemails. This time he attacked Ressler and
urged Conrad to have the Committee consider the transaction
that day.
Yes, Andrew. David [Murdock], here. It is 20 minutes after
11:00 and I very desperately need to talk to you quickly
and if I can possibly get to you. I don't know if this call is
going through to you or not. But they are going to postpone
the transaction and they will destroy it today if that woman
lawyer [referring to Ressler] gets her way. And we're all
wondering—Pete [Tennyson] and Michael [Carter]—all of
us—are wondering what in the hell do they think they're
doing. They've already taken 10 days past the 1st and so
they'll destroy it. And I'm urging you not to let them. You
have the power to tell them you want a vote today. They are
saying they don't want to vote, and they want to get another
meeting on Monday.
JX 787. Conrad received the voicemail. Conrad 788.
The Committee meeting went forward that afternoon,
and they recommended Murdock's proposal to the Board.
Immediately afterwards, the Board met and approved the
transaction. The terms of the final transaction included an
additional $50 million equity commitment from Murdock
plus a 30–day go-shop period during which Dole would
pay Murdock a $15 million breakup fee if Dole terminated
Murdock's deal to accept a superior proposal.
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After the Merger Agreement was signed, Dole made
presentations to the rating agencies in September 2013 and to
its lenders in October 2013 that utilized forecasts similar to
the Committee Projections and significantly higher than the
July Projections that Carter gave Lazard. The presentations
noted that (i) Dole planned “to increase owned production
in bananas, pineapples and selected berries to improve
productivity at the farm level,” JX 837 at 17, and (ii) the
adjusted EBITDA margins for the Fresh Fruit division were
expected to “increase by 50 bps from 2013 to 2015 due to
increased operating leverage through further investments” in
Company-owned farms. JX 845 at 2. Internal management
materials entitled “Latin American 2014 Budget and 5 Y[ear]
P[lan]” prepared in October 2013, observed that Dole's “5YP
presumes we continue investing in additional banana and
pineapple company farms.” JX 879 at 39.
Q. The Transaction Closes.
During the go-shop period, Lazard contacted over
sixty parties. Leonard Green & Partners and Platinum
Equity executed confidentiality agreements and met with
management. Both eventually declined to bid.
Murdock's financing syndicate changed after the Merger
Agreement was signed. The final price exceeded what the
lending group previously had authorized. Wells Fargo, one of
Murdock's long-time bankers, dropped out. Deutsche Bank
and the other participating lenders put together the financing.
Dole held a special meeting of stockholders on October 31,
2013. A narrow majority of 50.9% of the disinterested shares
voted in favor, 21.2% voted against, 10.5% abstained, and
17.4% did not vote. The transaction closed on November 1,
2013.
R. Dole's Performance Shortly After The Transaction
*25  After the Merger closed, Dole bought almost exactly
the amount of farms that Carter had predicted at the
Lender Meeting. Carter told Murdock's bankers at the
Lender Meeting that farm purchases “[e]asily could be $100
[million]” and produce a “$15 [million] initial return.” JX
692 at 3. Dole met or exceeded both predictions after the
take-private. According to a Wells Fargo analyst report
dated December 5, 2014, that year Dole spent “$37 million
for the acquisition of a pineapple farm and $7 million
for the acquisition of a banana farm.... In addition, Dole
has purchased several farms throughout the year, which
require payments in FQ4 exceeding $80 million.” JX 924
at 2. A Deutsche Bank report stated that the farms were
expected to increase EBITDA by “around $23 million once
the acquisitions are fully integrated.” JX 920 at 1. Carter
testified that Dole purchased a total of “maybe $80, $100
million worth of farms, roughly” in 2014. Carter 985.
The defendants insist that none of these farm purchases
could have been foreseen, but all were consistent with Dole's
long-term strategy of buying farms. See, e.g., JX 900 at 2.
Moreover, Dole actually was considering plans to purchase
some of the specific farms before the Merger. Carter had
told Murdock's bankers at the Lender Meeting that Dole was
considering buying farms in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Chile.
JX 699 at 5; JX 692 at 3. In addition, in October 2013,
shortly after negotiations with the Committee ended, a Dole
presentation indicated that the Company was interested in
acquiring seven farms for a total of $75.9 million (including
required capital investments for improvements) at an average
cash flow return on investment of 30.9%. JX 879 at 41. The
list identified a pineapple farm in Costa Rica and banana
farms in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Peru. Id. at 47. Just one month after the Merger closed, Dole
acquired a pineapple farm in Costa Rica for approximately
$40 million. Acuña 1198. Dole had identified this farm as an
acquisition target in July 2013. Acuña Dep. 16–17.
After the Merger closed, Dole achieved more than the
$50 million in cost savings predicted after the ITOCHU
Transaction. See JX 914 at 1. Dole achieved roughly $30
million of cost savings in 2014 and approximately $51 million
in 2015. JX 920 at 1. Carter testified that Dole ultimately
achieved approximately $70 million in cost reductions, with
only $5.5 million attributed to Dole no longer operating as a
public company. Carter 984, 979.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“This case is another progeny of one of our law's hybrid
varietals: the combined appraisal and entire fairness action.”
Del.  Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898
A.2d 290, 299 (Del. Ch.2006) (Strine, V.C.). The Delaware
Supreme Court has instructed that when a merger gives rise
to both a plenary action for breach of fiduciary duty and
a statutory appraisal proceeding, the court should rule on
the plenary claims first, because a finding of liability and
the resultant remedy could moot the appraisal proceeding.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Appraisal
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I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1189 (Del.1988). “[R]egardless of the
Court's substantive findings, the plaintiffs are limited to, and
statutorily assured of, a single recovery.” Bomarko, Inc. v.
Int'l Telecharge, Inc. (Bomarko I ), 794 A.2d 1161, 1177 (Del.
Ch.1999), aff'd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del.2000) (Bomarko II ).
In the plenary proceeding, the plaintiffs claim that the Merger
was not entirely fair. They argue that Murdock, Carter, and
DeLorenzo breached their duty of loyalty and are personally
liable for damages, and they contend that Deutsche Bank is
also liable as an aider and abetter. They also seek to impose
liability on DFC Holdings, LLC, one of two entities that
Murdock used to effect the Merger.
This decision holds that Murdock and Carter breached their
duty of loyalty and are liable to the Class for $148,190,590.18,
representing damages of $2.74 per share. The plaintiffs did
not prove their case against DeLorenzo or Deutsche Bank.
A. The Merger Was Not Entirely Fair.
*26  “When a transaction involving self-dealing by a
controlling shareholder is challenged, the applicable standard
of judicial review is entire fairness, with the defendants
having the burden of persuasion.” Ams. Mining, 51 A.3d at
1239. The Merger was an interested transaction, so entire
fairness provided the baseline standard of review. Because
the record did not permit a pretrial determination that the
defendants were entitled to a burden shift or a lower standard
of review, “the burden of persuasion ... remain[ed] with
the defendants throughout the trial to demonstrate the entire
fairness of the interested transaction.” Id. at 1243.
“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing
and fair price.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
711 (Del.1983). Fair dealing “embraces questions of when
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.” Id. Fair
price “relates to the economic and financial considerations
of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets,
market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other
elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock.” Id. Although the two aspects may be
examined separately, “the test for fairness is not a bifurcated
one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of
entire fairness.” Id.
Fairness does not depend on the parties' subjective beliefs.
Once entire fairness applies, the defendants must establish
“to the court's satisfaction that the transaction was the
product of both fair dealing and fair price.” Cinerama, Inc.
v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary IV ), 663 A.2d
1156, 1163 (Del.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Not even an honest belief that the transaction was entirely
fair will be sufficient to establish entire fairness. Rather, the
transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent of the
board's beliefs.” Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130,
1145 (Del. Ch.2006).
1. Fair Dealing
The evidence at trial established that the Merger was not a
product of fair dealing. This is not a case that requires an
overly granular analysis of the Weinberger factors. Carter
engaged in fraud. The concept of entire fairness “certainly
incorporates the principle that a cash-out merger must be
free of fraud or misrepresentation.” Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt
Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del.1985). According
to the common law nostrum, fraus omnia corrumpit—fraud
vitiates everything. Here it rendered useless and ineffective
the highly commendable efforts of the Committee and its
advisors to negotiate a fair transaction that they subjectively
believed was in the best interests of Dole's stockholders.
a. Timing and Initiation
Under Weinberger, the concept of fair dealing encompasses an
evaluation of how the transaction was timed and initiated.12
The scope of this factor is not limited to the controller's
formal act of making the proposal; it encompasses actions
taken by the controller in the period leading up to the formal
proposal. For approximately eighteen months, Murdock
had planned on taking Dole private after first separating
and realizing the value of Dole's higher-margin businesses.
This strategy was reflected in the Tesoriero Memo and
Murdock's discussions with Deutsche Bank about a spinoff-
plus-privatization structure. It was corroborated by Murdock's
sales of assets, including Lanai, and his discussions with
Deutsche Bank about the availability of the resulting capital
for that purpose. The ITOCHU Transaction set the stage for
the planned freeze-out to unfold. But rather than making a
merger proposal when Dole's stock was trading at high levels
following the announcement of the ITOCHU Transaction,
which took into account DeLorenzo's explanation of the $50
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million in run-rate cost savings that Dole could achieve,
Carter first primed the market by pushing down the stock.13
*27  “[A] calculated effort to depress the [market] price”
of a stock “until the minority stockholders [are] eliminated
by merger or some other form of acquisition” constitutes
unfair dealing. Sealy Mattress, 532 A.2d at 1336. It is an
example of the “prototype instance in which the timing of a
merger would itself likely constitute a breach of a controlling
shareholder's duty” under the entire fairness standard, namely,
“when it could be shown both (1) that the minority was
financially injured by the timing (i.e., from their point of view
it was an especially poor time to be required to liquidate their
investment) and (2) that the controlling shareholder gained
from the timing of the transaction what the minority lost.”
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 599 (Del.
Ch.1986) (Allen, C.).
As described in the Factual Background, Carter departed
from Dole's historic practice by providing earnings guidance,
and the guidance he provided changed Dole's estimate
of its ability to achieve cost savings after the ITOCHU
Transaction. DeLorenzo had told the markets that Dole
could achieve $50 million in cost savings, with $20 million
implemented immediately in 2012 and the remaining $30
million implemented in 2013. By the end of 2013, Dole would
have achieved the full run-rate of $50 million per year. In his
January 2013 press release, Carter told the markets that Dole's
“current expectation” was that Dole only would achieve
“2013 planned cost savings in the $20 million range.” JX 384.
Dole's stock price dropped 13% after the announcement.
It is certainly possible for cost estimates to change, but in
this case the evidence at trial forced me to conclude that
Carter's reduced estimate was false. Deutsche Bank had done
diligence on Dole's cost-cutting plan and believed it was
reasonable. DeLorenzo backed it, and he was a credible
witness. Other analyses suggested the total cost savings could
be higher. See JX 1615; JX 389. Carter was not a credible
witness on this issue, and he did not provide a believable
explanation for the reduced figure. See Factual Background,
Part F.1, supra.
Not coincidentally, after the Merger closed, Dole told the
analysts who covered its publicly traded debt that Dole
had completed over $30 million in additional cost cutting.
A Deutsche Bank analyst covering Dole drew the obvious
conclusion: “We would have expected a rationalization of
the business post the [ITOCHU Transaction] but it seems
like the company is just getting around to it now.” JX 914.
Logically, Dole should have achieved these savings as a
result of the ITOCHU Transaction, not the Merger. In the
ITOCHU Transaction, Dole sold approximately half of its
business, significantly reducing the size of the Company.
As DeLorenzo and Deutsche Bank recognized, the sale
naturally presented the opportunity for major cost cutting.
The Merger did not. After Murdock bought it, the Company
was essentially the same, with only $5.5 million of savings
attributed to public company costs.14
*28  For Carter to have intentionally given the market
a subterranean estimate of Dole's anticipated cost savings
matches up with his unilateral and pretextual cancellation of
the stock repurchase program that the Board adopted on May
8, 2013. As discussed in the Factual Background, Murdock
had pushed for Dole to engage in a self-tender offer that
would have increased his ownership above a mathematical
majority and helped him pay a lower overall price in an
eventual freeze-out. See, e.g., JX 404; JX 447. Led by Conrad
and Weinberg, the Board opted instead for a program of
open market purchases that would provide greater benefits
to Dole and its unaffiliated stockholders. Later that month,
the Board also approved the plan for Dole to purchase three
new refrigerated transport ships. On May 28, just under
three weeks after the Board approved the repurchase plan,
Carter announced that share repurchases had been “suspended
indefinitely” so that Dole could use its capital on the ships. JX
582. Dole's stock price tumbled 10% after the announcement.
Carter knew the announcement would drive down the stock
price. JX 592; Carter 1101. Carter had not informed the Board
of this decision or suggested any connection existed between
the ships and the repurchase plan. Dole's outside directors
only learned of the decision from public sources. At trial,
Carter claimed that he was worried about covenants in Dole's
debt, but they would not have been tripped even if Dole spent
the entire $200 million to repurchase shares and immediately
paid the entire $165 million for the ships. Regardless, Dole
did not have to do either. Dole was authorized to repurchase
shares in management's discretion over the course of a year; it
did not have to spend the full $200 million and not right away.
The contract for the ships called for payments spread over
four years, with $32.9 million per year due in 2013 and 2014.
The evidence establishes that the ship acquisition and share
repurchase programs were both feasible. Carter did not cancel
the stock repurchase plan because doing so would benefit
Dole. He did it to make Dole's stock price drop in advance of
Murdock's planned merger proposal.15
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b. Transaction Negotiation
*29  Under Weinberger, fair dealing encompasses questions
of how the transaction was negotiated. The defendants have
relied on the indisputably excellent work of the Committee
and its advisors. But even the most motivated, skilled, and
well-advised special committee cannot achieve a fair result if
those in control of the corporation deliberately undermine its
efforts.16
“[A]n important element of an effective special committee
is that it be fully informed in making its determination.”17
“[I]n order to make a special committee structure work it
is necessary that a controlling shareholder ... disclose fully
all the material facts and circumstances surrounding the
transaction.”18 There are certain categories of negotiating
information that the controlling stockholder need not share,
such as “information disclosing the top price that a proposed
buyer would be willing or able to pay, or the lowest price
that a proposed seller would accept,”19 but the categories of
information that the controller must disclose include:
1) ... all of the material terms of the proposed transaction;
2) ... all material facts relating to the use or value of the
assets in question to the beneficiary itself. Such facts would
include alternative uses for assets or “hidden value” (e.g.,
there is oil under the land subject to sales negotiation);
3) ... all material facts which it knows relating to the market
value of the subject matter of the proposed transaction.
Such facts would include[,] for example[,] forthcoming
changes in legal regulation or technological changes that
would affect the value of the asset in question either to the
subsidiary or to others.
Tremont I, 1996 WL 145452, at *16 (footnotes omitted).
These categories are intended to encompass “all material
information known to the fiduciary except that information
that relates only to its consideration of the price at which it
will buy or sell and how it would finance a purchase or invest
the proceeds of a sale.” Id.
*30  Implicit in the expectation that the controller disclose
this information is the requirement that the controller disclose
it accurately and completely. The controller must believe
that the disclosures are true and cannot deliberately withhold
material information or otherwise immaterial information that
is nevertheless necessary to make the disclosed information
complete and non-misleading. The fair dealing element of
the entire fairness standard mandates that all fiduciaries,
including the controller and its representatives, comply with
the duty of candor owed by corporate fiduciaries to disclose
all material information relevant to corporate decisions
from which they may derive a personal benefit.... The duty
of candor, integral to fair dealing, dictates that fiduciaries,
corporate or otherwise, may not use superior information
or knowledge to mislead others in the performance of their
own fiduciary obligations.20
To state what should be obvious, a controller cannot engage in
fraud. Nor can a corporate officer, even if his principal loyalty
is to a controller who is his boss and source of post-transaction
employment. To be blunt, if a duly empowered committee
asks for information, a corporate officer, employee, or agent
has a duty to provide truthful and complete information.21
Accurate and up-to-date information about the company's
financial performance is particularly important to a
committee's work. Withholding the company's latest
“projections, and knowledge of their existence, from the
[Special] Committee and its advisors” is “without more ...
enough to render the Special Committee ineffective as a
bargaining agent for the minority stockholders.” Emerging
Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at *35.
The Committee asked Carter for updated management
forecasts that reflected Dole management's “current best
views about the prospects of [the] business.” Garner 1248.
Carter constructed a set of projections that contained falsely
low numbers. In place of Dole's usual bottom-up approach,
Carter and the management team created the new projections
from the top down. Garner described the process as follows:
*31  [Dole management] used a different approach than
I normally see in which they basically did not start out
by saying what's revenues, what's expenses, what's the
difference and there's the profit. They basically said, let's
look at the profit line, the EBITDA line that had come
from the three-year process and let's see what's different
from the way we now see the world in terms of pricing
and costs of the system and how the bottom line would
change given management's new view of the world. And
then they worked their way back up to the top, you know,
in other words, in terms of what the revenue was. They had
a high and a low case and they looked in the middle and
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they developed it on the way up. It was—suffice it to say,
it was not a particularly rigorous process in our view.
Garner Dep. 25.
The Committee and Lazard had immediate concerns about the
July Projections:
• Dole management could not provide a basis for the
reduction in revenue forecasts as compared to the
December Projections.
• The projections were inconsistent with what Dole gave its
lenders in April 2013 for the post-ITOCHU Transaction
refinancing.
• The forecasts were inconsistent with what the Board
reviewed just weeks earlier when approving the
purchase of the new ships.
• The growth forecasted for 2014 and 2015 was “just an
extrapolation based on a mathematical formula, not on
real information.” Conrad Dep. 26.
• Dole management inexplicably kept flat the EBITDA
estimates for 2016 and 2017 except for a small
adjustment for the new cargo ships.
Conrad concluded that the July Projections were not “an
accurate representation of the value of the Company” and that
the Committee would “have to find an independent way to
evaluate the value of the company.” Conrad Dep. 25. Garner
believed that “management had taken a meat cleaver to the
projections in a way that it would be very difficult, if not
inappropriate, for a committee to weigh these projections as
the basis for determining the adequacy of a price.” Garner
Dep. 32; accord Garner 1249, 1313.
Conrad and Garner were too polite and professional to come
right out and say it, but a court has to call things as they are.
The projections Carter provided were knowingly false. Carter
intentionally tried to mislead the Committee for Murdock's
benefit.
The contrast between what Carter told the Committee and
what he told Murdock's lenders and advisors during the
Lender Meeting the next day confirms the fraudulent nature of
the July Projections. So does the contrast between what Carter
told the Committee and the instructions he gave a month
later for the preparation of the budgets and projections that
would be used to run the Company post-Merger. See Factual
Background, Part P, supra.
Faced with Carter's fraud, the Committee and Lazard created,
on an expedited basis, their own set of projections. Their
heroic efforts have enabled the defendants to argue that
Carter's misconduct was a “no harm, no foul” situation. The
Committee and Lazard did succeed in generating a credible
and reliable projection regarding Dole's business—the most
credible and reliable projection in the case—but they could
not do so for areas where they did not receive full or accurate
information.
The Committee and Lazard never received full and accurate
information about the cost savings that Dole could achieve.
Dole management failed to share with the Committee or
Lazard the analysis supporting the $50 million in cost savings
that Tesoriero prepared, even though Carter considered
it and contacted Tesoriero about it before meeting with
Murdock's lenders. Dole management also did not provide
the Committee and Lazard with accurate information about
Dole's farm purchases, and as a result Lazard removed
any effect of additional farm purchases from its analysis.
See Factual Background, Part K, supra. By providing the
Committee with false information, Carter ensured that the
process could not be fair.
*32  Although the false projections were the most egregious
of Carter's activities, he interfered with and obstructed the
Committee's efforts to manage the process and negotiate with
Murdock in other ways as well:
• At the outset, Carter sought to restrict the Committee's
mandate and limit the Committee to a simple up or
down? decision on Murdock's offer, rather than having
the ability to consider and explore the viability of
potentially superior alternatives.
• Carter resisted the Committee's hiring of Lazard, sought
to steer the Committee towards BAML, a banker with a
prior relationship with Dole and Murdock, and attempted
to limit the scope of Lazard's activities.
• When the Committee asserted its authority to enter into
confidentiality agreements on behalf of the Company,
Carter refused to go along, insisting that it was his job.
Through Carter, Murdock thereby gained a window into
the Committee's actions that he should not have had.
• Carter secretly assisted Murdock and his advisors in
preparing a hostile tender offer for use if the Committee
did not accede quickly enough.
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• Carter secretly convened the Lender Meeting, which was
a clear violation of the Process Letter established by the
Committee.
• After the Committee caught wind that Deutsche Bank
had attended a meeting with management and had access
to the Company's data room, Carter did not come clean
about the full scope of the Lender Meeting, its subject
matter, or attendees.
• When the Committee instructed Carter to cancel Deutsche
Bank's access to the data room, Carter refused.
• Carter secretly advised Murdock on how to negotiate
against the Committee and provided advice to Murdock
and his counsel on deal terms and agreements.
Given Carter's activities, the negotiation of the Merger was
the antithesis of a fair process. Through his actions, Carter
“render[ed] the Special Committee ineffective as a bargaining
agent for the minority stockholders,” notwithstanding the
Committee's valiant efforts. Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL
1305745, at *35.
c. Transaction Structure And Approval
Carter's fraud tainted the approval of the Merger by the
Committee, as well as the stockholder vote. Perhaps, with
the benefit of full information, the Committee would have
approved the Merger anyway. Whether they would have
approved the transaction “is inherently unknowable because
there is no way to learn what [the Committee would have
done] in the absence of [the fiduciaries'] disloyal conduct.”
Bomarko, 794 A.2d at 1184.
Likewise, perhaps if the stockholders had full information
about Murdock and Carter's activities, both before and during
the negotiation process, they might nevertheless have voted
for the deal. That outcome is also impossible to know.
Because both protective procedures were tainted, neither
provides evidence of fairness.
There are features of the Merger Agreement which, on
different facts, might provide evidence of fairness. The
Committee obtained a go-shop provision with a low break-
up fee, and Lazard diligently sought out other bidders. If
Murdock had committed to support an alternative transaction,
then the failure of a higher bidder to come forward would be
a significant indicator.22
*33  But Murdock controlled over 40% of Dole's voting
power, and he was not a seller. He made that clear in his
original proposal. He had affirmed that fact in his meetings
with Conrad. He had confirmed it separately when the
Committee asked him to entertain a proposal from Chiquita.
Conrad had to inform potential bidders that Murdock would
not sell his Dole shares or partner with them. On the facts of
this case, the go-shop was cosmetic.
2. Fair Price
The second aspect of the entire fairness inquiry is fair price.
“The fair price analysis is part of the entire fairness standard
of review; it is not itself a remedial calculation.” Reis, 28
A.3d at 465. For purposes of determining fairness, as opposed
to crafting a remedy, the court's task is not to pick a single
number, but to determine whether the transaction price falls
within a range of fairness. “The value of a corporation is
not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values....”
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at
*2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del.2005). When evaluating the
fair price aspect of the entire fairness standard of review,
the court considers whether the transaction was one “that a
reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard
as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could
reasonably accept.”23 “A court readily could conclude that a
price fell within the range of fairness and would not support
fiduciary liability, and yet the point calculation demanded by
the appraisal statute could yield an award in excess of the
merger price.”24
“The range of fairness permits a court to give some degree
of deference to fiduciaries who have acted properly; it is
not a rigid rule that permits controllers to impose barely fair
transactions.” Reis, 28 A.3d at 466. “The range of fairness
concept has most salience when the controller has established
a process that simulates arm's-length bargaining, supported
by appropriate procedural protections.”25
*34  Fair price can be the predominant consideration in the
unitary entire fairness inquiry.26 Most often, however, the
two aspects of the entire fairness standard interact. “A strong
record of fair dealing can influence the fair price inquiry,
reinforcing the unitary nature of the entire fairness test. The
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converse is equally true: process can infect price.”27 The
fact that negotiations occurred is not dispositive. “It is not
sufficient for ... directors to achieve the best price that a
fiduciary will pay if that price is not a fair price.” First Boston,
1990 WL 78836, at *7. Nor is it sufficient to obtain a fair
price if that price is not the best alternative available for the
corporation and its stockholders. Id.
The principal evidence on the issue of fair price consists
of the expert opinions at trial, the Committee's negotiations,
Lazard's fairness opinion, and market indications. Taken
together, these sources indicate that without accounting for
Carter's fraud, the $13.50 per share price fell within a range
of fairness. After accounting for Carter's fraud, the $13.50 per
share price represents a closer call, but still may have fallen
within the lower end of a range of fairness.
*35  The opposing expert opinions presented at trial adopted
widely divergent views of the value of Dole, as is often the
case in valuation litigation. See In re Appraisal of Dole Food
Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541, 556–59 (Del. Ch.2014). Relatively
speaking, the plaintiffs' expert was more helpful, because
his work demonstrated how different assumptions and inputs
affected Dole's value. The defense expert did little more
than provide a second fairness opinion using pro-defendant
assumptions. Lazard's work was far more credible. As already
noted, it was thorough and balanced, and it was prepared for
the benefit of the Committee as part of their consideration
of the transaction, rather than by an expert retained by the
defendants to help them defeat the plaintiffs' claims. In
the final analysis, neither of the parties' experts provided
compelling evidence about the fairness or unfairness of the
price.
If the Committee and Lazard had not been misled, then
the Committee's negotiations and Lazard's analysis would
have provided powerful evidence of fairness. But Carter's
actions tainted both the negotiation process and Lazard's work
product. Methods of valuation “are only as good as the inputs
to the model.” Neal v. Alabama By–Products Corp., 1990 WL
109243, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255
(Del.1991).
Modifying Lazard's discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis to
take into account the information that Carter misrepresented
or withheld suggests that the $13.50 per share price may
have been below the range of fairness. In its DCF analysis,
Lazard determined that the range of fair value for Dole's
common stock at the time of the Merger was between $11.40
and $14.08. In the areas where Lazard received complete
information, the Committee Projections and Lazard's DCF
provide the best insight into Dole's business and its value at
the time of the Merger. But the Committee Projections require
adjustments for the areas where the Committee and Lazard
were misled.
The first issue is cost-cutting. The evidence showed that
Murdock and Carter delayed Dole's cost-cutting program
until after the freeze-out, then achieved more than $30
million in incremental savings. In its sensitivity table, Lazard
calculated that an incremental $30 million cost savings would
justify an increase in price of $3.80 per share.
The second issue is farm purchases. At the Lender Meeting,
Carter predicted that Dole easily could purchase $100 million
in new farms. The plaintiffs' expert, Kevin Dages, calculated
that purchasing an incremental $28.6 million in farms in
Ecuador would have increased Dole's value by $1.22 per
share. Compare JX 1590 at 108 with id. at 106. In making
this calculation, Dages used 3.2% both as his perpetual
growth rate and to project cash flows in years four and five.
Lazard used 1.5%, which this decision adopts for consistency.
Modifying these inputs reduces the value of an incremental
$28.6 million in farms to $0.87 per share. Scaling up the
benefit proportionately for Carter's $100 million in farm
purchases yields incremental value of $3.04 per share.
At the time of the Merger, there was obviously some
uncertainty about how much Dole actually could achieve in
cost savings, as well as the number of farms that Dole could
buy and the value they would generate. Both undertakings
were riskier and less certain than Dole's established business.
In my view, it would overvalue the incremental cash flows
available from these sources to treat them for valuation
purposes as being just as certain as the cash generated by
Dole's core operations. As discussed below, this decision
finds that for purposes of this case, a more reasonable estimate
of the cost savings is $1.87 per share, and a more reasonable
estimate of the value of the planned farm purchases is $0.87
per share. See, infra, Part D.
*36  Adding the full value of the incremental cost savings
and farm purchases ($6.84 per share) increases the range
of fair value implied by Lazard's DCF to $18.24 to $20.92.
Adding what this decision determines to be a more reasonable
assessment of the value of those initiatives ($2.74 per share)
increases the range to $14.14 to $16.82. The Merger price falls
below both ranges.
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The defendants have argued vociferously—nigh desperately
—that the court cannot consider anything that happened
after the Merger closed and must ignore both the cost
savings that Dole actually achieved, as well as its farm
purchases. “Delaware law is clear that ‘elements of future
value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known
or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not
the product of speculation, may be considered.’ ” Del. Open
MRI, 898 A.2d at 315 (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713).
“In essence, when the court determines that the company's
business plan as of the merger included specific expansion
plans or changes in strategy, those are corporate opportunities
that must be considered part of the firm's value.” Id. at 315
n.51.
Obviously, when a business has opened a couple of
facilities and has plans to replicate those facilities as of
the merger date, the value of its expansion plans must be
considered in determining fair value. To hold otherwise
would be to subject our appraisal jurisprudence to just
ridicule. The dangers for the minority arguably are most
present when the controller knows that the firm is on the
verge of break-through growth, having gotten the hang
of running the first few facilities, and now being well-
positioned to replicate its success at additional locations—
think McDonald's or Starbucks.
Id. at 315–16. This is what Dole was doing with the cost
savings and farm purchases. The plans to cut costs and
buy farms to improve profits were part of Dole's “operative
reality” on the date of the Merger.28
*37  The modified DCF analysis suggests that with the
benefit of full information about Dole's value, including its
plans for cost savings and farms, the Merger price was not
fair. That said, the DCF methodology was not the only method
Lazard used, and the fact that the modified calculations in this
decision generate ranges above the deal price does not mean
that Lazard would have made the same judgments or done the
math the same way. Even if Lazard agreed with the figures in
this decision, it does not necessarily mean that the firm would
have concluded that the Merger price of $13.50 per share fell
below the range of fairness. The firm may have concluded
that the price was still fair, albeit at towards the lower end of
fairness.
There are also market indicators. The defendants relied on
every transaction that Dole had considered since Murdock's
discussion with Del Monte in 2009, as if Dole had been
engaged in an ongoing, multi-year market check. That was
a decent try for purposes of litigation, but it was not what
actually happened. The only time Murdock really considered
selling Dole was after the financial crisis, when he and Dole
were overburdened by debt. He solved his difficulties by
taking Dole public. From that point on, the only third-party
transaction involving all of Dole that Murdock seriously
considered was the Chiquita deal, which was really an
acquisition by Dole of Chiquita and would have expanded
Murdock's empire. Otherwise Murdock was not a seller. If
someone had approached him with a blow-out price he likely
would have considered it, but he placed a high value on
the benefits of control. He was particularly unwilling to sell
during the period surrounding the Merger, which is the only
relevant timeframe.
The defendants have also used metrics implied by various
transactions involving Dole and its peers (Chiquita and Del
Monte) to show that the Merger was fair. Taken together,
these indicators point in the same direction as the Lazard
analysis: Without information about Dole's cost savings and
farm purchases, the $13.50 price was within the range of
fairness. With information about Dole's cost savings and
farm purchases, the deal price fell towards the low end
of the range of fairness and may have dropped below it.
The defendants also pointed to Wells Fargo's decision to
withdraw from the loan syndicate as evidence that the deal
price was high. Wells Fargo just as easily could have been
uncomfortable with the amount of leverage rather than the
price. The number of turns of leverage that banks will fund
is heavily affected by prevailing market conditions, and there
were meaningful external dynamics at work in 2013, such
as the “Taper Tantrum,” when rates jumped in response to
concern that the Federal Reserve was moderating the massive
subsidy known euphemistically as Quantitative Easing. See
Frauen 2042–43. On a company-specific level, the degree
of leverage also depends on the size of the equity check,
and Murdock was only committing to provide an incremental
$100 million in equity. He did not actually write the check
to Dole until early 2015. Given the multiple factors involved,
Wells Fargo's apparent discomfort with Murdock's preferred
financing package does not indicate that the price was fair.
3. The Unitary Determination Of Fairness
“The concept of fairness is of course not a technical concept.
No litmus paper can be found or [G]eiger-counter invented
that will make determinations of fairness....” Tremont I, 1996
WL 145452, at *8. “This judgment concerning ‘fairness’ will
inevitably constitute a judicial judgment that in some respects
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is reflective of subjective reactions to the facts of a case.”
Technicolor Plenary III, 663 A.2d at 1140.
*38  In my view, Carter's conduct rendered the Merger unfair.
He engaged in “fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, [and]
gross and palpable overreaching.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at
714. Assuming for the sake of argument that the $13.50 price
fell within a range of fairness, the plaintiffs are entitled under
the circumstances to a “fairer” price. Reis, 28 A.3d at 466.
This is because by engaging in fraud, Carter deprived the
Committee of its ability to obtain a better result on behalf of
the stockholders, prevented the Committee from having the
knowledge it needed to potentially say “no,” and foreclosed
the ability of the stockholders to protect themselves by voting
down the deal.29
B. The Liability Of The Fiduciary Defendants
A ruling that a transaction is not entirely fair does not
automatically result in liability for the defendants. “The entire
fairness test seeks to determine whether directors complied
with their fiduciary duties.” Reis, 28 A.3d at 465. The test
“has only a crude and potentially misleading relationship to
the liability any particular fiduciary has for involvement in a
self-dealing transaction.” Venhill Ltd. P'ship v. Hillman, 2008
WL 2270488, at *22 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2008) (Strine, V.C.).
Directors who have breached their duties may have defenses
to liability, such as exculpation under Section 102(b)(7) of the
DGCL, protection due to reliance on advisors under Section
141(e) of the DGCL, or other doctrines.
Section 10.1 of Dole's certificate of incorporation provides
that “[t]o the fullest extent permitted by the DGCL as the
same exists or as may hereafter be amended, no director of the
Corporation shall be personally liable to the Corporation or
its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director.” Dkt. 695 Ex. A. (the “Exculpatory
Clause”). Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL provides that
the certificate of incorporation may also contain ... [a]
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided
that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability
of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts
or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under §
174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the
director derived an improper personal benefit.
8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7). The effect of a provision like the
Exculpatory Clause is to protect directors from personal
liability for monetary damages for a breach of fiduciary
duty, except for the four categories listed in Section 102(b)
(7). “The totality of these limitations or exceptions ...
is to ... eliminate ... director liability only for ‘duty of
care’ violations. With respect to other culpable directorial
actions, the conventional liability of directors for wrongful
conduct remains intact.” 1 David A. Drexler et al., Delaware
Corporation Law and Practice § 6.02[7] at 6–18 (2013).
*39  When a corporation has an exculpatory provision and
a self-dealing transaction has been determined to be unfair,
“only the self-dealing director [is] subject to damages liability
for the gap between a fair price and the deal price without
an inquiry into his subjective state of mind.” Venhill, 2008
WL 2270488, at *22. For other directors, “even the ones who
might be deemed non-independent by status, the presence of
the exculpatory charter provision ... require[s] an examination
of their state of mind, in order to determine whether they
breached their duty of loyalty by approving the transaction in
bad faith ..., rather than in a good faith effort to benefit the
corporation.” Id. at *23. “In other words, their status [as non-
independent directors] is only a fact relevant to the ultimate
determination whether they complied with their fiduciary
duties, it is not a status crime making them a guarantor of
the fairness of the transaction.” Id. In light of the Exculpatory
Clause, “[t]he liability of the directors must be determined on
an individual basis because the nature of their breach of duty
(if any), and whether they are exculpated from liability for
that breach, can vary for each director.” Emerging Commc'ns,
2004 WL 1305745, at *38.
1. Murdock
Murdock is personally liable for damages resulting from the
Merger. Murdock acted in two capacities in connection with
the Merger: as Dole's controlling stockholder and as a Dole
director.
As this court held in Emerging Communications, a provision
like the Exculpatory Clause “does not apply to [a defendant]
in his capacity as [a] controlling stockholder.” Id. As Dole's
controlling stockholder, Murdock “breached his duty of
loyalty to ... the plaintiff shareholder class, by eliminating
[Dole's unaffiliated] stockholders for an unfair price in an
unfair transaction.... For that breach of duty [Murdock] is
liable.” Id.
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Murdock is also liable in his capacity as a director. He
breached his duty of loyalty by orchestrating an unfair, self-
interested transaction. In addition, as the buyer, he “derived
an improper personal benefit” from the transaction. Id. The
Delaware Supreme Court recently confirmed this outcome in
Cornerstone : As the interested party, “a finding of unfairness
after trial will subject [him] to liability for breach of the duty
of loyalty regardless of [his] subjective bad faith.” 115 A.3d
at 1181; accord Venhill, 2008 WL 2270488, at *22.
Up to this point, this decision has not focused separately on
DFC Holdings, LLC, an entity Murdock controlled and used
as one of the acquisition vehicles for the Merger. Before the
Merger, DFC Holdings, LLC was the sole owner of DFC
Merger Corp., which merged with and into Dole. In Emerging
Communications, this court held that the acquisition vehicles
that the controlling stockholder used to effectuate an unfair
freeze-out merger were liable as aiders and abetters to
the same extent as the controlling stockholder. 2004 WL
1305745, at *38. The same analysis applies to DFC Holdings,
LLC.
2. Carter
Carter is personally liable for damages resulting from the
Merger. He also acted in two capacities in connection with the
Merger: as a director and as Dole's President, Chief Operating
Officer, and General Counsel. He is liable both as a director
and as an officer.
Carter is not entitled to exculpation in his capacity as a
director because he breached his “duty of loyalty to the
corporation [and] its stockholders” and his acts and omissions
were “not in good faith.” 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7). The
Delaware Supreme Court has held that for purposes of the
Delaware common law of fiduciary duties, these concepts
elide: The duty of loyalty includes a requirement to act in
good faith, which is “a subsidiary element, i.e., a condition,
of the fundamental duty of loyalty.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.2006)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise for purposes of
the Delaware common law of fiduciary duties, the Delaware
Supreme Court has held that “acting in bad faith” and “not
acting in good faith” are two sides of the same coin.30
At a minimum, good faith requires that the decision-maker
act “honestly and without pretext.”31 Bad faith involves the
opposite. In its most extreme form, it involves “the conscious
doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity” or “a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or ill will.” McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d
1012, 1036 (Del. Ch.2004). But it also encompasses other
failures to act in good faith, including when a decision-maker
“intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for [the decision-
maker's] duties,” or when the decision-maker “intentionally
acts with a purpose other than” the purpose that the decision-
maker is obligated to pursue.32 A corporate fiduciary thus
acts in bad faith when motivated by a purpose other than
that of advancing the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders.33
*40  Carter demonstrated that his primary loyalty was to
Murdock, not to Dole or to its unaffiliated stockholders.
Through Dole, Murdock was Carter's employer, and Carter
would continue to run Dole for Murdock after the Merger.
Carter knew of Murdock's buyout plans at least as early as
January 2013, and he consistently acted to promote Murdock's
interests. In support of Murdock's plan to privatize Dole,
Carter (i) pushed down the stock price, (ii) advocated for the
self-tender, (iii) participated in calls and meetings concerning
Murdock's plans to launch a hostile tender offer, (iv) sought
at the outset to restrict the authority of the Committee and its
advisors, (v) created falsely low forecasts for the Committee
to use, (vi) convened the secret Lender Meeting and lied
to the Committee about his supposed compliance with the
Process Letter, (vii) disregarded the Committee's instructions
to terminate Deutsche Bank's access to the data room, (viii)
provided advice to Murdock, Deutsche Bank, and Murdock's
counsel, and (ix) started a new budgeting process using
quite different and more positive assumptions and estimates
without telling the Committee. Carter's vote in favor of the
Merger as a director was the culmination of a course of
conduct permeated by bad faith and disloyalty.
Carter also acted in his capacity as Dole's President, COO,
and General Counsel. Indeed, Carter primarily interacted
with the Committee as an officer. When he provided false
information to the Committee and when he organized and led
the Lender Meeting, Carter was acting primarily as President
and COO of Dole. When he interfered with the Committee's
operations in other ways, such as by trying to cabin its
mandate, objecting to Lazard, insisting on having control
over Dole's confidential information, and providing legal and
strategic advice to Murdock, Carter was acting primarily as
Dole's General Counsel. As an officer, Carter owed the same
duties that he owed as a director, but the Exculpatory Clause
does not protect him when acting in those capacities. Gantler
v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 709 nn.36–37 (Del.2009).
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3. DeLorenzo
DeLorenzo presents a close call, but I conclude that he is
not liable to the plaintiffs. After the ITOCHU Transaction,
DeLorenzo left Dole but remained on the Board. The
plaintiffs contend that Murdock kept him there to have a
guaranteed vote in favor of the Merger. As evidence of
DeLorenzo's allegiance to Murdock, they observe that he
voted against the Committee's resolution to give it authority to
appoint its own chairman—something DeLorenzo admitted
did not make sense. DeLorenzo 699–701. The plaintiffs
then analogize DeLorenzo's situation to Salvatore Muoio
in Emerging Communications. 2004 WL 1305745 at *39–
40. In that decision, Justice Jacobs (sitting by designation)
held that a director who (i) had longstanding affiliations
with the controller, (ii) was serving as a paid consultant for
the controller and was seeking additional business from the
controller, and (iii) continued to have financial relationships
with the controller after the transaction failed to prove that
he was entitled to exculpation. Id. Justice Jacobs observed
that Muoio had special expertise that placed him “in a unique
position” to know that controller's freeze-out was unfair, yet
he remained silent and voted in favor of the deal.
In these circumstances, it was incumbent upon Muoio, as
a fiduciary, to advocate that the board reject the $10.25
price that the Special Committee was recommending. As
a fiduciary knowledgeable of [the controlled company's]
intrinsic value, Muoio should also have gone on record as
voting against the proposed transaction at the $10.25 per
share merger price. Muoio did neither. Instead he joined the
other directors in voting, without objection, to approve the
transaction.
Id. at *40. Justice Jacobs noted that unlike other less
knowledgeable and less sophisticated directors, Muoio could
not claim to have relied on the fairness opinion obtained by
the committee. Id.
Given these facts, Justice Jacobs asked the following
question: “Knowing (or at least having very strong reasons
to suspect) that the price was unfair, why, then, would
Muoio vote to approve the deal?” Id. He recognized that
the possibility existed that Muoio sincerely believed that the
$10.25 price was minimally fair, but he observed that under
Section 102(b)(7), the burden falls upon the director to show
that his failure to withstand an entire fairness analysis is
exclusively attributable to a violation of the duty of care.” Id.
(citing Emerald II, 787 A.2d at 98) (internal quotation marks
and alterations omitted). He continued:
*41  The credible evidence persuades the Court that
Muoio's conduct is explainable in terms of only one of two
possible mindsets. The first is that Muoio made a deliberate
judgment that to further his personal business interests, it
was of paramount importance for him to exhibit his primary
loyalty to [the controller]. The second was that Muoio, for
whatever reason, consciously and intentionally disregarded
his responsibility to safeguard the minority stockholders
from the risk, of which he had unique knowledge, that
the transaction was unfair. If motivated by either of those
mindsets, Muoio's conduct would have amounted to a
violation of his duty of loyalty and/or good faith.
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). Justice
Jacobs concluded that Muoio had “not established to the
satisfaction of the Court, after careful scrutiny of the record,
that his motivation was of a benign character.” Id.
The plaintiffs contend that DeLorenzo, even more so than
Muoio, possessed specialized knowledge about the value of
Dole. He knew in particular about the cost savings available
after the ITOCHU Transaction, having led the effort to
identify a total of $50 million in recurring savings and given
that number to the market, and he also knew about Dole's
plans to buy farms. They contend DeLorenzo should have
advocated against a transaction that he knew undervalued
Dole and voted against the deal. They say that instead he
remained silent and voted in favor of the Merger to further
his relationship with Murdock and because he had been well
compensated by Murdock and Dole over the years.
DeLorenzo's situation resembles Muoio's in many ways. The
principal distinctions are that DeLorenzo had left to work
for ITOCHU, was no longer receiving remuneration from
Murdock or his companies, and was not soliciting business
from Murdock. At most, DeLorenzo may have felt some
residual loyalty to Murdock. Importantly, DeLorenzo did
not personally participate in or know about the specific
misconduct in which Murdock and Carter engaged.
Ultimately what is required is an assessment of DeLorenzo's
motives. “[D]ivining the operations of a person's mind is an
inherently elusive endeavor.” Id. at *40. Although the issue is
close and the analogy to Emerging Communications is strong,
I find that DeLorenzo was entitled to rely on the Committee's
recommendation of the Merger. See 8 Del. C. § 141(e). I
do not believe that he acted disloyally or in bad faith. He is
therefore entitled to exculpation. See 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7).
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C. The Claim For Aiding And Abetting Against Deutsche
Bank
The plaintiffs seek to impose liability on Deutsche Bank
for aiding and abetting Murdock and Carter's breaches of
fiduciary duty. This claim has four elements: (i) the existence
of a fiduciary relationship, (ii) a breach of the fiduciary's duty,
(iii) knowing participation in the breach, and (iv) damages
proximately caused by the breach. Malpiede v. Townson, 780
A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del.2001). The finding of liability against
Murdock and Carter satisfies the first, second, and fourth
elements, but the third element is lacking.
Because the involvement of secondary actors in tortious
conduct can take a variety of forms that can differ vastly
in their magnitude, effect, and consequential culpability,
the element of “knowing participation” requires that the
secondary actor have provided “substantial assistance” to the
primary violator. Kuhns v. Bruce A. Hiler Delaware QPRT,
2014 WL 1292860, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 13, 2014). Section
876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects this
requirement by making a secondary actor liable “[f]or harm
resulting to a third party from the tortious conduct of another”
if the secondary actor “knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979); see Anderson
v. Airco, Inc., 2004 WL 2827887, *2–3 (Del.Super.Nov. 30,
2004).
*42  A court's analysis of whether a secondary actor
“knowingly” provided “substantial assistance” is necessarily
fact intensive. Illustrative factors include the following:
• The nature of the tortious act that the secondary actor
participated in or encouraged, including its severity, the
clarity of the violation, the extent of the consequences,
and the secondary actor's knowledge of these aspects;
• The amount, kind, and duration of assistance given,
including how directly involved the secondary actor was
in the primary actor's conduct;
• The nature of the relationship between the secondary and
primary actors; and
• The secondary actor's state of mind.
The list is drawn from and expands on factors that appear in
Kuhns, which drew its list from Patton v. Simone, 1992 WL
398478, *12 (Del.Super. Dec. 14, 1992).
In the current case, the plaintiffs did not prove that Deutsche
Bank knowingly participated in the breaches of duty giving
rise to fiduciary liability. The critical breaches of duty
involved fraud regarding Dole's cost-cutting and purchases
of farms. The tortious conduct was serious, its wrongfulness
was clear, and the extent of the consequences was obvious,
but Deutsche Bank did not know about or participate
in those acts. Deutsche Bank did not make any of the
misrepresentations, was not present for them, and did not
conceal information from the Committee. Deutsche Bank was
not directly involved, nor even secondarily involved, in the
critical breaches of duty.
Deutsche Bank did participate directly in the Lender Meeting,
but the plaintiffs did not prove that Deutsche Bank knew
about the Process Letter or that the meeting violated its terms.
A sophisticated firm like Deutsche Bank doubtless would
have expected the Committee and its advisors to establish
protective procedures such as those set forth in the Process
Letter, and if the Deutsche Bank representatives had pondered
whether the Committee had authorized the meeting, then
they likely would have found it suspicious that Lazard and
possibly Conrad and other Committee members were not in
attendance. But even then, Carter and his team might have
provided the same information to the Committee and Lazard
separately. Deutsche Bank did not have any reason to think
that the information it received at the Lender Meeting was
different than the information that the Committee received.
The most that can be said is that the Deutsche Bank
professionals who attended the meeting might have had some
reason to be concerned that something may have been amiss.
For that purpose, it is important to consider that when the
Lender Meeting took place, Deutsche Bank was acting as
Murdock's advisor and lead financier. Given that role, I do
not believe it was Deutsche Bank's job to call the Committee,
its counsel, or Lazard to make sure everything was OK.34
The fault lay with Dole's officers and employees, principally
Carter, who owed their duties to Dole and, for purposes of
Murdock's offer, reported to and acted under the direction of
the Committee. The same analysis applies to Deutsche Bank's
access to the Committee's data room and its communications
with Carter, Potillo, and other Dole officers.
*43  The plaintiffs take a broader view of Deutsche Bank's
culpable conduct. They argue that Deutsche Bank should be
liable for acting as Murdock's de facto advisor, advancing his
interests, and assisting him with preliminary planning for the
freeze-out beginning in 2012. The plaintiffs emphasize the
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periods when the bank was formally advising Dole on the
strategic business review and the ITOCHU Transaction, but
they also stress the months from January through May 2013
when Deutsche Bank was communicating regularly with
Carter, Potillo, and other Dole officers to help plan the freeze-
out.35 The plaintiffs complain that Deutsche Bank knowingly
received confidential Dole information that it used to help
Murdock plan the freeze-out and to advance his interests on
other matters.
This theory might present problems for Deutsche Bank if it
constituted an inherent breach of duty for a director or officer
to share Dole's confidential information with a substantial
stockholder without Board authorization. In his capacity as
a director and Dole's de facto controller, and later as its
CEO, Murdock had complete access to Dole's confidential
information. Because Murdock was also Dole's controlling
stockholder, and because he is a human being with only one
brain, in practice he was necessarily and constantly sharing
that information with himself in his stockholder capacity.
He went further by sharing Dole's confidential information
with his personal advisors, such as Deutsche Bank, Griswold,
and his counsel at Paul Hastings, during periods when they
were advancing his personal interests as a stockholder. At
Murdock's direction, other Dole fiduciaries, like Carter and
Potillo, also shared confidential information and participated
in discussions with Deutsche Bank, Griswold, and Paul
Hastings. If Murdock had been a third party unaffiliated
with Dole, rather than its dominant investor, no one from
Dole would have been sharing this information with him and
his advisors. At a minimum they would not have received
information without Board approval and a confidentiality
agreement.
In my view, a fiduciary sharing of information with an
affiliated stockholder and its advisors, standing alone, is not
inherently a breach of duty.36 It depends on what the provider
and recipients do with the information, including whether
they use the information to the detriment of the corporation
and its stockholders or to benefit themselves improperly.37
Under existing law, it does not seem to me that the information
sharing and preparatory activities in which Murdock engaged,
including Deutsche Bank's consultations with Dole officers
and its use of Dole's confidential information for preliminary
takeover planning, rose to the level of breach.38 Of course,
just as the law could have a bright-line anti-sharing rule,
it could have a bright-line rule against unauthorized bid
preparations by insiders. Indeed, such a rule likely follows
from a strong-form anti-sharing rule. Under such an approach,
the law would require a controller like Murdock (or a
manager considering an LBO) to act like a third-party
bidder. Before a third-party bidder can legitimately access
confidential information about its target, it has to approach
the company and obtain permission. A controller or manager
would have to do the same. Under such a regime, an advisor
who consciously assisted a fiduciary in preparing an as-yet
unauthorized bid would have knowingly participated in the
breach. If the company or its stockholders suffered harm, as
they did here, then the advisor would be jointly and severally
liable. But our law does not appear to me to have adopted
a bright-line position. The use and sharing of information is
rather another context-dependent inquiry.
*44  If I am incorrect and Murdock's sharing and use
of Dole's confidential information was prohibited, then
Deutsche Bank knowingly participated in the breach. Under
the first illustrative factor, Deutsche Bank knew that it was
receiving confidential information from Murdock, Carter,
Potillo, and other Dole insiders, and it used the information
to assist Murdock in planning for the freeze-out and on other
issues that affected his personal interests as a stockholder.
Deutsche Bank's assistance was prolonged and extensive.
At all stages, its relationship with the primary actors was
problematic. Deutsche Bank took pains at trial to stress that at
many points when it was receiving and using this information,
it was not working for Dole. During those periods, Deutsche
Bank knew it should not have access to Dole's confidential
information. At other times, Deutsche Bank was serving
as a common law agent and owed a duty of loyalty to
Dole.39 During those periods, Deutsche Bank should have
been focused on promoting Dole's interests. It should not
have been using Dole's confidential information to advance
Murdock's interests.
But to reiterate, I do not believe that the preparatory activities
amounted to a breach on the facts of this case, nor that any
actions by Deutsche Bank while its loyalties were divided
resulted in harm. In my view, the scope of Deutsche Bank's
exposure to liability depends on their knowing participation
in the breaches of duty that gave rise to causally related
damages, namely Carter's interference with and fraudulent
misrepresentations to the Committee. The aiding and abetting
claim against Deutsche Bank therefore fails.
D. Damages
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Once a breach of duty has been established, this court's
“powers are complete to fashion any form of equitable
and monetary relief as may be appropriate....” Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 714. At that point, the remedy could be a
damages award equal to the fair value of the shares, but
“the measure of any recoverable loss ... under an entire
fairness standard of review is not necessarily limited to the
difference between the price offered and the ‘true’ value
as determined under appraisal proceedings.” Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 371 (Del.1993). “In
determining damages, the powers of the Court of Chancery
are very broad in fashioning equitable and monetary relief
under the entire fairness standard as may be appropriate,
including rescissory damages.” Bomarko II, 766 A.2d at 440.
The award may include “elements of rescissory damages” if
the court “considers them susceptible of proof and a remedy
appropriate to all the issues of fairness” presented by the case.
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. An award exceeding the fair
value of the plaintiffs' shares may be appropriate “particularly
where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste
of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are
involved.” Id.
“Delaware law dictates that the scope of recovery for a breach
of the duty of loyalty is not to be determined narrowly.”
Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc. (Thorpe II), 676 A.2d 436, 445
(Del.1996). Damages must be “logically and reasonably
related to the harm or injury for which compensation is
being awarded.” In re J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. S'holder
Litig., 906 A.2d 766, 773 (Del.2006). But as long as that
connection exists, “[t]he law does not require certainty in the
award of damages where a wrong has been proven and injury
established. Responsible estimates that lack m[a]thematical
certainty are permissible so long as the court has a basis to
make a responsible estimate of damages.” Red Sail Easter
Ltd. P'rs v. Radio City Music Hall Prods., Inc., 1992 WL
251380, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 1992) (Allen, C.). “[O]nce
a breach of duty is established, uncertainties in awarding
damages are generally resolved against the wrongdoer.”
Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 1993 WL 443406, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 29, 1993).
*45  In a plenary breach of fiduciary duty action, “the
court can, and has in the past, awarded damages designed
to eliminate the possibility of profit flowing to defendants
from the breach of the fiduciary relationship.” Gesoff, 902
A.2d at 1154. “Once disloyalty has been established, the
standards evolved in Oberly v. Kirby and Tri–Star require that
a fiduciary not profit personally from his conduct, and that the
beneficiary not be harmed by such conduct.” Thorpe II, 676
A.2d at 445 (citing Oberly, 592 A.2d at 463, and In re Tri–
Star Pictures, Inc., Litig., 634 A.2d 319, 334 (Del.1993)).
The rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity,
does not rest upon the narrow ground of injury or damage
to the corporation resulting from a betrayal of confidence,
but upon a broader foundation of a wise public policy that,
for the purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes
all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the
confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.1939).
As discussed, on the facts presented, the stockholders are not
limited to an arguably fair price. They are entitled to a fairer
price.
The Committee Projections and Lazard's analysis, with
adjustments for the areas where Murdock and Carter misled
the Committee, provide the best insight into Dole's business
and its value at the time of the Merger. Because uncertainties
in damages calculations are resolved against the wrongdoer,
these items could support an award of damages as high as
$6.84 per share, consisting of $3.80 per share for the delayed
cost-cutting and $3.04 for the concealed projections about
farm purchases. But while such a finding is possible, it would
treat all of the upside from those initiatives as certain and
would assume that the Committee could extract 100% of the
incremental benefits from Murdock. If the goal of awarding
damages in a case involving a breach of the duty of loyalty
is to extinguish “all possibility of profit,” then imposing that
figure on Murdock and Carter is what the law demands.
To my mind, however, that level of damages seems unrealistic
and harsh, except as a form of rescissory damages.40 The
cost-saving initiatives and the purchases of new farms were
riskier and less certain than Dole's established business, so
it overvalues the incremental cash flows from these sources
to treat them as being just as certain as the cash generated
by Dole's core operations. This opinion therefore incorporates
more modest cost savings and benefits from farm purchases.
Dole's Management High Case assumed $14.8 million in
incremental cost savings. Carter 908; see JX 783 at 21
(rounding to $15 million). The number was adopted by Seth
Ferguson, one of the defendants' experts. JX 1593 at 72. It
provides a reasonable middle-ground estimate of the likely
benefits of additional cost-cutting. Lazard's sensitivity table
implies that $14.8 million in cost savings would be worth
$1.87 per share.
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*46  For the farm purchases, this decision adopts the
plaintiffs' ask. Rather than seeking the full $100 million in
farm purchases that Carter identified at the Lender Meeting or
which Dole otherwise appears to have planned, the plaintiffs
only sought to incorporate $28.6 million. As discussed above,
that investment in farms would be worth an additional $0.87
per share.
These more modest estimates add $2.74 per share to Lazard's
DCF valuation range, increasing it to $14.14 to $16.82 per
share. The midpoint of the adjusted range, which is $15.48 per
share, approximates the result of an arm's length negotiation
between parties having equal information. The result is a price
$1.98 per share higher than the $13.50 per share Murdock
paid. But because the defendants engaged in fraud, and in
light of the Delaware Supreme Court's guidance regarding
damages calculations for loyalty breaches, the plaintiffs are
entitled to the full incremental $2.74 per share in damages.
The resulting damages award implies a fair value for Dole
of $16.24, significantly less than the maximum of $20.34 per
share the responsible estimate standard could support. The
$2.74 per share figure suggests that Murdock and Carter's pre-
proposal efforts to drive down the market price and their fraud
during the negotiations reduced the ultimate deal price by
16.9%. This result matches the findings of one study in which
the data supported an average price decrease of 18.6% caused
by earnings manipulation before management-led buyouts.
See Wu, supra. Another way to evaluate the award is to
start with the market price after the ITOCHU Transaction,
when Dole's stock traded above $14.00 per share. By the time
Murdock made his offer, the price had declined to $10.20 per
share, in part because of Carter's actions. The award of $16.24
represents a 16.0% premium over the trading price of $14.00
per share, which is relatively modest.41
“[A] successful plaintiff is entitled to interest on money
damages as a matter of right from the date liability accrues.”
Summa Corp. v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 409
(Del.1988). Pre- and post-judgment interest will accrue at the
legal rate, fluctuating with the underlying Federal Discount
Rate and compounded quarterly, until the date of payment.42
E. The Appraisal Proceeding
*47  The appraisal claimants seek the fair value of their
shares. They are also members of the Class and are entitled to
the remedy provided by this decision. Because they are only
entitled to a single recovery, the damages award potentially
renders the appraisal claim moot. The appraisal proceeding
could regain its relevance, however, if the appraisal claimants
did not receive complete relief from Murdock, Carter, and
DFC Holdings, at which point they would have reason to
proceed against Dole. But because Dole is owned indirectly
by Murdock through DFC Holdings, a separate remedy
against Dole may not have incremental utility.
The issue may also be moot because this court held in
Emerging Communications that both acquisition vehicles
used by the controller to effect an unfair privatization— both
the parent company and the merger subsidiary—were liable
to the same degree as the controller. See Part B.1, supra.
Through DFC Holdings, Murdock caused DFC Merger Corp.
to merge with and into Dole, which thereby became liable for
DFC Merger Corp.'s obligations. See 8 Del. C. § 259(a).
It may be that the parties can resolve these issues in the first
instance. Rather than burdening an overly long opinion with
further analysis of appraisal and its contingent relevance, the
parties shall meet and confer about whether further rulings are
necessary.
III. CONCLUSION
Murdock, his entity DFC Holdings, LLC, and Carter are
liable for breaches of their duty of loyalty in the amount
of $148,190,590.18. DeLorenzo and Deutsche Bank are not
liable to the plaintiffs. The parties will confer and advise the
court as to any issues that remain to be addressed.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2015 WL 5052214
Footnotes
1 In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch.2013), aff'd sub nom., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635
(Del.2014). During the pendency of this case, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted then-Chancellor Strine's analysis.
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2 See, e.g., Koehler v. NetSpend Hldgs., Inc., 2013 WL 2181518, at *16–17 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (reviewing details
of “weak fairness opinion”); In re El Paso Corp. S'holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 441 (Del. Ch.2012) (Strine, C.) (noting
“questionable aspects” of banker's valuation); In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 771–73,
803–804 (Del. Ch.2011) (Strine, C.) (critiquing misleading analyses prepared by financial advisor); In re Loral Space &
Commc'ns Inc., 2008 WL 4293781, at *10–11, *14–15 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (Strine, V.C.) (analyzing erroneous and
misleading presentation by financial advisor); Robert M. Bass Gp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1245 (Del. Ch.1988)
(critiquing banker's analyses that included “at least one assumption that is incorrect, and upon others that are highly
questionable”); see also In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 817 (Del. Ch.2011) (enjoining transaction
where banker “secretly and selfishly manipulated the sale process to engineer a transaction that would permit [the bank]
to obtain lucrative buy-side financing fees”).
3 See Estate of Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 2009 WL 2586783, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2009) (“Typically, in a post-trial
opinion, the court evaluates the parties' claims using a preponderance of the evidence standard.”), aff'd, 991 A.2d 1153
(Del.2010). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means proof that something is more likely than not. It means that
certain evidence, when compared to the evidence opposed to it, has the more convincing force and makes you believe
that something is more likely true than not.” Agilent Techs, Inc. v. Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18,
2010) (Strine, V.C.) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under this standard, [the party bearing the burden] is not required
to prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence or to exacting certainty. Rather, [the party] must prove only that it is
more likely than not that it is entitled to relief.” Triton Const. Co. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6 (Del.
Ch. May 18, 2009), aff'd, 988 A.2d 938 (Del.2010) (TABLE).
4 The allocations did influence my rulings on a number of procedural issues, including the allotment of trial time, the order
of witnesses, the schedule for post-trial briefing, and presentation of post-trial argument. Generally speaking, because
the defendants bore the burden of proof on the fiduciary duty claim, they were given the advantages that ordinarily inure
to the party that bears the burden, such as the opportunity to present their case and arguments first and to present a
rebuttal case and reply.
5 Murdock obtained additional liquidity by entering into a forward sale covering another 27% of Dole's stock. The forward
sale was structured through the Murdock Automatic Common Exchange Security Trust, and the resulting securities
were called “MACES.” The plaintiffs have argued that the MACES influenced the timing of the announcement of the
ITOCHU Transaction, discussed below, and that communications surrounding the MACES show that Deutsche Bank's
primary loyalty was to Murdock, not Dole. It is undisputed that the ITOCHU Transaction was favorable for Dole and
its stockholders, and the timing of that transaction does not have any relevance to the outcome of this litigation.
That Deutsche Bank saw Murdock as its primary client is apparent from overwhelming evidence in the record. The
communications surrounding the MACES are cumulative.
6 Murdock 49–51 (video testimony); see Murdock 40 (admitting that he can be “pushy”); Murdock 47 (“I'm abrupt. I'm
always a strong-willed man. That's the reason why I get so many things done.” (video testimony)); Murdock 76 (“I have
been charged many times with being a strong individual, and I'm not ashamed of it.”); Murdock Dep. 175 (referring to his
outside directors, “They have their own opinions too, but I'm usually a little stronger than most people.”).
Murdock tried out three different personas during his testimony. During his deposition, he showed the true force of his
domineering personality. During the first day of trial, Murdock tried to appear more reasonable and conciliatory on direct,
but on cross-examination, he could not resist being combative. He denied basic points and made long speeches. Both
during his deposition and on the first day of trial, many of Murdock's assertions were not credible or plainly wrong. To
rehabilitate him, the defendants tried to portray him as a confused 91–year–old man, but it was clear that Murdock's
intellect remains sharp. Murdock's problem was different. By dint of his prodigious wealth and power, he has grown
accustomed to deference and fallen into the habit of characterizing events however he wants. That habit serves a witness
poorly when he faces a skilled cross-examiner who has contrary documents and testimony at his disposal.
On the second day of trial, Murdock tried a different approach: He became evasive and attempted to cast himself as an
uninvolved CEO who lacked any meaningful knowledge about what was going on at his company. He even denied being
involved in major decisions, such as when Dole started giving intra-quarter earnings guidance in the months before the
Merger. See Murdock 304–05, 311–14. This version of Murdock was not credible either.
In addition to offering the “confused old man” theory, the defendants sought to blunt the cumulative effect of Murdock's
testimony, demeanor, and actions by citing his philanthropy, which is commendable. But it does not inoculate his
business dealings. Tycoons like Vanderbilt, Carnegie, and Rockefeller built great fortunes as aggressive businessmen,
then devoted substantial portions of their wealth to the betterment of all. More recently, Bill Gates led a company that
was prosecuted successfully for antitrust violations, yet his foundation appears (at least to me) to be a force for good.
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The ultimate balancing is for posterity and the divine. My task is far narrower: to evaluate how Murdock and his fellow
fiduciaries behaved in connection with a specific transaction.
7 Grellier Dep. at 47; see Grellier 2114 (describing Murdock as “extremely volatile”); id. at 2130 (describing Murdock as
“very, very headstrong” and “not receptive to being pushed by anybody to do anything”). In one of the more telling
moments at trial, plaintiffs' counsel asked Dole's coverage banker about an internal email in which he referred facetiously
to Murdock, after the sale of Lanai, as being “bunkered in his office counting his money.” Brook 1983. The banker quailed
and quickly testified, “I was actually being very flip on that. He wasn't in his office counting his money.” Id. His demeanor
reflected serious concern about how Murdock would react to his remark.
8 Equally telling was the fact that promptly after the Merger had been negotiated, Murdock told his lenders that Dole could
achieve $200 million in EBITDA. Carter testified that Murdock made that claim without any support, and that he was
forced to fill in the gap with cost savings. Carter 970–71. Fortunately, Carter was able immediately to identify $40 million
in cost savings, $35 million of which were unrelated to the elimination of public company costs. Carter 971, 979. In reality,
the cost savings that Carter found were the same savings that were previously available. During his deposition, Renato
Acuña, the President of the Fresh Fruit division, testified candidly that the cost savings achieved after the Merger were
available previously. See Acun#a Dep. 14–15. Carter simply delayed them so that post-Merger, Murdock would benefit.
9 When asked about the reason for Weinberg's departure during his deposition, Murdock initially testified that Weinberg
had bought a house on Lanai, “was thinking about retiring,” “was thinking of doing other things,” “didn't have time,” and
“couldn't always be [present at Board meetings].” Murdock Dep. 41. After being confronted with his May 4 voicemail to
Conrad and Weinberg's deposition testimony, Murdock conceded the true backstory of Weinberg's ouster. Murdock 42–
45. Murdock nevertheless claimed that he and Weinberg “stayed–not quite as close a friends as we used to be, but
friendly” and that Weinberg “was at his house and had meals.” Murdock 67. Weinberg testified during his deposition in
May 2014 that he had not spoken to Murdock since leaving the Board a year earlier. Weinberg Dep. 34.
10 Carter claimed at trial that he was shocked to receive Murdock's proposal. Carter 946. That testimony was not credible.
Carter participated in meetings and conference calls concerning Murdock's take-private plans during the preceding
months, and he had helped negotiate the financing fees that Deutsche Bank would earn.
11 At trial, after being pinned down on cross-examination and forced to concede the actual subject matter of the Lender
Meeting, Carter characterized his decision not to tell Lazard about it as an innocent mistake, suggesting that “if I had to
do it again, I would have [invited Lazard].” Carter 965. That testimony was not credible. Carter invented a cover story
for the Lender Meeting at the time, and he stuck with it until it was proven false on cross-examination at trial. He never
provided the Committee with full disclosure about the participants in the Lender Meeting or its subject matter even after
the fact. And he continued to violate the Process Letter in other ways as the Committee's process unfolded.
12 See, e.g., Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del.2001) (reaffirming teaching of Weinberger
that fairness must take into account whether “the merger was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or a
low point in the company's cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive development”); Rabkin, 498 A.2d at
1106 (reversing dismissal of complaint challenging fairness of freeze-out merger where plaintiff alleged that controller
timed the proposal to occur after a one-year commitment to pay a higher price expired); In re John Q. Hammons Hotels
Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 3165613, at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (explaining that “[p]laintiffs could prevail at trial on
the issue of fair dealing if they were able to establish that the price of the minority shares was depressed as a result
of Hammons's [pre-merger] improper self-dealing conduct”); Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324,
1335 (Del. Ch.1987) (explaining that a controlling stockholder is “obliged not to time or structure the transaction, or to
manipulate the corporation's values, so as to permit or facilitate the forced elimination of the minority stockholders at an
unfair price”); see also Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d 760, 763 (Del. Ch.1964) (finding that complaint stated claim
based on actions taken before short-form merger in which “the merger was the final step of a conspiracy to accomplish
an unlawful end by unlawful means”).
13 Academic research has found a correlation between management-led buyouts and lowered guidance, increased
reserves, and other measures that reduce the apparent performance of a company during periods before the
announcement of the buyout. “The U.S. literature on accounting manipulation states that downward earnings
management prior to [management buyouts] is expected.” Yaping Mao & Luc Renneboog, Do Managers Manipulate
Earnings Prior to Management Buyouts? 5 (Center Discussion Paper Series No. 2013–055, October 11, 2013); see
James Ang, Irena Hutton & Mary Anne Majadillas, Manager Divestment in Leveraged Buyouts, 20 European Fin.
Mgmt. 462 (2013) (finding positive pre-transaction earnings management when managers disinvest in a third-party
leverage buyout but negative earnings management when managers retain a significant ownership stake after the
transaction); Patricia Dechow, Weili Ge & Catherine Schrand, Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review Of The
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Proxies, Their Determinants And Their Consequences, 50 J. Acc. & Econ. 344 (2010) (finding that managers have
options to make different accounting choices that vary depending on their misrepresentation objective); Y. Woody Wu,
Management Buyouts And Earnings Management, 12 J. Acc. & Fin. 373 (1997) (finding that earnings manipulation
in management buyouts caused an average decrease in price of 18.6%); Susan E. Perry & Thomas H. Williams,
Earnings Management Preceding Management Buyout Offers, 18 J. Acc. & Econ. 157 (1994) (finding evidence of
downward accrual management); see also Paul E. Fisher & Henock Louis, Financial Reporting And Conflicting Managerial
Incentives: The Case Of Management Buyouts, 54 Mgmt. Sci. 1700 (2008) (finding downward earnings manipulation
generally decreases when the managers require large amounts of external financing, but that the effect is smaller if the
company has significant fixed assets to serve as collateral). The behavior in this case provides a real-world example
of this phenomenon.
14 According to the defendants, Murdock and Carter could not achieve the cost savings they generated after the Merger as
long as Dole was a public company ostensibly because the cuts were too “risky” for public stockholders. Carter 982. That
argument turns traditional principles of limited liability and diversification upside down. Diversified public stockholders
should be less risk-averse, precisely because of their diversification, than a large stockholder with non-diversified risk.
See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch.1996) (“Shareholders can diversify the risks of
their corporate investments. Thus, it is in their economic interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive
net present value investment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk adjusted rate of return
first. Shareholders don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse.”). The contention that the post-
ITOCHU cuts had to be made after the Merger was a face-saving rationalization of self-interested behavior. The savings
from discontinuing Dole's status as a public company stand on a different footing.
15 He also did it to spite the outside directors and teach them a lesson about who was really in charge. During pre-
trial proceedings, Murdock and Carter's response to the outside directors' opposition to the self-tender was part of
what factored into my conclusion that triable issues of fact existed regarding the Committee's independence. Delaware
decisions have long worried about a controller's potential ability to take retributive action against outside directors if
they did not support the controller's chosen transaction and whether it could cause them to support a deal that was
not in the best interests of the company or its stockholders. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont II), 694 A.2d
422, 428 (Del.1997) (describing the inherent coercion present when a controlling stockholder is on the other side of
a transaction as involving the “risk ... that those who pass upon the propriety of the transaction might perceive that
disapproval may result in retaliation by the controlling shareholder”); In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d
604, 617–19 (Del. Ch.2005) (Strine, V.C.) (describing case law); In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436
(Del. Ch.2002) (same). The Delaware Supreme Court has confirmed that controlling stockholder status does not, standing
alone, give rise to concern. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S'holders Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1183 (Del.2015). At the
same time, Delaware decisions recognize that when controllers actually make retributive threats, that fact is evidence
of unfair dealing. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc. (Lynch), 638 A.2d 1110, 1120 (Del.1994); Reis v. Hazelett
Strip–Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 465 (Del. Ch.2011) (citing threats made by controlling stockholder as “evidence of
unfairness”); Hammons, 2009 WL 3165613, at *12 n.38 (“[N]either special committee approval nor a stockholder vote
would be effective if the controlling stockholder engaged in threats, coercion, or fraud.”); cf. Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 445
(reviewing tender offer by controlling stockholder under lower standard of review as long as “the controlling stockholder
has made no retributive threats”).
In this case, just weeks before Murdock proposed the Merger, Murdock and Carter gave the outside directors a
demonstration of the costs and futility of resistance. When Murdock and Dole management proposed the self-tender,
Conrad and Weinberg opposed it. As detailed in the Factual Background, Murdock was furious and did everything he could
to pressure both of them into changing their views. After the directors held an executive session on May 6, 2013, Murdock
petulantly absented himself from the next Board meeting on May 8. After Conrad and Weinberg convinced the Board to
adopt the program of open market repurchases, Murdock left a threatening message for Weinberg that was “not for public
consumption.” Weinberg Dep. 33. A few days later, Carter called Weinberg and demanded his resignation, citing a “lack
of collegiality at the board level” due to Weinberg's “personality clash” with Murdock. Carter Dep. 20. Weinberg resigned,
and the full Board accepted his resignation. Less than three weeks later, Carter cancelled the repurchase program.
Before evaluating the evidence at trial, it seemed to me that these events provided an extreme example of retributive
action that would influence the thinking and actions of an outside director. Murdock and Carter had shown the outside
directors that if they went in a different direction than Murdock wanted, they risked losing their Board seats, and the
decision they staked their positions on would be nullified. As discussed, having reviewed the record at trial and heard
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Conrad testify, I am convinced that the Committee was in fact independent, notwithstanding Murdock and Carter's shot
across the bow.
16 See Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 (Del.1989) (“[W]hen a board is deceived by those who will
gain from such misconduct, [including officers of the corporation,] the protections girding the decision itself vanish.”);
cf. Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1120 (holding that even if the members of a special committee were “truly independent and ...
performed their tasks in a proper manner,” that alone would not be sufficient to show fair dealing) (citing Am. Gen. Corp.
v. Texas Air Corp., 1987 WL 6337, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987)).
17 In re Tele–Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2005); see also Lynch, 638 A.2d
at 1120–21 (“Particular consideration must be given to evidence of whether the special committee was truly independent,
fully informed and had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length.”).
18 Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont I), 1996 WL 145452, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996) (Allen, C.) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Tremont I, Chancellor Allen held that the special committee functioned effectively and shifted to the plaintiffs
the burden to prove that the transaction price was unfair. Id. at *1. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
the special committee had not functioned effectively and reversed for a new determination of fairness with the burden
properly assigned. Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 429–30. The Delaware Supreme Court did not reverse any of the Chancellor's
legal rulings, although it did disagree with the use of the term “privileged” to describe information that a controller can
withhold during a negotiation. Id. at 432. This decision cites aspects of Tremont I that were not reversed on appeal. In
light of this disclosure, citations to Tremont I omit the cumbersome “rev'd on other grounds.”
19 Tremont I, 1996 WL 145452, at *15; accord Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 451.
20 Bomarko I, 794 A.2d at 1180 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added); accord HMG/Courtland Props., Inc.
v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch.1999) (Strine, V.C.) (explaining that directors have an “unremitting obligation to deal
candidly with their fellow directors” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735
A.2d 387, 413 (Del. Ch.1999) (“No doubt Fleming [the controlling stockholder] had a duty of disclosure to the ABCO
board of directors in seeking their approval.”). Even in a short-form merger, where appraisal is the exclusive remedy,
a court of equity has “the ever-present power ... to deal with illegality or fraud.” Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187
A.2d 78, 80 (Del.1962); accord Braasch, 199 A.2d at 764. See generally In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S'holders Litig.,
793 A.2d 329, 347 (Del. Ch.2000) (“Stauffer and Braasch remain authoritative expressions of the law.”), aff'd sub nom.
Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del.2001).
21 In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 544 (Del. Ch.2003) (Strine, V.C.) (holding that the duty of an officer-
director was to “provide the special committee and its advisors with all the information they asked for, because they were
entitled to all the information the company had”); see Kalisman v. Friedman, 2013 WL 1668205, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17,
2013) (“A director's right to information is essentially unfettered in nature.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord
Schoon v. Troy Corp., 2006 WL 1851481, at *1 n. 8 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2006); Intrieri v. Avatex, 1998 WL 326608, at
*1 (Del. Ch. June 12, 1998); Belloise v. Health Mgmt., Inc., 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 127, at *36 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1996)
(Allen, C.).
22 Compare Cysive, 836 A.2d at 538 (noting that the controlling stockholders “were enthusiastic supporters of the effort to
find a buyer or strategic partner for [the company],” and consequently, the lack of any higher bid provided evidence that
the transaction price was a fair price), and Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 350
(Del. Ch.2004) (Strine, V.C.) (finding merger price was a reliable indicator of the company's value where the company's
largest stockholder was willing to sell its stake and the sales process was not flawed in any material respect), with In re
First Boston, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1990 WL 78836, at *7 (Del. Ch. June 7, 1990) (Allen, C.) (“[T]he fiduciaries' position
may preclude the emerge[nce] of alternative transactions at a higher price.”).
23 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor Plenary III), 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del. Ch.1994) (Allen, C.), aff'd,
Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d 1156; accord Tremont I, 1996 WL 145452, at *1 (“A fair price is a price that is within a
range that reasonable men and women with access to relevant information might accept.”).
24 Reis, 28 A.3d at 466; compare Technicolor Plenary IV, 663 A.2d at 1176–77 (affirming that merger consideration of $23
per share was entirely fair), with Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26, 30 (Del.2005) (awarding fair value in
appraisal of $28.41 per share).
25 Id.; see, e.g., M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del.1999) (“A merger price resulting from arm's-length
negotiations where there are no claims of collusion is a very strong indication of fair value.”); Van de Walle v. Unimation,
Inc., 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (“The most persuasive evidence of the fairness of the $21 per share
merger price is that it was the result of arm's-length negotiations between two independent parties, where the seller ...
was motivated to seek the highest available price, and a diligent and extensive canvass of the market had confirmed
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that no better price was available. The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market reality
(as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence
that the price is fair.”).
26 Even a controller that has effected a squeeze-out unilaterally with no process at all conceivably could prove at trial that
the transaction was entirely fair. Envision, for example, an altruistic controller who is the sole director of a privately held
company and who owns a majority of the shares with the balance held by the company's employees. For idiosyncratic
reasons, the controller wishes to eliminate the minority. At the same time, because of the controller's relationship with the
employees, the controller wishes to provide an indisputably generous price. The controller implements the deal unilaterally
via a one-page merger agreement, approves it at the board level with a unanimous written consent, and approves it at
the stockholder level by written consent. The concept of “process” is non-existent, but even under those circumstances,
I believe that a controller who proved that the price was indeed fair would not have breached his duties. Cf. In re Trados
Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch.2013) (holding that fiduciaries did not breach their duties when they failed to
follow a fair process yet nevertheless approved a transaction that yielded a fair price).
27 Reis, 28 A.3d at 467; accord Ross Holding & Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Gp., LLC, 2014 WL 4374261, at *33 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Robust procedural protections may support a determination that price was fairly within a range
of reasonable values, and a failure of process may prevent a Court from reaching such a conclusion.”); see William
Penn P'ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 758 (Del.2011) (“Merely showing that the sale price was in the range of fairness,
however, does not necessarily satisfy the entire fairness burden when fiduciaries stand on both sides of a transaction and
manipulate the sales process.”); Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 432 (“[H]ere, the process is so intertwined with price that under
Weinberger 's unitary standard a finding that the price negotiated by the Special Committee might have been fair does
not save the result.”); Gentile v. Rossette, 2010 WL 2171613, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2010) (“From a tainted process,
one should not be surprised if a tainted price emerges.”); Bomarko I, 794 A.2d at 1183 (“[T]he unfairness of the process
also infects the fairness of the price.”); HMG/Courtland, 749 A.2d at 116 (holding that the defendants did not satisfy their
burden by showing that the price was “within the low end of the range of possible prices that might have been paid in
negotiated arms-length deals” where “[t]he process was ... anything but fair”).
28 See id.; accord Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 499 (Del.2000) (holding that post-closing evidence that
validated a pre-merger forecast was admissible to show that “plans in effect at the time of the merger have born fruition”);
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 298–99 (Del.1996) (requiring that valuation include value of business plans
in existence at the time of the merger); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2014 WL 2042797, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 19, 2014)
(“It is clear from our case law that, where a company begins to implement business plans, revenues from those plans
must be accounted for in an income-based valuation method.”), aff'd, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (ORDER);
ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 910 (Del. Ch.1999) (discussing law governing incorporation in valuation of
plans in existence at the time of the merger); Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 697 (Del. Ch.1996) (considering
multiple post-closing events in determining the fairness of the merger price). See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh &
Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119, 146 (2005) (“Remember
that the company is worth not only the present value of the free cash flow from its current assets, but also the free cash
flows generated by the reinvestment strategy that it pursues. The development of the cornfield is a reinvestment of the
company's free cash flow and, although the actual investments are not made until after the squeeze-out, the plans are
in place before the squeeze-out.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware
Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 359, 418 (“Although the idea
[of excluding elements of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger] makes some sense in
the arm's-length transaction where the dissenting shareholder is truly opting out, it is misapplied in squeeze-outs where
the shareholder is being expelled and where those who remain may be exploiting asymmetric information.”). Although
these cases focus on appraisal, the valuation principles and standards for determining statutory fair value are the same
as those used to evaluate the fair price aspect of the entire fairness test. See Orchard Enters., 88 A.3d at 30 & n.11
(collecting cases). Additionally, “[i]n an entire fairness case, where the influence of control is important, there is a sucker
insurance purpose to such evidence.” In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 812 n.177 (Del.
Ch.2011) (Strine, C.), aff'd 51 A.3d 1213 (Del.2012).
29 See HMG/Courtland, 749 A.2d at 116–17 (finding that although price fell within lower range of fairness, “The defendants
have failed to persuade me that HMG would not have gotten a materially higher value for Wallingford and the Grossman's
Portfolio had Gray and Fieber come clean about Gray's interest. That is, they have not convinced me that their misconduct
did not taint the price to HMG's disadvantage.”); Bomarko I, 794 A.2d at 1184 (holding that although the “uncertainty
[about] whether or not ITI could secure financing and restructure” lowered the value of the plaintiffs' shares, the plaintiffs
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were entitled to a damages award that reflected the possibility that the company might have succeeded absent the
fiduciary's disloyal acts).
30 See ev3, Inc. v. Lesh, 114 A.3d 527, 539 (Del.2014); DV Realty Advisors LLC v. Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of
Chi., 75 A.3d 101, 110–11 (Del.2013); Allen v. Encore Energy P'rs, L.P., 72 A.3d 93, 104 (Del.2013); Stone v. Ritter, 911
A.2d 362, 369 (Del.2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney II ), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del.2006). See generally Leo
E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 Geo. L.J. 629 (2010).
31 Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 859, 864 (2015); accord
Strine, supra, at 655 (explaining that the concept of good faith encompasses a director's “honest, non-pretextual use
of power”). For cases illustrating these concepts see, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.1984) (explaining
that as part of the business judgment rule, directors are presumed to act “in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company”); In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney I ), 907 A.2d 693, 755
(Del. Ch.2005) (“To act in good faith, a director must act at all times with an honesty of purpose and in the best interests
and welfare of the corporation.”), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.2006); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch.1977)
(stating that directors must act “in good faith, with honest motives, and for honest ends”).
32 Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67; accord Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (“A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where
the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation....” (quoting
Disney II, 906 A.2d at 67)).
33 See Venhill, 2008 WL 2270488, at *28 (“Howard did not act in the good faith pursuit of Venhill's best interests, as he
was bound to do. Instead, he acted in bad faith by impoverishing Venhill in order to keep Auto–Trol afloat for personal
reasons unrelated to Venhill's own best interests.”); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch.2003) (Strine,
V.C.) (“A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in
the corporation's best interest.... The reason for the disloyalty (the faithlessness) is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be
it venal, familial, collegial, or nihilistic) for conscious action not in the corporation's best interest does not make it faithful,
as opposed to faithless.”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch.1996) (Allen, C.) (defining
a “bad faith” transaction as one “that is authorized for some purpose other than a genuine attempt to advance corporate
welfare or is known to constitute a violation of applicable positive law”); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1989 WL
7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (Allen, C.) (explaining that the business judgment rule would not protect “a fiduciary
who could be shown to have caused a transaction to be effectuated (even one in which he had no financial interest) for
a reason unrelated to a pursuit of the corporation's best interests”).
34 Of course, had they done so, it would have been commendable and insulated them from any risk of liability relating to
the meeting.
35 See Murdock 132–33, 248–60, 262–269, 286–290; Carter 950, 954; Grellier 2149–2165, 2197–2202; JX 173; JX 244;
JX 393; JX 394; JX 396; JX 404; JX 476; JX 478; JX 1634; JX 1670; JX 1671.
36 See Kalisman, 2013 WL 1668205, at *6; Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113, 121 (Del. Ch.2000); KLM
v. Checchi, 1997 WL 525861, at *2–3 (Del. Ch. July 23, 1997); Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Cordant Hldgs. Corp., 1996
WL 307444, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 4, 1996); AOC Ltd. P'ship v. Horsham Corp., 1992 WL 97220, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 5,
1992); see also Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 208 (Del.2008) (holding that director lacked standing to sue derivatively
because stockholder he represented could bring suit, which only could happen if director was able to share information
with affiliated stockholder). For discussions of the nuanced issues raised by information sharing and the difficulties of a
bright-line rule that either permits or prohibits sharing, see J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and
Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 Bus. Law. 33, 54–57 (2015); Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, 74 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 197 (2011), and Catherine G. Dearlove & Jennifer J. Barrett, What To Do About Informational Conflicts Involving
Designated Directors, 57 Prac. Law. 45 (2011).
37 See, e.g., Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 463 (Del.1991) (“It is an act of disloyalty for a fiduciary to profit personally
from the use of information secured in a confidential relationship.”) (emphasis added); Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70
A.2d 5, 7–8 (Del. Ch.1949) (“A fiduciary is subject to a duty to the beneficiary not to use on his own account information
confidentially given him by the beneficiary or acquired by him during the course of or on account of the fiduciary relation
or in violation of his duties as fiduciary, in competition with or to the injury of the beneficiary, ... unless the information is
a matter of general knowledge.” (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added)); Holdgriewe v. Nostalgia Network,
Inc., 1993 WL 144604, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 1993) (Allen, C.) (limiting director's ability to share information directly
or through advisors where he was affiliated with entity engaged in active litigation against corporation); Henshaw v. Am.
Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch.1969) (same; noting that a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty would exist if
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the director seeking inspection were to “abuse his position as director [by making] information available to persons hostile
to the corporation or otherwise not entitled to it”).
38 Imagine an alternative history in which Murdock not only mimicked MFW 's form but adhered to its substance. Under
those circumstances, the Committee would have had full access to accurate information about the Company, could have
bargained with Murdock on an informed and arm's length basis, and could have agreed to a deal or, if it concluded that
Murdock was not willing to pay a fair price or that there were better alternatives available for Dole and its stockholders,
said no. By stepping back from his controller role and disabling himself at the Board and stockholder level when he made
his initial proposal, Murdock would no longer have stood on both sides of the transaction, the Committee could have
performed its function effectively, and the stockholders could have protected themselves at the ballot box. It does not
seem to me that under those circumstances, Murdock would be thought to have breached his fiduciary duties by making
preparations for his offer and enlisting Deutsche Bank's assistance.
39 In re Shoe–Town, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1990 WL 13475, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1990); see Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 1.01 & cmt. b (2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Bankers and Chancellors, 93 Tex. L.Rev. 1, 31 (2014).
As Professors Bratton and Wachter discuss, a common law agency relationship is contractable, subject to certain outer
limits. Because Deutsche Bank does not face liability even under a traditional common law relationship, this decision
does not parse the potential implications of provisions in Deutsche Bank's engagement letters.
40 Because Carter engaged in fraud, rescissory damages could be justified on these facts, and there is evidence suggesting
that damages of $6.84 per share would not be unwarranted. Carter testified that Dole not only met its budget for 2014,
but that it had exceeded that budget by “quite a bit.” Carter 994. At trial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence showing
that Dole reached $196.5 million in adjusted EBITDA in just the first three quarters of 2014, more than what was
forecasted in the Committee Projections for the entire year. JX 923 at 4; Carter 993–95; cf. JX 783 at 22 (showing that
the Committee Projections forecasted $189 in EBITDA in 2014). Supposedly to contradict this evidence, the defendants
sought to introduce just one of the monthly comprehensive management reporting packages for 2014, called the “Tuesday
Package,” even though Dole previously moved for a protective order to avoid producing those documents. See Tr.
2072–73. After the plaintiffs objected and I ordered the production of the remaining Tuesday Packages from 2014, the
defendants withdrew the lone Tuesday Package from evidence. Despite my ruling, the defendants never produced the
other Tuesday Packages, yet they continued to rely on Carter's unsupported testimony about the withdrawn Tuesday
Package. The natural inference is that the Tuesday Packages would have supported an even higher damages award
based on rescissory principles. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1119 n.7 (“The production of weak evidence when strong is, or
should have been, available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse.”); accord Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 879 (Del.1985); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 301 & n.7 (Del. Ch.2000)
(Strine, V.C.). Ironically, one of the defendants' main themes during post-trial argument was that the plaintiffs had “cherry-
picked” their evidence.
41 See, e.g., FactSet, US M & A News and Trends (July 2015), http://www.factset.com/websitefiles/PDFs/flashwire/
flashwire_7.15 (reporting an average deal premium between 30% and 40% in the third quarter of 2013, when the freeze-
out was negotiated); Jens Kengelbach & Alexander Roos, Boston Consulting Gp., Riding the Next Wave in M & A
12 (2011) (finding an average deal premium of 26% between 1990 and 2010 in a sample of approximately 26,000
transactions); Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The Market for Corporate Control, 2 J. Econ. Persp.
49, 51 (1988) (finding average historical deal premiums ranging from 19% to 35% in different decades).
42 See 6 Del. C. § 2301(a); Levey v. Browstone Asset Mgmt., LP, 2014 WL 4290192 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2014) (explaining
rationale for fluctuating rate); Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Gp., Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, at *13 (Del. Ch. July 25,
2003) (using quarterly compounding interval for legal rate “due to the fact that the legal rate of interest most nearly
resembles a return on a bond, which typically compounds quarterly”).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
McCORMICK, V.C.
*1  Due to the press of time,1 aspects of this decision lack
polish or extended treatment.
March came in like a lion. Snow flurries and gray overcast
covered downtown Wilmington for most of March's early
days. The courthouse witnessed another flurry of activity
during those days as the plaintiffs, FrontFour Capital Group
LLC and FrontFour Master Fund, Ltd. (“FrontFour”), tried
their expedited claims to enjoin transactions orchestrated by
twin brothers Brook and Seth Taube.
The challenged transactions, which were announced on
August 9, 2018, would combine an asset management firm
founded and majority owned by the Taube brothers, Medley
Management, Inc. (“Medley Management”), with two
business development corporations that Medley Management
advises, Medley Capital Corporation (“Medley Capital”),
and Sierra Income Corporation (“Sierra”). If the transactions
proceed, Sierra will acquire first Medley Capital and then
Medley Management in two cross-conditioned mergers, with
Sierra as the surviving combined entity (the “Proposed
Transactions”). Medley Management will receive per share
$ 3.44 cash, plus $ .065 in cash dividends, and the right
to receive .3836 shares of Sierra stock, which represents a
premium of approximately 100% to Medley Management's
trading price. The Taube brothers and their management
team will receive lucrative employment contracts with the
combined company. Medley Capital stockholders, including
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FrontFour, will receive per share the right to 0.8050 shares
of Sierra stock, which provides no premium against Medley
Capital's net asset value (“NAV”).
The Taube brothers proposed the transactions in late June
2018. They touted size/scale, asset quality, and internalized
management resulting from the transactions as beneficial
to all of the parties. They set an aggressive timeline to
permit announcement of a deal in early August 2018 in
connection with the release of second-quarter financials.
In response to the proposal, each of the three affiliated
entities empowered a special committee to negotiate and,
if appropriate, recommend the transaction. It was July 11th
before the Medley Capital special committee had retained a
financial advisor and was prepared to negotiate, leaving only
a few weeks to negotiate under the Taube brothers' timeline.
During that time, the Medley Capital special committee
negotiated a slightly better exchange ratio, secured the Taube
brothers' agreement to waive payments in connection with
a valuable tax receivable agreement (“TRA”), and obtained
the opinion of an independent compensation expert that
the Taube brothers' compensation packets were reasonable.
The committee members also secured for themselves the
agreement that two of the four of them—to be determined
through an interview process following announcement of the
Proposed Transactions—would serve on the board of the
combined entity.
*2  From a distance, this process appeared arm's-length. The
December 2018 proxy recommending that the stockholders
approve the Proposed Transactions certainly made it seem
that way.
At trial, FrontFour proved otherwise. FrontFour commenced
this litigation on February 11, 2019. They claimed that the
Medley Capital directors, who include the Taube brothers,
breached their fiduciary duties to the common stockholders
by entering into the Proposed Transactions. They accused
Sierra of aiding and abetting in those breaches. They also
claimed that Medley Capital's public disclosures failed
to provide several categories of information material to
stockholders considering the Proposed Transactions.
In reality, when the Taube brothers proposed the transactions
in June 2018, Medley Management was facing enormous
financial pressure. Medley Management had engaged in
two sales processes in 2017, both of which failed, which
left merging with affiliates as Medley Management's only
solution. As part of the 2017 sales processes, Medley
Management had secured standstill agreements from around
thirty potential bidders, which prevented those third parties
from proposing transactions with Medley Capital. During
negotiations with one bidder during the 2017 sales process,
the Taube brothers had already agreed to give up the TRA for
substantially less consideration than they will receive under
the Proposed Transactions. In 2018, Medley Management
received two inbound expressions of interest for Medley
Capital, which they ignored. The Medley Capital special
committees did not know any of this information before this
litigation. They were not told. They did not ask.
In the midst of this informational vacuum, Medley Capital's
special committee members determined not to run any pre-
signing market check or consider alternative transactions.
They made this determination, although around that time at
least one stockholder was agitating for Medley Capital to
engage in a sales process. They capitulated to the aggressive
timeline, although Medley Capital had no business reasons
for rushing toward a deal. Then, they insulated the deal from
a post-signing market check by agreeing to deal protections,
including a no-shop.
This post-trial decision finds that the Proposed Transactions
trigger the entire fairness test. FrontFour proved that half
of the Medley Capital special committee was beholden to
the Taube brothers, and thus the Taube brothers dominated
and controlled the board with respect to the Proposed
Transactions. Defendants failed to meet their burden of
proving that the Proposed Transactions are entirely fair. The
deal protections of the merger agreement also fail enhanced
scrutiny.
As relief, FrontFour seeks a curative shopping process,
devoid of Medley Management's influence, free of any deal
protections, plus full disclosures. One obstacle prevents the
Court from issuing this relief: FrontFour failed to prove that
the acquirer, Sierra, aided and abetted in the other defendants'
breaches of fiduciary duties. Under the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in C & J Energy,2 an injunction may not issue
if it would “strip an innocent third party of its contractual
rights” under a merger agreement, unless the party seeking
the injunction proves that the third party aided and abetted
a breach of fiduciary duty by the target directors. Ordering
a go-shop despite the no-shop and preventing enforcement
of the deal protections would effectively strip Sierra of its
contractual rights.
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*3  And so, what came in like a lion goes out like a lamb:
Under C & J Energy, FrontFour's requested relief must be
denied.
Medley Capital's stockholders, however, are entitled to
corrective disclosures. The proxy creates the misleading
impression that the special committee replicated arm's-
length negotiations amid the conflicts tainting the Proposed
Transactions. To vote on an informed basis, the stockholders
must know the reality—that the majority of the members
of the special committee failed to act independently
when negotiating the Proposed Transactions. Further, the
stockholders are entitled to additional disclosures concerning
third-party expressions of interests. On this topic, disclosures
to date have been incomplete or, in one instance, outright
false. Any stockholder vote on the Proposed Transactions is
enjoined pending corrective disclosures consistent with the
matters discussed in this decision.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over one and three-quarter days. The record
comprises over 800 trial exhibits, live testimony from six fact
and two expert witnesses, deposition testimony from five fact
witnesses, and ninety-seven stipulations of fact.3 The parties
submitted pre-trial and post-trial briefs. These are the facts as
I find them after trial.
A. The Taube Brothers, the Medley Entities, and
Medley Capital
Each of the entities named as a defendant in this action
is an affiliate of Medley Management, a publicly traded
asset management firm formed by Brook and Seth Taube.
Brook, Seth, and their younger brother, Chris, control
Medley Management through majority ownership.4 Medley
Management is the parent entity of several registered
investment advisors, which manage several funds, including
Medley Capital and Sierra (collectively, the “Medley
Entities”). The Medley Entities' organizational structure is
reflected in the attached chart.5
Medley Capital is a business development corporation
(“BDC”) formed by the Taube brothers in 2011.6 BDCs are
special investment vehicles regulated under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the “ '40 Act”) and designed
to facilitate capital formation for small and middle-
market companies.7 Medley Capital describes its business
as “generat[ing] income and capital appreciation by
lending directly to privately held middle market companies
....”8 Medley Capital “source[s] investment opportunities
through direct relationships with companies, financial
intermediaries ..., as well as through financial sponsors.”9
Medley Capital launched its initial public offering in 2011.10
*4  Medley Capital licenses its name from the Medley
Entities.11 Medley Capital has no employees, offices, or
physical assets of its own; all of this is supplied by its
external advisor, MCC Advisors LLC (“Advisors”), a Medley
Management subsidiary. The Medley Entities experience
total insider overlap. Every member of Medley Capital's
management team holds management positions, and each of
Medley Capital's inside directors hold board seats in other
Medley Entities, including Medley Management, Advisors,
and Sierra.12
Advisors manages Medley Capital pursuant to an Amended
and Restated Investment Management Agreement (the
“Management Agreement”) dated January 19, 2014.13 Under
that agreement, Medley Capital pays Advisors a base
management fee of 1.75% of Medley Capital's gross assets
and a two-part incentive fee calculated from net investment
income (“NII”) and net capital gains.14 Advisors has broad
discretion in making investment decisions and directing
Medley Capital's rights under its debt instruments.15 Such
external management arrangements are common among
BDCs.16
Under the '40 Act, a majority of Medley Capital's board of
directors (the “Board”) must be independent, and Medley
Capital cannot enter into any transaction with its external
advisor without the approval of a majority of its independent
directors.17 Medley Capital has a seven-member Board
divided into three classes.18 The directors are elected by a
plurality vote and serve staggered three-year terms.19 Medley
Capital's current Board comprises three inside directors
and four independent directors.20 Medley Capital's inside
directors are Brook Taube, Seth Taube, and their friend of
thirty years, Jeff Tonkel.21 Medley Capital's outside directors
are John E. Mack, Karin Hirtler-Garvey, Arthur S. Ainsberg,
and Mark Lerdal.22 Mack, Hirtler-Garvey, and Ainsberg
joined the Board in 2011.23 Lerdal joined the Board in 2017.24
- 56 -
FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Under the '40 Act, Medley Capital's independent directors
must annually review and, if appropriate, approve its
Management Agreement.25 In the approval process, the
outside directors confer with counsel and review management
fee levels of other BDCs.26 Under the '40 Act, the
Management Agreement must be terminable at will on
60 days' notice without a termination fee.27 The outside
directors have never considered Advisors' performance28 or
threatened (or even considered threatening) to terminate the
Management Agreement as part of their annual review or
otherwise.29
*5  In sum, Medley Capital depends on the Taube brothers
for its day-to-day operations, office space, office equipment,
staff, and even its name. Medley Capital has the right to
terminate Advisors' Management Agreement, but has never
considered using that right. Termination of that agreement
would not extricate Medley Capital from the Taube brothers'
influence in any event, given the other points of overlap.
Another salient fact: None of Medley Capital's fiduciaries
(officers and directors) have interests aligned with the
interests of Medley Capital's common stockholders.
As to the inside directors and management, their financial
interests lie in Medley Management,30 although the Taube
brothers beneficially own just under 15% of Medley
Capital's common stock.31 If the Proposed Transactions
close, the Taube brothers and Tonkel will each receive
compensation for their Medley Management interests, as well
as lucrative compensation packages more secure than the at-
will Management Agreement.32
As to the outside directors, the value of their director fees
dwarfs the value of their Medley Capital common stock.33
Ainsberg, Hirtler-Garvey, and Mack have each been paid over
$ 1 million for serving on the Board and its committees.34
For the company's fiscal year ending September 30, 2018,
Ainsberg earned $ 299,000 as a Medley Capital director,
representing roughly half of his 2018 income.35 Lerdal has
been paid $ 288,702 for his two years as Medley Capital
director.36 By contrast, at the deal price, the value of all
of the outside directors' combined common stock is under
$ 40,000.37 In the Proposed Transactions, two of Medley
Capital's four outside directors will serve on the Board of the
combined company; all four outside directors interviewed for
the position after the Merger Agreement was signed.38
B. Pre-Signing Events
1. Medley Management's Failed Sales Processes
*6  Since its January 20, 2011 IPO, by every industry
measure, Medley Capital has been in a steady financial
decline.39 This decline occurred during a period of sustained
stock market and sector share price increases.40 Medley
Capital's performance is poor compared to its peers.41 Due
to Medley Capital's poor financial performance,42 Medley
Management faced financial pressures.43
In May 2017, Medley Management embarked on a
process to consider a range of strategic transactions.44
Medley Management retained UBS and Credit Suisse to
conduct outreach.45 Nineteen parties expressed interest and
seven executed confidentiality agreements, but the process
ultimately failed.46
*7  In October 2017, Medley Management determined to
restart the process and reach out to potential bidders.47
Medley Management retained Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC (“Goldman”) and Broadhaven Capital Partners,
LLC (“Broadhaven”).48 They invited thirty-eight potential
strategic partners to participate in the preliminary round
of a two-round sale process.49 Twenty-four of them
executed confidentiality agreements.50 Medley Management
received three “viable” first-round, non-binding indications
of interest.51 Only one bidder, “Party X,” made a second-
round proposal.52 From January 12, 2018, through January
24, 2018, Medley Management and Party X engaged
in negotiations and exchanged numerous proposals and
counterproposals.53
The confidentiality agreements executed by third parties in
Medley Management's two sales processes prevented the
third-parties from offering to enter into any transaction with
funds managed by Medley Management, including Medley
Capital.54 These restrictions applied for a “standstill period”
following execution of the agreements. The standstill periods
ranged from twelve to twenty-four months.55
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On January 26, 2018, the Medley Capital Board convened a
meeting to receive updates on Medley Management's sales
process.56 Brook Taube reported on the process as well as the
status of negotiations with Party X.57 His report to the Board
was high-level. It omitted information that he had presented
to Medley Management's board of directors that same day.58
The Board was not informed, for example, that the arm's-
length parties were only willing to pay premia of 8.4% (one
third-party) – 30.0-55.4% (Party X). They were not told that
Party X had dropped its price due to concerns about the
performance of Medley Management. They were not made
aware of the standstill provisions restricting transactions at
Medley Capital. Before this litigation, none of the Board
members ever asked for or were made aware of this
information.
*8  If consummated, Party X's proposal would result in
a change of control of Medley Management, triggering
Medley Capital's approval rights under the Management
Agreement.59 To consider the impact of the Party X proposal
on Medley Capital,60 the Board determined to establish a
special committee.61 The Board appointed to the committee
Ainsberg, Hirtler-Garvey, Mack, and Lerdal, with Ainsberg
as chair (the “Special Committee”).62 The committee retained
Kramer Levin as legal advisors.63
On March 15, 2018, Party X submitted a revised bid
that reduced the proposed purchase price significantly and
changed other important terms.64 Medley Management
determined that the revised proposal was not in the
best interests of Medley Management and terminated
discussions.65 On May 2, 2018, Party X informed Medley
Management that it did not intend to continue to pursue a
potential transaction.66
In April 2018, a third-party, Origami Capital Partners, LLC
(“Origami”), reached out to Medley Capital several times to
propose a potential transaction.67 On April 4, 2018, Origami
submitted an indication of interest.68 Medley Capital publicly
denied ever receiving that letter.69 But Origami addressed
the April 2018 letter to both Brook Taube and Marilyn
Adler, a Medley Capital Senior Managing Director.70 And
Adler responded to the letter: “I am excited to tell you
that Medley has agreed to discuss a process for the sale.
I've given your name as a possible buyer. I am having a
discussion this week and will update you as I know more.”71
Brook Taube still maintains: “It's not clear to me where
the mysterious correspondence came from.”72 Before this
litigation, the Special Committee was not aware of Origami's
2018 overtures.
As part of Medley Management's negotiations with Party
X, the Medley Entities' founders (the Taube brothers
and other executives) agreed to give-up their TRA,73
which was worth approximately $ 5.9 million for fifteen
years following Medley Management's IPO.74 Before this
litigation, the Special Committee was not informed of Medley
Management's negotiations with Party X concerning the
TRA.
2. Medley Management's Proposed Transactions with
Medley Capital and Sierra
*9  By May 2018, Brook Taube felt that Medley
Management was “under enormous pressure” financially.75
Wells Fargo noted that Medley Capital's “NAV has dropped
for a remarkable fifteen quarters,”76 and observed Medley
Capital's “severe underperformance.”77 In Mack's words, by
May 2018, Medley Capital's credit portfolio was “bottoming
out.”78 The management team faced fee waivers at Medley
Capital79 and NAV issues “across the board,” which would
have a “meaningful impact on [Medley Management].”80
Intensifying this pressure, in 2016, the Taube brothers caused
Medley LCC, a subsidiary of Medley Management, to a
Master Investment Agreement with affiliates of Fortress
Credit Advisors, LLC (“Fortress”). Under the agreement,
Fortress provided approximately $ 40 million in capital for
Medley Capital projects. Fortress received a put right that, if
exercised, forces Medley to “immediately redeem” Fortress's
interest.81 This put right can be triggered in if Medley LLC
fails to pay Fortress a preferred distribution or if Medley
ceases to control Advisors.82
Brook Taube proposed implementing drastic steps, including
closing Sierra Total Return Fund83 to boost cash flow, ending
the Sierra distribution to gain $ 4 million in EBITDA, and
imposing other cost saving initiatives to squeeze another $
2 million out of the business.84 On May 9, 2018, Brook
even requested that two of his senior management members
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agree to defer cash payments owed to them and take Medley
Management stock instead.85 His colleagues declined.86
Before this litigation, the Special Committee was unaware
of the pressures Medley Management faced during this time
period.87 In a candid moment during trial, Ainsberg admitted
that he wished he had known.88
As one solution, the Taube brothers and their team began
to contemplate a three-way combination between Medley
Management, Medley Capital, and Sierra. Sierra is a non-
traded BDC specializing in first lien, second lien, and
subordinated debt of middle market companies with annual
revenue between $ 50 million and $ 1 billion.89 Like
Medley Capital, Sierra is externally managed by a Medley
Management subsidiary.90 Sierra is much larger than Medley
Capital. As of September 30, 2018, Sierra had total net assets
of $ 687,862,000 and a NAV per share of $ 7.05.91
*10  Internally, Medley Management referred to this new
proposal as “Project Integrate.”92 Brook Taube had conceived
of this transaction in March 2018 as a fallback to the Party X
deal.93 By May 21, 2018, Project Integrate was at the top of
the list of alternatives, and the management team was “very
supportive.”94 By May 30, 2018, Brook Taube had asked
Goldman and Broadhaven to consider the proposed three-way
combination.95
At Sierra and Medley Capital board meetings on June 18
and 19, 2018, respectively, Medley Management formally
introduced the idea of the three-way combination.96 The
initial proposal was that each share of Medley Capital
stock would be converted into the right to receive 0.76
shares of Sierra common stock. Sierra would acquire Medley
Management for $ 3.75 in cash and 0.41 shares of Sierra
common stock.97
The minutes of the January 19, 2019 Board meeting
summarize Medley Management's rationale behind the
proposed transaction.98 In sum, the major benefits of the
proposed transaction touted by the transaction's proponents
are: increased scale, increased liquidity, diversified asset pool,
and internalization.99
Of course, the Proposed Transactions posed significant
conflicts. In an effort to simulate arm's-length dealings,
each of the three entities empowered a special committee
to negotiate and, if appropriate, approve the transaction.
Like Medley Capital, Sierra had formed a special committee
in January 2018 to consider the impact of the Party X
transaction;100 the committee had been in a holding pattern
since that time. Each of the committees hired financial
advisors. Medley Management hired Barclays Capital Inc.
(“Barclays”);101 Medley Capital hired Sandler O'Neill +
Partners, L.P. (“Sandler”), as discussed below; and Sierra
hired Broadhaven.
*11  Brook Taube facilitated the Sierra special committee's
retention of Broadhaven. He thought highly of Broadhaven's
Todd Owens,102 having known him for years.103 However,
Medley Management had determined to retain Goldman only
for Project Integrate—“two fees on the Integrate didn't make
sense.”104 So, Brook Taube agreed to introduce Broadhaven
to the Sierra special committee,105 even though Broadhaven
was still engaged by Medley Management.106 Brook Taube
suggested the idea to Tonkel on June 6, 2018. Broadhaven
terminated its engagement with Medley Management on June
16, 2018, and pitched the Sierra special committee on June
18, 2018.107 The Sierra special committee formally retained
Broadhaven on June 29, 2018.108 Although Broadhaven
terminated its Medley Management engagement without
receiving any payment, the Sierra special committee agreed
to make an up-front payment of $ 1 million, the same
amount Broadhaven would have earned as a transaction fee
if the Medley Management strategic process had concluded
successfully.109
3. Medley Capital's Special Committee Process
On June 19, 2018, the Medley Capital Board expanded
the scope of the Special Committee's charter to consider
the Proposed Transactions.110 The Special Committee was
empowered to evaluate and negotiate any proposed business
combination, hire independent legal and financial advisors,
determine whether the transaction was in the best interests of
Medley Capital's stockholders, and recommend the approval
or rejection of the transaction.111
a. What the Special Committee did.
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The Special Committee retained a financial advisor. They
interviewed two candidates. Ainsberg and Hirtler-Garvey
participated in person; Mack and Lerdal participated
by phone.112 On June 21, 2018, at Brook Taube's
recommendation, the committee members interviewed
Medley Management's recent financial advisor, Credit
Suisse.113 On June 22, 2018, the committee interviewed
Sandler.114 The committee members met again on June 22
and 25, 2018, to select financial advisors, and they determined
to retain Sandler.115 Ainsberg signed Sandler's engagement
letter on June 29, 2018.116 Sandler gained access to the data
room that day.117
*12  The Special Committee next met on July 11, 2018,
to consider the Proposed Transactions.118 Chris Donohoe
of Sandler gave a presentation to give the committee “a
solid grounding in understanding what Medley Capital
looked like, what the other companies coming in would
look like, and what a combined company would look
like ....”119 They authorized Sandler to negotiate on their
behalf.120 The committee's goals in these negotiations
was to obtain “greater value for [the Medley Capital]
stockholders” and “make sure that the combined company
was better positioned to succeed.”121 To reach those goals, the
committee (through Sandler) asked for cash consideration.122
In the alternative, they authorized Sandler to push for less
cash to leave the combined company.123 Sandler negotiated
on the founders' TRA and the management team's post-
closing compensation.124 Finally, Sandler set out to “ensure
that the disinterested shareholders of [Medley Capital] had
representation and say in the management of the combined
business” through board representation in the combined
company.125
Sandler began to negotiate on July 11, 2018.126 Through
negotiations, the founders agreed to waive the annual TRA
payment,127 Sierra agreed to permit two Medley Capital
directors to join their Board,128 and Sierra agreed to a higher
exchange ratio than originally proposed.129 At Sandler's
request, Sierra obtained a compensation expert's opinion
concerning the management compensation packages.130 The
opinion was provided on August 3, 2018,131 with a supporting
presentation.132 Sierra did not agree to any cash consideration
for Medley Capital stockholders.133
On July 29, 2018, Medley Management, Medley Capital,
and Sierra reached final agreement on the ratios.134 In the
preceding three weeks, the Special Committee had met eight
times.135
After settling on the economic terms, the parties focused
on the legal terms of the merger agreement.136 The Special
Committee met four more times.137 The record concerning
negotiations of the deal protections is sparse. At least one
document reflects that, as of August 8, 2018, the termination
fee was still being negotiated.138
*13  On August 9, 2018, Sandler presented its opinion
to the Special Committee that the Medley Capital Merger
Consideration was fair to Medley Capital stockholders from
a financial point of view.139 On August 9, 2018, the Special
Committee approved Medley Capital's merger agreement
with Sierra.140
b. What the Special Committee did not do.
Out of the gate, the Special Committee failed to assert
control over the timing of the process. At the June
2018 Medley Capital Board meeting, Medley Management
presented an aggressive timeline, which contemplated that
the parties would execute definitive transaction agreements
and announce a transaction by July 31, 2018.141 This made
sense for Medley Management, which had shopped itself
for more than a year prior to that point. By contrast,
Medley Capital had not undertaken any strategic process
before the June meeting.142 Between its January 26, 2018
formation and the June 19, 2018 Board meeting, the Special
Committee did not hold any meetings, retain a financial
advisor, or engage in any substantive discussions with the
Taube brothers or other members of Medley Management
about a strategic transaction.143 Unlike Medley Management,
the Special Committee was starting from scratch. Unlike
Medley Management, the Special Committee had no reason
to rush deliberations. Yet, the committee capitulated to the
timeline Medley Management proposed.
Then, throughout the negotiations, Brook Taube pressured
the Special Committee to stick to the aggressive timeline.
He denies this,144 but contemporaneous documents prove
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otherwise.145 In a July 11, 2018, email to the Medley
Management Board, Brook Taube emphasized that “[t]ime
is not in our favor given performance, inquiries, letters,
etc.”146 He specifically flagged the possibility of “unwanted
interloping” and emphasized that it was “real and should be
taken seriously by the board.”147 He went on to underscore
the fact that the transaction represented a “100% premium
and a great deal” for Medley Management.148 On July 27,
2018, Brook instructed Medley Management and Goldman to
advise Medley Capital that they “have a fiduciary obligation
to close.”149 That same day, he emailed Broadhaven: “Make
this happen!!!!!!”150 On July 31, 2018, Brook Taube emailed
Jeff Tonkel while Tonkel was on a “Sierra call with Tony.”151
He instructed Tonkel: “Thursday board meetings are the time
to push these guys hard in person.”152 On August 1, 2018,
Brook reported to the Medley Management Board that “[w]e
and Goldman continue to believe the risk is substantial if we
announce earnings without simultaneously announcing this
deal.”153 On August 5, 2018, Lerdal texted Brook Taube:
“Are we on track? Anything you need from me?” Taube
responded: “Let's talk soon / Pushing Hard :-)”154
*14  The Special Committee did not analyze the value
of Medley Management, or understand what Medley
Management would obtain in the Proposed Transactions,
although in effect Medley Capital and Medley Management
were competing for consideration. The Medley Management
transaction and Medley Capital/Sierra Merger were cross-
conditioned, and the new, combined company would own
Medley Management post-closing.
The Special Committee did not consider alternative
transactions,155 although disgruntled stockholders were
publicly advocating for a sale process as of April 2018. In a
letter to the Board dated April 17, 2018, one Medley Capital
stockholder wrote: “We believe the Board of Directors should
immediately undertake a serious effort to sell the business
(the underlying investment portfolio and the Management
Agreement). We believe there is an attractive market for
[Medley Capital's] investment portfolio well above where
[Medley Capital's] current stock trades.”156 Although the
Special Committee was broadly empowered, they laser-
focused on only one option. Sandler corroborated—they
viewed their role as evaluating the three-way combination
only.157
The Special Committee did not conduct a pre-signing market
check. When asked why, Hirtler-Garvey said she was happy
with the transaction at hand.158 She wanted a deal with
Medley Management. Ainsberg testified to his belief that
the 2017 Medley Management sales processes “effectively”
checked the market for Medley Capital.159 He believed that
Party X's offer had the potential to result in a deal with
Medley Capital.160 Mack went further, testifying that he
understood the Party X transaction to be geared toward a
deal with Medley Capital, not with Medley Management.161
This, of course, was wrong. Brook Taube testified, and
contemporaneous evidence reflects, that the 2017 sales
processes and negotiations with Party X aimed to develop
strategic transactions and generate potential bidders for
Medley Management, not Medley Capital.162 Medley Capital
was not “effectively” shopped.
*15  Although Medley Management's prior two sales
processes informed the Special Committee's decision not to
conduct a pre-signing market check, the committee members
did nothing to inform themselves of basic aspects of those
two sales processes. As discussed above, one member did not
know that the process aimed to generate a deal for Medley
Management, not Medley Capital.163 No one asked about
the terms of the potential Party X transaction or any other
proposal received by Medley Management as part of those
processes.
Critically, none of the committee members knew that
approximately thirty confidentiality agreements contractually
foreclosed potential third parties from proposing a transaction
with Medley Capital. Of the thirty agreements, only two
standstill periods expired before the Proposed Transactions
were announced on August 9, 2018.164 The other twenty-
eight agreements restricted potential counterparties during the
entire period that the Special Committee was negotiating the
Proposed Transactions.165
When asked about the standstill agreements during his
deposition, Mack stated his belief that “[t]his is a management
issue, not a director [issue].”166 He thought that more
signed standstill agreements would be beneficial for Medley
Capital.167 He admitted, “I was not familiar with the
specifics,” and disclaimed any interest in being informed: “I
may not want to know how sausage is made.”168
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The Special Committee did not probe meaningfully into
the value of Medley Management. Medley Management's
financial projections forecasted “hockey stick” growth in the
outer years of the forecast based on revenue from new projects
and clients.169 Sandler ran a sensitivity analysis, but lacked
much of the information that was concerned with whether
the NII benefit from the deal was just projected growth, or
whether there was underlying value and earnings to support
the figures.170
Also, the Special Committee did not know about two
expressions of interest from third parties concerning a
transaction with Medley Capital. The first was from Origami,
discussed above. The Special Committee did not learn of
Origami's 2018 outreach until Origami publicly disclosed it
in February 2019.171 The second was from Lantern, which
executed a confidentiality agreement on May 23, 2018, as
part of the Medley Management sales process.172 On July 3,
2018, Tom Schmidt of Lantern reached out to Goldman about
its interest in acquiring Medley Management and potentially
recapitalizing Medley Capital.173 Schmidt followed up on
July 10.174 He followed up again on July 20, this time
expressing frustration.175 On July 30, Lantern submitted
an indication of interest.176 Among other things, Lantern
explained that it was “interested in exploring alternatives
for providing a significant cash infusion of new capital into
Medley Capital to the extent it is prudent.”177 Lantern's
recapitalization idea did not reach the Special Committee
before execution of the Merger Agreement.
C. The Proposed Transactions
*16  On August 9, 2018 the Special Committee
unanimously recommended that the Board approve the
merger agreement with Sierra (the “Merger Agreement”).178
Medley Management, Medley Capital, and Sierra announced
the Proposed Transactions on August 9, 2019.179
The Merger Agreement contains a series of deal protection
provisions. Section 7.10 of the Merger Agreement prevents
Medley Capital from soliciting or engaging with parties
submitting “Competing Proposals” unless it constitutes a
“Superior Proposal” or is likely to lead to one.180 “Competing
Proposal” is defined as an offer to acquire 20% or more
of Medley Capital's securities or assets or a liquidation.181
“Superior Proposal” is defined as a Competing Proposal
that is on terms more favorable, from a financial point
of view, than the Merger Agreement and is as likely to
close.182 Section 7.10(e) of the Merger Agreement provides
that the Medley Capital Board may not make an “Adverse
Recommendation Change” or enter into any agreement (other
than a confidentiality agreement), subject to a fiduciary
out.183 Section 9.4 of the Medley Capital Merger Agreement
provides for a $ 6 million “Termination Fee,” which Medley
Capital must pay if either party terminates the Medley Capital
Merger Agreement after the Medley Capital Board effects an
“Adverse Recommendation Change,” or if Medley Capital
terminates the Medley Capital Merger Agreement to enter
into a definitive agreement contemplated by a Superior
Proposal.
*17  Employment contracts connected to the merger provide
for lucrative positions for Medley Management's senior
management.184 The cost of these employment contracts
exceeds the estimated synergies arising from the Proposed
Transactions.185
D. Post-Signing Events
1. FrontFour's Reaction
FrontFour beneficially owns 1,674,946 shares of Medley
Capital common stock, which constitutes approximately
3.1% of Medley Capital's outstanding shares.186 FrontFour
first learned of the Proposed Transactions when they were
publicly announced on August 9, 2018.187
FrontFour's corporate representative, David Lorber, testified
at trial that he was “perplexed” by the announcement.188
He believed that Medley Management had performed poorly
over the prior five years, “erod[ing] significant NAV value, as
well as stock price,” yet “Medley Management was receiving
an excessive amount of value” in the Merger Transactions.189
A FrontFour analyst reached out to Medley Capital to “better
understand the transaction”190 and eventually was placed in
contact with Medley Capital's risk management officer, Sam
Anderson.191 They spoke on the phone in late September.192
FrontFour was not aware during that call that Anderson was
also a senior managing director of Medley Management.193
During the call, FrontFour's representative asked why the
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proxy had not yet been issued.194 Anderson responded
suggesting that the parties to the Merger Transactions were
having difficulty agreeing on the disclosures, which raised
concerns for FrontFour.195 After the call, FrontFour asked
to be placed in contact with Medley Capital's independent
directors.196 Instead, Brook Taube responded. He promised
to “revert back.”197 He did not timely do so.198
*18  On November 2, 2019, FrontFour nominated Lorber
and Clifford Press as candidates for election as directors at
Medley Capital's next annual meeting of stockholders.199 On
November 20, 2018, FrontFour obtained a telephonic meeting
with Ainsberg and Hirtler-Garvey.200 John Fredericks,
Medley Capital's Chief Compliance Officer—who is also
Medley Management's General Counsel and Sierra's Chief
Compliance Officer—joined the call and did all of
the talking.201 On November 27, 2018, Medley Capital
responded to questions raised by Lorber on the call.202
On December 13, 2018, FrontFour issued an open letter to
stockholders opposing the Proposed Transactions.203
2. Medley Capital's Public Disclosures
During an investors call on August 10, 2019, Medley Capital
management represented that the proxy statement would
be filed within weeks.204 Medley Capital issued the proxy
statement on December 21, 2019.205 It was flawed.206 On
January 11, 2019, FrontFour commenced litigation in this
Court pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 220 to compel Medley Capital
to produce book and records for inspection.207 After an
initial scheduling conference with the Court, Medley Capital
voluntarily produced to FrontFour stocklist materials and
certain core documents concerning the Merger.208 On January
30, 2019, FrontFour raised questions regarding the adequacy
of the disclosures in the Proxy.209 On February 5, 2019,
Medley Capital issued the Proxy Supplement and postponed
the stockholder vote until March 8, 2019.210
3. Multiple Third Parties Express Interest in Medley
Capital
After Medley Capital issued the proxy, multiple third parties
expressed interest in entering into an alternative transaction
with Medley Capital.
• ZAIS. On January 2, 2019, ZAIS submitted a letter
proposing that the Special Committee appoint ZAIS
as the new investment advisor for the sole purpose
of managing an orderly sale or liquidation of Medley
Capital.211 ZAIS requested the opportunity to meet
the Special Committee to share its views. The Special
Committee met to consider the proposal on January
9, 2019.212 Nobody acting on behalf of the Special
Committee ever contacted ZAIS. On January 24, 2019,
Brook Taube instructed ZAIS that the Medley Capital
Merger Agreement prohibited contact.213
*19  • NexPoint. On January 24, 2019, NexPoint
Advisors, L.P. (“NexPoint”) submitted a letter of
intent proposing that Medley Capital terminate the
Management Agreement and replace Advisors with
NexPoint, which would charge a lower fee and make
a cash payment to Medley Capital.214 On January 31,
2019, NexPoint made a second proposal contemplating
the combination of Medley Capital and Sierra and the
retention of $ 100 million in cash otherwise earmarked
for Medley Management stockholders in the Proposed
Transactions.215 NexPoint also proposed to pay $ 25
million to the combined company for the benefit of
stockholders, to provide a reduced fee structure and
lowered costs (resulting in at least $ 9 million in annual
savings), and to purchase at least $ 50 million of
combined company shares over a five-quarter period.216
On February 1, 2019, NexPoint made both its proposals
public.217 On February 6, 2019, Medley Capital
and Sierra issued a press release indicating that
their respective special committees had unanimously
determined not to pursue the second NexPoint
Proposal.218 The press release purported to identify
the reasoning behind the determinations by the Special
Committees. But Medley Management had drafted the
press release before the Special Committee had even
made its determination.219
• Origami. On February 11, 2019, Origami issued an open
letter to the Medley Capital Board, proposing to buy
100% of the interests of Medley Capital's wholly owned
subsidiary, Medley SBIC, for $ 45 million cash.220
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Origami also disclosed that it had reached out several
times during the spring of 2018 and sent a formal
letter on April 4, 2018 expressing interest but had never
received a response.221 On February 14, 2019, Origami
sent another letter clarifying and reiterating its interest
in a potential transaction.222 On February 19, 2019,
Medley Capital rejected Origami's proposal.223
• Marathon. On March 1, 2019, Marathon Asset
Management L.P. (“Marathon”) submitted a letter
to the Special Committee proposing that Medley
Capital remain as an independent company, terminate
the Management Agreement, and enter into a new
management contract with Marathon.224
The Special Committee held meetings to consider the multiple
expressions of interest. But nobody reached out to ZAIS,
except to confirm that the Merger Agreement prohibited
contact.225 Nor has anyone acting on behalf of the Special
Committee contacted NexPoint or Origami, despite their
expressed willingness to improve their proposals.226 The
Special Committee has never asked for a waiver of the non-
solicitation provisions of the Merger Agreement to enable
discussions with any of these potential counterparties, nor has
it attempted to secure better terms from the Taube brothers.227
*20  In sum, the Special Committee considered each offer,
but did not engage with any competing bidder, and seems to
question the need to do so.228 Their attitude is best captured
by Lerdal in a text to Brook Taube. Around the time of the
Special Committee meeting at which the ZAIS offer was
considered, Lerdal texted Brook Taube: “Are we going to
respond to every f**ksake on the planet?”229
E. The Litigation
FrontFour commenced this litigation on February 11, 2019,
and amended the complaint the next day to reflect the Origami
offer.230 Defendants stipulated to an expedited schedule, and
the parties agreed to hold trial before the March 8, 2019
stockholder vote.231 The parties substantially completed
document production by February 24, 2019, took twelve
depositions between February 26 and March 4, 2019, and
submitted pretrial briefs and a form of pretrial order on March
4, 2019.232 A pretrial conference was held on March 5,
2019.233 Trial took place on March 6 and 7, 2019.234
II. ANALYSIS
The Amended Complaint asserts three counts: Count I
contends that the Taube brothers, Tonkel, and the Special
Committee members breached their fiduciary duties to
FrontFour and the members of the Class in connection
with the approval of the Proposed Transactions.235 Count
I challenges the Proposed Transactions under the entire
fairness standard (the “Entire Fairness Claim”), and the deal
protections of the Merger Agreement under enhanced scrutiny
(the “Enhanced Scrutiny Claim”). Count II contends that
the Medley Capital directors breached their fiduciary duty
of disclosure (the “Disclosure Claims”).236 Lastly, Count III
contends that Medley Management, Sierra, Advisors, and
two other Medley Entities—Medley Group and Medley LLC
—aided and abetted in the other Defendants' breaches of
fiduciary duties.237
A. Entire Fairness Claim
“Delaware has three tiers of review for evaluating director
decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced
scrutiny, and entire fairness.”238 Entire fairness review arises
“when the board labors under actual conflicts of interest,”239
such as when a controlling stockholder stands on both
sides of a challenged transaction240 or when a controlling
stockholder competes with the minority stockholders for
consideration.241
*21  FrontFour argues that the Proposed Transactions should
be reviewed under Delaware's most onerous standard,242
entire fairness. The Taube brothers stand on both sides of the
Proposed Transactions, so entire fairness applies if they are
deemed controllers. FrontFour bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence facts necessary to trigger
entire fairness. If entire fairness is triggered, Defendants bear
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the Proposed Transactions are entirely fair.
1. Entire Fairness Applies Because the Taube Brothers
Are Controllers.
The Taube brothers beneficially own less than 15% of
Medley Capital, and those shares are subject to “echo
voting” requirements. Although a majority stockholder
is a controlling stockholder as a matter of law,243 a
- 64 -
FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12
minority stockholder can also be deemed a controller.244 In
determining whether a minority stockholder is a controller,
the level of stock ownership is not the predominant factor, and
an inability to exert influence through voting power does not
foreclose a finding of control.245
*22  Under Delaware law, a plaintiff can demonstrate that a
minority stockholder exercised de facto control by showing
that: (a) the stockholder “actually dominated and controlled
the majority of the board generally”;246 or (b) the stockholder
“actually dominated and controlled the corporation, its board
or the deciding committee with respect to the challenged
transaction.”247
FrontFour has proven facts necessary to trigger entire
fairness under the second theory. Specifically, FrontFour
has proven that at least half of the Special Committee
members were not independent from the Taube brothers when
negotiating the Proposed Transactions. Under Delaware law,
calling a director “independent” does not make it so. To
be independent, a director “must act independently.”248 An
independent director should demonstrate “the care, attention
and sense of individual responsibility to the performance of
one's duties ... that generally touches on independence.”249
Mack, who did not testify at trial, demonstrated a lack of
independence through his deposition testimony, where:
• Mack spoke to Brook Taube on the phone frequently, at
least weekly, about business matters.250
• Mack knew that the Taube brothers managed
Medley Capital's investments, but couldn't identify any
other person involved in managing Medley Capital's
portfolio.251
• Mack had no idea what Medley LLC was, who owned it,
or the role it played in the Taube brothers' control of the
Medley family of entities.252
• Mack had no understanding of what Medley
Management's business was in 2017.253
• Mack could not identify the Taube brothers' or Tonkel's
roles at Medley Management, the very source of their
conflicts.254
*23  • Mack did not know that the Taube brothers
controlled Medley Management, and did not think
it was important to consider their ownership of
Medley Management in evaluating the Proposed
Transactions.255
• Mack “was not familiar with the specifics” of the
transaction process and “may not want to know how
sausage is made.”256
• Based on a call with Brook Taube, Mack believed
Goldman Sachs was engaged to assist Medley
Capital.257
• Mack did not believe the standstill provisions should have
been reviewed by the Board, calling it a “management
issue, not a director [issue]” and suggesting “the more
the merrier.”258
• Mack did not think it was important for the
Medley Capital Board to be informed when Medley
Management entered contracts that were binding on
Medley Capital.259
• Mack had no idea whether Medley Capital paid
performance fees to Advisors in 2017, or how the
fees Advisors collected from Medley Capital affected
Advisors' ability to pay its employees.260
• Mack believed that the Party X proposal was geared
toward a deal with Medley Capital, not Medley
Management.261
• Mack could not recall whether he considered having
Sandler perform any form of a market check.262 Instead,
he relied on Brook Taube for his purported knowledge
that “we were looking at strategic alternatives.”263
• Mack did not believe that Medley Capital had ever
solicited the market on its own behalf and was indifferent
about the failure to do so.264
• Mack did not think the personal interests of the Taube
brothers in closing the Proposed Transactions were
relevant considerations in evaluating the transactions.265
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• Mack did not have any understanding as to the
significance of the Taube brothers' Medley Capital
stockholdings or how they came to hold that position.266
• Mack was completely unaware as to the financing
arrangement that the Taube brothers had with Fortress,
which intensified the “enormous pressure” that drove
the Taube brothers' decision to pursue the Proposed
Transactions.267
• Mack did not think the fund's recent performance
was an important consideration in the annual review
of Advisors' contract with Medley Capital. Mack
stressed the Board would consider comparisons to
the fees and legal restrictions of comparable advisory
arrangements, but did not think that recent performance
was particularly important.268
• The lack of cash consideration for Medley Capital
stockholders in the Proposed Transactions raised no
concerns for Mack, even in the face of the large cash
component that Medley Management was going to
receive in the transactions.269
• Mack was indifferent to the compensation levels that
would be paid to senior management in the combined
company, even in the face of conversations concerning
the fact that the compensation packages could
potentially eliminate the benefits touted for Medley
Capital stockholders in the Proposed Transactions.270
Mack was satisfied that it was a concern for Sierra's
board because they were negotiating and deciding the
compensation, rather than the Medley Capital Board.271
*24  The record also reflects that half of Mack's annual
income in the past three years had come from his service on
the Board, making him susceptible to wanting to stay in the
good graces of the Taube brothers.272
Lerdal was similarly susceptible to Brook Taube's outsized
influence as Medley Capital's founder.273 Lerdal desired
to continue as director after formation of the combined
company. He curried favor from Brook Taube during the
selection process. When he was not selected, he contacted
Brook Taube for other personal favors. The record reflects
that Lerdal, who did not testify at trial, was loyal to Brook
Taube, not the Medley Capital common stockholders:
• Lerdal shared information about the Special Committee's
process with Brook.274
• Lerdal personally kept Brook up to date on market interest
in Medley Capital, warning him by text on August 15,
2018 that the company “has some bargain hunters.”275
• Four days before approving the merger, Lerdal asked
Brook: “Are we on track? Anything you need from
me?”276 The two talked on the phone soon thereafter.
• The day the Special Committee approved the Proposed
Transactions, Lerdal praised Brook as the “architect” of
the deal and stated that he was “excited for the future
whether the Sierra guys give me the nod or not.”277
• When the Special Committee decided to turn down a
bidder in February 2019, Lerdal texted Brook: “Hang in
there brother. The deal is still the best option.”278 The
two then exchanged an additional fourteen messages.
• When Brook Taube suggested that the “predictable
naysayers” would be the first people removed from
their positions during the Proposed Transactions, Lerdal
was quick to support the idea, texting “Freak the
naysayers.”279
• Lerdal requested personal updates by text on the merger
behind-the-scenes from Brook, asking “How do we
look?” on October 9, 2018. Brook responded that there
was “[G]ood news yesterday from [the SEC]” and
that the deal was “Read[y] to go when ‘advisors’ stop
fussing.”280
• Lerdal's texts effortlessly wove ingratiating personal
adoration with business details. On October 26, 2018, he
texted Brook that he had played a game of golf in Brook's
honor, and offered “an open invitation to visit and I'll
host any time.”281
• In an August 1, 2017 email, Lerdal complained that the
Taube brothers gave the Board “too much information,”
asserted that the company could not pay him enough
to make him continue being diligent and thorough, and
bragged about how he would conduct himself in future
litigation against the company.282
*25  In short, the majority of the members of the Special
Committee lacked independence from the Taube brothers.
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The Special Committee also sat supine in negotiations
concerning the Proposed Transactions, allowing the Taube
brothers to dominate the process by: setting the deal structure;
controlling the flow of information; withholding information;
withholding details about Medley Management's own value
and the existence of offers from third parties; locking out
“interlopers” through standstill agreements, deal protections,
and an aggressive timeline; and rushing the committee's
deliberations. In the end, the Special Committee allowed
Medley Management to extract a huge premium while
Medley Capital stockholders received none.
The Special Committee deferred to the Taube brothers
although the committee had ample negotiating leverage—the
ability to terminate the Management Agreement or simply
reject the deal, either of which would have had devastating
consequences for Medley Management. Terminating the
Management Agreement would trigger Fortress's rights under
the joint venture. Rejecting the deal would foreclose Medley
Management's only viable solution to the enormous financial
pressure they labored under.
It bears noting that there is nothing inherently wrong under
Delaware law with the structure of the Medley Entities. Most
BDCs have corporate structures similar to Medley Capital
and Sierra—they rely on external advisors for management,
administration, office space, staff, and other aspects of their
existence. As a critical counterbalance to management's
extensive control over the day-to-day operations, the '40 Act
requires that the majority of the directors on BDC boards are
independent from management. At no point in time is this
protection more critical than in the context of a conflicted
transaction. In this case, FrontFour has demonstrated that the
Taube brothers are controllers not because of flaws inherent
in the structure of BDCs, but rather, because those tasked
with standing independent from the Taube brothers willfully
deferred to their authority.
2. The Proposed Transactions Are Not Entirely Fair.
“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing
and fair price.”283 Although the two aspects may be examined
separately, “the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as
between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must
be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire
fairness.”284 Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating
that fair dealing and fair price.285
Fair dealing “embraces questions of when the transaction was
timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and
the stockholders were obtained.”286 “The scope of this factor
is not limited to the controller's formal act of making the
proposal; it encompasses actions taken by the controller in
the period leading up to the formal proposal.”287 “Particular
consideration must be given to evidence of whether the
special committee was truly independent, fully informed and
had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length.”288
*26  In this case, the timing, structure, initiation, and
negotiation of the Proposed Transactions were conceived for
the purpose of—and did—advance the Taubes' interest at the
expense of Medley Capital's other stockholders. In the events
leading up to the Proposed Transactions, the Taube brothers
created an informational vacuum, which they then exploited.
The Special Committee was not truly independent and did
not negotiate at arm's length. In sum, Defendants have not
proven that the Proposed Transactions were the product of fair
dealing.
The second aspect of the entire fairness inquiry is fair
price. Fair price “relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value
of a company's stock.”289
The primary evidence presented at trial on the issue
of fair price consists of the opinions of the parties'
respective experts.290 Defendants offered the testimony
of Dr. Marc Zenner, who performed regression analyses
intended to show the benefits of size/scale, asset quality, and
internalized management.291 That analysis did not support
the propositions for which it was offered. One analysis
explained only 11% of the variation in p/NAV multiples.292
The other was not statistically significant and lacked
explanatory power.293 Zenner also conducted a comparable
transactions analysis, but 50% of his “transactions” were
offers that never resulted in an actual merger.294 Zenner
did not opine on the value of Medley Capital, a fair price
to acquire Medley Capital, or the value of the combined
company if the Proposed Transactions were to occur. He
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opined that the process used by various investment banks was
reasonable, but an expert cannot simply vouch for the work of
someone else.295 Zenner opined that Medley Capital's trading
price following the announcement of the proposed transaction
supported a finding of fair price. Zenner, however, was unable
to exclude other possible causes of Medley Capital's stock
price bump in response the Proposed Transactions.296
By contrast, FrontFour's expert Dr. William Kennedy credibly
testified that the fair value of Medley Capital is $ 5.07 per
share and the price being offered is well below that.297
Ultimately, this is a case in which a deeply flawed process
obscures the fair value of Medley Capital. The record reveals
that the Taube brothers obstructed any pre-signing price
competition from “interlopers.”298 The two aspects of the
entire fairness standard interact.299 Just as “[a] strong record
of fair dealing can influence the fair price inquiry, ... process
can infect price.”300 Any inability to determine the degree
to which the flawed process infected the price works to
Defendants' detriment, as they bear the burden of proof on
this issue.301
B. Enhanced Scrutiny Claim
*27  The parties engaged in a robust dispute concerning
whether deal protections or the Proposed Transactions in their
entirety are subject to and pass enhanced scrutiny.302 Any
Delaware law enthusiast would relish the opportunity to dilate
on the issues raised, but the press of time requires a more
direct approach.
FrontFour challenges three deal protections in the Merger
Agreement: a no-shop, an adverse-recommendation-change
requirement, and a termination fee.303 Enhanced scrutiny
applies to deal protections, and the burden lies on Defendants
to justify those protections.304 Defendants cannot meet that
burden here.
The suite of deal protections at issue would pass muster under
most circumstances, but not in this case. The Court's analysis
is fact intensive and context specific.305 Due to extreme
process flaws that led to the Proposed Transactions, the deal
protections are not within the range of reasonableness.306
*28  Of the three challenged deal protections, the no-shop
is the primary offender. No-shop provisions paired with a
fiduciary out are not unique.307 No-shop provisions are used
to entice acquirers to make a strong offer by contractually
eliminating the risk that the acquirer is a stalking horse
used to generate a bidding war.308 That justification has
no application here. The Proposed Transactions are among
affiliated entities. All of the parties were aware, when
negotiating the deal protections, that there was no pre-signing
auction or market check and no risk that Sierra was being
used as a stalking horse. There was also no risk that Medley
Capital would lose the “bird in hand” if the transaction was
shopped.309
Incrementally, the other two deal protections are
also problematic. The adverse-recommendation-change
provision310 unduly cabins the Board.311 Although the
termination fee is not unreasonable on its own, in combination
with the other deal protections, it too falls outside the range
of reasonableness.312
C. Disclosure Claims
*29  “[T]o establish a violation of the duty of disclosure,
[a plaintiff] must prove that the omitted fact would have
been material to the stockholder action sought.”313 The
materiality standard requires that fiduciaries disclose all facts
which “under all the circumstances ... would have assumed
actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable
shareholder.”314 “A material fact is one that a reasonable
stockholder would find relevant in deciding how to vote. It
is not necessary that a fact would change how a stockholder
would vote.”315 “A material fact is one that a reasonable
investor would view as significantly altering the ‘total mix’
of information made available.”316 However, once fiduciaries
have “traveled down the road of partial disclosure,” they
must “provide the stockholders with an accurate, full, and fair
characterization of [the] events.”317
Controlling stockholders “have large informational
advantages that can only be imperfectly overcome by the
special committee process, which almost invariably involves
directors who are not involved in the day-to-day management
of the subsidiary.”318 Accordingly, controllers owe “a duty
of complete candor when standing on both sides of a
transaction and must disclose fully all the material facts and
circumstances surrounding the transaction.”319
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Applying these principles, FrontFour has proven that
Defendants violated their duties of disclosure to inform
stockholders of the process that led to the Proposed
Transactions and the expressions of interest from third parties.
1. Process Disclosures
The Proxy describes the deployment of three different
special committees to mitigate conflicts and replicate arm's-
length bargaining.320 The description creates the misleading
impression that the Special Committee process at Medley
Capital was effective. In reality, during the negotiation
process, the Special Committee was disabled by its ignorance
of: the details of the bids made for Medley Management
during Project Elevate; the “enormous pressure” facing
Medley Management and the Taubes;321 and the standstill
agreements that forbade potential transaction partners from
presenting proposals directly to Medley Capital without
Medley Management's consent. These process failures and
others identified in this decision are material to stockholders
considering the Proposed Transactions.
The Proxy and Medley Capital's other public filings disclose
certain of these process flaws now, but they fail to mention
that the Special Committee only learned of these items
after the execution of the Merger Agreement (and in some
cases only after this litigation began).322 The timing of the
Board's knowledge is a critical fact that would impact any
stockholder's assessment of the quality of the transaction
process.323
2. Other Indications of Interest—Lantern, NexPoint,
Origami, and ZAIS
*30  Following FrontFour's January 30, 2019 letter to the
Medley Capital Board,324 Medley Management disclosed
on February 5, 2019 certain terms of eleven indications of
interest. It characterized each as a “non-binding indication
of interest received by Medley Management.”325 Medley
Capital separately issued supplemental disclosures regarding
offers made by NexPoint on January 31, 2019, to replace
Medley Management as manager, and Origami on February
11, 2019, to acquire Medley SBIC.
Defendants never disclosed to stockholders that Lantern
had expressed interest in a recapitalization transaction with
Medley Capital, or that Lantern had executed a standstill
agreement with Medley Management that prohibited it from
making its recapitalization proposal directly to Medley
Capital.326
Defendants also never disclosed ZAIS's January 2, 2019
proposal to replace Medley Management as Medley Capital's
investment advisor for the “explicit task of managing an
orderly sale or liquidation of Medley Capital.”327 Nor
have Defendants disclosed Brook Taube's January 24,
2019 rejection of ZAIS's proposal on behalf of Medley
Capital, citing the non-solicitation provision in the Medley
Capital Merger Agreement.328 Text message correspondence
between Brook Taube and Lerdal on the day of the Special
Committee's January 9, 2019 meeting shows that Medley
Management coordinated with the Special Committee
regarding whether and how to respond to ZAIS. None of this
was disclosed.329
Stockholders cannot make a fully informed decision
regarding the Proposed Transactions unless they know about
Lantern's expressed interest in a recapitalization, the ZAIS
proposal, and Brook Taube's response citing the Medley
Capital Merger Agreement.330
Further, on February 13, 2019, Defendants publicly denied
that Medley Management received an offer from Origami to
purchase Medley SBIC in April 2018.331 Medley Capital's
February 13 press release stated: “Contrary to Origami's
public statements, the Company never received a proposal
to buy the SBIC Subsidiary from Origami until yesterday.
Origami did not propose to buy the equity of the SBIC
subsidiary for 60% of its fair market value or at any price
last April as suggested by Origami's press release.”332 This
disclosure creates the impression that Origami fabricated the
fact of the proposal.
Origami did not fabricate the fact of the proposal. In fact,
Medley Capital received an April 11, 2018 letter from
Origami addressed to Brook Taube and Marilyn Adler, Senior
Managing Director, Medley Capital, expressing “interest in
purchasing 100% of Medley Capital Corporation and its
affiliates' interest in Medley SBIC.”333 Adler responded,
dispelling any notion that the email failed to transmit.334
Whether Brook Taube never saw Origami's proposal, as he
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contends, is irrelevant to the truth: Medley Management
received it. “Whenever directors communicate publicly or
directly with shareholders about the corporation's affairs,
with or without a request for shareholder action, ... the
sine qua non of directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders
is honesty.”335 Medley Capital must correct its disclosures
regarding Origami.336
D. Aiding and Abetting
*31  To establish an aiding and abetting claim against
Sierra, FrontFour was required to prove that Sierra knowingly
participated in the other Defendants' breach of fiduciary
duty.337 This is “a stringent standard that turn[s] on proof of
scienter.”338 FrontFour bears the burden for the aiding and
abetting claim.339
“The adjective ‘knowing’ modifies the concept of
‘participation,’ not breach.”340 The underlying wrong does
not have to be knowing or intentional; it can be a breach of
the duty of care.341 Under Section 876(b) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, knowing participation exists when a third
party:
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant
to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other to so conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in
accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the
third person.342
For purposes of a board decision, the requirement of
participation can be established if the third party “participated
in the board's decisions, conspired with [the] board, or
otherwise caused the board to make the decisions at issue.”343
In particular, a third party can be liable for aiding and abetting
a breach of the duty of care if the third party “purposely
induced the breach of the duty of care ....”344 The method of
facilitating the breach can include “creating the informational
vacuum” in which the board breaches its duty of care.345
*32  A court's analysis of whether a secondary actor
“knowingly participated” is necessarily fact intensive.
Illustrative factors include the following:
• The nature of the tortious act that the secondary actor
participated in or encouraged, including its severity, the
clarity of the violation, the extent of the consequences,
and the secondary actor's knowledge of these aspects;
• The amount, kind, and duration of assistance given,
including how directly involved the secondary actor was
in the primary actor's conduct;
• The nature of the relationship between the secondary and
primary actors; and
• The secondary actor's state of mind.346
At trial, FrontFour succeeded in raising suspicions concerning
the independence of the Sierra special committee's financial
advisor, Broadhaven. Broadhaven's conflicts alone, however,
do not prove that Sierra knowingly participated in the other
Defendants' fiduciary breach. Broadhaven did act as Sierra's
agent, and Sierra knew that Broadhaven had previously
worked for Medley Management. But this is the extent
of Sierra's scienter FrontFour proved at trial. Broadhaven
was not “the fiduciary and primary wrongdoer.”347 Nor
was Broadhaven a “representative of the [Sierra] who either
controls [Sierra] or who occupies a sufficiently high position
that [its] knowledge is imputed to [Sierra].”348
FrontFour provided no window into the deliberations on
the Sierra side of the negotiations to permit the Court to
conduct the fact-intensive inquiry demanded. FrontFour did
not call any of the Sierra special committee members live
or by deposition. FrontFour adduced no evidence that the
Taube brothers controlled the Sierra portion of the process
or dominated the Sierra board. FrontFour did not brief their
aiding and abetting claim before or after trial.349
Accordingly, FrontFour has failed to prove that Sierra aided
and abetted in the other Defendants' breaches of fiduciary
duties.
E. Remedy
To recap, FrontFour has proven that: Conflicted insiders
tainted the process that led to the Proposed Transactions.
The Special Committee negotiated with willful blinders, not
knowing: the value that third-parties had placed on Medley
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Management; that Medley Management felt “enormous
pressure” to enter into a transaction; that standstill agreements
prevented third parties from coming forward; and that Medley
Management—not Medley Capital—was shopped in the
2017 sale process on which they relied when determining not
to conduct a pre-signing market check. Compounding these
problems, the Special Committee agreed to deal protections
preventing an effective post-signing market check.
*33  At this stage, the most equitable relief for the Medley
Capital stockholders would be a curative shopping process,
devoid of Medley Management's influence, free of any deal
protections, plus full disclosures. Thereafter, if no better
proposal surfaces, the Medley Capital stockholders would
have the opportunity to cast a fully informed vote for or
against the Proposed Transactions. This relief is precisely
what FrontFour seeks.
Yet, ordering such relief would require the Court to blue-
pencil Sierra's merger agreement with Medley Capital (and,
by implication, its cross-conditioned agreement with Medley
Management) so that Medley Capital could solicit additional
competing bids in contravention of the no-shop provision. In
other words, FrontFour's requested relief would keep Sierra
“on the hook” to purchase Medley Capital in case the “go-
shop” process fails to yield a better offer. Such a revision of
the Merger Agreements would deny Sierra the benefit of its
bargain and force Sierra to comply with terms to which it
never agreed.
Under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in C & J
Energy,350 an injunction may not issue if it would “strip an
innocent third party of its contractual rights” under a merger
agreement, unless the party seeking the injunction proves that
the third party aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty
by the target directors. FrontFour has failed to prove that
Sierra aided and abetted in the breaches of fiduciary duties.
Under these circumstances, C & J Energy leaves this Court
no discretion—the most equitable remedy for Medley Capital
stockholders cannot be granted.
To ensure that Medley Capital stockholders are fully informed
on any vote on the Proposed Transactions, FrontFour is
entitled to corrective disclosures consistent with this decision,
and Defendants are enjoined from consummating the Mergers
until such disclosures have been made.351 FrontFour may
also pursue a damages claim by amending their complaint, if
FrontFour so chooses.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court holds that Medley
Capital's directors violated their fiduciary duties in entering
into the Proposed Transactions. Medley Capital is ordered to
issue corrective disclosures in accordance with this decision
and to permit the stockholders sufficient time in advance of
any stockholder vote to assimilate the information. Judgment
on Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint are entered
in favor of FrontFour to the extent set forth in this decision,
and judgment on Count III is entered in favor of Defendants.
FrontFour's request to permanently enjoin the Proposed
Transactions is denied.352
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All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2019 WL 1313408
Footnotes
1 This litigation commenced on February 11, 2019. The parties stipulated to an expedited schedule to accommodate a
March 31, 2019 drop-dead date under the challenged merger agreements. Pre-trial briefs were submitted on Monday,
March 4. Over 800 trial exhibits arrived in Chambers on Tuesday, March 5. Trial took place on March 6–7. On the second
day of trial, the acquirer informed the Court that its “rights under the Merger Agreements will be eviscerated if the Court
does not issue a decision on Plaintiffs' request for an injunction by 9 a.m. on Monday, March 11.” Post-trial briefs were
filed at 8 a.m. on Saturday, March 9. Daylight savings time began on Sunday, March 10, further depriving the Court of
an hour and confirming Murphy's law.
2 C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Empls.' and Sanitation Empls.' Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1071–72 (Del.
2014).
3 The Factual Background cites to: docket entries (by docket “Dkt.” number); trial exhibits (by “JX” number); the trial
transcript (“Trial Tr.”); and stipulated facts set forth in the Parties' Pretrial Order (Dkt. 128) (“PTO”). The parties called by
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deposition John Mack, Russ Hutchinson on behalf of Goldman Sachs, John Simpson on behalf of Broadhaven, Jeffrey
Young on behalf of Origami, and Thomas Surgent on behalf of NexPoint. The transcripts of their respective depositions
are cited using the witnesses' last names and “Dep. Tr.” (e.g., “Mack Dep. Tr.”).
4 The three Taube brothers own about 82% of Medley Group LLC. Trial Tr. at 311:17–312:11 (Taube). Medley Group LLC,
in turn, owns 97.7% of Medley Management. Id. at 321:12–14.
5 See Dkt. 136, Ex. A: PDX 001. This decision refers to a number of demonstratives that summarize the record evidence
and were publicly filed by the parties. Referring to charts has the added bonus of appealing to the visual learner. The
Charts need a cipher, as this decision uses different defined terms to refer to each of the Medley Entities to improve
readability: MDLY = Medley Management; MCC = Medley Capital; SIC = Sierra.
6 PTO ¶¶ II.3, II.5.
7 See generally U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Fast Answers: Investment
Company Registration and Regulation Package, available at https://www.sec.gov/investment/fastanswers/
divisionsinvestmentinvcoreg121504htm.html#P75_10439 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019); Morrison Foerster, FAQs About
BDCs, https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faqbusiness-development-companies.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). See
also Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 30 (Feb. 14, 2018) (“We are classified as a non-diversified
investment company within the meaning of the '40 Act, which means that we are not limited by the '40 Act with respect
to the proportion of our assets that we may invest in securities of a single issuer.”).
8 JX 013 at p.4.
9 Id.
10 PTO ¶ II.21.
11 JX 051 at p.23.
12 See Dkt. 136, Ex. A: PDX 005 (“Medley Entities: Overlapping Management & Directors”).
13 JX 004. Advisors provides Medley Capital's office facilities, equipment, and other administrative services to Medley Capital
pursuant to a separate administration agreement. PTO ¶ II.23; JX 051 at p.23. For the years ended September 30, 2017,
2016, and 2015, Medley Capital paid Advisors $ 3.8 million, $ 3.9 million, and $ 4.1 million, solely for administrative
expenses, respectively. Id.
14 PTO ¶ II.24; JX 004 § 8.
15 Trial Tr. at 313:17–315:23 (Taube testimony). “We [Advisors] make the loans on behalf of Medley Capital ... as the
manager, we manage all aspects of the loan from inception through to repayment, and the board isn't involved in how
we process the loan at any time.” Id. at 315:7–14.
16 See Trial Tr. at 417:22–418:5 (Hirtler-Garvey).
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56; JX 430 at p.14.
18 Medley Capital Corp., Registration Statement Amendment (Form N-2/A) (Nov. 23, 2010), Ex. 99.A.3 (“Medley Capital
Certificate of Incorporation”) § 6.3; Id., Ex. 99.B.3 (“Medley Capital Bylaws”) § 3.1 (“The number of directors which shall
constitute the whole of the Board of Directors shall be seven.”).
19 Medley Capital Certificate of Incorporation § 6.3.
20 Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 72 (Dec. 4, 2018).
21 PTO ¶¶ II.4–6; Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 72 (Dec. 4, 2018); Trial Tr. at 318:12–16 (Taube
testifying that he has known Tonkel since college).
22 PTO ¶¶ II.7–10.
23 Id. ¶¶ II.7–9.
24 Id. ¶ II.10.
25 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2).
26 Trial Tr. at 163:10–21 (Ainsberg); Mack Dep. Tr. at 40:21–41:9.
27 Id. § 80a-15(a)(3); PTO ¶ II.23; see Trial Tr. at 286:20–287:2 (Taube); Id. at 162:24–163:21 (Ainsberg).
28 Trial Tr. at 197:11–14 (Ainsberg) (“Q.... [T]he Medley Capital board has never considered declining to renew Medley
Capital Advisors' contract due to poor performance, has it? A. It has not.”).
29 Mack Dep. Tr. at 43:10–12 (“Q: Has the Board ever considered terminating the investment management agreement?
A: Not that I'm aware of.”); Trial Tr. at 197:11–14 (Ainsberg) (“Q: ... [T]he Medley Capital board has never considered
declining to renew Medley Capital Advisors' contract due to poor performance, has it? A. It has not.”); id. 390:1–5 (Hirtler-
Garvey) (“Q: Now, did you ever discuss with your special committee members or with the other independent directors of
the board, I guess, terminating that contract? A. We have not.”).
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30 The Taube brothers have close to a 100% ownership interest in Management. See PTO ¶ II.5 (“Seth Taube, with Brook
Taube, is the beneficial owner of ... 97.7% of the voting interests in [Medley Management] common stock”); PDX 001.
Tonkel owns 6% of the units in Medley LLC, which are exchangeable for shares of MDLY Class A stock. PTO ¶ II.6.
31 PTO ¶ II.5 (“Seth Taube, with Brook Taube, is the beneficial owner of 14.6% of Medley Capital common stock”); Trial
Tr. at 281:19–21 (Taube) (“Management and Medley [Management] have, in combination, approximately 14.9 percent
interest in Medley Capital Corporation shares.”).
32 Under the terms of the Proposed Transactions: Brook Taube will be Chairman and CEO of the combined company,
receive an annual base salary of $ 600,00, and be eligible for additional performance-based compensation of $ 1,200,00
cash and $ 2,000,000 in restricted shares; Seth Taube will be Vice Chairman, Senior Executive Vice President, and
Senior Managing Director of the combined company, receive an annual base salary of $ 480,000, and be eligible for
additional performance-based compensation of $ 600,000 in cash and $ 1,150,000 in restricted stock; and Tonkel will be
President, receive an annual base salary of $ 480,000, and be eligible for additional performance-based compensation
of $ 600,000 cash and $ 1,150,000 in restricted stock. PTO ¶¶ II.69–71.
33 Ainsberg owns only 3,000 shares of Medley Capital stock, which he purchased shortly after joining the Medley Capital
Board (JX 001); Hirtler-Garvey owns only 3,000 shares of Medley Capital stock, which were purchased shortly after the
IPO (JX 003); Mack owns only 1,000 shares of Medley Capital stock, which were purchased in 2012 (JX 002); and Lerdal
does not own any shares of Medley Capital stock. None of them have elected to receive Medley Capital stock in lieu
of cash compensation since 2011, and none of the independent directors have acquired shares in Medley Capital since
2012. JX 1–JX 3; JX 417 at p.559.
34 Each independent director receives an annual fee of $ 90,000. Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 78
(Dec. 4, 2018). In addition, Chairman of the Audit Committee receives an annual fee of $ 25,000, and chairpersons of the
Nominating, Corporate Governance, and Compensation Committees receive annual fees of $ 10,000. Id. Other members
of the Audit Committee, the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, and the Compensation Committee
receive annual fees of $ 12,500, $ 6,000, and $ 6,000, respectively. Each independent director on the special merger
committee received a one-time retainer of $ 25,000, the chairman of the special committee receives a monthly fee of $
15,000 and other members receive a monthly fee of $ 10,000. Id. For Medley Capital's fiscal year ending on September
30, 2018, Ainsberg received $ 299,000, Hirtler-Garvey received $ 267,500, Mack received $ 275,000, and Lerdal received
$ 252,500. Id.
35 JX 622 at pp.7–11.
36 Medley Capital Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), Proposal I (Dec. 21, 2017) (reporting compensation of $ 36,202
for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2017); Medley Capital Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 78 (Dec. 4, 2018) (reporting
compensation of $ 252,500 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2018).
37 Seven thousand shares x $ 5.68 per share. JX 700, Medley Capital Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A) (Dec. 21,
2018) (“Medley Capital Proxy”).
38 Mack Dep. Tr. at 102:2–14; Trial Tr. at 387:15–23; JX 379 at p.1.
39 See Dkt. 118, Pls.' Pretrial Br. at 17, Chart & n.3 (compiling data). Between its IPO and the announcement date of
the challenged transactions, Medley Capital's stock plummeted by approximately 72% and its cumulative return was
-34%. JX 507 at p.7. The deterioration in Medley Capital's net investment income (“NII”), a key metric in measuring BDC
performance and a proxy for BDC earning power, and dividend are particularly dramatic. Since 2014, NII has plunged
by 85% (from $ 1.58 to $ 0.23 per share), and the dividend has fallen by 65% (from $ 1.48 to $ 0.52 per share). JX
443 at p.8; Trial Tr. at 194:4–12 (Zenner). Because dividends have exceeded NII, Medley Capital has operated with an
unsustainable shortfall since 2016. Id.
40 JX 509 at p.7.
41 The S & P BDC Index has had a positive 57% return since 2011. JX 443 at p.3; Trial Tr. at 469:23–470:2 (Zenner)
(testifying that Medley Capital's performance had been poor relative to its peers). As of August 9, 2018, Medley Capital
had the largest discount to NAV (53%) of any BDC. JX 343 at p.33. As of year-end, Medley Capital has continued to
languish at a 55% discount to NAV—the single largest NAV discount among the 46 BDCs covered by Raymond James'
investment banking group in their “BDC Weekly Insight” report (published January 3, 2019) and nearly 3x the BDC
average discount of 19%. JX 434 at p.7.
42 At the end of 2017, the Management Agreement appears to have accounted for 21% of Medley Management's fee-
earning assets under management (“fee earning AUM” or “FEAUM”). Medley Management, Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K) at 52–53 (Mar. 29, 2018). FrontFour quantifies the Management Agreement as producing about 30% of Medley
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Management's fee revenue. JX 443 at p.10. Whichever way one computes the value of the Management Agreement to
Medley Management, it is clearly significant.
43 Between 2016 and 2017, base management fees paid to Medley Capital Advisors fell from $ 19.5 million to $ 17.8 million.
JX 051. The incentive fee had fallen from $ 8.0 million to $ 0.9 million in the same period, and Advisors was likely to lose
all of its incentive fees from Medley Capital in 2018. JX 051 at F-51.
44 Id. at 288:17–289:22; PTO ¶ II.27; Medley Capital Proxy at 57. Medley Management internally referred to this process
as “Project Redwood.” JX 027 (Project Redwood Management Presentation).
45 PTO ¶ II.27.
46 Id.; Medley Capital Proxy at 57–58. On July 2017, two interested parties submitted non-binding bids, but neither bid
progressed beyond the initial indication of interest. PTO ¶ II.30; JX 621 (Pls.' Expert Report of Dr. Kennedy) at ¶ 26 (“one
cash proposal included an acquisition of [Medley Management] and [Advisors], and the other proposed a combination in
exchange for consideration of cash and stock of the combined entity”); Medley Capital Proxy at 57 (“In July 2017, two of
the interested parties submitted non-binding bids to acquire [Medley Management] and [Advisors]. One of the interested
parties proposed an acquisition of [Medley Management] and [Advisors] for cash, and the other proposed a combination
in exchange for consideration of cash and stock of the combined entity. However, neither bid progressed beyond the
initial indication of interest.”).
47 Medley Management referred to this process internally as “Project Elevate.” See JX 029 (Project Elevate: Confidential
Information Packet). The relevant record materials are: id.; JX 068 (Project Elevate: January 2018 Discussion Materials);
JX 635 (Project Elevate: Apr. 2018 Process Summary); JX 639 (Project Elevate: July 2018 Process Summary); JX 646
(Project Elevate: Deal Point List); JX 035 (Project Elevate: Oct. 2017 Discussion Materials); JX 047 (Project Elevate:
First Round Bid Summary Materials); JX 064 (Project Elevate: Discussion Materials); JX 205 (Project Elevate: July 2018
Process Updates).
48 JX 054 (letter engaging Goldman “as financial advisor in connection with the possible sale of all or a portion of [Medley
Management]”); Medley Capital Proxy at 58.
49 JX 085.
50 Medley Capital Proxy at 58.
51 Id.
52 JX 057; JX 635 at p.3.
53 Medley Capital Proxy at 58.
54 They prevented the third parties from offering to acquire or be involved in “any acquisition, transaction, merger or other
business combination relating to all or part of ... any funds advised by [Medley Management] or acquisition transaction
for all or part of the assets of ... any funds advised by [Medley Management].” PTO ¶ II.28; see, e.g., JX 037 (Schroders
Conf. Agr.) § 10.a. The agreements also restricted the third parties' ability to “encourage, initiate, induce or attempt to
induce [Medley Capital] ... to terminate, amend or otherwise modify their advisory agreements with [Medley Management]
during the Standstill Period.” PTO ¶ II.29. See, e.g., Schroders Conf. Agr. § 10.h.
55 See Dkt. 136, PDX 006 (Summary: Standstill Periods); id. PDX 007 (Summary: Standstill Periods, cont.).
56 JX 065 at p.1.
57 Id. at pp.1–2.
58 Compare JX 067 (including half-page summary of the Goldman process and background on Party X) with JX 068
(including comprehensive information about the Medley Management bidding process, the terms of each bid, and financial
terms proposed by Party X).
59 JX 065 at p.2 (Jan. 26, 2018 Medley Capital Board meeting minutes, Brook reported that the contemplated transaction
“would result in a change in control due to the fact that [Medley Capital's] investment advisory agreement would be
assigned to [Party X].”).
60 Trial Tr. at 293:13–24 (Taube) (“You know, when the determination was made to proceed with [Party X], we identified
that, due to the assignment of the contract, that that was a decision that needed to be made. My recollection is that
[the] special committee was formed so that they could make that decision and determination on their own without the
interested board members.”).
61 JX 065 at pp.2–4.
62 Id.
63 Id. at p.5. The Medley Capital Board approved a $ 25,000 retainer for each committee member, a stipend of $ 15,000
per month for the committee chair, and a stipend of $ 10,000 per month for all other members. Id.
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64 JX 087; Medley Capital Proxy at 59; JX 635 at p.5.
65 PTO ¶ II.40; Medley Capital Proxy at 59.
66 PTO ¶ II.41.
67 JX 101; JX 107.
68 JX 544.
69 Medley Capital Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) at 1 (Feb. 13, 2019) (“Contrary to Origami's public statements, the
Company never received a proposal to buy the SBIC Subsidiary from Origami until yesterday.”).
70 JX 100. Origami addressed the letter to Adler because it believed at the time that Adler was instructed to solicit
expressions of interest to purchase Medley SBIC. Young Dep. Tr. at 78:6–7. Knowing that Brook and Adler worked
together, Origami contacted the two of them. Id. at 77:13–15. Origami was “surprised and disappointed that [Brook]
refused to respond.” Id. at 77:16–18.
71 JX 108.
72 Trial Tr. at 373:22–374:1.
73 For some background on TRAs, see Lynnley Browning, Squeezing Out Cash Long After the I.P.O., New York Times
(Mar. 13, 2013), available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/private-equity-squeezes-out-cash-long-afterits-
exit/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
74 Trial Tr. at 246–47 (Sterling).
75 JX 126 (May 9, 2018 email from Brook Taube).
76 JX 078 (Wells Fargo Equity Research Report, Medley Capital: We Were Wrong, But Staying the Course (Feb. 6, 2018) );
see also JX 618 (Defs.' Expert Report of Dr. Zenner) at p.56.
77 JX 129 (Wells Fargo Equity Research Report, Medley Capital: When the Going Gets Tough ... (May 10, 2018) ); see also
JX 618 (Defs.' Expert Report of Dr. Zenner) at p.58.
78 Mack Dep. Tr. at 61:16–25.
79 On May 4, 2018, Medley Capital Advisors voluntarily elected to waive $ 380,000 of the base management fee payable
for the quarter ended March 31, 2018. JX 417 at p.16.
80 JX 126 at p.1. Trial Tr. at 287:18–23 (Taube) (“[W]e were under pressure. And by that I mean, we were not going to make
the quarter. And I think on any quarter, we're doing our best to make the earnings that we are targeting. In this quarter,
as I recall, a few hundred thousand dollars was the difference.”).
81 Id. § 6.3.
82 Id. § 6.2.
83 “[A]nother [investment] vehicle that was intended and still does follow in the tracks of [Sierra].” Trial Tr. at 282:14–17.
84 See JX 119.
85 JX 126 (May 9, 2018 email from Brook Taube).
86 JX 701; JX 133.
87 Trial Tr. at 215–17 (Ainsberg), 287–88 (Taube).
88 Id. at 215:18–217:2.
89 PTO ¶ II.12; JX 656.
90 Medley Capital Proxy at 21.
91 Id. at 360.
92 See JX 091; JX 092.
93 JX 092 (Mar. 29, 2018 email from Brook: “I like project integrate / Let's see if we can defer recapture and tax ... and
keep TRA / That would be good :-)”).
94 See JX 134.
95 JX 140.
96 JX 162; JX 163; JX 164.
97 JX 164.
98 Those minutes state: “[T]here was an industry-wide push for increased scale, ... potential benefits of increased scale
include better financing options, investment opportunities, and cost savings, among other benefits. In particular, by scaling
the institutional manager, [the combined company, “Newco”] would be able to commit capital for investments alongside
strategic partners and other institutional investors. He also pointed out that the Potential Transaction would create a
streamlined organizational structure allowing for significant reductions in fixed costs and expenses. In addition, following
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the Potential Transaction, Newco would experience increased scale and liquidity. Newco would have approximately $
1.2 billion in assets and would be the second largest internally managed [BDC] and the seventh largest BDC overall.
Discussion ensued among members of the Board. Mr. Taube further noted that compared to externally managed BDCs,
internally managed BDCs traded at a substantial market premium to book, or net asset value, and that issuing shares
while trading at a premium would in and of itself be accretive. Mr. Taube emphasized, however, that it is not possible to
precisely predict how the market would react to the Potential Transaction.” JX 164 at p.2.
At this point, it bears noting that none of the Board or Special Committee meeting minutes from June 2018 forward were
finalized until after FrontFour commenced this litigation. Trial Tr. at 419:2–16 (Hirtler-Garvey); JX 293. For that reason, I
do not view them as contemporaneous evidence or give them any presumptive weight, but rather use them to summarize
Defendants' litigation position.
99 JX 163 at p.7 (June 19, 2018 Medley Capital Board Presentation); Medley Capital Proxy at 26; JX 618 ¶ 25; Trial Tr.
at 295:8–297:12 (Taube).
100 Medley Capital Proxy at 71 (“[O]n January 26, 2018, [Medley] Management held meetings with the Medley Capital Board
and the Sierra Board ... [the] Sierra Board established ... the Sierra Special Committee ... and authorized the committee[ ]
to evaluate the merits of a potential sale of substantially all of [Advisors'] assets to Party X ....”).
101 PTO ¶ II.53. The decision to engage Barclays was made at the July 10, 2018 meeting of the Medley Management special
committee. JX 204 at p.2.
102 Trial Tr. at 349 (Taube).
103 Id. at 348.
104 Id. at 301; see also id. at 349 (“We had made the decision only to pay Goldman going forward.”).
105 Id.
106 Trial Tr. at 300:21–301:3 (Taube) (B. Taube giving reasons for recommending Broadhaven to the [Sierra] special
committee); JX 151 (June 13, 2018 email from B. Taube telling Broadhaven that they were “on deck” to pitch on June
18, 2018).
107 JX 158; JX 151; JX 162.
108 JX 031.
109 See JX 191 at p.4; JX 031.
110 JX 164.
111 Id. at pp.6–8.
112 Trial Tr. at 170:9–171:3 (Ainsberg); Id. at 299:19–300:1 (Hirtler-Garvey). But see Mack Dep. Tr. at 71:12–17 (“Q. And
were you involved in the hiring of a financial advisor? A. I was not involved in the interview process. However, all of the
members of the committee reviewed the submitted materials and voted on the hiring of the financial advisor.”).
113 Trial Tr. at 299:23–300:14 (B. Taube recommended Credit Suisse); JX 177 (June 21, 2018 Credit Suisse pitch book).
114 JX 189 (Sandler engagement letter); JX 175 (June 22, 2018 Sandler pitch book); JX 187 (Email from B. Taube to J.
Tonkel describing terms of Sandler engagement).
115 JX 175; JX 430; Trial Tr. at 170–71 (Ainsberg). Mack explained his reasons for selecting Sandler: “[T]hey gave a very
good presentation and they were a lot cheaper than the other guy.” Mack Dep. Tr. at 72:2–4. In Ainsberg's view: “[Sandler]
had extensive experience in the BDC space. They're a very highly regarded investment banker. I had known the firm for
many years reputationally. I had never done any business with them. They had known the folks at [Medley Management]
but hadn't had any important retention ... for a period of years.” Trial Tr. at 171:8–17. And Ainsberg agreed that Sandler's
“pricing for their assignment was significantly less than Credit Suisse, so finances were a factor.” Id.
116 PTO ¶ II.49; Medley Capital Proxy at 71.
117 JX 703; Trial Tr. at 236:2–237:6 (Sterling).
118 JX 209 at 2–4.
119 Trial Tr. at 240:2–241:8 (Sterling); JX 208; JX 209.
120 Trial Tr. at 242:2–14 (Sterling).
121 Id. at 243:17–18.
122 Id. at 243:21–244:4.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 173–74 (Ainsberg); Id. at 244:5–14 (Sterling).
125 Id. at 244:15–19 (Sterling); id. at 395:9–16 (Hirtler-Garvey) (“That was an idea that they brought forward that we thought
was a great idea.”).
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126 JX 707.
127 Trial Tr. at 246:12–247:6 (Sterling).
128 JX 509 at p.5; JX 723 at 10; Trial Tr. at 244:15–19 (Sterling).
129 Trial Tr. at 245:18–24, 246:5–8 (Sterling) (testifying that negotiations achieved a ratio that was equal to Medley Capital's
“equity value or book value in the form of NAV”).
130 JX 288.
131 The one-sentence letter reads: “It is our professional opinion that the employment agreements and the executive
compensation packages attached to the merger agreement are reasonable.” JX 641.
132 JX 299; Trial Tr. at 247:21–248:1.
133 Id. at 246:1–4. See generally Id. at 173–76 (Ainsberg).
134 JX 280.
135 See Dkt. 134, Defs.' Demonstrative SC-D-01 (Medley Capital Special Committee Meetings Between Retention of Sandler
O'Neill and Announcement of Merger). See also JX 208 (July 11, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 209 (July 11, 2018
board minutes); JX 223 (July 17, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 225 (July 17, 2018 board minutes); JX 228 (July
18, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 229 (July 18, 2018 board minutes); JX 235 (July 20, 2018 Sandler presentation
deck); JX 236 (July 20, 2018 board minutes); JX 247 (July 20, 2018 Sandler presentation deck, draft); JX 248 (July 23,
2018 board minutes); JX 257 (July 26, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 259 (July 26, 2018 board minutes); JX 266;
JX 278 (July 27, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 268 (July 27, 2018 board minutes) JX 279 (July 28, 2018 board
minutes).
136 Trial Tr. at 177–78 (Ainsberg).
137 JX 295 (Aug. 2, 2018 board minutes); JX 308 (Aug. 6, 2018 board minutes); JX 321 (Aug. 8, 2018 board minutes); JX
319 (Aug. 9, 2018 Sandler presentation deck, draft); JX 333 (Aug. 9, 2018 Sandler presentation deck); JX 335 (Aug. 9,
2018 board minutes); JX 640 (Sandler Summary of Synergies).
138 JX 332 at p.6.
139 PTO ¶ II.58; JX 333 (Sandler Fairness Opinion Presentation deck).
140 Id. ¶ II.59.
141 See JX 163.
142 See JX 702.
143 See Medley Capital Proxy at 59–71. Despite the lack of any visible work, the Medley Capital Special Committee was paid
a total of $ 280,000 between January and June 2018. JX 164 at p.6.
144 Trial Tr. at 355:3–6 (Taube) (“Q. You were pushing the special committees of all of these entities to get a deal done;
right? A. I was not.”).
145 Compare Trial Tr. at 352 (“We wanted to have a process that was timely but sensible.”) with JX 289 (“Thursday board
meetings are the time to push these guys hard in person.”) (emphasis added); JX 269 (“I want to agree on ONE suggestion
(not a menu) and tell them they are better off ... or at least no worse off ... and have a fiduciary obligation to close”)
(emphasis added); JX 275 (“Make this happen!!!!!! If not ... I don't know what to say). See also Simpson Dep. Tr. at
623:23–225:2 (“Brook was pushing very hard – we advised the Special Committee that we had talked to Brook and that
he was pushing very hard for his position.”).
146 JX 212 at p.3.
147 JX 212 at p.3.
148 Id. at p.4.
149 JX 269.
150 JX 275. Brookhaven's corporate representative, John Simpson, advised the Sierra special committee “that Brook was
pushing very hard ... that [Broadhaven] had talked to Brook and that he was pushing very hard for his position.” Simpson
Dep. Tr. at 224–25.
151 JX 289.
152 Id. (emphasis added).
153 JX 292.
154 JX 717 at p.1 (emphasis added). Brook Taube did not produce text messages in discovery. Trial Tr. at 358. FrontFour was
forced to press for them. Dkt. 127. Lerdal produced this text message after Brook Taube's deposition. Trial Tr. at 359:5–9.
155 JX 569 (“Medley Capital did not contact any third parties for the purpose of exploring an Alternative Medley Capital
Transaction between May 1, 2017 and execution of the Medley Capital Merger Agreement”).
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156 JX 105. See also Trial Tr. at 20:8–13 (Lorber).
157 Trial Tr. at 231:18–232:14 (Sterling).
158 Id. at 419:17–420:4 (Hirtler-Garvey).
159 Id. at 182:2–183:4 (Ainsberg) (“We didn't shop the company because, if one steps back and thinks about the history
of [Medley Management], starting in 2017, even before the Goldman Sachs and Brookhaven involvement, Medley
Management undertook a process with both Credit Suisse and UBS to look at the marketplace to see if there would
be an opportunity to come together with a group. And when [Medley Management] was doing that, as we discussed
earlier, that involves [Medley Capital], because [Medley Capital] effectively would have to approve a transaction in some
shape, manner, or form. So effectively what happened, both at the time of the Credit Suisse/UBS and at the time of the
Goldman/Broadhaven reach-out to the street, many, many significant players in the street knew about it, that [Medley
Management] was interested in the transaction. So this business effectively was -- was looked at. Now, did they look at
our -- I don't know what they looked at, effectively, when they were looking at it, these other entities. I don't know what
documents they were provided with. But you would assume that they, early on, before our current transaction, that these
folks looked at various documents of the entities.”).
160 Trial Tr. at 225–28 (Ainsberg).
161 Mack Dep. Tr. at 57:10–25. Mack also testified that he did not know or think about who Goldman Sachs was working for.
Id. at 99:20–25. “They were – they were trying to shop to see whether there was a deal out there, but I'm not sure that
I ever thought about who they were working for.” Id. at 99:25–100:4.
162 Trial Tr. at 289:21–293:24 (Taube); JX 022 (Benefit Street Partners non-binding proposal to Medley Management); JX 035
(Project Elevate Discussion Materials); JX 038 (Project Elevate Preliminary Proposal Instructions); JX 031 (Broadhaven
engagement letter).
163 Mack Dep. Tr. at 57:3–25.
164 See Dkt. 136, PDX 006 (Summary: Standstill Periods); id. PDX 007 (Summary: Standstill Periods, cont.).
165 See Dkt. 136, Ex. A: PDX 006 (Summary: Standstill Periods).
166 JX628 at 52:7–10 (“You have to delegate things to the management. Directors direct. I'm sorry. Directors direct, managers
manage.”).
167 Mack Dep. Tr. at 53:13–15 (“The fact is, as you -- as I think about it, the more the merrier. It's -- then it's just become
a part of a process.”).
168 Mack Dep. Tr. at 53:13–22.
169 JX 341 at p.28.
170 Trial Tr. at 254:5–11 (Sterling).
171 Id. at 213:10–23 (Ainsberg).
172 JX 137.
173 JX 197.
174 JX 213.
175 JX 234 (“I have not been able to get you guys to respond since Tuesday. Left messages at the office for you as well as
email. Not trying to be difficult but would like some input on scheduling. If I need to get to NYC I will do that. Thank you.”).
176 JX 286.
177 JX 283 at p.2 (emphasis added).
178 PTO ¶ II.59; JX 336.
179 JX 350.
180 JX 317 (Merger Agr.) § 7.10(d) (“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, at any time
prior to the date that [Medley Capital] Stockholder Approval is obtained (in the case of [Medley Capital] ) or [Sierra]
Stockholder Approval is obtained (in the case of [Sierra] ), in the event that [Medley Capital] (or its representatives on
[Medley Capital's] behalf) or [Sierra] (or its representatives on [Sierra's] behalf) receives a Competing Proposal from any
Third Party, (i) [Medley Capital] and its representatives or [Sierra] and its representatives, as applicable, may contact
such Third Party to clarify any ambiguous terms and conditions thereof (without the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra]
Board, as applicable, being required to make the determination in clause (ii) of this Section 7.IO(d) ) and (ii) [Medley
Capital] and the [Medley Capital] Board and its representatives or [Sierra] and the [Sierra] Board and its representatives,
as applicable, may engage in negotiations or substantive discussions with, or furnish any information and other access
to, any Third Party making such Competing Proposal and its representatives and Affiliates if the [Medley Capital] Board
or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, determines in good faith (after consultation with its outside financial advisors and legal
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counsel) that (A) such Competing Proposal either constitutes a Superior Proposal or could reasonably be expected to
lead to a Superior Proposal and (B) failure to consider such Competing Proposal could reasonably be expected to be
inconsistent with the fiduciary duties of the directors of [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable, under Applicable Law;
provided, that (x) such Competing Proposal did not result from any material breach of any of the provisions set forth
in this Section 7.10, (y) prior to furnishing any material non-public information concerning [Medley Capital] or [Sierra],
as applicable, [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable, receives from such Third Party, to the extent such Third Party
is not already subject to a confidentiality agreement with [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable, a confidentiality
agreement containing confidentiality terms that are not less favorable in the aggregate to [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as
the case may be, than those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement (unless [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as applicable,
offers to amend the Confidentiality Agreement to reflect such more favorable terms) (it being understood and agreed that
such confidentiality agreement need not restrict the making of Competing Proposals (and related communications) to
[Medley Capital] or the [Medley Capital] Board or to [Sierra] or the [Sierra] Board, as the case may be) (an ‘Acceptable
Confidentiality Agreement’) and (z) [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as the case may be, shall (subject to the terms of any
confidentiality agreement existing prior to the date hereof) promptly provide or make available to the other party any
material written non-public information concerning it that it provides to any Third Party given such access that was not
previously made available to the other party or its representatives.”) (emphasis original).
181 Id. § 1.1 (“ ‘Competing Proposal’ means any inquiry, proposal or offer made by any Third Party: (a) to purchase or
otherwise acquire, directly or indirectly, in one transaction or a series of transactions (including any merger, consolidation,
tender offer, exchange offer, stock acquisition, asset acquisition, binding share exchange, business combination,
recapitalization, liquidation, dissolution, joint venture or similar transaction), (i) beneficial ownership (as defined under
Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act) of twenty percent (20%) or more of any class of equity securities of [Medley Capital]
or [Sierra], as applicable, or (ii) any one or more assets or businesses of [Medley Capital] or its Subsidiaries or [Sierra]
or its Subsidiaries that constitute twenty percent (20%) or more of the revenues or assets of [Medley Capital] and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or [Sierra] and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as applicable; or (b) any liquidation
of [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], in each case other than the Merger and the other transactions to occur at Closing in
accordance with this Agreement.”) (emphasis original).
182 Id. (“ ‘Superior Proposal’ means any bona fide written Competing Proposal made by a Third Party that the [Medley
Capital] Board or the [Sierra] Board, as applicable, determines in good faith, after consultation with its outside financial
advisors and legal counsel, and taking into account the terms and conditions of such proposal, the party making such
proposal, all financial, legal, regulatory and other aspects of such proposal, as well as the likelihood of consummation of
the Competing Proposal relative to the Merger and such other factors as the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as
applicable, considers to be appropriate, is more favorable to [Medley Capital's] stockholders or [Sierra's] stockholders,
as applicable, from a financial point of view than the Merger and the other transactions contemplated by this Agreement
(including any revisions to the terms of this Agreement committed to by [Sierra] to [Medley Capital] in writing in response
to such Competing Proposal made to [Medley Capital] or by [Medley Capital] to [Sierra] in writing in response to such
Competing Proposal made to [Sierra] under the provisions of Section 7.10(f); provided however, for these purposes, to
the extent relevant to the Competing Proposal in question, all percentages in subsections (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of the definition
of Competing Proposal shall be increased to fifty percent (50%).”) (emphasis original).
183 Id. § 7.10(e) (“Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, (i) the [Medley Capital] Board shall not effect [a Medley
Capital] Adverse Recommendation Change and the [Sierra] Board shall not effect [a Sierra] Adverse Recommendation
Change (each, an ‘Adverse Recommendation Change’), (ii) [Medley Capital] Board shall not approve or recommend,
or allow [Medley Capital] to execute or enter into, any letter of intent, memorandum of understanding or definitive merger
or similar agreement with respect to any Competing Proposal (other than an Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement), and
(iii) the [Sierra] Board shall not approve or recommend, or allow [Sierra] to execute or enter into, any letter of intent,
memorandum of understanding or definitive merger or similar agreement with respect to any Competing Proposal (other
than an Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement); provided however, that notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the
contrary, if at any time prior to the receipt of [Medley Capital] Stockholder Approval (in the case of [Medley Capital] ) or
the [Sierra] Stockholder Approval (in the case of [Sierra] ), [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as the case may be, has received
a Competing Proposal that its board of directors has determined in good faith (after consultation with its outside financial
advisor and legal counsel) constitutes a Superior Proposal, the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable,
may (x) make an Adverse Recommendation Change in connection with such Superior Proposal if the board of directors
effecting the Adverse Recommendation Change determines in good faith (after consultation with its outside financial
advisor and legal counsel) that failure to make an Adverse Recommendation Change could reasonably be expected to
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be inconsistent with the fiduciary duties of the [Medley Capital] Board or [Sierra] Board, as applicable, under Applicable
Law, and/or (y) authorize, adopt or approve such Superior Proposal and cause or permit [Medley Capital] or [Sierra], as
applicable, to enter into a definitive agreement with respect to such Superior Proposal concurrently with the termination of
this Agreement in accordance with Section 9.1(g) or 9.1(i), as applicable, but in each case only after providing the Notice
of Adverse Recommendation or Notice of Superior Proposal, as applicable, and entering into good faith negotiations as
required by Section 7.lO(f).”) (emphasis original).
184 Trial Tr. at 405:13–20 (Hirtler-Garvey). Brook Taube will be Chairman and CEO of the combined company and will receive
an employment package that includes a base $ 600,000 annual salary and a $ 3.2 million incentive bonus comprising $ 2
million in restricted stock units and $ 1.2 million in cash. PTO ¶ II.69. Seth Taube will be Vice Chairman, Senior Executive
Vice President and Senior Managing Director of the combined company and will receive an employment package, with a
base $ 480,000 annual salary and a $ 1.75 million incentive bonus comprising $ 1.15 million in restricted stock units and
$ 600,000 in cash. PTO ¶ II.70. Tonkel will serve as President of the combined company and will receive an employment
package, with a base $ 480,000 annual salary and a $ 1.75 million incentive bonus comprising $ 1.15 million in restricted
stock units and $ 600,000 in cash. PTO ¶ II.71.
185 Trial Tr. at 405:16–406:3 (Hirtler-Garvey).
186 Dkt. 128, Pretrial Order (“PTO”) ¶ II.1; JX466; JX 720. FrontFour is on the “smaller scale of hedge funds. Assets under
management are ... about $ 150 million.” Trial Tr. at 11, 55 (Lorber).
187 Id. at 16.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 16:11–18:6.
190 Id. at 18:19–24.
191 Id. at 24:19–24.
192 Id. at 24:22–23.
193 Id. at 24:6–18.
194 Id. at 25:10–16.
195 As Lorber described: “[Anderson] said to Steve [FrontFour's representative], ‘have you ever done a merger before?’
Steve said, ‘you know, yes, I have.’ And Sam said, ‘have you ever done a three-way merger?’ Steve said, ‘no, actually
I haven't.’ And then Sam said, ‘well, it's very difficult to get three parties to agree on what actually happened.’ That was
quite alarming. Given that what actually [happened] should be factual. It shouldn't be difficult to get people to agree on
what actually happened.” Id. at 25:10–24.
196 Id. at 26.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 27:16–20.
199 JX 396. Lorber testified that this was the deadline for nomination letters. Trial Tr. at 29. Medley Capital has not noticed
the 2019 annual meeting. Id. at 31.
200 JX 409; Trial Tr. at 27–28. The meeting was held telephonically, as Medley Capital refused FrontFour's request for an
in-person meeting. Id. at 28.
201 Id. at 28.
202 JX 409.
203 JX 421.
204 JX 365 (Transcript of Aug. 10, 2018 Medley Investor Conference Call re: Merger Overview) at p.2 (“there will be further
detail in our proxy which will file in the next few weeks”); Trial Tr. at 25:10–14 (Lorber).
205 See Medley Capital Proxy.
206 It claimed that, “because each of the proposals submitted included various conditions and carve-outs, and different
forms of consideration, some of which was contingent, and in light of the fact that none were binding, it would be both
impracticable and speculative to assign a particular value to any such proposal.” Id. at 57 (emphasis added); see also
Id. at 59. But it was possible to derive enterprise, equity and corresponding per-share values for Medley Management
(as well as implied premium calculations) from each of the IOIs; Medley Management and its advisors did exactly that
when communicating internally. JX 705.
207 C.A. No. 2019-0021-KSJM.
208 Id. at Dkt. 17 (Oral Argument on Pls.' Mot. to Expedite and the Court's Ruling).
209 JX 706.
- 81 -
FrontFour Capital Group LLC v. Taube, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 29
210 JX 513.
211 JX 432.
212 JX 439.
213 JX 459; Trial Tr. at 366:22–367:10 (Taube).
214 JX 458.
215 JX 472.
216 Id.
217 JX 488. After NexPoint made its proposals public, ISS changed its recommendation to voting against the Proposed
Transactions. ISS initially recommended voting in favor of the merger based on the theory that it was the better of two bad
options. JX 463 at p.2 (describing the Proposed Transactions as “the better of the two underwhelming options available
to shareholders”).
218 JX 524.
219 JX 514.
220 JX 544.
221 See id; see also JX 101.
222 JX 557.
223 JX 564.
224 Medley Capital Corp., Non-Management Solicitation Material (Form DFAN14A) (Mar. 6, 2019).
225 JX 459; Trial Tr. at 366:22–367:10 (Taube).
226 Trial Tr. at 188:21–189:1 (Ainsberg); id. at 424:2–425:3 (Hirtler-Garvey).
227 Also, as discussed above, in May 2018, Lantern expressed an interest in a possible transaction that involved a
recapitalization of Medley Capital. JX 138. On July 3, 2018, a Lantern representative again reached out to Goldman:
“[A]ny chance we can talk today? I have been speaking with Todd Owens [of Broadhaven] about our interest in acquiring
[Medley Management] and recapitalizing Medley Capital. Thanks!” JX 197. By that time, Project Integrate was underway.
The Special Committee was unaware of this offer when they were negotiating the Proposed Transactions, and it has
never been disclosed to Medley Capital stockholders. Despite a call that apparently took place between Lantern and “the
company” in late July 2018, followed by an email to Russ Hutchinson, no one from Medley Capital pursued Lantern's
proposal. JX 254; Trial Tr. at 188:21–189:1 (Ainsberg) (“Q. And what happened with respect to the proposals, at least
at the – what's happened so far with respect to the proposals? That is to say, Zais, NexPoint, and Origami. A. They've
all been rejected.”).
228 Trial Tr. at 222:16–225:7 (Ainsberg); id. at 423:5–425:3 (Hirtler-Garvey).
229 JX 717 at p.11.
230 Dkt. 1; Dkt. 8 (“Am. Compl.”).
231 Dkt. 63; Dkt. 79.
232 Dkt. 271, 81, 116, 117, 118, 124.
233 Dkt. 128, PTO ¶ II.130.
234 Dkt. 133.
235 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 144–52.
236 Id. ¶¶ 153–60.
237 Id. ¶¶ 161–67.
238 Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011).
239 Id.
240 Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont II ), 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997); Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110,
1115 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
241 In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 3165613, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009), interlocutory appeal
refused, 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) (TABLE); see In re Delphi Fin. Gp. S'holder Litig., 2012 WL 729232, at *12 n.57 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (applying entire fairness where the controlling stockholder received differential merger consideration);
see also In re Primedia, Inc. S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 455, 487 (Del. Ch. 2013) (applying entire fairness where “the
[m]erger conferred a unique benefit on” the controlling stockholder).
242 In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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243 Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113 (observing that a stockholder becomes a fiduciary if it “owns a majority interest in ... the
corporation” (internal quotation marks omitted) ); see In re PNB Hldg. Co. S'holders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999, at *9 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (Strine, V.C.) (“Under our law, a controlling stockholder exists when a stockholder ... owns more than
50% of the voting power of a corporation ....”); Williamson v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 2006 WL 1586375, at *4 (Del. Ch. June
5, 2006) (“A shareholder is a ‘controlling’ one if she owns more than 50% of the voting power in a corporation.”).
244 See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1113 (observing that a stockholder becomes a fiduciary if it “exercises control over the business
affairs of the corporation” (emphasis original) ); In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2018 WL 1560293, at *19 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (concluding on a motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that Musk, owner of 22.1% of
company's common stock, was a controller based on well-pled facts related to “Musk's voting influence, his domination of
the Board during the process leading up to the [challenged acquisition] against the backdrop of his extraordinary influence
with the Company generally, the Board level conflicts that diminished the Board's resistance to Musk's influence, and
the Company's and Musk's own acknowledgement of his outsized influence”); Calesa Assocs. v. Am. Capital, Ltd., 2016
WL 770251, at *10–12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2016) (concluding on motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that
stockholder owning 26% of the company's stock exercised actual control where the plaintiff alleged instances of actual
control beyond the fact that the stockholder “exercised duly obtained contractual rights to its benefit and to the detriment
of the company”); In re Zhongpin Inc. S'holders Litig., 2014 WL 6735457, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014) (concluding
on motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that stockholder owning only 17.3% of the company's stock was
a controller because the stockholder was CEO and the company's 10-K stated that the stockholder effectively controlled
the company), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S'holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173 (Del.
2015); Williamson, 2006 WL 1586375, at *4–5 (concluding on a motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable
that two stockholders, owning collectively 17.1% of the company's stock, jointly controlled the company based on their
ability to nominate two of the five directors, their ability to influence the flow of revenue into the corporation, and their
potential “veto” power over certain corporate decisions); In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 535, 551–
52 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, V.C.) (finding post-trial that a stockholder owning 35% of the company's stock controlled
the company because he was a “hands-on” “Chairman and CEO of [the company],” and because he had the ability to
“elect a new slate [of independent directors] more to his liking without having to attract much, if any, support from public
stockholders” through his familial ties with the company's other stockholders); O'Reilly v. Transworld Healthcare, Inc.,
745 A.2d 902, 912–13, 915–16 (Del. Ch. 1999) (concluding on motion to dismiss that it was reasonably conceivable that
a 49% stockholder exercised actual control where the plaintiff alleged that the stockholder forced the board to comply
with its terms on the merger through threats).
245 See Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *14 (“[T]here is no absolute percentage of voting power that is required in order for there
to be a finding that a controlling stockholder exists.” (quoting PNB Hldg., 2006 WL 2403999, at *9) ); Calesa Assocs., 2016
WL 770251, at *11 (explaining that there is “no correlation between the percentage of equity owned and the determination
of control status”); see In re Crimson Expl. Inc. S'holders Litig., 2014 WL 5449519, at *10–12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014)
(collecting cases discussing when a stockholder may be considered a controlling stockholder).
246 Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *13; In re Rouse Props., Inc., 2018 WL 1226015, at *12 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2018) (citing
Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 2017 WL 2325152, at *17 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017); Cysive, 836 A.2d at 531,
and Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1114–15); see In re Primedia Inc. Deriv. Litig., 910 A.2d 248, 257 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[T]he plaintiffs
need not demonstrate that [the alleged controller] oversaw the day-to-day operations of Primedia. Allegations of control
over the particular transaction at issue are enough.”).
247 Rouse, 2018 WL 1226015, at *12 (citing Williamson, 2006 WL 1586375, at *4); Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *13; see
also Basho Techs. Holdco B, LLC v. Georgetown Basho Inv'rs, LLC, 2018 WL 3326693, at *27 (Del. Ch. July 6, 2018)
(“Broader indicia of effective control also play a role in evaluating whether a defendant exercised actual control over a
decision. Examples of broader indicia include ownership of a significant equity stake (albeit less than a majority), the
right to designate directors (albeit less than a majority), decisional rules in governing documents that enhance the power
of minority stockholder or board-level position, and the ability to exercise outsized influence in the board room, such as
through high-status roles like CEO, Chairman, or founder.” (footnotes omitted) ).
248 Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002) (emphasis added); see also Tesla, 2018 WL 1560293, at *17
(“Even an independent, disinterested director can be dominated in his decision-making by a controlling stockholder.”).
249 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000); accord Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 430; Telxon, 802 A.2d at 264.
250 Mack Dep. Tr. at 16–17.
251 Id. at 23–24.
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252 Id. at 30–31.
253 Id. at 44.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 31.
256 Id. at 53.
257 Id. at 46–47.
258 Id. at 52–53.
259 Id. at 52–53.
260 Id. at 63.
261 Id. at 57. Until his deposition, Mack “never really thought about the entities” involved in the proposal. Id. at 118; see id.
(“I thought it was Medley Capital, but I would say that's just me not digging into who the parties are.”).
262 Id. at 73.
263 Id. at 53.
264 Id. at 72–73.
265 Id. at 32.
266 Id. at 33–34.
267 Id. at 34–35.
268 Id. at 42–43.
269 Id. at 79.
270 Id. at 82–83.
271 Id. at 80–81, 83.
272 Id. at 10–11.
273 See Basho Techs., 2018 WL 3326693, at *27 (explaining that a broader indicia of effective control includes “the ability to
exercise outsized influence in the board room, such as through high-status roles like CEO, Chairman, or founder”).
274 JX 717 at p.11 (text message chain on January 9, 2019 at 2:56 p.m.: Lerdal: “Old ladies and their schedules ...”; Brook:
“Whoa”; Lerdal: “Recommendation will be forthcoming. Proper response. Your question was the proper one.”; Brook:
“Which one?”; Lerdal: “Are we going to respond to every f**ksake on the planet?”)
275 Id. at p.4.
276 Id. at p.1.
277 Id. at p.2.
278 Id. at p.4.
279 Id. at p.4.
280 Id. at p.5.
281 Id. at pp.6–7.
282 JX 023.
283 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
284 Id.
285 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995) (defendants must prove “to the court's satisfaction
that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price” (emphasis original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) ).
286 Id. at 1162 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
287 In re Dole Food Co., Inc. S'holder Litig., 2015 WL 5052214, at *26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015).
288 Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1120–21. See also In re Tele–Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2005 WL 3642727, at *10 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 21, 2005) (“[A]n important element of an effective special committee is that it be fully informed in making its
determination.”); Tremont II, 694 A.2d at 431 (“In evaluating this claim the Court of Chancery correctly stated that “[a]
controlling shareholder ... must disclose fully all material facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.”) (citing
Kahn v. Tremont Corp. (Tremont I ), 1996 WL 145452, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996) ).
289 Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1115 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711).
290 See Trial Tr. at 427:3–502:21 (Zenner examination); JX 618 (Zenner Report); Trial Tr. at 94:6–152:20 (Kennedy
examination); JX 621 (Kennedy Report).
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291 JX 621 (Kennedy Report).
292 Trial Tr. at 475–76 (Zenner).
293 Id. at 474–75.
294 Id. at 491–92.
295 See, e.g., Va. Power Energy Mktg., Inc. v. EQT Energy, LLC, 2012 WL 13034278, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 9, 2012) (holding
that a “comment upon the opinion of another expert ... is not a proper subject for expert opinion evidence”).
296 Trial Tr. at 488:3–8 (Zenner).
297 Trial Tr. at 96–98, 103–111 (Kennedy).
298 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *36 & n.36 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016) (“[T]he bulk of any price competition
occurs before the deal is signed.”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master
Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
299 Dole, 2015 WL 5052214, at *34.
300 Reis, 28 A.3d at 467; accord Ross Hldg. & Mgmt. Co. v. Advance Realty Gp., LLC, 2014 WL 4374261, at *33 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Robust procedural protections may support a determination that price was fairly within a range
of reasonable values, and a failure of process may prevent a Court from reaching such a conclusion.”); see William
Penn P'ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 758 (Del. 2011) (“Merely showing that the sale price was in the range of fairness,
however, does not necessarily satisfy the entire fairness burden when fiduciaries stand on both sides of a transaction and
manipulate the sales process.”); Gentile v. Rossette, 2010 WL 2171613, at *9 (Del. Ch. May 28, 2010) (“From a tainted
process, one should not be surprised if a tainted price emerges.”); Bomarko, Inc. v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161,
1183 (Del. Ch. 1999), as revised (Nov. 16, 1999), aff'd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del. 2000) (“[T]he unfairness of the process also
infects the fairness of the price.”); HMG/Courtland Properties, Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 116 (Del. Ch. 1999) (holding that
the defendants did not satisfy their burden by showing that the price was “within the low end of the range of possible prices
that might have been paid in negotiated arm's-length deals” where “[t]he process was ... anything but fair”); Tremont II,
694 A.2d at 432 (“[H]ere, the process is so intertwined with price that under Weinberger's unitary standard a finding that
the price negotiated by the [special committee] might have been fair does not save the result.”).
301 Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., 40 A.3d 839, 857–58 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd 59 A.3d 1206 (Del. 2012). See also id. at
874–75 (“[The defendant] has argued throughout this litigation that [the property] was worth less than its debt and thus
any surplus over zero was a fair price, but I cannot accept this as true based on the record before me. [The defendant]
himself is responsible for this evidentiary doubt. He fended off [a potential buyer], gave incomplete information to [the
appraiser hired by the LLC], and did not promote a fair Auction process. Thus, I do not view the Auction process as
generating a price indicative of what [the property] would fetch in a true arm's-length negotiation. Rather, the evidence
suggests that [the property] was worth more than what [the defendant] paid. [The defendant] was not motivated to bid
his best price because he knew that he was the only bidder before he finalized his offer ... The fact that we do not have
concrete evidence of what a fully negotiated third-party deal would have produced is [the defendant's] own fault, and
such ambiguities are construed against the self-conflicted fiduciary who created them.”).
302 FrontFour urges the Court to apply enhanced scrutiny to the entirety of the Proposed Transactions, not just the deal
protections. They argue that, “as conceived, the entire Transaction is an improper defensive measure implemented by
[Medley] Management to advance its own interests ....” Pls.' Post-Trial Br. at 65.
303 More specifically, the deal protections are: (1) a no-shop provision preventing each party from attempting to undermine the
Merger Agreement by soliciting other bids, subject to a “Superior Proposal” fiduciary out; (2) an “adverse recommendation
change” requirement that the Medley Capital Board recommend that the stockholders vote in favor of the merger, subject
to a fiduciary out; and (3) a “termination fee” provision requirement the payment of $ 6 million to Sierra under certain
conditions. Defendants' expert quantifies the termination fees as 2.79% of the deal value, and FrontFour does not dispute
this computation. JX 618 at p.31.
304 See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989); Mills Acq. Co. v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1288 (Del. 1988). “Deal protections” are provisions of a merger agreement that compensate a jilted third party if
the target does not consummate the deal or obstructs disruption of the deal by another transaction. Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. Law. 919, 922 (2001)
[hereinafter Categorical Confusion]. Under default rules of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a stockholder can sell
control of the company in the minimum number of days permitted under federal securities law. Id. at 924 & n.14. Deal
protection measures disturb this natural ordering by obstructing a stockholders' ability to engage in other transactions
once a merger agreement is signed. Further, mergers require stockholder approval. To be effective, the stockholder vote
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must be “meaningful and voluntary.” See 8 Del. C. § 251(c). By safeguarding the merger, deal protections encroach on
the voluntary nature of the stockholder vote. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1387 (Del. 1996).
305 La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The inquiry, by its very
nature fact intensive, cannot be reduced to a mathematical equation.”); id. (“Our courts do not ‘presume that all business
circumstances are identical or that there is any naturally occurring rate of deal protection, the deficit or excess of which
will be less than economically optimal.... [A] court focuses upon the real world risks and prospects confronting [directors]
when they agreed to the deal protections.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also In re BioClinica, Inc.
S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 5631233, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“a no-solicitation provision, a poison pill, a reasonable
termination fee, information rights, and a top-up option ... in the context of an otherwise reasonable sales process, have
been found non-preclusive” (emphasis added) ); In re Cogent, Inc. S'holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487, 501–09 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(assessing the preclusive effect of deal protections individually and “in the aggregate”); Orman v. Cullman, 2004 WL
2348395, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004) (noting that deal protection devices may be unreasonable even if not coercive or
preclusive); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 1573, 1587 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Allen, C.) (“Thus, where
it is applicable, Unocal requires a judicial judgment finely focused upon the particulars of the case.”).
306 Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935 (Del. 2003).
307 See, e.g., In re Cogent, 7 A.3d at 502 & n.40 (collecting decisions) (“Potential suitors often have a legitimate concern
that they are being used merely to draw others into a bidding war. Therefore, in an effort to entice an acquirer to make
a strong offer, it is reasonable for a seller to provide a buyer some level of assurance that he will be given adequate
opportunity to buy the seller, even if a higher bid later emerges.”).
308 Id. at 502.
309 Interestingly, Defendants' expert, Dr. Marc Zenner, presented a comparable transactions analysis related to deal
protection devices. In that analysis two-thirds of his comparable set involved a pre-signing formal auction. Of course,
this renders the set not comparable to the Proposed Transactions. Trial Tr. at 494–95. It also supports the notion that
no-shops are outside of the range of reasonableness absent a pre-signing market canvas or efforts to assess potential
price competition pre-signing. See Forgo v. Health Grades, Inc., C.A. No. 5716-VCS, at 16:18–20 (Del. Ch. Sept. 3,
2010) (TRANSCRIPT) (“Well, you know, if you're not going to do as much on the front end, you got to make sure the
back end works.”).
310 Merger Agr. § 7.10(e).
311 See generally In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL, at 17 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012)
(TRANSCRIPT) (stating that placing restrictions on a board's “ability to change its recommendation” that mirror “the
types of conditions and procedures frequently and historically used to regulate a target's contractual ability to terminate
a merger agreement and accept a superior proposal” is “fraught with peril”). This Court provided a definitive summary of
the relevant issues in In re Primedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation:
Delaware law requires that a board of directors give a meaningful, current recommendation to stockholders regarding
the advisability of a merger including, if necessary, recommending against the merger as a result of subsequent
events. This obligation flows from the bedrock principle that when directors communicate publicly or directly with
shareholders about corporate matters, the sine qua non of directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty. The
duty of loyalty, which mandates that directors act in stockholders' best interests, consequently requires ensuring an
informed stockholder vote. The obligation to change as recommendation prior to a stockholder vote can be further
viewed as a duty to update a prior material statement. A board may not suggest or imply that it is recommending the
merger to the shareholders if in fact its members have concluded privately that the deal is not now in the best interest
of the shareholders. In light of these principles, the target board must have an ability to make a truthful and
candid recommendation consistent with its fiduciary duties—and this duty will be applicable whether or not
there is a superior offer.”
67 A.3d 455, 491–92 (Del. Ch. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
312 See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 840 (Del. Ch. 2011) (enjoining defensive measures not
because the defensive measures themselves failed enhanced scrutiny but because they were “the product of a fiduciary
breach”).
313 Unanue v. Unanue, 2004 WL 2521292, at *10 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004).
314 In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (citation omitted).
315 Klang v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 156 (Del. 1997) (footnotes omitted).
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316 Zaucha v. Brody, 1997 WL 305841, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997); see Novell, 2013 WL 322560, at *13 (explaining that
material facts are those which, “under all the circumstances ... would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations
of the reasonable shareholder.” (citation omitted) ).
317 Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1280 (Del. 1994); see also Rodgers v. Bingham, C.A. No.
2017-0314-AGB, at 81 (Del. Ch. June 1, 2017) (TRANSCRIPT).
318 In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 450 (Del. Ch. 2002).
319 Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79, 88 (Del. 1995).
320 See JX 430 at 72–73.
321 See Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 287–88 (Del. 2018), as revised (July 27, 2018) (reversing trial court's dismissal
of disclosure claim after concluding that “stockholders were entitled to know the depth and breadth of the pressure
confronting the Company” given “the Company chose to speak on the topic”).
322 See Trial Tr. at 203–217 (Ainsberg); Id. 409–416 (Hirtler-Garvey); JX 628 at pp.13–15.
323 See In re Rural Metro, 88 A.3d 54, 94 (Del. Ch. 2014) (concluding after a trial that, at the time they approved the
transaction, the [directors] were unaware of RBC's last minute efforts to solicit [a] buy-side financing role from Warburg ...
and did not know about RBC's manipulation of its valuation metrics,” and holding that, “[u]nder the circumstances,
the Board's decision to approve Warburg's bid lacked a reasonable informational basis and fell outside the range of
reasonableness.”); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 2535256, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2011)
(fee award opinion emphasizing that lead counsel “uncovered facts not previously known to the [target] board” that
“empowered the [target] directors to re-evaluate their prior decisions and reliance on [their financial advisor]”).
324 JX 706.
325 JX 513 at pp.3–4.
326 JX 138 at p.4; Trial Tr. at 340–43 (Taube).
327 JX 432.
328 JX 459.
329 See Trial Tr. at 366 (Taube); JX 717 at p.11 (“Proper response forthcoming ... Are we going to have to respond to every
f**ksake on the planet?”).
330 See In re Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58, 77 (Del. Ch. 2007) (issuing an injunction after finding that proxy statement
misrepresented competing bidder's acquisition proposals and failed to disclose CEO's potentially bid-deterring statements
to the market).
331 JX 553 at p.3.
332 Id.
333 JX 100.
334 JX 108 (“I am excited to tell you that Medley has agreed to discuss a process for the sale. I've given your name as a
possible buyer. I am having a discussion this week and will update you as I know more.”); Trial Tr. at 374–75 (Taube).
335 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).
336 In re Topps Co., 926 A.2d at 77 (issuing injunction after finding that proxy statement misrepresented competing bidder's
acquisition proposals).
337 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1096 (Del. 2001) (setting out the elements of an aiding and abetting claim).
338 In re MeadWestvaco S'holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 688 (Del. Ch. 2017) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Hldgs., L.P., 910 A.2d 1020, 1039 (Del. Ch. 2006).
339 Dole, 2015 WL 5052214, at *3.
340 Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97.
341 Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 152–53 (Del. 2016) (ORDER); see RBC Capital Markets LLC v. Jarvis, 129 A.3d
816, 862 (Del. 2015) (affirming imposition of liability on financial advisor who aided and abetted the board's breach of its
duty of care). See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d (1979) (explaining that secondary liability can
attach where the underlying breach “is merely a negligent act” and “applies whether or not the [underlying wrongdoer]
knows his act is tortious”).
342 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1979); see In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig., 2018 WL 5018535, at *47–50
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018); Anderson v. Airco, Inc., 2004 WL 2827887, at *2–3 (Del. Super. Nov. 30, 2004).
343 Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1098.
344 RBC Capital, 129 A.3d at 842 (upholding finding of aiding and abetting where financial advisor inexplicably modified
its precedent transaction analysis); In re Wayport Litig., 76 A.3d 296, 322 n.3 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[A] non-fiduciary aider
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and abettor could face different liability exposure than the defendant fiduciaries if, for example, the non-fiduciary misled
unwitting directors to achieve a desired result.”); Del Monte, 25 A.3d at 836 (holding that investment bank's knowing
silence about its buy-side intentions, its involvement with the successful bidder, and its violation of a no-teaming provision
misled the board); Goodwin v. Live Entm't, Inc., 1999 WL 64265, at *28 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1999) (granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants charged with aiding and abetting a breach of the duty of care but suggesting that such a
claim could proceed if “third-parties, for improper motives of their own, intentionally duped the Live directors into breaching
their duty of care”); see also Mills Acq., 559 A.2d at 1283–84, 1284 n.33 (describing management's knowing silence
about a tip as “a fraud on the Board”). Cf. Singh, 137 A.3d at 152 (“[A]n advisor whose bad-faith actions cause its board
clients to breach their situational fiduciary duties ... is liable for aiding and abetting.”); Technicolor, 663 A.2d at 1170 n.25
(“[T]he manipulation of the disinterested majority by an interested director vitiates the majority's ability to act as a neutral
decision-making body.”).
345 Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 97 (holding that a party is liable for aiding and abetting when it “participates in the breach by
misleading the board or creating the informational vacuum”); see Mesirov v. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc., 2018 WL 4182204,
at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 29, 2018) (sustaining claim for aiding and abetting against financial advisor for preparing misleading
analyses and creating an informational vacuum); In re TIBCO Software Inc. S'holders Litig., 2015 WL 6155894, at *25
(Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2015) (same); In re Nine Sys. Corp. S'holders Litig., 2014 WL 4383127, at *48 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4,
2014) (holding that interested director aided and abetted breach of duty by failing to adequately explain valuation, thereby
misleading the board and creating an informational vacuum), aff'd sub nom. Fuchs v. Wren Hldgs., LLC, 129 A.3d 882
(Del. 2015) (TABLE).
346 Dole, 2015 WL 5052214, at *42.
347 PLX, 2018 WL 5018535, at *49.
348 Id.
349 Because FrontFour failed to brief the claim, it was waived. See In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 62 (Del.
Ch. 2001) (explaining that a party waived its argument by not raising it in its opening post-trial brief); Zaman v. Amadeo
Hldgs., Inc., 2008 WL 2168397, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 23, 2008) (explaining that the party waived a defense by failing to
raise it in its answer and its pre-trial brief because “[t]hey gave no fair notice”).
350 107 A.3d 1049, 1054, 1071–72 (Del. 2014).
351 See In re MONY Gp. Inc. S'holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 32–33 (Del. Ch. 2004) (enjoining a transaction until “necessary
supplemental disclosure” is made and noting that because the remedy “can be accomplished quickly, there is no basis
to believe that an injunction will result in any harm to ... the defendants”); Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Hldgs.,
Inc., 729 A.2d 280, 300 (Del. Ch. 1998) (enjoining a transaction until “corrective disclosures consistent with the matters
discussed herein” were made and disseminated); see also State of Wisc. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL 193115, at *2
(Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2000) (enjoining a transaction to provide time for the stockholders “to assimilate information necessary
to assure that they may cast an informed vote”).
352 The parties have not briefed the issue of class certification and this decision does not resolve it.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
SLIGHTS, Vice Chancellor
*1  This statutory appraisal action arises from a merger
whereby Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. (“Newell”) acquired
Jarden Corporation (“Jarden” or the “Company”) (the
“Merger”) for cash and stock totaling $59.21 per share (the
“Merger Price”). Petitioners, Verition Partners Master Fund
Ltd., Verition Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd., Fir Tree Value
Master Fund, LP and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master
Fund, LP (together “Petitioners”), were Jarden stockholders
on the Merger's effective date and seek a judicial appraisal of
the fair value of their Jarden shares as of that date.
At the close of the trial, I observed, “[w]e are in the
classic case where ... very-well credentialed experts are miles
apart.... There's some explaining that is required here to
understand how it is that two very well-credentialed, I think,
well-intended experts view this company so fundamentally
differently.”1 This observation was prompted by the all-
too-frequently encountered disparity in the experts' opinions
regarding Jarden's fair value. Jarden's expert, Dr. Glenn
Hubbard, applying a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis,
opines that Jarden's fair value as of the Merger was $48.01
per share. Petitioners' expert, Dr. Mark Zmijewski, applying
a comparable companies analysis, contends that Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger was $71.35 per share. To put the
disparity in context, Dr. Zmijewski's valuation implies that the
market mispriced Jarden by over $5 billion.
In a statutory appraisal action, the trial court's function is
to appraise the “fair value” of the dissenting stockholder's
“shares of stock” by “tak[ing] into account all relevant
factors.”2 The statute does not define “fair value” but our
courts understand the term to mean the petitioner's “pro rata
share of the appraised company's value as a going concern.”3
This definition of fair value “is a jurisprudential, rather
than purely economic, construct.”4 Even so, the remarkably
broad “all relevant factors” mandate necessarily leads the
court deep into the weeds of economics and corporate
finance. These are places law-trained judges should not go
without the guidance of experts trained in these disciplines.
In other words, corporate finance is not law. The appraisal
exercise is, at bottom, a fact-finding exercise, and our courts
must appreciate that, by functional imperative, the evidence,
including expert evidence, in one appraisal case will be
different from the evidence presented in any other appraisal
case. Different evidence, of course, can lead to different
decision paths and different outcomes. After all, the appraisal
exercise prescribed by the governing statute contemplates a
trial—a good, old-fashioned trial—where the parties carry
burdens of proof, present their evidence in hopes of meeting
that burden and subject their adversary's evidence to the
“crucible of cross-examination” in keeping with the traditions
of our adversarial process of civil justice.5
*2  Our Supreme Court has had several opportunities
recently to provide direction with regard to certain frames
of reference this court should consider while performing the
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statutory appraisal function.6 I will not recount those holdings
here as they are well known. Suffice it to say, as I approached
my deliberation of the evidence in this case, my “takeaway”
from the Supreme Court's recent direction reduced to this:
“What is necessary in any particular [appraisal] case [ ] is for
the Court of Chancery to explain its [fair value calculus] in
a manner that is grounded in the record before it.”7 That is
what this court endeavors to do after every trial and what I
have endeavored to do here.8
The parties have reveled in the statutory mandate that the
court consider “all relevant factors.” Indeed, they have
joined issue on nearly every possible indicator of fair value
imaginable, including market indicators (unaffected market
price, deal price less synergies, Jarden stock offerings shortly
before the Merger) and traditional valuation methodologies
(comparable companies and DCF analyses).9 The result: an
unfortunately long opinion, made so by a sense that I needed
to traverse every road the parties waived me down right to
the bitter end, even if that road did not lead to the desired fair
value destination. Appraisal litigation can be unwieldy. This
is one of those cases. Apologies in advance to those who read
on.
I begin my fair value analysis where I believe I must—
with the market evidence.10 As explained below, I have
found Jarden's unaffected market price of $48.31 per share
is a reliable indicator of its fair value at the time of the
Merger. This finding is supported by credible, unrebutted
expert testimony from Dr. Hubbard, including an event
study that analyzed the market's response to earnings
and other material announcements. Dr. Hubbard's expert
analysis of the Unaffected Market Price is corroborated by
credible evidence, including that Jarden had no controlling
stockholder, its public float was 93.9%, it was well covered by
numerous professional stock analysts, its stock was heavily
traded and it enjoyed a narrow bid-ask spread. As important,
there was no credible evidence that material information
bearing on Jarden's fair value was withheld from the market
as of the Merger. This market evidence was persuasive
and I have given it substantial weight in my fair value
determination.
*3  As noted, the Merger consideration, or “deal price,”
was $59.21 per share. Respondent proffers this evidence as a
reliable indicator fair value, particularly when synergies are
“backed out” as required by our law.11 Petitioners respond
that the sale process leading to the Merger was highly flawed
because Jarden's lead negotiator was willing to sell Jarden
on the cheap and the Jarden board of directors (the “Board”)
failed to test the market before agreeing to sell the Company
to Newell. After considering the evidence, I agree with
Petitioners that the sale process left much to be desired.
Jarden's lead negotiator acted with little to no oversight by
the Board and, in doing so, got way out in front of the Board
and Jarden's financial advisors in suggesting to Newell a price
range the Board would accept to sell the Company before
negotiations began in earnest. There was no pre-signing or
post-signing market check. Moreover, the contemporaneous
evidence regarding deal synergies was conflicting and the
parties' experts acknowledged that valuing the synergies and
assessing which party took that value in the Merger was
especially difficult in this case. For these reasons, I have
placed little weight on the deal price less synergies beyond
considering that evidence as a “reality check” on my final fair
value determination.
As additional market evidence of Jarden's fair value,
Respondent points to Jarden's decision to finance a sizeable
acquisition just prior to the Merger (in the midst of
negotiations) with an equity offering valued at $49.00 per
share. When the market reacted poorly to the acquisition,
Jarden announced that it would buy back up to $50 million
in Jarden shares at prices up to $49.00 per share as a
signal of confidence to the market. This contemporaneous
evidence of Jarden management's internal valuation of the
Company, performed to facilitate Jarden's acquisition strategy
in furtherance of its standalone operations, is relevant market
evidence of fair value. While far from dispositive, Jarden's
internal efforts to value itself as a going concern for business,
not litigation, purposes provides a useful input.
In keeping with their theme that the market evidence is not
reliable, Petitioners have focused on “traditional valuation
methodologies” to carry their burden of proving Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger. Their valuation expert opines that a
comparable company/market multiples analysis provides the
best evidence of fair value, and that methodology supports
his conclusion that Jarden's fair value at the Merger was
$71.35 per share. The credibility, or not, of this methodology
depends in large measure on the quality of the comparables.
And then the appraiser must select an appropriate multiple.
After considering the evidence, I am satisfied that Petitioners'
comparable companies analysis is not credible because Jarden
had no reliable comparables. Consequently, I give no weight
to the results derived from this valuation approach.
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Not surprisingly, both parties proffered expert evidence
regarding Jarden's fair value based on DCF and, not
surprisingly, the experts' DCF analyses yielded results that
were solar systems apart. After carefully reviewing the
evidence, including the valuation treatises submitted as
evidence in support of the experts' conclusions, I am satisfied
that both experts utilized inputs in their DCF models that
were not justified and that skewed the results.12 Accordingly,
I have utilized the most credible components of both expert's
analyses to conduct my own DCF valuation, in my best
effort to obey our appraisal statute's “command that the Court
of Chancery undertake an ‘independent’ assessment of fair
value” when performing its mandated appraisal function.13
As explained below, my DCF analysis reveals a valuation of
$48.13 per share.
*4  After considering all relevant factors, I have appraised
Jarden's fair value as of the Merger at $48.31 per share.
This value, derived from the unaffected market price, is
consistent with Jarden's DCF value and the less reliable, but
still relevant, deal price less synergies value.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I recite the facts as I find them by a preponderance of the
evidence after a four-day trial beginning in June 2018. That
evidence consisted of testimony from twenty-eight witnesses
(twenty-five fact witnesses, some presented live and some by
deposition, and three live expert witnesses) along with more
than 2,000 exhibits. To the extent I have relied upon evidence
to which an objection was raised but not resolved at trial, I
will explain the bases for my decision to admit the evidence
at the time I first discuss it.
A. Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
Prior to its acquisition by Newell on April 15, 2016 (the
“Merger Date”), Jarden was a consumer products company
that held a diversified portfolio of over 120 quality brands.14
This portfolio included well-known goods like Ball jars,
Coleman sporting goods, Crock-Pot appliances and Yankee
Candle candles.15 Jarden was incorporated in Delaware with
headquarters in Boca Raton, Florida, and corporate offices
in Norwalk, Connecticut and Miami, Florida.16 Prior to the
Merger, Jarden traded on the New York Stock Exchange.17
Following the Merger, the combined company was re-named
Newell Brands, Inc. (“Newell Brands”).18
Petitioners are Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., Verition
Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd., Fir Tree Value Master
Fund, LP and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund,
LP.19 Petitioners acquired their Jarden shares after the
announcement of the Merger and were stockholders as of
the Merger Date. They collectively hold 2,435,971 shares of
Jarden common stock.
B. The Company
Jarden traces its origins to Alltrista Corporation, a company
that was spun off in 1993 from Ball Corporation's canning
business.20 In 2000, Martin Franklin and Ian Ashken acquired
Alltrista after having initiated a stockholder campaign
to unseat Alltrista's board and senior management.21 By
2001, Franklin and Ashken served as Alltrista's Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively,
and renamed the company Jarden.22 In August 2003, James
Lillie joined the Jarden team as Chief Operating Officer.23
Their shared goal was to create the “best consumer products
company in the world.”24
Franklin served as CEO and Chairman of the Board until
2011,25 when Jarden reorganized its management structure.
The Company created the “Office of the Chairman,”
comprising Franklin as Executive Chairman, Ashken as Vice
Chairman and CFO,26 and Lillie as CEO.27 As a result of
this reorganization, Franklin surrendered direct control of
Jarden's day-to-day operations, but remained chiefly in charge
of capital distribution and M&A activity.28 Lillie and Ashken
took over the day-to-day operation of the Company.29 Ashken
also maintained a dominant role in Jarden's financial planning
and acquisitions.30
*5  As a holding company,31 Jarden maintained a unique,
decentralized structure. Its various businesses functioned
autonomously, allowing them to pursue outside opportunities
and synergies.32 The respective business unit heads exercised
full control over the development of their individual
strategic plans.33 Even so, the businesses stayed in constant
communication with Jarden senior management regarding
operations.34
C. Jarden Experiences Strong Growth from 2001–2015
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Jarden pursued a two-pronged growth strategy, focusing on
internal growth and growth via acquisitions.35 In this regard,
management set a goal of 3 to 5% annual internal revenue
growth,36 10 to 15% earnings per share (“EPS”) growth, 3 to
5% organic top-line growth, 7 to 10% EBITDA growth and
20 to 50 basis points of gross margin growth.37 These targets
produced laudable results. From 2010 through 2015, Jarden
saw average organic yearly revenue growth of 4.8%, the top
of its targeted range.38 In fact, Jarden was regarded as “best in
class by any measure in terms of shareholder returns over 15
years, 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 1 year.”39 Jarden's margins
experienced continued expansion and it met or exceeded its
guidance in all but one quarter of its existence.40 By 2015,
Jarden generated over $1.2 billion in segment earnings and
revenues of almost $9 billion.41 This reflected an increase in
revenue of 4.8% year over year in fiscal year 2015.42
Given its impressive results, it is not surprising that Jarden's
stock performed well and traded efficiently. In 2012, Jarden
joined the “S&P 400.”43 By the end of 2015, Jarden's
market capitalization topped $10.2 billion, placing it among
the top 20% of all US publicly traded firms.44 More
than twenty professional financial analysts followed Jarden,
reporting regularly on the Company's business operations and
forecasts.45 In addition to its high average trading volume,
Jarden's “bid-ask spread” was just 0.02% and its public
float was approximately 94% of its outstanding stock.46
Jarden's stock trading price historically responded to the
announcement of value-relevant information as one would
expect in a semi-strong efficient market.47
M&A drove Jarden's growth.48 With Franklin at the helm,
Jarden acquired over 40 companies and brands, its stock grew
over 5,000% and its sales progressed from approximately
$305 million in 2001 to over $8.6 billion in 2015.49 Franklin
and his team were not only well-known “deal-makers” in the
public markets,50 they were among “the best performers in
the sector.”51
*6  Under Franklin's leadership, Jarden management
constructed a well-conceived convention for singling-out
and completing acquisitions.52 Jarden avoided acquisitions
that would insert it in spaces where major pure-play
competitors, like Proctor & Gamble, operated.53 Jarden,
instead, concentrated on acquiring top brands in niche
markets.54 This strategy developed secure trenches that
presented barriers to others who might look to compete with
Jarden's niche product lines.55 It also enabled Jarden globally
to expand its brands.56
D. Jarden Shifts Its Strategic Focus
Jarden's businesses sold their products across a vast spread
of distribution channels, including business-to-business,
direct-to-consumer (“DTC”), e-commerce retailers, and
club, department store, drug, grocery and sporting goods
retailers.57 In 2014, Jarden committed to expanding its DTC
operations by promoting then-Vice President of International
Development, Leo Trautwein, to Vice President of Direct
to Consumer and Revenue Development. Trautwein, along
with Jarden management, developed a DTC Council that
comprised of representatives from Jarden and each of its
individual business units.58 The DTC Council aimed to detect
DTC best practices and put in place DTC initiatives.59 It
set meaningful benchmarks to enhance DTC sales.60 In their
July 2015 Board presentation, Jarden management expected
online sales to represent 13% of Jarden's total sales by 2019,
equating to 15.9% of total EBITDA.61 The DTC initiative,
on the other hand, was expected to yield a 55–60% return
on investment.62 As it turned out, from 2012 through 2016,
Jarden's DTC e-commerce sales (i.e., not including brick and
mortar DTC sales) experienced a more than 270% increase
in five years—expanding from roughly $237 million to $643
million.63
E. Jarden Makes Two Major Acquisitions Just Prior to
the Merger
Jarden completed two of the largest acquisitions in its history
in 2015. In July 2015, Jarden acquired the Waddington
Group, Inc. for approximately $1.35 billion.64 Waddington
manufactures plastic consumables for the $14 billion U.S.
food sector market.65 The acquisition was projected to yield
revenue of $840 million in 2016 with an approximately 20%
EBITDA margin.66
In November 2015, Jarden acquired the parent company of
Jostens, Inc. for $1.5 billion.67 Jostens was a market leader
in manufacturing and marketing yearbooks, rings, caps and
gowns, diplomas, regalia and varsity jackets, mainly selling to
schools, universities and professional sports leagues.68 Jarden
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predicted the Jostens acquisition would not only offer Jarden
“unique access to the difficult-to-enter academic market,”69
but also would allow Jarden to grow a number of its existing
distribution channels and develop new ones, intensifying
Jarden's DTC impact.70 Jostens provided superior market
positions, steady financial performance, strong margins and
attractive cash flow to Jarden's portfolio.71 Indeed, Jostens'
gross margins were anticipated to better Jarden's overall
margins and, in fact, the transaction was instantly accretive.72
*7  Overall, Jarden anticipated that these two acquisitions
would push Jarden's total annual revenues over the $10 billion
threshold. At the same time, however, they simultaneously
would increase Jarden's debt to a point where Jarden would
be unable to make another substantial acquisition for at least
another year.73
F. Franklin Considers a Sale of Jarden
Jarden was not Franklin's only business interest. In 2013,
Franklin founded Platform Specialty Products Corporation
(“Platform”), a specialty chemicals production company, with
financial backing from Bill Ackman.74 In 2014, Franklin
founded Nomad Foods Ltd. (“Nomad”), a frozen foods
company headquartered in the U.K.75 Franklin also ran
a “family investment vehicle” called Mariposa Capital.76
Mariposa entities often acquired orphan brands, like its
acquisition of Royal Oak in 2016.77 In 2017, after the Merger,
Franklin created a special purpose acquisition vehicle, J2
Acquisition Limited (“J2”), that raised more than $1 billion
in order to buy consumer-focused brands.78 Franklin also
looked forward to pursuing business ventures with his sons,
as his father did with him.79
In early July 2015, during a meeting between Franklin
and Roland Phillips of Centerview Partners relating to
Nomad, Phillips mentioned that Newell's CEO, Michael Polk,
wanted to meet Franklin.80 As discussed below, Newell had
previously retained Centerview to assist with Newell's search
for transformative M&A opportunities.81 Understanding that
Polk would likely want to talk about a Newell/Jarden
transaction, Franklin told Phillips he would take the meeting,
he “would gladly take equity, [and he] ha[d] no issue with
someone else running the combined business.”82
Later that month, Franklin met with Bill Ackman, his
Platform partner, and expressed his willingness to sell Jarden
so he could devote more energy to Platform and Nomad.83
Ackman emailed Warren Buffett the following day and
indicated that Franklin would entertain a negotiated sale of
Jarden to Berkshire Hathaway.84
Franklin was not authorized by the Board to entertain
discussions regarding a sale of Jarden nor did he disclose to
the Board his discussions with Phillips or Ackman.85
G. Newell and Franklin Meet
*8  Like Jarden, Newell was a major consumer products
company with a vast portfolio of products sold under brands
like Sharpie, Paper Mate, Elmer's, Rubbermaid, Lenox, Graco
and Baby Jogger.86 In 2011, Newell implemented a strategic
roadmap known as the “Growth Game Plan” under the
direction of its new CEO, Polk.87 This plan incorporated
an initiative known as “Project Renewal” to streamline the
Company's business structure and decrease costs.88
For many years, Newell operated as a traditional holding
company, much as Jarden did, owning several portfolio
businesses that essentially functioned as independent
companies.89 In 2010, Newell retooled by implementing
an integrated operating company model as contemplated by
Project Renewal.90 Newell “delayered the structure of the
company, ... releas[ing] a whole bunch of money” that was
invested back into Newell's brands.91 As a result, Newell
doubled its brand expenditures, creating fast-tracked growth
and amplified margins for its business.92 By the fall of
2014, Newell realized that the “investment firepower” Project
Renewal generated “was going to wane” by late 2018.93 It
needed a new growth plan.
In late 2014, Newell initiated a strategy of pursuing
“transformational M&A” opportunities that would generate
larger scale and market share in its central businesses, in
addition to new prospects for growth.94 This new strategy
prompted Newell to engage Centerview to produce a list
of possible targets for Newell and to arrange “get-to-know-
you meetings” as requested.95 While Jarden was included
on Centerview's list, it was the target “least familiar” to
Newell since it “had been built [steadily] through acquisitions
from 2001 onward” and was, therefore, in Newell's eyes,
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a “relatively new company.”96 Polk had reservations about
Jarden because it was seen as a “company of diversified niche
categories,” when Polk was “looking for scaled brands and
big, global categories.”97 Even so, Polk asked Centerview to
arrange the “get-to-know-you meeting” with Franklin.98 As
noted, Franklin agreed to take the meeting.99
Franklin and Polk's first meeting took place at the Barclays'
investor “Back-to-School” conference on September 9,
2015 (the “Back-to-School Meeting”).100 The conversation
exposed their different perspectives regarding the roles they
played at their respective companies—Franklin defined his
role at Jarden as creating value and “[t]hat's it,” while Polk
defined his role at Newell as building stronger brands and
a stronger company.101 In other words, Franklin focused on
M&A, while Polk concentrated on organic growth.102 Near
the meeting's end, Franklin directed the conversation to where
he believed Polk wanted it to go by confirming that his
team was open to “strategically connecting” with Newell.103
The meeting closed with both Franklin and Polk agreeing to
continue the conversation about a potential deal.104
*9  Polk reported back to the Newell board that Franklin “cut
straight to the chase about being willing to sell his company
and offered a deeper discussion over the next few weeks.”105
At this point, however, Franklin still had not informed
Jarden's Board that he was entertaining Newell's overture.106
Indeed, it was not until several days after the Back-to-School
meeting that Franklin made individual calls to members of the
Board to let them know about his discussions with Polk.107
For his part, Polk warmed quickly to the idea of acquiring
Jarden, believing that Jarden would provide scale and
immediate cost synergies once Newell consolidated Jarden's
operations per Project Renewal.108 As Polk explained, “we
believed we had the potential, based on what we could see
through the public data, to apply the playbook we'd just run on
Newell Rubbermaid to a broader set of categories that looked
very similar to the categories that we were managing as part
of [Newell].”109
On October 5, 2015, Franklin and Polk met again, this time
on Franklin's yacht in Miami, along with Ashken, Lillie and
Mark Tarchetti, Newell's then-Chief Development Officer
(the “Boat Meeting”).110 While Franklin informally provided
some advance notice of the Boat Meeting to certain members
of the Board, he did not obtain Board approval to meet with
Newell and certainly did not have Board approval to discuss
the financial parameters of a deal.111 But that is precisely what
he did.
*10  Franklin advised Newell's team that Newell's offer for
Jarden would have to “start with a six” and would have to
include a significant cash component if Newell's goal was
to gain control of the combined company.112 According to
Franklin, he arrived at this number based, in part, on his
understanding of Jarden's value as determined in connection
with the Jostens acquisition which was underway as of the
Boat Meeting.113 He also wanted to state a number he
believed Newell had the “ability to pay,”114 and he assumed
a price of $70.00 or higher was “laughable.”115 At the time
of the Boat Meeting, Jarden's stock was trading in the high
$40s.116 Therefore, by this metric, a price “starting with
a six,” by any measure, would be a premium for Jarden's
stockholders.117 According to Franklin, even if $60 per share
undervalued Jarden,118 Franklin believed Jarden stockholders
would reap additional value by sharing in the upside of the
Merger with stock in the combined company.119
On the other side of the table, Polk expressed Newell's hope
that a merger would open substantial synergies given the
Newell team's demonstrated ability to consolidate business
functions and utilize the resulting cost savings to produce
growth.120 Jarden's team had a more modest outlook on
possible synergies in the early stages of the discussions, but
became progressively more “excited” by the opportunity to
unlock significant transaction synergies as the negotiations
advanced.121
Although he had not sought Board approval to meet with
Newell, Franklin briefed the Board on the Boat Meeting
within a matter of days, including his admonition to Newell
that an offer would need to “start with a six.”122 The
Board was supportive and encouraged Franklin and his team
to continue the discussions with Newell within Franklin's
outlined parameters.123
Jarden did not formally engage Barclays until November
2015. Even so, Franklin contacted Welsh, his personal
Barclays banker, on October 16, 2015, after the Boat
Meeting.124 Franklin told Welsh he already signaled to
Newell that Jarden would agree to sell at $60 per share and
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instructed him to start developing an analysis supporting a
transaction in the range of $60–$69 per share.125
H. The Ebb and Flow of the Negotiations
*11  On October 9, 2015, Newell distributed a press release
revealing that Tarchetti and another executive would leave
Newell at the end of the year.126 Franklin was “very upset”
Polk had not informed him that “his chief lieutenant” was on
his way out of Newell.127 Franklin was so upset, in fact, that
he entertained the idea of “stopping the conversations at that
point” because he “didn't want to look stupid in front of [the
Jarden] board ... [by] having a conversation with someone
that wasn't serious.”128 Within days of the announcement,
Franklin and Polk had a “tough conversation” where Polk
explained that Tarchetti would stay with Newell if the parties
agreed to a deal.129 After this, Franklin “got over it” and
negotiations continued.130
As the parties were discussing a Jarden/Newell combination,
Jarden was closing the Jostens deal. On October 14, 2015,
Jarden announced it would acquire Jostens and finance
the acquisition through an equity offering priced at $49.00
per share and additional debt.131 The next day, Jarden
presented five-year projections to potential financing sources
that reflected net sales growth of 3.1% (the “Lender
Presentation”).132
The market reacted negatively to the Jostens acquisition.133
Jarden's stock price dropped approximately 12% over the
following two weeks and analysts' reduced their Jarden price
targets accordingly.134 The Board determined that Jarden
needed to project confidence to the market. Accordingly, in
early November 2015, it approved a stock buy-back up to
$50 million at prices capped at $49.00 per share.135 Jarden
ultimately repurchased 276,417 shares on November 2, 2015,
at an average price of $45.96 per share, and repurchased an
additional 775,685 shares on November 3, 2015, at an average
price of $48.05 per share.136
On October 15, 2015, Franklin caused Jarden to enter into a
mutual confidentiality and standstill agreement with Newell,
and the parties began preliminary due diligence.137 True to
form, Franklin did not seek Board authorization to begin
diligence on Jarden's behalf.138 The next day, also without the
Board's authorization, Franklin and Polk spoke on the phone
to continue negotiations on the cash and stock components of
a deal, and Franklin introduced the concept of Jarden taking
seats on the combined company's board.139
On October 22, 2015, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie met
with Newell representatives at Jarden's offices in Norwalk,
Connecticut (the “Norwalk Meeting”) and shared non-
public information, including a set of three-year financial
projections.140 The three-year projections, apparently created
in connection with the negotiations, incorporated financials
for both the Waddington and Jostens acquisitions,141 and
forecast 5% revenue growth, i.e., growth at the high end of
Jarden's historic guidance range of 3% to 5%.142
*12  Entering into negotiations with Newell, Jarden had set
the market standard for average annual revenue growth within
the 3% to 5% range.143 These growth figures were meant
to reflect Jarden's “organic growth” range, but they included
revenue from “tuck-in” acquisitions, where a Jarden portfolio
company would acquire a target.144 Other public companies
operating as holding companies typically do not include
tuck-in acquisitions when projecting “organic growth.”145
Nevertheless, even when tuck-in acquisitions are excluded,
Jarden generally performed in line with its target growth
range.146
At trial, Lillie justified giving Newell projections at the
very top of the Company's 3%–5% guidance range by
explaining that 5% was a “round number[ ].”147 He went on
to explain that, while the projections given to Newell were not
“wildly optimistic,” Jarden internally projected growth “in
the fours.”148 Polk took notice of Jarden's “really aggressive”
projections.149 He and his team determined that it was best to
stick with the 3.1% growth projections as stated in the Lender
Presentation when evaluating the transaction.150
In November 2015, Jarden's financial advisor, Barclays,
asked Jarden management for projections extended to
2020.151 In response, Lillie told Barclays to “extrapolate out”
the three-year forecast at a continuing growth rate of 5% (the
“November Projections”).152 Barclays used these five-year
projections in its analyses of the potential transaction and in
its fairness opinion.153
In addition to negotiating price terms during the Norwalk
Meeting, Newell and Franklin began to discuss specifics
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regarding change-in-control payments that would be due to
Franklin, Ashken and Lillie in the event of a merger.154
And, again, Franklin did not seek Board approval before
undertaking these discussions.155
Following the Norwalk Meeting, Franklin, Ashken, Lillie
and John Welsh of Barclays on behalf of Jarden,
and Polk and Tarchetti on behalf of Newell, met for
dinner.156 Franklin believed whether the transaction would
be consummated depended on whether Tarchetti stayed at
Newell.157 Accordingly, he asked Tarchetti to share his
thoughts on the potential transaction.158 Tarchetti declined to
respond, explaining he believed Newell still lacked adequate
information to evaluate the transaction.159 Franklin was not
happy.
*13  After this “difficult dinner” among the negotiators,
Franklin told Ashken and Lillie, “I'm done. I don't want to deal
with this.”160 Likewise, Polk said he thought about “pull[ing]
the plug” on the negotiations.161 After a “conciliatory” call
between Lillie and Tarchetti, however, the parties decided not
to “let a bad dinner get in the way of looking at whether this
makes sense[,]” and negotiations continued.162
The Board held its first formal meeting to discuss a potential
Newell transaction on October 28, 2015.163 There was no
discussion of a pre-signing market check.164 Instead, the
Board focused its attention on Newell and directed that
negotiations continue.165
In the meantime, Newell retained both Goldman Sachs
(“Goldman”) and Bain & Company (“Bain”) as additional
financial advisors to assist in evaluating a possible acquisition
of Jarden.166 Tasked with performing a thorough evaluation
of Jarden's product categories, Bain's initial assessment
was that Jarden's portfolio demonstrated strong performance
across many promising product segments,167 but its historic
organic growth rate, once “tuck-in” acquisitions were
separated, was at most 3.5%.168 Early in the process,
Centerview had projected that potential synergies of $500
million to $900 million would result from a combination with
Jarden.169 By the end of October 2015, Bain was estimating
that the combination had the “potential to create $700M–
$800M in cost synergies.”170 Bain's assessment encompassed
“annualized savings” that would recur annually.171
Through due diligence, Newell discovered “almost every deal
Jarden had done, which were profound in number, had been
left standalone with almost no cost synergies or revenue
synergies realized.”172 As a result of this holding company
structure, Newell and its advisors believed that Jarden
presented a substantial opportunity to replicate Newell's
Project Renewal success by combining Jarden's businesses
into Newell's operating company structure.173
I. Newell Makes an Offer and Jarden Negotiates
*14  On November 10–11, 2015, the Newell board met
to discuss, among other things, whether to make an offer
to acquire Jarden.174 On the first day, Tarchetti presented
the results of the diligence efforts so far, in addition to
management's perspective on the benefits of a merger with
Jarden.175 On the second day, Bain and Goldman presented
their analysis of potential synergies.176 Bain opined that
the potential Newell/Jarden “combination would enable ~
$600M in cost savings opportunities, with potential upside
to ~$700M.”177 Goldman appraised cost synergies based
on comparable transactions ranging from 2.1% to 14.0%
of revenue, with a median of 10.0%, translating to roughly
$850 million of annual cost synergies resulting from the
acquisition.178
Despite Bain and Goldman's synergies estimates, Newell
and its advisors structured their deal model on an estimate
of $500 million in annual cost synergies.179 With this
estimate, Newell's model priced Jarden at $57.00 to $61.00
per share.180 Within these parameters, the Newell board
understood that if its management team did not realize the
$500 million synergies estimate, then Newell shareholders
would not receive any increase in EPS.181 After the advisors'
presentations, the Newell board authorized management to
negotiate an acquisition of Jarden at a price between $57.00
and $60.00 per share, with cash consideration up to $21.00
per share.182
On November 12, 2015, Polk sent Franklin an offer whereby
Newell would acquire Jarden in a cash-and-stock transaction
consisting of $20.00 cash plus a fixed exchange ratio of
0.823 Newell shares for each share of Jarden common stock,
representing total per share consideration of $57.00.183 The
offer reflected an 18% premium over Jarden's then-current
share price ($48.19) and a 19% premium to Jarden's 30-
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day volume-weighted average share price ($47.89). Newell
arrived at the cash and stock mix to preserve Newell's
investment grade credit rating and dividend policy.184 Polk's
offer letter made clear that Newell “expect[ed] that Mr.
Franklin would join the Newell Brands Board of Directors
given the role he has played in Jarden's performance and
strategy to date,” and allowed that Newell was “open to
adjusting the size of our board and taking on a limited number
of [additional] members from Jarden's board.”185
The Board met that day to discuss Newell's offer.186 Barclays
made a presentation regarding the adequacy of Newell's
$57.00 offer in which it provided a preliminary valuation
of Jarden based on Jarden's historic market price as well
as comparable companies, precedent transactions and DCF
analyses.187
While the $57.00 per share offer was higher than Jarden's
stock had ever traded, the Board unanimously decided “it was
not inclined to engage in discussions and possible negotiation
with [Newell] on the economic terms set forth in the [offer]
[l]etter,” and authorized management to “seek to obtain a
revised proposal with more favorable proposed terms.”188
The Board “emphasized that the Company was not for sale
and that it would consider a potential business combination
with [Newell] only on terms that appropriately valued
the relative contribution (including revenue and EBITDA)
of each standalone company to the pro forma combined
company.”189
*15  The Board authorized Franklin to continue negotiations
with Newell, but did not authorize him to make a counteroffer
because, as director Robert Wood testified, doing so would
“tie their hands.”190 Franklin, however, recalled, “the board
basically authorized [him] to go back and have further
discussions and ... push the envelope to try to come back to
them with an enhanced offer from Newell.”191
During the November 12 Board meeting, Franklin suggested
that the Board formally engage Barclays as the lead banker
for the Company and UBS Group AG as “co-investment
banker.”192 Jarden thought a transaction of this magnitude
justified having two banks on board to guide the Company
through the process.193 Barclays, in particular, had a
longstanding, fruitful relationship with Franklin and it knew
Jarden well.194 Accordingly, Franklin believed Barclays was
positioned to provide Jarden with “genuine good advice” on
the potential merger.195 And he believed UBS would serve
as a well-informed source for “second opinions.”196 The
retention of UBS, however, did cause Jarden director Ros
L'Esperance to recuse herself from all deliberations and votes
of the Board, as she led UBS's Client Corporate Solutions
Group.197
*16  On November 16, 2015, Jarden and Newell, along with
their financial advisors, met to continue negotiations over
the potential transaction.198 In advance of the meeting with
Newell, the Jarden management team scheduled an evening
Board dinner anticipating there would be new developments
in the negotiations that would require the Board's prompt
attention.199 In yet another demonstration of Franklin getting
ahead of his Board, Franklin announced to the Newell team
at the outset of the meeting that their $57.00 offer was too
low and then made a counteroffer of $63.00 per share—
$21.00 in cash with the balance in stock of the combined
company.200 The Newell team balked. Not only did they
decline the counteroffer on the spot, they also refused to raise
their $57.00 offer.201 Discussions turned “acrimonious” and
the meeting abruptly adjourned.202
After the meeting, Ashken emailed the Board to advise that
the parties were at impasse and there was no need for the
scheduled Board dinner.203 According to Ashken, “[a]s far as
we were concerned the deal was dead.”204
J. Newell Increases Its Offer
On November 21, 2015, Newell submitted a revised offer to
acquire Jarden for $21.00 in cash plus a floating exchange
ratio between 0.85 to 0.92 Newell shares for each Jarden
share to be determined based on Newell's trailing 10-day
unaffected volume weighted average price (“VWAP”) at the
time of signing, with a target price of $60.00 per share.205
This revised proposal was a 30% premium over Jarden's then-
current stock price ($46.33) and a 27% premium over Jarden's
30-day VWAP ($47.43). Newell reiterated that it expected
the potential merger to produce annual cost synergies of
approximately $500 million.206 It also renewed its offer for
Franklin, Ashken, Lillie and a new independent director to
join the board of the combined company.207
The Board convened the following day to discuss the $60.00
per share offer. After discussions with its financial advisers,
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the Board determined that the offer would be accepted and
that Newell would be granted exclusivity during a period of
confirmatory due diligence.208 Outside director Robert Wood
testified that the Board viewed the revised offer “much more
favorably,”209 and explained that while the Board thought
Jarden's forecast of 5% growth over the next three years
was achievable, “the [B]oard's level of concern [regarding
future growth] was higher” following recent acquisitions.210
Specifically, the Board had come to appreciate that Jarden
could not sustain historic growth without pursuing “bigger
and bigger acquisitions,” a strategy the Company had found
was increasingly difficult to execute.211 As a result, Wood
and the other directors believed the $60.00 offer provided
more value for shareholders than Jarden could deliver as a
standalone company.212
*17  Franklin believed the $60.00 offer represented a 13.5x
EBITDA multiple, “a high multiple, by any standard, for our
business ... [and] the highest multiple, by far, our company
would have ever traded or been valued.”213 By way of
comparison, just a few weeks before Newell delivered its
revised offer, Jarden had acquired Jostens for $1.5 billion,
representing a 7.5x EBITDA multiple.214 The Board also
concluded that Jarden stockholders stood to benefit from any
synergies on top of the $500 million estimate baked into
the purchase price, by remaining invested in the combined
company following the Merger.215
As noted, the Board agreed to mutual exclusivity.216 This,
of course, disabled any market check prior to consummation
of the Merger.217 The Board thought “Newell was the
best and most likely acquirer of our business” and there
were no other “companies that had the same fit in terms
of synergies and ability to pay as Newell.”218 From the
Board's perspective, Jarden was a “very diverse business”
operating in siloed industries that were not of interest to
other large consumer product companies.219 Accordingly,
the Board and management understood that Jarden would
likely continue standalone unless a unique opportunity for a
business combination came along.220 Newell provided that
opportunity.
K. Jarden and Newell Finalize Deal Documents
Over November 29 and 30, 2015, Jarden and Newell
convened at Jarden's Norwalk, Connecticut offices, where
the Newell team continued its diligence and presented its
strategic plan for the combined company.221 Both Newell
and Jarden knew from the outset that a deal could only be
done if a substantial portion of the consideration was Newell
stock.222 Because Newell understood this and appreciated
the magnitude and significance of Jarden's assets to the
combined company, Newell committed that certain Jarden
directors would be offered a seat on the Newell board post-
closing.223 Newell specifically wanted Franklin to sit on the
combined board to provide a positive signal to the market of
his confidence in the future of the combined company.224
*18  The parties understood that Newell's management team
would lead the combined company since capturing synergies
through the implementation of Project Renewal was the
“logic for the deal.”225 Franklin, Ashken and Lillie each were
subject to two-year non-competition covenants in event they
were terminated following a change of control.226 Newell
wanted to draw out these non-competition covenants to
four years.227 It also wanted to have access to Franklin,
Ashken and Lillie as consultants post-closing if needed.228
Accordingly, Newell, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie negotiated
an “Advisory Services Agreement” that extended their non-
competes but also provided for Mariposa (on behalf of the
three executives) to be paid an annual consulting fee of $4
million for three years ($12 million in total).229 The Advisory
Services Agreement provided that Mariposa “shall, upon the
request of [Newell], devote up to an average of 120 hours
per fiscal quarter” to Newell, and that Franklin and Ashken
waived “any and all fees and compensation” they would have
ordinarily received as directors of Newell during the term of
the agreement.230
L. The Leak
On December 7, 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported
that Newell and Jarden were discussing a potential business
combination, though the article did not reveal the specifics
of who would be buying whom or the transaction
consideration.231 In reaction to this news, Newell's shares
traded up 7.4%, closing at $48.16 and Jarden's shares traded
up 3.7%, closing at $50.09.232
Following the leak, and resulting impact on the companies'
stock prices, the parties agreed that it no longer made sense
to calculate the final exchange ratio based upon the 10-day
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trailing VWAP as of the day of signing.233 Ashken contacted
Tarchetti to re-negotiate and the parties ultimately settled on a
fixed ratio of 0.862,234 resulting in total merger consideration
at that time of $60.03 based upon Newell's closing stock price
on December 11, 2015.235
The 10-day trailing VWAP through the last unaffected day
prior to the leak, was $44.60.236 If Jarden held firm to the
original agreement, on top of the $21.00 in cash, Jarden
stockholders would have received 0.874 shares of Newell
stock for every share of Jarden stock they owned.237 In other
words, Jarden stockholders would have received $120 million
more in consideration if not for the renegotiation.
M. Jarden and Newell Stockholders Approve the
Merger
*19  On December 10, 2015, the Board met to discuss the
status of negotiations and to assess whether the transaction
continued to make sense. Lillie opened the meeting
by presenting the 2015 estimated financial results that
demonstrated 4.4% growth in organic net sales over 2014.238
Barclays also presented a summary of the transaction's
proposed terms and an analysis of Jarden's standalone
value.239 The meeting minutes emphasize that “the Company
has not been and is not currently for sale and that remaining
independent (as a standalone entity) is the sole alternative
to the proposed business combination with Newell, which
offers unique revenue and cost synergies and long-term value
accretion opportunities for the Company's stockholders.”240
Jarden's negotiating team had been discussing change of
control payments with Newell for several weeks but raised
the subject with the Board for the first time at the December
10 meeting.241 Ashken recommended to the Board that he,
Franklin and Lillie receive their 2017 and 2018 Restricted
Stock Awards (“RSAs”) should the transaction with Newell
be approved.242 The RSAs would not have been due under
the existing employment agreements but Franklin's team
instructed Barclays to include the RSAs in the shares
outstanding calculation used for its valuation analyses of
the transaction and they had already presented that share
calculation to Newell.243 John Capps, Jarden's General
Counsel, advised the Board that Jarden was legally obligated
to grant the RSAs even though the agreements themselves
were, at best, ambiguous on the point.244 Ultimately, the
Board's Compensation Committee recommended that the
Board award the 2017 and 2018 RSAs.245
The Board met next on December 13, 2015. Barclays
presented the revised proposed deal terms and its revised
valuation of Jarden as a standalone company.246 Barclays
also orally presented its opinion that the proposed merger
was fair from a financial point of view to Jarden and its
stockholders.247 After hearing from Barclays and reviewing
the final deal terms, the Board approved the Merger.248
The Board also approved the separation agreements and
amendments to the employment agreements with Franklin,
Ashken and Lillie.249 The final Merger Agreement provided
that Jarden stockholders would receive 0.862 shares of
Newell stock plus $21.00 in cash for each Jarden share,
representing a value as of signing of $60.03.250
*20  The Newell board also met on December 13 to consider
the final transaction terms and to receive Goldman and
Centerview's final presentations.251 In their analyses, both
Goldman and Centerview used five-year projections for
Jarden, assuming 3.1% revenue growth during FY18–20,
consistent with the Lender Presentation and below the 5%
revenue growth forecast in the November Projections.252
Goldman maintained its estimate of $500 million in annual
cost synergies.253 Centerview estimated $500–$700 million
in synergies.254 After the presentations by its advisors,
the Newell board approved the terms of the final Merger
Agreement and the parties announced the Merger.255
N. The Market Reacts
The Merger announcement, released on December 14, 2015,
stated “[Newell] anticipates incremental annualized cost
synergies of approximately $500 million over four years.”256
In response to the announcement, Jarden's stock price closed
at $54.09, roughly 12% above the unaffected trading price
of $48.31 from December 4, 2015.257 The delta between
Jarden's stock price and the implied Merger Price (i.e.,
the merger arbitrage spread) slowly narrowed following the
announcement and ultimately converged in the days leading
up to the closing.258
Newell's stock price rose 7.4% on December 7, 2015,
when financial media outlets first reported the parties were
negotiating.259 When the final terms of the transaction were
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made public on December 14, 2015, however, Newell's
stock price declined by 6.9% to $42.15.260 After accounting
for market fluctuations, Newell's stock price after the
announcement of the Merger terms reflected, at best, a neutral
market response.261
On February 26, 2016, Jarden reported its 2015 year-end
results, including a considerable loss in operating income and
net income as compared to the prior two years.262 A few days
later, on February 29, 2016, Lillie shared weak results for the
first quarter of 2016 with the Board.263 Lillie also shared the
final 2016 budget, which was adjusted downward to reflect
year-end revenue of $9.79 billion (as compared to the $10.15
billion in the November Projections).264
*21  During March and April 2016, before the Merger
closed, Jarden management prepared updated multi-year
projections for the period 2016 to 2020 (the “April
Projections”).265 The original version of the April Projections
reflected a “bottoms up build” from the business units and
forecast a 4.4% compound annual revenue growth rate.266
This was well below the 5.0% forecast in the November
Projections.267
Jarden and Newell stockholders voted to approve the Merger
on April 15, 2016.268 As of the closing, the mix of cash and
Newell shares valued Jarden at $59.21 per share.269
O. Post-Closing
By January 2016, Bain shortened the time Newell would
realize $500 million in recurring annual cost synergies from
four years to three.270 By May 2016, Bain raised its projection
of potential cost savings to a range of $900 million to $1
billion.271 In February 2017, Newell announced it would
meet the initial estimate of $500 million in annual cost
synergies by Q3 2018, and doubled the size of its total
cost synergy target from $500 million to $1 billion, to be
reached by 2021.272 Newell also announced its intention to
divest several businesses—both historical Jarden and Newell
—and to exit certain product lines.273 In early 2018, Newell
announced it would sell businesses accounting for almost
50% of its customer base and approximately one-third of its
revenue.274
The Jarden/Newell integration did not go smoothly.275
Newell Brands (the combined company) faced an uphill
battle with the divestitures of highly-profitable and valuable
businesses.276 In early 2018, Franklin resigned from the
Newell Brands board in spectacular fashion, publicly
proclaiming that Polk was “ruining the company” and calling
for Polk's ouster.277 Ashken, L'Esperance and long-time
Newell director, Dominico De Sole, left the Newell Brands
board soon after.278
*22  After leaving, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie united with
Starboard Value LP, an activist hedge fund, to advance a
slate of directors to challenge the Newell Brands board.279
Carl Icahn entered the mix and ultimately was successful
in placing his slate of five directors on the Newell Brands
board, thereby effectively ending the Franklin/Starboard-led
challenge.280 In the fallout of the proxy contest, Tarchetti,
President of Newell Brands, resigned.281
P. Procedural Posture
Between June 14, 2016 and August 12, 2016, four petitions
for appraisal were filed in connection with the Merger.282
By order of the Court dated October 3, 2016, the four
appraisal actions were consolidated.283 On July 5, 2017,
Merion Capital LP, Merion Capital II LP and Merion
Capital ERISA LP were dismissed from the consolidated
action after reaching settlement agreements with Jarden.284
On July 7, 2017, Dunham Monthly Distribution Fund,
WCM Alternatives: Event-Driven Fund, Westchester Merger
Arbitrage Strategy sleeve of the JNL Multi-Manager
Alternative Fund, JNL/Westchester Capital Even Driven
Fund, WCM Master Trust, The Merger Fund, The Merger
Fund VL and SCA JP Morgan Westchester were also
dismissed, again after reaching settlement agreements with
Jarden.285
The Court held a four-day trial in June 2018. Three experts
testified. For Petitioners, Dr. Mark Zmijewski evaluated the
standalone value of Jarden on the Merger Date by conducting
a market multiples analysis and a DCF analysis, ultimately
relying on his multiples (comparable company) analysis for
his fair value conclusion. He opined that Jarden's fair value on
the Merger Date was $71.35 per share. Dr. Zmijewski holds
the Charles T. Horngren Professorship at the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business.
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For Respondent, Dr. Glenn Hubbard evaluated the standalone
value of Jarden on the Merger Date by analyzing market
evidence, including Jarden's unaffected market price and
the Merger Price less synergies, and traditional valuation
methodologies, including comparable companies and DCF.
Based on his DCF analysis, which he correlated to the market
evidence, Dr. Hubbard opined that Jarden's fair value on the
Merger Date was $48.01 per share. Dr. Hubbard holds the
Russell L. Carson Professorship in Finance and Economics
in the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University,
where he is also the Dean.286
Respondent also presented the testimony of Dr. Marc Zenner,
a retired investment banker. Dr. Zenner testified that the
projected synergies estimates reported in the joint proxy
statement issued by Jarden and Newell in connection with
the Merger were conservative and that the synergies were
taken by Jarden stockholders. He also opined that the Board's
decision not to hold an auction for Jarden was reasonable
because Jarden's size and diverse product portfolio made it
unlikely that a merger partner more suitable than Newell
would have emerged.
*23  Following post-trial briefing and argument, the Court
wrote to the parties, as previewed at the conclusion of post-
trial oral argument, to advise that it would postpone the
issuance of its post-trial opinion in this case until our Supreme
Court issued its decision in Aruba.287 The parties submitted
brief (and unsolicited) letters regarding Aruba on April 30
and May 1, 2019, at which time the matter was submitted for
decision.
II. ANALYSIS
Delaware's appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262(h) provides, in
part:
Through [the appraisal] proceeding, the Court shall
determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.288
“Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of ‘fair value’
at the time of a transaction ... [and] vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
‘all relevant factors’ and determine the going concern value
of the underlying company.”289 “By instructing the court to
‘take into account all relevant factors’ in determining fair
value, the statute requires the Court of Chancery to give
fair consideration to ‘proof of value by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’ ”290
Since “ ‘[e]very company is different; [and] every merger
is different,’ the appraisal endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible
process.’ ”291
I have carefully considered all relevant factors. I have
weighed those factors according to the credible evidence
in the record and applied “accepted financial principles” as
derived from that evidence.292 To follow is my independent
evaluation of Jarden's fair value as informed by my findings
of fact.
A. Merger Price Less Synergies
Respondent has proffered the Merger Price less synergies
as a reliable indicator of fair value, and for good reason.
Our Supreme Court has stated, “a buyer in possession of
material nonpublic information about the seller is in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal
price, and that view of value should be given considerable
weight by the Court of Chancery absent deficiencies in
the deal process.”293 This court has heeded the Supreme
Court's guidance and regularly rests its appraisal analysis
on the premise that when a transaction price represents
an unhindered, informed and competitive market valuation,
that price “is at least first among equals of valuation
methodologies in deciding fair value.”294
In PetSmart, I observed, “[a]fter years of striving for it, Vince
Lombardi finally arrived at the understanding that perfection
in human endeavors is not attainable.”295 “Even in the best
case, a process to facilitate the sale of a company, constructed
as it must be by the humans who manage the company and
their human advisors, will not be perfect.”296 With that said,
I am mindful of our Supreme Court's guidance in Dell, where
the Court observed that certain factors, including “fair play,
low barriers to entry, [and] outreach to all logical buyers,”
are reflective of the kind of “robust sale process” that will
discover a company's fair value.297
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*24  The “sale process” for Jarden, if one can call it that,
raises concerns. To be sure, there was no need for a full-blown
auction of Jarden. In this regard, Dr. Zenner's testimony,
corroborated by other evidence, was credible.298 Moreover,
there were signs of arms-length, provocative negotiating
between Jarden and Newell.299 This is not surprising given
that Jarden's negotiators owned millions of Jarden's shares
and had every incentive to negotiate a good deal.300 But the
evidence revealed a troubling theme. Franklin immediately
took charge and, consistent with a stereotypical “cut to the
chase” CEO mentality,301 he laid Jarden's cards on the table
before the negotiations began in earnest and before the Board
and its financial advisors had a chance to formulate a plan.
Petitioners are right to complain that Franklin's approach may
well have set an artificial ceiling on what Newell was willing
to pay.
Franklin did not inform the Board he was meeting with
Polk at the Back-to-School Meeting or the Boat Meeting,
and he certainly did not receive authority from the Board
to suggest a price (“beginning with a 6”) at which the
Board might agree to sell the Company.302 Franklin made
counteroffers unauthorized by the Board.303 He negotiated
his change-in-control compensation with no authorization
from (or knowledge of) the Board.304 And he recommended
Barclays as the lead financial advisor for the deal without fully
disclosing his prior substantial relationship with the bank, just
as he nudged the Board to hire UBS as a second banker as a
“kiss” in gratitude for its prior uncompensated work for the
Company.305
*25  As factfinder, these flaws in the sale process, coupled
with the fact that there was no effort to test the Merger
Price through any post-signing market check, raise legitimate
questions regarding the usefulness of the Merger Price as an
indicator of fair value.306 As explained below, the difficulty
in assessing the extent to which Newell ceded synergies to
Jarden in the Merger makes the Merger Price less synergies
an even less reliable indicator of fair value.
In Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software Inc., the court
set forth a useful framework to approach the appraisal
statute's mandate that the court appraise “the fair value
of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation.”307 BMC recommends a “two-step
analysis[:]” “first, were synergies realized from the deal; and
if so, were they captured by the sellers in the deal price?”308
There is no dispute here that synergies were realized in the
Merger, as one would expect when two strategic partners
combine.309 Indeed, the synergies created the “logic for the
deal” from Newell's perspective.310 The first announcement
of the Merger stated, “[Newell] anticipates incremental
annualized cost synergies of approximately $500 million over
four years.”311 This remained the case through the release of
the joint proxy statement.312 Internally, Newell believed the
$500 million estimate was conservative.313 Nevertheless, the
experts have focused on the expected synergies as disclosed
in the joint proxy statement ($500 million), and they have
assumed that estimate is accurate.314 In the absence of any
real expert analysis of the issue, I have no basis in the evidence
to depart from that assumption.
As for whether Jarden captured the synergies in the Merger,
the evidence is less clear. There is evidence in the trial record
that would suggest Newell believed it was not paying any
of the synergies at the $59.21 per share Merger Price.315
During negotiations, Polk told his board that if Newell could
“get the deal done between $60 and $65 [per share], we
are basically getting the synergies with no value ascribed to
them.”316 After the Merger, Polk further suggested that the
premium over market price that Newell paid in the Merger
was not for synergies but instead was for control of the
combined company.317 Polk explained, “Jarden shareholders
get a premium versus their current stock price for [Jarden].
The Newell shareholders get ownership of [Jarden], and
after the synergies are delivered, the future value creation
that comes through the new combination.”318 Even Franklin
questioned whether the premium to market price that Newell
paid was for control of the combined entity.319
*26  On the other hand, Jarden points out that there is
evidence Newell was keenly aware of synergies and that
it was incorporating synergies into its value thesis for the
Merger.320 Dr. Hubbard supported Jarden's view of the
evidence that Jarden stockholders realized the value of the
synergies by conducting two separate analyses. First, he
performed a “discounted value of cash flows” analysis, in
which the expected future cash flows from the synergies
(net of the costs to achieve them) were discounted to their
value as of the Merger Date, to conclude that the synergies
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had a value of $4.2 billion, or $17.43 per Jarden share.
This happens to line up nicely with the delta between
the unaffected market price ($48.31) and the Merger Price
($59.21), indicating that the delta, or premium, represented
expected synergies.321 He then prepared a market-based
analysis of the expected synergy value in which he observed
that the rise in stock price of both companies after the leak
of merger negotiations revealed that the market appreciated
the presence of significant synergies. The fact that Newell's
stock price fell when Jarden's rose after announcement of the
Merger indicates the market appreciated that the anticipated
synergies would accrue to the Jarden stockholders.322
Jarden bears the burden of demonstrating “what, if any,
portion of [the synergies] value was included in the price-per-
share ....”323 The evidence on this point stands in equipoise.
It is difficult to square Polk's contemporaneous assessment
of where the synergies would land with Newell's internal
valuation exercises and Dr. Hubbard's straightforward
analysis of the issue. Given the state of the evidence, I give
little weight to the Merger Price less synergies evidence
when assessing fair value.324 Not because I believe the
Merger created no synergies. And not because I believe that
Jarden stockholders probably did not receive the value of the
synergies that were created by the deal. I place less weight on
this market-based valuation approach in this case because the
sales process was not well-conceived or well-executed and
the expert analysis of the transaction synergies raised more
questions than it answered.
B. Unaffected Market Price
Jarden has proffered its unaffected stock trading price, $48.31
per share (the “Unaffected Market Price”), as strong evidence
of the Company's fair value.325 According to Jarden, “[t]his
value impounded the collective judgments of thousands of
stockholders, as well as the more than twenty professional
analysts that followed Jarden.”326 Jarden supports its position
that the Unaffected Market Price is indicative of fair value
with detailed analysis from Dr. Hubbard.327 Petitioners
elected not to counter that evidence with expert evidence of
their own.328 Instead, they attacked Dr. Hubbard's opinion
as lacking in doctrinal and factual foundation. For reasons
explained below, I find Dr. Hubbard's analysis of the
reliability of Jarden's Unaffected Market Price as an indicator
of fair value both credible and persuasive.
1. The Market for Jarden's Stock Was Efficient
*27  In an efficient stock market, “a company's market price
quickly reflects publicly available information.”329 In this
environment, the company's trading price “balances investors'
willingness to buy and sell the shares in light of [available]
information, and thus represents their consensus view as to
the value of the equity in the company.”330 Efficient markets
aggregate all available information and quickly digest new
information, which is then reflected by proportionate changes
in market price.331 When the market is efficient, the trading
price of a company's stock can be a proxy for fair value.332
As Dr. Hubbard explained, several factors support the
conclusion that Jarden's stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market.333 The stock was traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) and Jarden became a member of the
S&P 400 index in 2012.334 In 2015, Jarden's shares traded
with a daily and weekly average trading volume in the top
25% of the S&P 500.335 High trading volume contributes to
the efficiency of the market.336 Jarden's market capitalization
of approximately $10.2 billion placed it in the top 20% of
all publicly traded firms.337 High market capitalization leads
to greater “interest in the security being analyzed,” which, in
turn, “increases the likelihood that new information will be
quickly incorporated into the stock price.”338
Jarden had no controlling shareholder.339 In fact, Jarden
had a 94% public float.340 A high public float is another
factor indicating an efficient market for Jarden's stock
because the more holders of a security that are not insiders
with access to non-public information, the more likely
the market will demand that information be released for
public consumption.341 Jarden stock exhibited a “bid-ask
spread” of only 0.02%.342 A narrow bid-ask spread indicates
minimal information asymmetry between insiders and the
public markets and, as a result, higher market efficiency.343
Approximately twenty professional market analysts covered
and disseminated reports on Jarden in the year prior to
the Merger Date.344 Jarden exhibited no serial correlation,
meaning there were no patterns detached from events or news
from the Company that would enable the market to divine
future price movements based purely on past performance.345
Additionally, Jarden's Unaffected Market Price aligned with
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options market pricing, suggesting there were no arbitrage
opportunities for Jarden stock.346
*28  Dr. Hubbard summarized the factors allowing him to
conclude that Jarden's stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market in a helpful chart:
For context, and to illustrate that Jarden's stock price
historically reacted appropriately to material information, Dr.
Hubbard performed an event study to trace how, in the two
years prior to the Merger, Jarden's stock price responded
quickly and appropriately to earnings announcements and
other performance guidance, even when the news was
unanticipated.347 In each instance, Dr. Hubbard traced the
public disclosure of material information, the reaction of
analysts to the information and the commensurate adjustment,
up or down depending upon whether the news was positive or
negative, in the trading price of the stock.348
The evidence shows that Jarden's stock reached a pre-Merger
peak of $56.25 on July 20, 2015, and then declined gradually
over the next few months in response to poor earnings
reports.349 The decline was marked by low quarterly growth
and it prompted Jarden to lower its guidance for the second
and third quarters of 2015.350 Jarden's stock price recovered
somewhat in the fourth quarter and closed at $48.31 on
December 4, 2015 (i.e., the Unaffected Market Price).351
After The Wall Street Journal article reported on the merger
negotiations the following Monday, Jarden's stock price rose
and continued to rise to $54.09 on December 14, 2015, the
day Jarden and Newell officially announced the Merger.352
The steady climb continued following the announcement and
then plateaued before the calendar year ended.353 Jarden's
stock price oscillated between $59.00 and $50.00 until early
March 2016.354 In March, as the negotiations finalized and
the Merger Date neared, Jarden's share price approached
but never exceeded the Merger Price of $59.21.355 As Dr.
Hubbard explained:
The fact that Jarden's stock price never closed above the
Merger Price is a strong indicator that fair value is no
greater than the Merger Price. If investors believed that
the Company was worth materially more, then one would
expect to see the market price exceeding the Merger Price
in anticipation of a topping bid. In more than five percent
of M&A deals since 2001, the merger arbitrage spread the
day after the merger announcement was negative, implying
that the market expected a topping bid.356
Newell's stock also traded in an efficient market and the
market's reaction to the announcement of the Merger with
respect to Newell's trading price provides further evidence
that the Unaffected Market Price is reflective of Jarden's
fair value.357 Newell's stock price jumped after the leak of
negotiations when the terms of the deal were unknown.358
The market reacted differently, however, when the terms of
the Merger were announced. Newell's stock price dropped
significantly (6.9%). Dr. Hubbard explained the significance:
“The initial positive reaction to the deal rumors suggests
that the market was hopeful that some value would accrue
to Newell, but after learning the terms of the deal and
additional information about synergies, the market reassessed
and shifted the value from Newell to Jarden.”359
*29  After carefully reviewing the evidence, I am satisfied
that Jarden's Unaffected Market Price is a powerful indicator
of Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date. Petitioners' attempts
to undermine this evidence, as explained below, were not
persuasive.
2. Petitioners Did Not Persuasively Rebut Jarden's
Market Evidence
Petitioners mount three challenges to the reliability of
Jarden's Unaffected Market Price: (a) as of the date fixed
for the Unaffected Market Price (December 4, 2015), the
market lacked material information concerning Jarden (i.e.,
information asymmetry) that skewed the trading price; (b) the
Unaffected Market Price must be adjusted to account for a
so-called “conglomerate discount” and a “minority discount;”
and (c) the Unaffected Market Price was stale by the time the
Merger closed on April 15, 2016.360 I address each in turn.
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a. Information Asymmetry
According to Dr. Zmijewski, Jarden's market-based evidence
should be disregarded because the market lacked material
information as of the date fixed for Jarden's Unaffected
Market Price.361 Dr. Zmijewski cited the decline in the
federal risk-free rate, the rise in Jarden's share price and the
divergence between Jarden management and market analysts'
projections for Jarden's future performance as reasons the
Unaffected Market Price was not a reliable indicator of
fair value.362 Importantly, Dr. Zmijewski also observed
that Jarden stockholders had no access to the November
Projections as of the date fixed for the Unaffected Market
Price. The evidence supports the factual predicates for these
observations, but it does not support a conclusion that the
absent facts resulted in the kind of information asymmetry
that would render the Unaffected Market Price unreliable.
As for the decline in the federal risk-free rate, Dr. Zmijewski
states that, “[a]ll else equal, the decline in the risk-free rate
results in an increase in Jarden's Fair Value,” and goes on
to argue that because the federal risk-free rate declined from
December 2015 to April 2016, Jarden's fair value must be
higher than the Unaffected Market Price.363 Interest rates
on U.S. Treasury 20-year constant maturity bills declined
19%, from 2.65% to 2.14%, between December 4, 2015 and
April 15, 2016.364 Dr. Hubbard conceded that, if “all else”
were, in fact, “equal,” as Dr. Zmijewski posited, then Jarden's
fair value would increase as the risk-free rate decreased.365
But then Dr. Hubbard exposed the flaw in Dr. Zmijewski's
elephant-sized assumption that “all else” remained “equal.”
Specifically, Dr. Hubbard referred directly to market data
showing that, as the interest rate on 20-Year Treasury Bonds
declined between December 2015 and April 2016, stock
prices in general, represented by the S&P 500 Market Index,
did not increase in response.366 Contrary to Dr. Zmijewski's
“all else equal” assumption, the evidence shows that the stock
market declined just as the risk-free rate declined.367 In other
words, the correlation that supports the supposed information
asymmetry is no correlation at all.
*30  Regarding the lack of consensus between Jarden
management and third-party analysts' projections, Dr.
Hubbard emphasized the qualitative difference between
unvarnished raw information tracking Jarden's performance
and well-reasoned opinions about Jarden's prospects.368
Jarden's revenue projections for 2016, 2017, and 2018 were
1.0%, 1.7% and 2.6% higher, respectively, than financial
analysts' consensus forecast.369 Jarden's EBITDA projections
for 2016, 2017 and 2018 were 1.3%, 6.6% and 9.0% higher,
respectively, than financial analysts' consensus forecasts.
Jarden's November Projections incorporated this data but
were not released to the public until March 2016, and thus
would not have been incorporated into the Unaffected Market
Price.370 But is this evidence of information asymmetry? Dr.
Hubbard hypothesized the answer is no.371
To test his hypothesis, Dr. Hubbard turned to his event
study. The November Projections were disclosed in the joint
proxy in March 2016. If the November Projections revealed
information not previously incorporated in Jarden's stock
price, Hubbard reasoned, then both Jarden and Newell's stock
price should have proportionately reflected that information.
In other words, if the November Projections justified more
value (according to Dr. Zmijewski substantially more value),
then Newell's stock price should have increased substantially
to reflect that Newell was acquiring Jarden at less than fair
value.372 But, of course, that is not what happened; Jarden's
stock price climbed while Newell's stock price dropped.373
Moreover, Jarden's April Projections lowered the Company's
financial guidance to forecasts more in line with the analysts'
earlier projections.374 Dr. Hubbard persuasively opined that
the April Projection's convergence with the analysts' forecasts
was a strong indication that the difference between the
November Projections (as disclosed in the joint proxy) and
the analysts' projections was not attributable to unreasonable
market pessimism, but instead showed that market analysts
had more accurately estimated Jarden's 2016 outlook than
Jarden's management (who may have been motivated by
factors other than actual anticipated results when making their
forecasts).375
The credible evidence reflects no information asymmetry.
The market was well informed and the Unaffected Market
Price reflects all material information.
b. The Conglomerate and Minority Discounts
Dr. Zmijewski also criticizes Dr. Hubbard's Unaffected
Market Price analysis because it does not account for Jarden's
massively diversified portfolio of operating companies (the
conglomerate discount) and does not adjust for embedded
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agency costs (the minority discount).376 Here again, Dr.
Zmijewski flags the issues but makes no attempt to quantify
their impact, if any.377
*31  As for the conglomerate discount, the evidence does not
support that this is even “a thing,” meaning it is not clear that
this notion is accepted within the academy or among valuation
professionals.378 With that said, there is evidence that
Jarden's unique structure and diversified portfolio did pose
valuation challenges. Newell's Tarchetti described Jarden as
a “fast-changing company” that was difficult to appraise, in
part, due to its complexity and tendency to grow and evolve
at any point in time.379 Even so, the Company's high trading
volume and the intense scrutiny paid it by market analysts
has convinced me that the market understood Jarden's holding
company structure as an operative reality, considered the high
overhead costs associated with decentralized management
and imputed those factors into Jarden's Unaffected Market
Price.380
The minority discount, likewise, does not fit here. For a
company without a controlling stockholder, the premise is
that the appraiser must consider the conflict of interest
between Company management and a diffuse stockholder
base and account for minority trading multiples.381 Setting
aside that Petitioners have offered no credible evidentiary
basis to quantify any minority discount here, I see no basis to
even try given that the foundation for applying the discount
has not been laid. Jarden's management was well known
to stockholders and well known to the market. But for the
Merger, they were not going anywhere as the Company
was not for sale.382 As Dr. Hubbard explained, under these
circumstances, Jarden's agency costs were embedded in its
operative reality and reflected in its Unaffected Market
Price.383
c. Staleness of the Unaffected Market Price
Petitioners also argue that the Unaffected Market Price was
stale as of the Merger Date.384 I disagree. There is no
evidence to suggest that Jarden gained value from the date set
for the Unaffected Market Price and the closing of the Merger,
or that the market was deprived of information that might
have been perceived as enhancing value. Indeed, following
a period where Jarden had been especially acquisitive, the
Company was experiencing declines in operating income
and net income and management was giving the Board
revised, more conservative projections for 2016.385 The April
Projections forecasted reduced revenue growth and increased
working capital investment for FY17–20.386 This is not a
case where the credible evidence reveals that the Unaffected
Market Price was demonstrably below Jarden's fair value as
of the Merger.
* * * * * * * * * *
After carefully considering the evidence, I find that the
Unaffected Market Price is a reliable indicator of Jarden's
value as a going concern on the Merger Date. I have given it
substantial weight in my assessment of fair value.
C. The Other Market Evidence
As Jarden was negotiating with Newell, it was also pursuing
an acquisition of Jostens. To raise capital for that deal, Jarden
initiated a share offering priced at $49.00 per share.387 At
the time, the stock was trading in the mid-$40s.388 When the
market reacted poorly to the Jostens acquisition, and the stock
price fell, the Board believed it needed to send a signal that the
Company and its management were optimistic about Jostens.
So it authorized a $50 million stock buyback,389 and it set the
price cap again at $49.00 because, after internal assessments,
it believed that price reflected Jarden's value.390 Ultimately,
Jarden repurchased 276,417 shares on November 2, 2015, at
an average price of $45.96 per share, and another 775,685
shares on November 3, 2015, at an average price of $48.05
per share.391 This evidence is by no means dispositive. But
it is persuasive evidence that, in the weeks leading up to the
leak of the merger negotiations, uncluttered by transactional
or forensic incentives, both the Company and the market saw
Jarden's value well below what Petitioners seek here.
D. Comparable Companies
*32  Both parties' experts performed comparable companies
analyses to estimate Jarden's value relative to sets of proposed
peer firms. Applying his comparable companies analysis, Dr.
Zmijewski concluded that Jarden's fair value on the Merger
Date, based on Jarden's 2016 forecasted EBITDA using the
90th, 75th and 50th percentiles of his peer set, was $81.44,
$70.49 and $66.30, respectively.392 Based on Jarden's 2017
forecasted EBITDA, the market multiples based-valuation
using the 90th, 75th and 50th percentiles of his peer set,
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revealed a per share value of $77.39, $72.20 and $65.56,
respectively.393 For his part, Dr. Hubbard disclaimed the
efficacy of a comparable companies valuation for Jarden, but
then performed his own comparable analysis for the sake
of completeness, resulting in a value range of $40.12 to
$55.21 per share.394 Before addressing the experts' divergent
analyses and conclusions, it is useful to review basic concepts,
separated from forensics.
1. The Comparable Companies Methodology
As a threshold matter, before a comparable companies
multiples analysis can be undertaken with any measure
of reliability, it is necessary to establish a suitable peer
group through appropriate empirical analysis.395 In fact,
nearly every text in the record states that the accuracy of a
multiples-based valuation depends entirely on the existence
of comparable peers:
• Holthausen & Zmijewski (JX 242): “While selecting
comparable companies might not appear to be too
difficult, we often quickly conclude that not many, if
any, companies are truly comparable to the company we
are valuing for purposes of a market multiple valuation
once we understand all the different dimensions of
comparability and begin to analyze the potential
comparable companies ... simply selecting close
competitors is not sufficient to ensure the companies
are comparable, as we observe a substantial amount of
variation in multiples within an industry.”396
• Koller (JX 2516): “Selecting the right peer group is
critical to coming up with a reasonable valuation using
multiples.”397
• Damodaran (JX 2515): “... finding similar and
comparable firms is often a challenge, and frequently we
have to accept firms that are different from the firm being
valued on one dimension or the other. When this is the
case, we have to either explicitly or implicitly control for
differences across firms on growth, risk, and cash flow
measures.”398
• Berk & DeMarzo (JX 2032): “Of course, firms are not
identical. Thus, the usefulness of a valuation multiple
will depend on the nature of the differences between
firms and the sensitivity of the multiples to these
differences.”399
McKinsey recommends beginning the peer group
identification process with the Standard Industrial
Classification (“SIC”) or Global Industry Classification
Standard (“GICS”) codes.400 While these codes are a good
starting point for selecting a peer group, the industry-specific
company lists they produce require significant refinement to
identify truly comparable firms.401
To isolate a relevant peer group from a larger industry data
set, the appraiser must identify firms with similar risk profiles,
costs of capital, return on invested capital and growth.402 It
is better to have a smaller number of peers that truly compete
in the same markets with similar products than including
aspirational or nearly comparable companies.403 In order
effectively to narrow down a list of potential comparables
according to growth and risk, the analysis must consider
whether the companies have similar “value drivers” as the
target.404 As Dr. Zmijewski described in his text:
*33  [A] company's product lines, customer types,
market segments, types of operation, and so forth are
all important aspects to consider when we identify
comparable companies. Even after all these are taken into
consideration, two companies can be in the same industry
yet not be comparable on all of the characteristics that are
important for a market multiple valuation.405
In addition, the finance literature advises against relying
on peers provided by the target company's management.
This reasoning reflects common sense; optimistic executives
often provide “aspirational peers” rather than companies that
actually compete head-to-head with their firm.406
The importance of selecting a proper peer set in the
performance of a proper comparable companies analysis
cannot be overstated. Because this threshold task is so
important, and yet so difficult, the valuation treatises
generally view the comparable companies methodology as
inferior to other methodologies: “a key shortcoming of the
comparables approach is that it does not take into account
the important differences among firms,” therefore “[u]sing
a valuation multiple based on comparables is best viewed
as a ‘shortcut’ to the discounted cash flow methods of
valuation.”407
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If, and only if, a proper peer set can be selected, the
next step in the comparable companies analysis is to
select an appropriate multiple and then determine where
on the distribution of peers the target company falls.408
The Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiples valuation (“EV/
EBITDA”) is widely accepted as the most reliable data
set for a comparable companies analysis.409 In this regard,
it appears that the preference is to use forward-looking
projections instead of a firm's historical earnings data.410
Forward-looking multiples are deemed more consistent with
the principles of valuation, especially in the context of
estimating the present value of a company as a going
concern.411 Projections generally exhibit less variation across
peer companies compared to historical data, and although
long-term earnings projections are favored, one- and two-year
forecasts are reliable when they uniformly represent the firm's
long-term prospects.412
*34  With these generally accepted features of a proper
comparable companies valuation in mind, I turn to the experts'
comparable companies valuation of Jarden.
2. The Experts Attempt But Fail to Select a Valid Peer Set
Both experts developed their peer set by drawing from the
peer set developed by Barclays in its valuation work for
the Company with regard to the Merger. They then made
adjustments based on their own sense of comparability.
For his part, Dr. Zmijewski conceded that he “did not
do any qualitative assessment of any inherent differences
between the Jarden business and the business of its peers
companies.”413 Giving such deference to the peer set selected
by management, without any meaningful, independent
assessment of comparability, is not useful and, frankly, not
credible.414 Dr. Zmijewski made no mention of GICS or SIC
codes in his report and there is no indication that he employed
them, or any other objective criteria, in his selection of a peer
set.415
Failing to ground his peer set in any objective methodology
is all the more problematic given Dr. Zmijewski's apparent
willingness to adjust the management/Barclays' peer set when
it suited him to yield a higher valuation for Jarden. As
stated in his report, Dr. Zmijewski excluded Kimberly-Clark
Corporation and Colgate-Palmolive Company, which were
both included in the Barclays list, because both companies
maintain a significantly larger market capitalization than
Jarden and the other comparables.416 The notion that a
company with a very large market capitalization is not a
true peer of a company with a relatively smaller market
capitalization has a certain lay appeal. But Dr. Zmijewski's
own text makes clear that “there is no theoretical model
we are aware of that includes size as a determinant of
market multiples.”417 It may well be that Kimberly-Clark
and Colgate-Palmolive are not “comparables” for Jarden, but
the absence of any meaningful analysis or explanation in Dr.
Zmijewski's report leaves the Court with no way to determine
if the exclusion was arbitrary or principled.418
*35  Before addressing Dr. Hubbard's peer set, it must
be emphasized that Dr. Hubbard does not sponsor the
comparable companies methodology as the appropriate
means by which to assess Jarden's fair value.419 His preferred
methodology is DCF.420 Nevertheless, Dr. Hubbard engaged
with Dr. Zmijewski on comparable companies and, not
surprisingly, reached a very different conclusion after doing
so.
Dr. Hubbard assessed Jarden's peers by using GICS codes.421
He then cited to over a dozen industry analyst reports that
corroborated his peer set, which included companies that were
larger and smaller than Jarden and companies that were not on
the Barclays list.422 Once he completed his peer set, however,
Dr. Hubbard emphasized his view that Jarden's unique and
highly diversified portfolio of businesses, its aggressively
acquisitive growth strategy and its holding company structure
made the selection of a valid peer set for a comparable
companies analysis a fundamentally flawed exercise since
Jarden “lack[ed] truly comparable peers.”423
After carefully reviewing the evidence, I am convinced that
Dr. Hubbard is correct—Jarden had no comparable peers, at
least not as developed in the credible evidence presented at
trial. Under these circumstances, the fact that Dr. Zmijewski
engaged in no real analysis when developing his peer set is
not surprising.424
Having found that the first, and most important, element of
a proper comparable companies analysis is lacking in this
record, I give the experts' comparable companies conclusions
no weight in my fair value determination.425 Accordingly, I
move next to the parties' competing DCF valuations.
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E. Discounted Cash Flow
*36  As I approach the parties' fantastically divergent
conclusions following their DCF analyses, I am mindful of
our Supreme Court's admonition that, tempting as it is to
select the entirety of one expert's analysis over the other's,
my review of the experts' opinions must not be presumptively
binary:
The role of the Court of Chancery has evolved over time
to the present requirement that the court independently
determine the value of the shares that are the subject
of the appraisal action. Even though today a Chancellor
may be faced with wildly divergent values presented by
the parties' experts, the acceptance of one expert's value,
in toto, creates the risk that the favored expert will be
accorded a status greater than that of the now eliminated
[expert appraiser]. This is not to say that the selection of
one expert to the total exclusion of another is, in itself,
an arbitrary act. The testimony of a thoroughly discredited
witness, expert or lay, is subject to rejection under the usual
standards which govern receipt of such evidence. The nub
of the present appeal is not merely that the Chancellor made
an uncritical acceptance of the evidence of SAP's appraiser
but that he announced in advance that he intended to choose
between absolutes.426
As I discuss below, in many important respects, the experts
have utilized very different inputs in their DCF models
leading to a substantial delta between their ultimate DCF
valuations—Dr. Zmijewski's DCF valuation produced a range
of $70.36 and $70.40 per share;427 Dr. Hubbard's DCF
valuation is $48.01 per share.428 The number and degree of
their differences has necessitated the lengthy discussion that
follows. For reasons I explain, I have adopted some of both
expert's inputs to construct my own DCF model. Based on
that model, my DCF valuation is $48.13 per share.
I begin by noting where the experts agree. First, they
agree that DCF is a widely used and industry-accepted
means of calculating the value of a corporation as a going
concern. Dr. Hubbard likes DCF best to value Jarden, while
Dr. Zmijewski uses his DCF valuation to corroborate his
comparable companies analysis.429 Both experts used the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”) method to
determine the appropriate discount rate. Both agreed that
the November Projections were the appropriate cash flow
forecasts upon which their DCF models should be based. Both
largely agreed on the required net investment to drive growth
through the year 2020, which is the last year included in
the November Projections. And both agreed that the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) was appropriate to calculate
Jarden's Cost of Equity. Because I see no basis in the evidence
to depart from these stipulations, I adopt them without further
analysis.
*37  The bulk of the experts' disagreements relate to how
Jarden will perform in the terminal period beyond the
November Projections' explicit forecasts.430 I address and do
my best to resolve each of the disagreements below.
1. Jarden's Future Cash Flows
As noted, both experts used the November Projections
for their DCF analyses.431 Even so, both made different
adjustments to the projections to calculate Jarden's unlevered
free cash flows.432 After reviewing the adjustments, I
find that their adjustments for EBITDA, depreciation and
amortization, and Dr. Zmijewski's adjustment for projected
taxes, are appropriate.433 These adjustments yield the
following for Jarden's Net Operating Profits after taxes
(“NOPAT”):434
FY2016-E
 
FY2017-E
 
FY2018-E
 
FY2019-E
 
FY2020-E
 
$869 million
 
$967 million
 
$1,062 million
 
$1,146 million
 
$1,235 million
 
Using Jarden's NOPAT, I have calculated Jarden's unlevered
free cash flows for each projection year by: (1) adding
back depreciation; (2) deducting Jarden's year-over-year
change in working capital; and (3) deducting Jarden's capital
expenditures. These adjustments track those made by Dr.
Hubbard (albeit at a 35% marginal rate),435 and yield the
following as Jarden's unlevered free cash flow in each of the
projected years:
FY2016-E
 
FY2017-E
 
FY2018-E
 
FY2019-E
 
FY2020-E
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$572 million
 
$701 million
 
$783 million
 
$853 million
 
$927 million
 
2. Jarden's Terminal Value
Jarden's terminal value is the value of the Company beyond
the discrete projection period as defined in a discounted future
earnings model (“Terminal Value”).436 In the context of the
experts' DCF analyses for Jarden, Terminal Value refers to
Jarden's estimated value taking into account all future cash
flows at the end of the November Projection's explicit forecast
period assuming a stable growth rate in perpetuity.437
Dr. Zmijewski's Terminal Value calculation and
accompanying analysis mostly relies on his comparable
companies analysis,438 which I have found not reliable for
reasons already stated. Dr. Hubbard used a formula developed
by McKinsey & Co. to calculate Jarden's Terminal Value. The
McKinsey formula involves dividing the value of cash flow
in the Terminal Period by the difference between the Discount
Rate (the rate at which future cash flows are discounted to
present) and Jarden's Terminal Growth Rate.439 According
to Dr. Hubbard, this formula generally provides that “all
else remaining equal,” a company's terminal value is larger
when cash flow is high, and the discount rate is low or the
growth rate is high.440 The “all else remaining equal” caveat,
Hubbard explains, assumes that increased growth will be
supported by increased investment which, in turn, reduces
cash flow.441 In other words, increasing investment in the
Terminal Period will proportionately reduce Jarden's cash
flow and thereby lower Jarden's measurable value in the
Terminal Period. To calculate Jarden's Terminal Value, it is
necessary to estimate its Terminal Growth Rate, Terminal
Investment Rate and Discount Rate.
a. Terminal Growth Rate
*38  “Of all the inputs into a discounted cash flow
valuation model, none creates as much angst as estimating the
[terminal] growth rate. Part of the reason for it is that small
changes in the [terminal] growth rate can change the terminal
value significantly[.]”442 The terminal growth rate (“TGR”)
describes Jarden's long-term growth in revenue, earnings and
cash flow in the Terminal Period, which includes the years
starting in 2021 and onward. Since acquisitions are typically
not considered in organic growth rate calculations,443 a
key question is whether Jarden's several tuck-in acquisitions
should be included in the TGR.444
Both experts measure Jarden's TGR based on estimates of
U.S. nominal GDP growth and long-term economic inflation.
This method makes sense and is generally accepted.445 The
experts disagreed, however, as to what forecast sources
provide the most useful data.446
Dr. Zmijewski derived a 2.1% projected long-term inflation
rate from four estimates of U.S. economic outlooks and
an expected nominal GDP growth rate of 4.3% from
three projections of U.S. GDP growth.447 Based on these
projections, Dr. Zmijewski applied the midpoint of 3.2%,
which he asserts is a reasonable long-term growth rate
for Jarden.448 Dr. Zmijewski's TGR analysis included an
assessment of the Company's acquisition-driven and organic
growth, and the results showed Jarden's historic organic
growth rate to be roughly 3.1%.449 As corroboration, Dr.
Zmijewski emphasized that key players in the Merger
projected that Jarden would grow between 2.0% to 4.0%
annually in perpetuity.450
For his Composite DCF calculation, Dr. Zmijewski used
the 2.1% projected U.S. inflationary growth rate as Jarden's
TGR.451 Dr. Zmijewski explained he used U.S. inflation
as Jarden's TGR as a “conservative” measure because the
Composite DCF relies on calculations supplemented by
comparable companies data, and Jarden's long-term growth
was estimated to be much higher than any of the companies
in Dr. Zmijewski's peer set.452 For his Jarden-Specific DCF
analysis, Dr. Zmijewski set Jarden's TGR at 3.2%, which he
suggested conforms to the other Jarden-only measurements
and calculations in that valuation.453
Dr. Hubbard's report set Jarden's TGR at 2.5% based on
several inflation and nominal GDP growth forecasts for the
U.S. economy and the European Union's Eurozone.454 He
noted that his TGR comports with the TGR utilized by
Goldman Sachs and Centerview in advising Newell, both of
which used a TGR of 2.0% in their valuations of Jarden.455
He also pointed to analyst reports by Deutsche Bank and
RBC Capital that estimated Jarden's TGR at 1.5% and 2.5%,
respectively.456 Finally, he noted that his TGR is consistent
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with Jarden's historic organic growth, which he determined
to be 2.2% annually.457 With all these factors considered,
Dr. Hubbard concluded that his 2.5% TGR falls squarely
between his estimated range of inflation and nominal GDP
and aligns well with Jarden's historic organic growth when
fairly adjusted for “tuck-in” acquisitions.458
*39  Dr. Zmijewski took issue with Dr. Hubbard's
adjustments for “tuck-ins” because the adjustments result in
double counting certain companies that did not fit Jarden's
definition of a “tuck-in.”459 Dr. Hubbard conceded this
error, revised his analysis and found Jarden's organic, non-
acquisitive growth rate to be 3.2% annually.460 Despite his
upward revision to Jarden's historic organic growth, Dr.
Hubbard did not change his 2.5% TGR estimate.461
Jarden's “tuck-in” acquisitions, although relatively small in
scale, are acquisition-driven growth, not organic growth.462
Accordingly, Dr. Hubbard's attempt to account for “tuck-in”
acquisitions when estimating Jarden's TGR is well taken. Dr.
Hubbard's reluctance, however, to acknowledge the impact
of his organic growth rate miscalculation on his estimate of
Jarden's TGR is not.463 Moreover, considering Dr. Hubbard's
revised 3.2% historic organic growth rate in light of his
economic research supporting long-run inflation in the range
of 2.0% annually, and nominal GDP growth in the range of
4.07% annually, with a midpoint of roughly 3.04%,464 Dr.
Hubbard's 2.5% TGR is not supported.
Dr. Zmijewski calculated Jarden's historic organic growth
rate to be 3.1%.465 His economic research supported U.S.
long-run inflation at 2.1% annually and nominal GDP growth
at 4.3% annually.466 And his estimates are within one-
or two-tenths of a percentage point of Dr. Hubbard's. The
midpoint of each experts' inflation and GDP estimates is
approximately 3.1%, which aligns with Dr. Hubbard's 3.2%
revised historic organic growth rate and Dr. Zmijewski's 3.2%
midpoint TGR in his Jarden-Specific DCF.467 The literature
recommends a conservative approach to estimating long-
term growth rates for a DCF valuation, in recognition that
many companies experience cyclical growth in relation to the
overall economy.468 Jarden was considered a GDP growth
business.469
Based on these factors, and the credible evidence in the trial
record, I apply a 3.1% TGR. In my view, this reflects the most
credible aspects of the experts' analyses and comports with
the most persuasive view of Jarden's historic growth.
b. Terminal Investment Rate
The experts' disagreement over the terminal investment rate
(“TIR”) accounts for 87% of the disparity in their DCF
valuations.470 In other words, of the $22.39 difference
between Dr. Hubbard's DCF per share value of $48.01 and
Dr. Zmijewski's DCF per share value of $70.40, $19.56 is
attributable to the disagreement over Jarden's TIR. After
carefully considering the experts' analyses of TIR, and
exposing what I believe to be flaws in both, I have determined
that an appropriate TIR for Jarden is 27.75%.
*40  The disagreement between the experts boils down
to whether Dr. Hubbard improperly relied upon accounting
theory when calculating TIR.471 Dr. Zmijewski's approach
to Jarden's TIR aligns, in concept, with the Bradley-Jarrell
Plowback Formula, which provides, in broad terms, that
the rate of reinvestment must be measured by what is
realistically required to drive real growth.472 Real growth,
under the plowback paradigm, is measured by the delta
between the company's growth rate and inflationary growth,
which is driven by the greater economy and not cash
reinvestment.473 In other words, as Jarden's growth slowed
over time and became steadier, the Company required less
capital expenditure to drive real growth because a greater
percentage of its overall growth was driven by inflation
and broader economic factors. According to Dr. Zmijewski,
because Jarden was a steady-growth company that expected
lower growth in the Terminal Period, it required a much lower
TIR, which he calculated at only 4.9%.474
Dr. Hubbard calculated TIR by applying a formula from
McKinsey & Co.475 The McKinsey formula posits that
a company's return on invested capital (“ROIC”) should
converge towards its WACC over time.476 The formula rests
on the premise that a company operating in a competitive
industry will not “have both high and rising forever returns
on invested capital.”477 Applying the McKinsey formula,478
Dr. Hubbard used 2.5% as his TGR and 7.38% as his WACC/
ROIC, yielding a TIR of 33.9%.479
Dr. Zmijewski expressed four principal criticisms of Dr.
Hubbard's application of the McKinsey formula.480 First,
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according to Dr. Zmijewski, Dr. Hubbard incorrectly assumes
that any new investment Jarden made starting in 2021 would
not create any value.481 Second, Dr. Zmijewski believes
Dr. Hubbard improperly defined investments to include only
working capital and capital expenditures, which, according
to Dr. Zmijewski, is the accounting definition of investments
(meaning “what you put on a balance sheet”) that does not
account for real world economics.482 In other words, Dr.
Hubbard's definition of investment excludes research and
development, advertising and human capital expenditures that
would create value for Jarden in years beyond 2021.483 Third,
Dr. Hubbard's definition of net investment as investment
above depreciation is, again, an accounting definition that
does not fit when calculating TIR.484 Fourth, Dr. Hubbard
improperly calculated WACC by “using accounting rates of
return” instead of “economic rates of return,” which do “not
measure the same thing.”485
*41  Dr. Hubbard's testimony that, in competitive industries,
the return on new invested capital should equal the company's
WACC was credible, and it is supported by the valuation
treatises.486 Although I found credible Dr. Hubbard's well-
reasoned premise that companies like Jarden cannot maintain
growth without sufficient investment to drive growth above
inflation over time, his relatively high TIR raises at least
yellow flags. At first glance, the empirical analysis Dr.
Hubbard undertook to support his 33.9% TIR appears
reasonable, particularly given Jarden's historic investment
rates, which averaged roughly 26.9% of comparable growth
over six years.487 But why study six years here when Dr.
Hubbard's TGR estimation was premised on five years of
Jarden's historic growth?488 By including the sixth year,
2010, in his calculation, Dr. Hubbard was able to reach a
significantly higher number for Jarden's historical average
growth. After excluding the 2010 investment rate of 64.3%,
Jarden's five-year average investment rate is 21.6%.
In view of Jarden's five-year 21.6% average historic
investment rate, Dr. Zmijewski's 4.6% TIR is too low; it
unreasonably assumes rising ROIC for more than 40 years
into the Terminal Period, unreasonably assumes all new
investment in the Terminal Period will be comprised entirely
of working capital, and is based on a methodology that
conflicts with the valuation goal of striking a balance between
investment and growth.489 The November Projection's
forecast of net investment in 2021 at 9.8%, likewise, stands
out as low relative to Jarden's five-year average investment
rate. The midpoint of Dr. Hubbard's 33.9% TIR and Jarden
management's projected 9.8% TIR is roughly 21.8%. With
a calculated TGR of 3.1%, which coincides with Jarden's
historic organic growth rate, the appropriate TIR should
reflect Jarden's historic investment rate but account for a
slight increase to accommodate sustained growth in the
Terminal Period. The credible evidence, in my view, supports
a TIR for Jarden of 27.75%.490
c. Jarden's Weighted Average Cost of Capital/Discount
Rate
As previously stated, both experts' DCF models used Jarden's
WACC as the input for the Discount Rate in the DCF
formula.491 The Discount Rate converts Jarden's future cash
flows from the November Projections to present value as of
the Merger Date.492 WACC reflects Jarden's cost of equity
and debt financing and the relative weight of each in Jarden's
capital structure.493 Given that a DCF valuation is meant to
calculate Jarden's value as a going concern, the components
relied upon to calculate WACC should represent Jarden's
prospective outlook.494 The experts agreed on one of the
relevant inputs to calculate Jarden's WACC, the risk-free rate
of return. They differed, however, in their respective estimates
of Jarden's capital structure, beta, equity risk premium, and
whether a size premium was appropriate.495 I address each
issue below.
*42  The application of a discount rate to financial
projections converts the target company's future income
stream at its expected opportunity cost of capital to its present
value.496 A company's WACC represents the cost (to the
company) of financing its business operations; it comprises
the weighted average of the company's cost of debt and
equity:497
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i. Jarden's Capital Structure
A company's capital structure indicates what percentage of its
activities is financed by debt and what percentage is financed
by equity.498 Determining the correct capital structure is
essential to WACC because without a clear picture of a
company's debt-to-equity ratio, the cost of financing future
operations will be improperly weighted.499
Both experts recognized the impact of the substantial amount
of convertible debt in Jarden's capital structure.500 Jarden's
convertible debt conceptually existed as both debt and equity
components in its capital structure, and both experts valued
the debt and equity components of Jarden's convertible notes
separately.501
Dr. Zmijewski calculated Jarden's capital structure based on
Jarden's median capital structure ratios in the last four quarters
before December 4, 2015.502 According to the previous year's
ratios, Dr. Zmijewski selected a Jarden capitalization ratio of
69% combined equity and 31% debt.503
For his part, Dr. Hubbard examined Jarden's capital structure
ratio for the five years prior to the Merger.504 He noted that
Jarden maintained a debt level of roughly 50% from the last
quarter of 2010 through 2011, but beginning in 2012, Jarden's
debt to equity ratio began shifting due to Jarden's increased
acquisition activity.505 As Jarden stepped up acquisitions
between 2012 and 2015, its total debt nearly doubled but its
equity value expanded in even greater proportions.506 By the
third quarter of 2015, Jarden's market capitalization nearly
tripled and its capital structure had shifted from nearly a
50:50 ratio to 37.5% debt and 62.5% equity.507 Following
the Yankee Candle acquisition in 2013, Jarden's goal was to
de-lever itself to three times its bank leverage-to-EBITDA
ratio.508
Dr. Hubbard observed that, in order to capture Jarden's value
as a going concern, the capital structure ratio used in the
WACC analysis should reflect Jarden's long-run target capital
structure.509 He concluded that, because Jarden was on a
trajectory of lower debt leading up to the Merger, and its long-
term goal was to achieve an even lower debt-to-equity ratio,
Jarden's average debt in the one-year period before the Merger
was the best estimate of Jarden's target capital structure for
WACC.510 Based on that judgment, Dr. Hubbard calculated a
capital structure equal to Jarden's one-year average ratios of
36.1% debt and 63.9% equity.511
*43  The valuation literature suggests that because of the
increased use of convertible securities, assessing the debt-to-
EBITDA ratio alongside capital structure helps build a more
comprehensive picture of a company's leverage risk.512 Both
experts were cognizant of the effect of Jarden's convertible
securities on its capital structure, and Dr. Hubbard went on
to consider changes in Jarden's debt-to-EBITDA ratio and the
corresponding effect on Jarden's future leverage risk.513
The two experts relied on one year of debt-to-equity
information to calculate their capital structure estimates. Dr.
Zmijewski calculated Jarden's capital structure according to
its median debt-to-equity ratios prior to the unaffected trading
date of December 4, 2015.514 That is where Dr. Zmijewski's
analysis ended. Dr. Hubbard made a similar assessment of
Jarden's capital structure as it stood just prior to the unaffected
trading date, but did not end his analysis there. Instead,
Dr. Hubbard assessed Jarden's target debt-to-EBITDA ratios,
which reflected the capital structure Jarden set as a forward-
looking goal well before merger negotiations began.515
This further analysis makes sense. The cost of capital analysis
should be based on target debt-to-equity ratios instead of
current ratios.516 Target capital structure represents the
ratios expected to prevail over the life of the business and
the literature stresses that relying solely on current capital
structure can distort the cost of capital analysis.517 Overly
optimistic capital structure targets must be accounted for
if they are expected to take many years to be realized.518
Jarden's target capital structure and debt-to-EBITDA ratio
was not overly optimistic under the circumstances. As of
2015's third quarter, Jarden's leverage had shifted downward
to 37.5% as its market capitalization grew,519 and Jarden
planned to continue its deleveraging strategy until it reached
a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 3.0x.520 Adjusting Jarden's 37.5%
debt as of September 30, 2015, to conform to its target
leverage ratio would lower Jarden's debt ratio to 33.3%.521
Based on the dramatic swings in Jarden's capital structure in
the five years prior to the Merger, a 4.2% deleveraging was
well within Jarden's ability to achieve in the short term.
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Because Dr. Hubbard's analysis conservatively includes
Jarden's forward-looking target capital structure in his
capitalization analysis, I adopt Dr. Hubbard's capital structure
of 63.9% equity and 36.1% debt.522 Accordingly, I adopt
Hubbard's estimated equity and debt values for Jarden at
$10,596,000,000 and $5,043,000,000, respectively.523
ii. Jarden's Cost of Debt
A company's cost of debt reflects “the current cost to the
firm of borrowing funds to finance projects.”524 Generally, it
is derived from three variables: (1) the riskless rate, (2) the
default risk (and associated default spread) of the company
and (3) the tax advantage associated with debt.525
*44  Dr. Zmijewski estimated Jarden's after-tax Cost of Debt
at 2.8%.526 He arrived at this figure by calculating a Debt
Beta of 0.36 based on Moody's Long-Term Corporate Family
Rating of Ba3 for Jarden as of December 4, 2015, and the Duff
& Phelps debt beta estimate for Ba debt as of March 2016.527
Dr. Hubbard estimated Jarden's Cost of Debt based on a tax
adjusted yield to maturity rate of 5.30%.528 This yielded a
Cost of Debt of 3.2%.529
I agree with Dr. Zmijewski that calculating the cost of below-
investment-grade debt by using yield to maturity sets the cost
of debt too high.530 I adopt his Cost of Debt of 2.8%
iii. Jarden's Tax Rate
Jarden's tax rate is 35%, which is the top marginal corporate
tax rate for U.S. companies at the time of the Merger.531
iv. Jarden's Cost of Equity
Establishing an accurate Cost of Equity is an essential
subcomponent of Jarden's WACC. Both experts used the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) to calculate Jarden's
cost of equity capital.532 This approach calculates Jarden's
risk separately from systematic risk to produce a reliable
estimate of Jarden's Cost of Equity.533 CAPM has four
components: the risk-free rate, equity beta, equity risk
premium, and if necessary, a size premium.534 Following
CAPM, a company's cost of equity is calculated as follows:535
• The Risk-Free Rate
The only point of agreement between the experts in the
WACC analysis is the risk-free rate of return. Both experts set
their analyses' risk-free rate at the 20-year constant maturity
U.S. Treasury Bonds return as of the Merger.536 That rate
was 2.14%.537 Relying on 20-year U.S. Treasury Bonds for
the risk-free rate is universally accepted practice in corporate
valuation.538
• Beta
Beta, in short, is a measurement of the systemic risk that
a particular security adds to a market portfolio.539 The
consensus from the corporate finance literature in the record is
that the conventional approach for estimating equity beta for a
publicly traded company, like Jarden, is through a regression
analysis of the historical returns of its stock against the returns
of a market index.540 In other words, equity beta is derived
by assessing a stock's sensitivity to and correlation with
changes in the aggregate market. A beta regression analysis
requires three parameter-setting choices. First, the time period
for measuring returns must be established.541 Second, the
return interval at which measurements will be taken over the
duration of the designated time period must be specified.542
Third, an appropriate market index must be identified that
will represent the cumulative market over time as a control to
measure the target company's market price.543
*45  The experts disagreed on the relevant time periods and
return intervals to use in their regression analyses. From the
evidence, it appears the most appropriate (and commonly
used) parameters are two- or five-year time periods and
weekly or monthly return intervals.544
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The control market index should be one developed from the
exchange where the target company's stock trades.545 For
companies traded on the NYSE, like Jarden, it is reasonable
to use either the NYSE Composite or the S&P 500 Index.546
The experts agreed that the S&P 500 is an appropriate market
index and both used the S&P 500 as their control to measure
Jarden.547
In addition, both experts relied on Jarden's historical market
returns data and estimated Jarden-specific betas. Yet, they
disputed whether it was necessary to balance Jarden's beta
with betas estimated from historical returns of comparable
companies.
In his report, Dr. Zmijewski calculated two equity betas to use
in his Jarden-Specific DCF and Composite DCF analyses. To
estimate Jarden's beta as of the Merger Date, Dr. Zmijewski
measured the equity beta for Jarden and for each of a list
of comparable companies based on five years of weekly
returns ending on the Merger Date.548 He then performed a
regression analysis for each company against the S&P 500
for the same period that showed Jarden's unlevered beta was
1.04 and that the unlevered beta for his comparable companies
(plus Jarden) was 0.86.549 Finally, he made adjustments
to account for Jarden's cash and other financial assets and
relevered each beta to produce a Jarden-specific equity beta
of 1.24 (the “Jarden-Specific Beta”) and a combined equity
beta for his comparable companies (plus Jarden) of 1.01 (the
“Composite Beta”).550
Dr. Hubbard's regression analysis yielded an equity beta
of 1.18 (the “Hubbard Beta”) that was based on Jarden's
daily returns for one year ending on December 4, 2015.551
Unlike Dr. Zmijewski, Dr. Hubbard did not balance his
Jarden-specific beta regression analysis with beta estimates of
comparable companies. Instead, he regressed Jarden's single
year daily returns against the S&P 500 during the one-year
period and calculated an unlevered beta of 0.771.552 Like Dr.
Zmijewski, he then adjusted for cash and financial assets and
re-levered the beta to produce a Jarden equity beta of 1.18.553
Dr. Hubbard also calculated Jarden-specific betas from two
years of weekly returns and five years of monthly returns,
but ultimately decided to use the single year daily returns
beta to mitigate the potential confounding effects of several
large acquisitions Jarden completed in the five years prior to
the Merger.554 Dr. Hubbard explained that he chose the year
ending on December 4, 2015, in order to avoid contaminating
his regression analysis with news of the possible merger.555
*46  The literature in the record supports the use
of comparable companies in a beta regression because
companies in the same industry face similar “operating
risks” and therefore should have similar operating betas.556
This, of course, assumes that “truly” comparable peers
exist that can meaningfully be compared to the target
company.557 Here again, Dr. Zmijewski failed convincingly
to demonstrate that his comparable companies shared
similar risk profiles with Jarden.558 As Dr. Hubbard
persuasively testified, Dr. Zmijewski provided no analysis
or discussion to support this assumption.559 Without a
thorough explanation and corroborating evidence of how
Dr. Zmijewski's comparable companies had risk profiles
comparable to Jarden's “complex”560 and “unique”561
structure and business model, I am disinclined to consider on
Dr. Zmijewski's Composite Beta.
Jarden's stock consistently traded in the upper quartile of
market volume on the NYSE from 2011 to 2015.562 And
its share price had a positive correlation with the market, as
defined by the S&P 500, throughout the same time period.563
With this in mind, I am persuaded that Dr. Hubbard's decision
to use daily interval measurements is reasonable, and his
opinion that Jarden's market returns data provide a reliable
measurement of Jarden's beta is supported by the literature in
the record.564
Dr. Hubbard corroborated his calculated beta with a second
regression using two-year weekly returns that yielded
a Jarden-specific beta of 1.22.565 Dr. Zmijewski's beta
estimates were derived from a five-year period of weekly
returns, and his Jarden-specific analysis produced a beta of
1.24 for Jarden alone.566 The spread between Dr. Hubbard's
beta and Dr. Zmijewski's Jarden-specific beta is 0.06, which,
according to the literature, suggests that the Jarden-specific
beta estimates have a low error rate across different time and
interval measurements.567 A narrow error rate between firm-
specific beta estimates of different intervals and time periods
indicates the estimates are converging on the company's true
beta.568
Moreover, it is important to note that, when estimating beta,
the goal is to evaluate Jarden's future beta, and by extension,
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the sensitivity of Jarden's share price to future market risk
as predicted by its historical performance.569 Because betas
generally converge on the general market beta (1.0) over
time,570 and Jarden, by all indicators, was a mature, highly
traded company, I am satisfied that Dr. Hubbard's beta (1.18)
is a reasonable estimate of Jarden's share price sensitivity to
future market risk.
• Equity Risk Premium
*47  Equity Risk Premium (“ERP”) “captures the
compensation per unit of risk that investors demand in order
to hold risky investments rather than riskless investments.”571
The experts' disagreement over the proper methodology
for estimating Jarden's ERP reflects the lack of consensus
regarding this issue within the valuation community at
large.572 One aspect of the broader debate that has played
out here is whether to approach ERP as Long-Term Historical
ERP, Supply-Side ERP, or an adjusted hybrid ERP derived
from the available data. As explained by Dr. Hubbard, when
appraisers estimate ERP from Long-Term Historical ERP,
they consult historical data regarding stock premiums, in
his case from 1926 through 2015.573 As explained by Dr.
Zmijewski, Supply-Side ERP incorporates adjustments to the
Long-Term Historical ERP to account for a long-term decline
in risk premiums that upwardly bias the Long-Term Historical
rate in order more effectively to represent recent market
conditions.574
Dr. Zmijewski set Jarden's ERP at the Supply-Side ERP
estimate of 6.03%.575 Dr. Hubbard determined the proper
ERP to be 6.47%, which is the mid-point between the
Long-Term Historical ERP and Supply-Side ERP.576 After
considering the evidence, I am satisfied that Dr. Zmijewski's
estimate of ERP reflects a more principled approach. First,
there is strong support for the use of the forward-looking
Supply-Side ERP in the valuation literature.577 Second, as
Dr. Zmijewski persuasively observes, Dr. Hubbard's “mid-
point” ERP estimate is unexplained and appears to lack any
methodological foundation.578
• Size Premium
Dr. Zmijewski opined that a size premium must be
incorporated in the calculation of Jarden's equity cost
of capital given that, according to the Duff & Phelps
classification, Jarden is within the second decile of public
companies, which justifies a size premium of 0.57%.579 Dr.
Hubbard implied that a Size Premium was not necessary but
provided no credible explanation for that position.580 The
valuation texts in the record make the point that beta captures
some, but not all of a company's size premium and that a
size premium is an empirically observed correction to the
CAPM.581 I agree with Dr. Zmijewski and the literature that
the CAPM should include a size premium when appropriate,
as here, and adopt his size premium of 0.57% for Jarden.
* * * * * * * * * *
Dr. Zmijewski calculated a Composite Cost of Equity, but for
reasons previously stated, I have disregarded estimates based
on Jarden's so-called comparable companies. Dr. Zmijewski
calculated a Jarden-specific Cost of Equity at 10.21%.582 Dr.
Hubbard calculated Jarden's Cost of Equity at 9.74%.583 In
my view, for reasons stated, neither view lines up entirely
with the credible evidence. Accordingly, I have calculated
Jarden's Cost of Equity with the following CAPM inputs
that reflect what I deem proven by a preponderance of the
evidence: Dr. Hubbard's Beta of 1.18, Dr. Zmijewski's Equity-
Risk Premium of 6.03%, Dr. Zmijewski's Size Premium of
0.57% and both experts' risk-free rate of 2.14%. With these
inputs, I have calculated Jarden's Cost of Equity to be 9.83%.
Jarden's Calculated WACC: Dr. Zmijewski calculated a
Jarden-Specific WACC of 7.88%.584 Dr. Hubbard calculated
a WACC of 7.38%.585 Once again, for reasons stated, I have
found that neither experts' calculated WACC is supported
entirely by the credible evidence. Instead, I calculate WACC
with the following inputs: a 9.83% Cost of Equity, a 2.8%
Cost of Debt, a 35% marginal tax rate and a capital structure
of 63.9% equity and 36.1% debt. These inputs yield a WACC
of 6.94% for Jarden.586 Thus, I adopt a Discount Rate of
6.94%.587
3. The Final Calculation of Terminal Value
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Based on the credible evidence, I calculate Jarden's terminal
value to be $17.7 billion, using the following equation:588
In order to arrive at the unlevered free cash flow for year
2021, I subtracted the predicted revenue for 2021 from the
predicted capital expenditures for 2021.589 The predicted
revenue for 2021 is $12.9 billion, 4.964% higher than
the 2020 revenue.590 The predicted capital expenditure for
2021 is $334 million, 2.6% higher than the 2020 capital
expenditure.591
4. The DCF Calculation of Fair Value
Using 6.94% as the Discount Rate, I calculate Jarden's
enterprise value using the following formula:592
The final adjusted enterprise value is $16.6 billion.593
5. Jarden-Specific Adjustments to the DCF Valuation
*49  In order to determine the final share price under a DCF
approach, the appraiser must account for Jarden's excess cash
and debt in its enterprise value.594 Dr. Hubbard additionally
adjusts for tax effects related to future profits not captured
by tax rates, liability from net unrecognized tax benefits and
pensions.595 I do not find any of Dr. Hubbard's arguments for
these additional adjustments persuasive and, in any event, his
proposed further adjustments have a marginal impact on the
final share value.596
a. Excess Cash
Companies commonly keep liquid cash in order to conduct
their operations.597 If the company holds more cash than
necessary, the surplus is a source of value to the equity holders
and must be added to the DCF valuation.598 Jarden held $799
million of cash and cash equivalents at the end of the first
quarter of 2016.599 As of the Merger, Jarden required $50
million in cash for working capital purposes.600 The excess
cash balance, or the difference between the total cash and the
required cash, is $749 million, which I add to the enterprise
value.
b. Nonconvertible Debt
As of March 31, 2016, Jarden's non-convertible debt totaled
$5.04 billion.601 Debt is a claim on the assets of the firm
and must, therefore, be subtracted from the DCF enterprise
value.602
c. Convertible Debt
To measure the value of Jarden's unconverted convertible
notes at the Merger Date, Dr. Hubbard uses a standard options
pricing methodology to estimate the embedded warrants
value since they are economically analogous to an option on
Jarden's common stock.603 This formula relies on various
inputs for each series of notes, including the time remaining
until maturity, the conversion price, the current value of
Jarden's stock, the risk-free rate and the expected volatility
of Jarden's stock returns.604 Using these inputs, Dr. Hubbard
estimated the equity components of the convertible notes to be
$0.71 billion in total at the Merger Date.605 He further valued
the debt component of the convertible notes by discounting
the remaining coupons and principal value of each note at
Jarden's 5.3% cost of debt. In total, the value of the debt
component of the convertible notes is $1.00 billion. The
total value of Jarden's convertible securities is the sum of
the debt and equity components. At the Merger Date, the
value of Jarden's convertible debt totaled $1.71 billion.606 Dr.
Hubbard's approach was conservative, made sense and I adopt
it here.
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6. Number of Shares
I calculate the shares outstanding, following Dr. Zmijewski's
calculation,607 by subtracting the Jarden stock awards
issuable to executives in connection with the merger
transactions and the Jarden common stock expected to
be issued upon assumed conversion of outstanding Jarden
convertible notes from the total estimated shares of Jarden's
common stock entitled to the Merger consideration. With
these inputs, the total amount of outstanding shares and
restricted stock units as of the Merger was 219.9 million
common shares.608
7. Equity Value per Share from DCF Analysis
*50  After adding non-operating assets to the enterprise
value, and subtracting non-operating liabilities, Jarden's
equity value as of the Merger Date was $10.59 billion. On a
per share basis, the DCF valuation is $48.13.
REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIALLY LEFT BLANK
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8. The DCF Valuation Comports With the Market
Evidence
As indicated above, I have determined that the Unaffected
Market Price, $48.31, is a reliable indicator of Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger Date. While I have questioned the
reliability of the Merger price less synergies approach, I
recognize that the most reliable estimate of fair value under
that approach is approximately $46.21. My DCF valuation
yields a fair value of $48.13. What stands out here, of course,
is that Petitioners' proffered estimate of fair value for Jarden
of $71.35 is, to put it mildly, an outlier.
Based on the preponderance of evidence, I am satisfied
that the Unaffected Market Price is the best evidence of
Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date. Insofar as I am
obliged to articulate a principled, evidence-based explanation
for the delta between the Unaffected Market Price and the
DCF valuation (here, $0.18 per share), I am satisfied the
difference reflects the subjective imperfections of the DCF
methodology. The DCF valuation corroborates the most
persuasive market evidence and provides comfort that I have
appraised Jarden as best as the credible evidence allows.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I have found the fair value of
Jarden shares as of the Merger was $48.31 per share. The legal
rate of interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue from the
date of closing to the date of payment. The parties shall confer
and submit an implementing order and final judgment within
ten days.
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25 PTO ¶54.
26 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 8:24–11:5.
27 Trial Tr. 368:3–19 (Franklin).
28 Trial Tr. 367:15–22, 467:20–22 (Franklin).
29 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 11:9–10, 15:20–22.
30 Id. at 10:20–11:10.
31 PTO ¶38.
32 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 11:5–12:24, 49:6–50:13.
33 JX 502 at 5; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 17:15–21.
34 Id.
35 JX 502 at 6.
36 Id. at 21.
37 JX 1192 at 11; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 11:5–14; JX 1775 (Sansone Dep.) at 101:5–20, 146:21–147:3.
38 JX 786 at 17.
39 Trial Tr. 423:1–9 (Franklin).
40 Trial Tr. 451:14–18, 451:19–21(Franklin); Trial Tr. 81:10–11 (Lillie) (“Q. That was one quarter miss in 13 years? A. Yes.”);
JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 265:16–266:7.
41 Trial Tr. 53:12–24 (Lillie); JX 1459 (“Consistent with its guidance, the Company expects that net sales for 2015 will be
approximately $8.6 billion”).
42 JX 1519 at 47.
43 See JX 1816 at ¶47. The S&P 400 refers to the Standard & Poor's MidCap 400 index.
44 Id.
45 Id. at ¶¶46–48 and Figure 11; JX 1439.
46 JX 1816 at ¶¶45–48.
47 Id. at ¶¶48–50; see also Trial Tr. 1019:24–1020:23 (Hubbard).
48 Trial Tr. 370:17–18 (Franklin) (“We were building a business, both organically and by acquisition.”); JX 578 at 33.
49 JX 1519 at 40, 44; JX 30 at 36; JX 502 at 19; JX 1459.
50 JX 1519 at 40.
51 Trial Tr. 125:12–22 (Gross); JX 502 at 25; JX 1773 (Talwar Dep.) at 21:19–22:3, 27:6–10.
52 The strategy included targeting: (i) category-leading positions in niche consumer markets; (ii) with recurring revenue and
margin growth channels; (iii) robust cash flow characteristics, including substantial EBITDA multiples; (iv) a successful
management team; and (v) strong transaction valuations, with value-generating presynergies. JX 502 at 25.
53 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 24:25–25:21; JX 1773 (Talwar Dep.) at 28:4–13.
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54 Id.
55 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 133:2–21; JX 1773 (Talwar Dep.) at 27:11–24.
56 JX 502 at 11.
[We] ... looked at everything. Again, it goes back to being professional opportunists, in terms of building a business.
You've got to—you know, we were a fairly unusual group. We started from a $200 million business 15 years prior, to
becoming a 10-plus billion dollar business 15 years later. It wasn't done from sitting behind a desk. We were building
a business, both organically and by acquisition.
Trial Tr. 370:11–18 (Franklin).
57 PTO ¶40.
58 JX 763 at 25.
59 JX 514 at 10.
60 JX 1393.
61 JX 763 at 22.
62 Id. at 17.
63 JX 1795 at 21.
64 PTO ¶110.
65 JX 527 at 23, 26.
66 Id. at 23; JX 606 at 3–4.
67 PTO ¶113.
68 JX 726 at 15.
69 Id.
70 Trial Tr. 455:3–9 (Franklin) (“Q. And in 2015, you were spending real money on direct-to-consumer and expanding your
distribution channels. Correct? A. Well, we bought a business that expanded our distribution capabilities. We bought
Jostens for the same kind of reason. It gave us a different access into schools.”).
71 JX 726 at 11; JX 823 at 3–4.
72 JX 726 at 12.
73 JX 1816 at ¶¶46–48, Figure 11; JX 1439.
74 PTO ¶234. As of the Merger Date, Ashken was a director of Platform. Id. ¶61; JX 576 at 2.
75 PTO ¶235. As of the Merger Date, Lillie was a director of Nomad. Id. ¶63.
76 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 359:15–16; PTO ¶97. Lillie and Ashken were also investors in Mariposa. Trial Tr. 527:11–
13 (Franklin).
77 PTO ¶282. But for the Merger, Franklin would have pursued the Royal Oak transaction for Jarden. Trial Tr. 559:4–560:5
(Franklin). Jarden's lead independent director, Michael Gross, also participated in the Royal Oak acquisition. Id.; JX 1807
(Gross Dep.) at 14:22–15:10. Gross and Franklin have been close personal friends for 30 years. JX 1807 (Gross Dep.)
at 15:14–18.
78 PTO ¶249; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 93:7–8. Ashken and Lillie were also investors in J2. JX 1770.
79 JX 765; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 71:20–72:12; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 164:14–165:3.
80 JX 533; JX 490; PTO ¶125; Trial Tr. 584:12–585:24 (Polk). Phillips previously worked opposite Franklin in a transaction
with Nomad. Trial Tr. 585:14–18 (Polk); Trial Tr. 373:6–18 (Franklin).
81 Trial Tr. 576:5–13 (Polk); JX 490; JX 524; PTO ¶123.
82 JX 533; PTO ¶125.
83 JX 576 at 2.
84 Id.
85 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 28:9–19; JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 121:10–122:3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 157:25–158:14.
86 PTO ¶79. Newell was a member of the NYSE and the S&P 500. PTO ¶84. It was followed by at least 16 financial analysts
and, like Jarden, its stock exhibited the attributes of a narrow “bid-ask spread,” a high average trading volume and a
large public float. JX 1816 at ¶57, Figure 15.
87 Trial Tr. 566:21–567:8 (Polk).
88 Trial Tr. 567:9–569:3 (Polk); see also Trial Tr. 721:22–722:5 (Torres).
89 PTO ¶80. Trial Tr. 566:11–20 (Polk).
90 Trial Tr. 566:11–20 (Polk).
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91 Trial Tr. 567:20–569:3 (Polk).
92 Trial Tr. 571:2–7 (Polk).
93 Trial Tr. 571:20–572:2 (Polk).
94 Trial Tr. 572:6–574:19 (Polk).
95 Trial Tr. 576:12–582:1 (Polk). See JX 655; JX 860.
96 Trial Tr. 581:10–17 (Polk).
97 Trial Tr. 581:18–582:1 (Polk).
98 Trial Tr. 584:12–24 (Polk); Tr. 373:19–24 (Franklin).
99 Trial Tr. 375:5–14 (Franklin). As Franklin explained, “[i]f a CEO wants to meet with me, I'll always want to meet with him.”
Trial Tr. 376:17–20 (Franklin).
100 JX 902; PTO ¶¶127, 129.
101 Trial Tr. 588:3–13 (Polk).
102 Trial Tr. 586:14–21 (Polk).
103 Trial Tr. 376:13–20 (Franklin); Tr. 588:22–589:7 (Polk).
104 JX 902 at 2.
105 Id.
106 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 54:13–22; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 25:2–7, 26:10–19. The Board met on September 28,
2015, but the minutes do not reflect any discussion of a potential transaction with Newell or Franklin's September 9th
meeting with Polk. See JX 691; PTO ¶131.
107 Trial Tr. 378:24–380:18, 480:16–17 (Franklin); JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 57:2–23, 58:22–59:3 (Franklin called board
members to advise them on meeting); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 26:24–27:12 (same); JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 28:20–
29:8, 33:20–34:4 (same).
108 Trial Tr. 566:9–20 (Polk).
109 Trial Tr. 598:10–16 (Polk); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 29:18–30:9, 32:10–33:9 (explaining Jarden “was by far the most
likely [acquisition] candidate to reapply the Newell Rubbermaid business model” of consolidation, which “could release
a large amount of value”).
110 JX 685 at 2; JX 902 at 2; PTO ¶132. Trial Tr. 383:23–384:8 (Franklin). Following the Merger, Tarchetti became the
President of the combined entity. JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 14:17–21.
111 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 58:9–21; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 31:12–25; PTO ¶133. I note that Franklin's testimony
that he did not intend to negotiate definitive deal parameters during the Boat Meeting was credible. Trial Tr. 486:11–
16 (Franklin). It appears, instead, that Franklin intended to lay out certain expectations and then “tell[ ] [the] Newell
[team that] if they had different expectations, they shouldn't bother spending time, effort, and money.” Trial Tr. 489:14–17
(Franklin). As Franklin explained, “I didn't want to go down the path of having any real substantive conversations unless
they understood that we were looking for a real premium.” Trial Tr. 469:2–22 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 384:21–385:2
(Franklin); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 64:4–9 (explaining “we sort of made it very clear that Jarden wasn't for sale; but
if we got an extraordinary offer our job was to create value for our shareholders, so we would always listen to whatever
Mike had to say”).
112 JX 1794 (Christian Dep.) at 159:9–160:14; JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 72:2–3; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 85:24–86:7; JX
1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 305:24–306:10; PTO ¶134.
113 JX 2502; JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 64:17–65:4, 97:14–98:2; JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 27:10–21; Trial Tr. 369:22–
370:2, 471:11–472:16 (Franklin). While Jarden had asked Barclays to prepare some preliminary combination models and
to do some “rough math” prior to the Boat Meeting (Trial Tr. 472:7–8 (Franklin); JX 688), Jarden had no formal analysis
of its standalone value, nor had it retained a financial advisor when Franklin set the range for a transaction at $60–$69
per share. JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 135:14–136:3; Trial Tr. 470:18–471:8 (Franklin).
114 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 95:15–19. See also Trial Tr. 473:24–475:1 (Franklin) (explaining his sense of Newell's financial
limits).
115 Trial Tr. 391:24–392:10 (Franklin).
116 Trial Tr. 385:10–14 (Franklin).
117 Trial Tr. 385:24–386:4 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 666:6–7 (Polk) (“And I interpreted that to be between 60 and 69, which is a
very wide range.”); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 65:21–23 (referring to a price in the $60s as “a very, very, very,
very full price”).
118 Trial Tr. 474:14–475:1 (Franklin); JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 103:3–13.
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119 Trial Tr. 475:18–476:22 (Franklin).
120 Trial Tr. 598:3–16 (Polk) (explaining that “the logic for the deal” was the expectation of synergies by recreating the success
of Project Renewal); see also JX 674 at 2 (Polk noting that “there are tons of synergies because they have not done what
we have done with Renewal (they are a holding company)”) (emphasis in original).
121 Trial Tr. 387:13–388:23 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 664:3–665:8 (Polk).
122 Trial Tr. 391:24–392:10 (Franklin).
123 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 60:5–13 (discussing Franklin's view that any offer “needed to start with a 6 handle” and
explaining that “[g]iven where the stock was trading, that made a lot of sense”); see also JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 49:3–11.
124 Trial Tr. 548:22–549:4 (Franklin); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 135:14–136:3.
125 JX 769; JX 785; JX 915; JX 977; JX 1073; JX 1203; JX 1862; Trial Tr. 550:16–20 (Franklin); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at
137:22–138:18.
126 Trial Tr. 392:8–15 (Franklin); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 62:23–63:2.
127 Trial Tr. 392:16–393:6 (Franklin).
128 Id.
129 Trial Tr. 393:7–394:2 (Franklin).
130 Id.
131 JX 2502 at 2, 10.
132 JX 775.
133 JX 871 at 1; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 259:14–261:13.
134 On October 13, 2015, the day prior to the Jostens announcement, Jarden's stock price was $50.69. Jarden's stock price
fell to $44.80 by the end of October 2015. PTO Ex. A; see also JX 1816 at ¶¶66–68.
135 Trial Tr. 404:1–9 (Franklin). Franklin testified, “we were buyers up to [$]49, which we considered full value at the time.”
Trial Tr. 404:16–18 (Franklin).
136 JX 900 at 2.
137 JX 1565 at 85; PTO ¶135. Trial Tr. 394:23–395:4 (Franklin).
138 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 136:12–15; JX 1565 at 85. See Trial Tr. 492:5–10 (Franklin) (explaining Jarden's Board learned
of the confidentiality agreement).
139 PTO ¶136.
140 JX 786 at 110; PTO ¶138; Trial Tr. 396:17–397:2 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 602:24–603:15 (Polk).
141 JX 786 at 110; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 131:7–12, 148:6–149:5.
142 JX 786 at 111; see also Trial Tr. 827:19–828:11 (Waldron).
143 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 24:16–25:8.
144 Tuck-in acquisitions usually amounted to less than 1% of Jarden's yearly revenue. See, e.g., JX 380 at 11; JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 20:6–16; JX 432 at 5; JX 380 at 3, 11.
145 Trial Tr. 929:9–930:9 (Zenner).
146 JX 1816 at ¶30; JX 1831, Ex. 5A. Jarden achieved “organic growth” of 4% (including tuck-in acquisitions) and adjusted
organic growth of 3.2% (excluding all acquisitions), from 2011 to 2015. Id.
147 Trial Tr. 106:13–107:3 (Lillie).
148 Trial Tr. 106:1–9 (Lillie); JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 252:15–253:6.
149 Trial Tr. 604:3–12 (Polk) (explaining Newell did not use Jarden's projections because “I didn't believe 6 percent and 5
percent compounded. Those were really aggressive growth rates in the environment.”); see also id. 604:22–605:21 (Polk)
(explaining that Newell utilized more realistic projections when analyzing Jarden's value).
150 JX 1252 at 12; JX 1247 at 29.
151 JX 927 at 1.
152 Id.
153 JX 1045 at 31; JX 1205 at 44. With only minor adjustments for 2015 year-end actuals, the November Projections were
also included in the Company's proxy statement regarding the Merger.
154 JX 791 (Tarchetti told a colleague that “Martin change of control” was on a list of discussion points Franklin brought to
the meeting on October 22); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 33:20–35:4.
155 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 38:12–16, 67:13–25; JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 89:6–8; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 67:12–
15, 68:11–13.
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156 Trial Tr. 397:8–10, 399:6–10 (Franklin); see also JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 154:4–10.
157 Trial Tr. 397:15–398:4 (Franklin) (“I thought it was a little odd that, you know, a potential $20 billion transaction would all
hinge on the whims of the guy who is not the CEO, who is not even on the board ....”).
158 Id.
159 Trial Tr. 398:5–20 (Franklin); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 201:6–202:7.
160 Trial Tr. 398:16–20 (Franklin).
161 Trial Tr. 615:5–14 (Polk); see also JX 799 at 2.
162 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 221:24–222:9; Trial Tr. 398:21–399:5 (Franklin).
163 JX 815; PTO ¶140; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 35:9–36:17; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 58:9–14.
164 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 94:22–95:6; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 46:17–20; JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 87:2–13; JX 1789
(Welsh Dep.) at 162:20–163:9.
165 JX 815.
166 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 246:17–247:7; Trial Tr. 725:7–14 (Torres).
167 Trial Tr. 734:12–14 (Torres). Bain continued to analyze Jarden's category growth rates through closing. It eventually
determined that Jarden's categories “were relatively weak and were actually losing market share,” like the Coleman brand
that lost distribution to dominant outlets such as WalMart. This prompted Bain to downgrade its category growth rate
for Jarden to 2.5% as of closing. Trial Tr. 737:16–738:8 (Torres). When additional information became available post-
closing, Bain further decreased Jarden's category growth rate to 2.2%. Trial Tr. 739:2–8 (Torres).
168 Trial Tr. 753:1–7 (Torres).
169 Trial Tr. 600:16–601:7 (Polk); see also JX 1309 at 80.
170 JX 706 at 3; Trial Tr. 746:22–23 (Torres).
171 Trial Tr. 741:4–742:2 (Torres).
172 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 251:9–14; Trial Tr. 722:8–16 (Torres).
173 Trial Tr. 598:10–16, 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (the “logic for the deal” was to apply the Newell integration playbook to Jarden's
businesses); see also id. 699:6–9 (Polk) (“the costs associated with [Jarden's] decentralized model, that's where the
synergies were”).
174 JX 957 at 1.
175 Id. at 1–2.
176 Id. at 3 (Bain “highlighted three key benefits of the deal: transformational scale; high cost synergies; and likely above
average revenue synergies due to channel overlap and the ability to apply the Growth Game Plan to selected categories
at [Jarden]”).
177 JX 973 at 42; Trial Tr. 767:2–24 (Torres).
178 JX 943 at 11.
179 Trial Tr. 614:4–18, 678:12–16 (Polk).
180 Id.
181 Trial Tr. 678:12–16 (Polk) (“The deal architecture assumed $500 million of gross synergies. If we didn't deliver $500
million of gross synergies, we would not have delivered the operating margin outcomes, and we would not have delivered
accretive EPS.”).
182 Trial Tr. 616:12–23 (Polk); JX 957 at 9.
183 JX 986; PTO ¶142.
184 JX 986 at 2.
185 Id.
186 JX 976 at 1–2; PTO ¶143.
187 JX 977.
188 JX 976 at 2–3; Trial Tr. 405:12–16 (Franklin).
189 JX 976 at 2; PTO ¶145.
190 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 91:22–25; see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 48:3–8 (“Q. Did Jarden to your knowledge ever
make a counteroffer to Newell? A. Not that I'm aware of. Q. Did the Board ever discuss parameters of the counteroffer?
A. Not that I'm aware of.”).
191 Trial Tr. 406:2–5 (Franklin).
192 JX 976 at 3.
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193 Trial Tr. 562:4–5 (Franklin) (“The board wanted a second advisor.”); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 100:12–101:6.
194 Trial Tr. 407:2–15 (Franklin). Barclays earned about $180 million from all of Franklin's businesses, including nearly $70
million from Platform alone in the four years between Platform's founding and the Merger Date. JX 1805; Trial Tr. 546:11–
17 (Franklin). Barclays' history with Franklin and his businesses earned Franklin “Platinum client” status. JX 438; JX 1789
(Welsh Dep.) at 50:25–54:4. The Board made no inquiry regarding the thickness of Franklin's relationship with Barclays
and there is no indication that either Franklin or Barclays made any effort to disclose their past relationships to the Board.
See JX 976; JX 1070.
195 Trial Tr. 407:16–408:3 (Franklin).
196 Trial Tr. 560:22–24 (Franklin). Franklin explained to the Board that UBS had done work for the Company in the past
for free, and described the UBS engagement in connection with the Newell transaction as giving UBS a “kiss.” Trial Tr.
561:19–562:12 (Franklin) (“I described it at one point as giving them a kiss. It was a way of saying thanks for all the work
that you've done that you didn't get compensated for. We—you know, you're on par with a couple of other firms to do this
advisory work for us for the board, and we're happy to have you do that work.”). Petitioners argue that this means UBS
was paid for doing no work and that the payment diverted value from stockholders. This is not a fair characterization of
UBS's role. The record reflects that UBS prepared Board decks, led discussions at Board meetings and was generally
available to the Board as a sounding board. Trial Tr. 560:22–24 (Franklin); JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 35:23–36:10.
Whether UBS's compensation was fully earned is beyond the scope of this appraisal proceeding.
197 Trial Tr. 408:4–15 (Franklin); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 44:10–14; JX 976 at 3; PTO ¶146. See JX 1565 at 89 (“With
respect to UBS, it was noted that Ms. Ros L'Esperance is the Head of Client Corporate Solutions of UBS, and as such
she would be recused from all deliberations and votes of the Jarden board, if any, in respect of the possible business
combination with Newell Rubbermaid.”).
198 Trial Tr. 408:24–409:8 (Franklin); JX 1001 at 1.
199 Trial Tr. 411:4–10 (Franklin).
200 Trial Tr. 409:1–8 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 618:24–619:3 (Polk); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 214:2–9; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at
297:3–12, 300:8–16; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 48:3–8; JX 1016 at 3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 91:15–92:2; PTO ¶148.
201 Trial Tr. 410:2–7 (Franklin).
202 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 116:22–119:20 (“[A]s we explained to them, we were not sellers. If you want to buy it, buy it.
But don't waste our time. And it was a pretty acrimonious meeting. And it didn't make any difference to us whether we
bought or sold.”); see also Trial Tr. 410:8–24 (Franklin).
203 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 116:13–21.
204 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 119:6–9. Franklin similarly explained: “I went back to the board and said, This deal is dead.
We tried to get a better offer out of them, and they refused.” Trial Tr. 504:23–505:1 (Franklin).
205 JX 1069; JX 1066 at 2; JX 1149; PTO ¶153; JX 1064 at 2; see also Trial Tr. 619:18–620:5 (Polk) ($21.00 was “the limit
to what we could afford” in cash consideration). According to Franklin, Newell “blinked” and agreed to increase its offer.
Trial Tr. 412:19–413:2 (Franklin).
206 JX 1064 at 3; see also JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 307:4–8 (“So by this stage, we'd obviously recommended to the board
that we should try to consummate the transaction because we believed the synergies would create a lot of value for
both parties.”).
207 JX 1064 at 3.
208 JX 1070 at 2; PTO ¶¶155, 157. Franklin went over the terms of the revised offer, discussing the increased proposed
cash consideration from $20.00 to $21.00 per share and the formula for determining the exchange ratio. JX 1070 at 1.
Barclays also presented its analysis of the updated offer, including a revised valuation analysis of Jarden as a standalone
company. JX 1079 at 27–28.
209 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 112:5–6.
210 Id. at 55:7–15.
211 Id. at 55:10–56:9.
212 Id. at 49:3–11. See also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 68:19–23, 69:23–70:4 (“When we looked at it and we thought, you
know, if we can realize something that begins with a 6 for our shareholders is that more than we could expect if we
continue to run the operations and did all the stuff? And we felt the answer was yes.”).
213 Trial Tr. 415:2–11 (Franklin).
214 Trial Tr. 415:19–23 (Franklin).
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215 Trial Tr. 684:13–685:22 (Polk) (explaining that $500 million in synergies was assumed in the deal model, but “if there's
future value to be created, more synergies, more growth, then any equity owner benefits from that”); see also Trial Tr.
415:2–15 (Franklin). Franklin described the $60.00 offer as “a full and fair price by any measure.” Trial Tr. 444:5–10
(Franklin).
216 JX 1070 at 2–3; PTO ¶¶155, 157. During the exclusivity period, Franklin and Ashken continued to negotiate the terms
of the Merger Agreement, but also negotiated for Franklin, Ashken, and Lillie to continue with the combined company as
paid consultants through Mariposa. See JX 906; JX 1061; JX 1074.
217 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 102:6–8 (explaining the Board's view that “it would not be value enhancing and perhaps very
distracting to management to run an auction”). Respondent acknowledges that the Board never considered authorizing
its bankers to reach out to other potential strategic buyers or financial sponsors. Id. at 94:22–95:6.
218 Id. at 100:13–23.
219 Trial Tr. 419:21–420:5 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 918:10–921:11 (Zenner) (explaining that other large consumer product
companies had targeted businesses and were probably not interested in a diversified company like Jarden). Until Newell
surfaced, no potential acquirer had expressed interest in Jarden during its entire 15-year history. Trial Tr. 425:10–13
(Franklin).
220 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 129:2–130:14; JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 65:5–10.
221 JX 1565 at 90; JX 1116 at 194–242.
222 Trial Tr. 475:2–7 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 617:5–18 (Polk).
223 Trial Tr. 621:9–13 (Polk).
224 Trial Tr. 620:17–20 (Polk); Trial Tr. 406:24–407:1 (Franklin) (“[I]t would almost look odd if I didn't agree to serve as a
director in the go-forward company.”); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 120:3–16, 124:6–18 (discussing Franklin's role as the
“face of Jarden” and the importance of having Franklin on the board of the combined entity, which would serve as an
endorsement of the Merger); JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 153:24–154:3.
225 Trial Tr. 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (“We wanted as part of—the deal terms, to get control of the company. Because there
was no way that, without our leadership of the change agenda, those synergies were going to be realized.”); JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 153:15–19.
226 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 163:13–14.
227 Id. at 163:14–19 (explaining Newell was “very keen to have [the noncompete period] be four years” because Newell “had
had a bad experience” before with competition from a past executive); see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 58:16–59:9
(noting Newell was “requiring that the management team extend their non-compete agreements from two to four years,”
which was a “big ask” since management was in the prime of their careers).
228 Trial Tr. 526:18–20 (Franklin); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 347:15–349:7.
229 JX 1233 at 2–3.
230 Id.
231 JX 1150 at 1–2; JX 1148; PTO ¶164. According to one witness, Newell's counsel leaked news of the Merger to a reporter.
JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 322:23–323:9.
232 PTO, Exs. A, B.
233 Trial Tr. 424:1–5 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 658:16–659:2 (Polk) (explaining that after the leak, Newell “had to” negotiate a fixed
exchange rate because “we would have had exposure, potentially, if the stock had run one way or the other”); JX 1779
(Tarchetti Dep.) at 325:17–23 (fixing the exchange ratio was “in the interest of both parties because the stock prices were
very volatile, and it was against the spirit of the agreement to not reflect the fact that there had been a leak”); JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 136:12–17 (same).
234 JX 1195 at 1.
235 JX 1241 at 5; Trial Tr. 507:1–19 (Franklin).
236 JX 1218 at 2. Had Jarden negotiated for a 0.90 exchange ratio, Jarden stockholders would have received $380 million
in additional equity. Id.
237 Id.
238 JX 1207 at 3.
239 JX 1205.
240 JX 1202 at 1.
241 Id.
242 Id.
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243 JX 906 at rows 15–17; JX 1057; JX 1072 at 1–2.
244 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. In addition to his work as Jarden's General Counsel, Capps has served as General
Counsel for Platform since 2016. S&P Global Market Intelligence, Platform Specialty Products (ESI:NYSE) (2019). Capps
was also to be a beneficiary of any grant of 2017 and 2018 RSAs. JX 1565 at 146–147.
245 JX 1231 at 18. There is no evidence the Compensation Committee ever looked at the employment agreements. JX 1231
at 16; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 66:12–22, 81:15–82:2 (“I don't even know if I've seen it before.”).
246 JX 1232; JX 1231 at 2.
247 JX 1231 at 2; see JX 1255. Barclays delivered its written fairness opinion the following day. JX 1255.
248 JX 1231 at 4. The Jarden board reiterated “its belief that the combined company's long-term value, prospects and benefits
from the merger would exceed the value that could be realized by Jarden's stockholders were Jarden to continue operating
on a stand-alone (independent) basis.” Id. at 3.
249 Id. at 4, 9. The amended employment agreements for Franklin, Ashken and Lillie extended the term of their non-competes
upon termination from two years to four years. JX 1326 at 15. They also confirmed the acceleration of certain RSAs
in connection with the transaction. JX 1326 at 15; see also Trial Tr. 638:11–16 (Polk) (explaining that the negotiations
concerning the RSAs were between the Jarden executives and the Jarden board). Franklin, Ashken and Lillie had three-
year “evergreen” employment agreements. Under those agreements, they each were guaranteed their 2017 and 2018
RSAs, which the Board agreed to grant prior to the Merger. JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 142:23–143:4, 146:4–7; Trial Tr.
517:9–19 (Franklin). Using Newell's stock price as of the Merger Date to determine the exchange ratio cash equivalent,
Franklin received a total of $71.04 per share in Merger-related consideration, Ashken received a total of $76.11 per share
and Lillie received an equivalent of $81.69 per share. JX 1818 at ¶40.
250 JX 1231 at 2. The final Merger consideration represented a premium of 24.3% over the unaffected market price of $48.31
on December 4, 2015 (the last day of trading before the leak) and a premium of 24% over the VWAP of $48.35 for the
30-day period prior to December 11, 2015. Id.
251 JX 1251 at 1–2.
252 JX 1252 at 12; JX 1247 at 29; see also JX 775 at 5. Newell also used numbers in line with the Lender Presentation
projections in its internal modeling and in the presentation made to rating agencies on December 7, 2015. JX 1154 at 41.
253 JX 1230 at 10.
254 JX 1228 at 7. Bain's report in advance of the meeting estimated total annual synergies ranging from $585 million to $1
billion, comprised of $500–$700 million in cost synergies and $85–$320 million in revenue synergies. JX 1139 at 50.
Bain was “very comfortable” Newell would meet at least the low end of its estimate range. Trial Tr. 773:14–22, 774:17–
775:6 (Torres).
255 PTO ¶¶179, 181.
256 JX 1269 at 3.
257 PTO, Ex. A.
258 JX 1816 at ¶53. Jarden's stock price never closed above the implied Merger price prior to closing. Id. at ¶54.
259 Id. at ¶58.
260 Id. at ¶59.
261 Id. at ¶¶59–60.
262 JX 1519 at 68. Net income fell by nearly 40% as compared to 2014 year-end. Id. Jarden also adjusted its guidance
downward twice during 2015. JX 454 at 4, 17, 41. And, in November 2015, Lillie advised investors that Q4 2015 organic
growth would be in the 2–4% range, not the 3–5% range as earlier reported. JX 1034 at 1.
263 JX 1514 at 1–2; see also Trial Tr. 622:15–17 (Polk) (noting that Jarden fell below its goals for Q1 2016).
264 Id.; Trial Tr. 440:22–441:1 (Franklin); see also JX 1510; Trial Tr. 823:13–19, 856:1–6 (Waldron). The 2016 budget
assumed Jarden would remain a standalone company. Trial Tr. 830:16–21 (Waldron).
265 JX 1562 (revised multi-year plan projecting $9.816 billion in total revenue); see also Trial Tr. 833:5–834:11 (Waldron).
Newell asked for a copy of Jarden's updated multi-year plan in mid-March 2016, which Jarden provided. Trial Tr. 833:5–
834:11 (Waldron). Newell later asked Jarden to reevaluate the operating cash flow assumptions in the plan. After doing
this, Jarden circulated a revised version on April 1, 2016. Trial Tr. 832:24–838:3 (Waldron). See also JX 1563; JX 1597;
JX 1598. While this revision included minor adjustments, the annual revenue and EBITDA projections remained the same
as those estimated in the unrevised plan. Id.
266 Trial Tr. 834:12–835:11 (Waldron).
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267 JX 1598; JX 1565; see also JX 1826 at ¶88, Figure 16. Newell incorporated the revised multi-year plan into its own multi-
year forecast. Newell's forecast, however, assumed growth at 3.5%. JX 1691 at 95; Trial Tr. 626:4–627:15 (Polk).
268 PTO ¶183. Over 97% of voting Jarden stockholders approved the Merger (representing 83% of the outstanding shares).
JX 1663 at 7.
269 JX 1816 at ¶10. The per share decrease in consideration from $60.03 to $59.21 reflects the change in Newell's stock
price from signing to closing.
270 Trial Tr. 780:14–781:2 (Torres); see also JX 1373 at 11.
271 Trial Tr. 781:18–782:20 (Torres); JX 1691 at 7.
272 Trial Tr. 783:4–784:7 (Torres).
273 JX 1666; JX 2015; Trial Tr. 447:16–18 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 796:22–797:11, 798:20–799:11, 800:20–801:24, 802:18–804:3
(Torres).
274 JX 1801; JX 1802; Trial Tr. 802:18–803:4 (Torres). Franklin strongly objected to this strategy. JX 1808; JX 1809; JX
1825; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 16:9–14.
275 JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 191:13–20.
276 Newell Brands announced an agreement to sell Waddington in April 2018 for $2.3 billion, almost $1 billion more than the
price Jarden paid less than three years prior. Trial Tr. 450:18–451:2 (Franklin) (“Q. Okay. Waddington, you bought for
1.35 million [sic] in July of 2015. Correct? A. Correct. Q. And Newell sold that business this year for 2.3 billion. Right?
A. Correct. Q. They made almost a billion on that. Right? A. Yes.”).
277 Trial Tr. 447:2–11 (Franklin); JX 1808; JX 1809; JX 1823; JX 1834.
278 JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 184:17–188:12; JX 1809.
279 Trial Tr. 447:12–15 (Franklin); JX 1809.
280 JX 1822.
281 Newell Brands, Inc., Form 8-K at 3 (dated May 17, 2018).
282 PTO ¶11.
283 D.I. 13.
284 D.I. 35.
285 D.I. 37.
286 The expert reports were submitted under seal. At the close of this case, the Court will unseal the reports. Perhaps
the legal and business academies will find interesting, and worthy of study and classroom discussion, how two such
well-credentialed experts in their fields reached such wildly divergent conclusions regarding the fair value of the same
company as of the same date.
287 D.I. 154.
288 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
289 DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h)).
290 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983)).
291 Id.
292 Id. at 22.
293 Aruba, 2019 WL 1614026, at *6.
294 In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018). See also In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc.,
2017 WL 2303599, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (collecting cases).
295 In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *27 (citing Chuck Carlson, Game of My Life: 25 Stories of Packer
Football (Sports Pub. 2004) (quoting Coach Lombardi as opening his first Packers team meeting in 1959, after twenty
years of coaching, by saying: “Gentleman, we are going to relentlessly chase perfection, knowing full well we will not
catch it, because nothing is perfect.”)).
296 Id. (citing Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (observing that no “real-
world sales process” will live up to “a perfect, theoretical model”)).
297 Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 35.
298 Dr. Zenner testified that auctions are less effective as companies increase in scale and complexity. Trial Tr. 915:3–14,
916:17–917:17 (Zenner). For sale transactions over $5.4 billion, as here, only one in five are the product of an auction.
Id.; JX 1817, App'x C-5. See also JX 1827 at ¶¶53–54 (explaining that the most logical strategic partners were too small
to buy the Company); JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 101:18–102:11 (Jarden routinely “looked at likely people we could have
business combinations with or that we could acquire ... [and] didn't think there was anybody out there who would come
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in and make a preemptive offer to buy the company”); Trial Tr. 921:12–923:16 (Zenner); JX 1817 at ¶95 (explaining that
financial sponsors were not interested in Jarden because its leverage was too high); Trial Tr. 419:6–8 (Franklin) (“In 15
years of building the company, I haven't had one company come and sort of make an offer to buy Jarden.”); JX 1789
(Welsh Dep.) at 143:5–10 (“The combination with Newell was viewed to be a highly strategic combination that couldn't
necessarily be replicated with other counterparties....”); JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 88:3–4 (“UBS was not aware of any
other buyers that were interested in acquiring all of Jarden.”).
299 Trial Tr. 504:23–505:1 (Franklin) (“I went back to the board and said, This deal is dead. We tried to get a better offer out
of them, and they refused.”); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 119:6–9; see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 41:3–15.
300 JX 1816 at ¶169, Figure 23.
301 I appreciate Franklin was no longer CEO when he negotiated with Newell. With regard to M&A, however, his role as
Executive Chairman was tantamount to that of a typical CEO. Trial Tr. 367:15–22, 467:20–22 (Franklin).
302 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 54:13–22, 58:9–21, 121:10–122:3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 25:2–7, 26:10–19, 31:12–
25, 32:2–17, 157:25–158:14. Franklin's revelation at the Boat Meeting that he would like to exit from Jarden in order to
have more time to pursue business ventures with his sons also made an impression on Polk and, when coupled with his
direction regarding an acceptable offer price, likely communicated to Newell that he was eager, maybe overly eager, to
do a deal. See JX 765 (Tarchetti reporting that Franklin revealed “his desire for an exit, which as the company figurehead
is difficult. He says he would like to inve[st] in business with his sons having taken some money off the table (assuming
he has about 0.5bn if this happened”)); Trial Tr. 71:20–72:12 (Polk); Trial Tr. 164:14–165:3 (Tarchetti). There is other
evidence in the record that Franklin was perceived as an anxious seller. See JX 576 (Bill Ackman's July 2015 email to
Warren Buffett, copying Franklin, attempting to interest Buffett in acquiring Jarden); JX 533; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at
157:25–158:14; JX 860 (Centerview set up the first meeting between Franklin and Polk, marketing Jarden to Newell as
a “willing seller.”); JX 902 at 2 (Polk stating that Franklin “cut straight to the chase” about his willingness to sell Jarden).
303 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 38:12–16, 48:3–8, 67:13–25; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 72:9–18, 91:15–92:2; JX 1788
(L'Esperance Dep.) at 89:6–8.
304 JX 1049. The Board justified the compensation awards after the fact. JX 1212 at 15; JX 1565 at 146. Moreover, as Franklin
and Ashken were telling Newell they were entitled to the 2017 and 2018 RSAs, Jarden's Compensation Committee had
not discussed the possibility of awarding those grants. JX 1145; JX 1202. The Board was told by in-house counsel Capps
—who was also receiving 2017 and 2018 RSAs—that Jarden was contractually obligated to make these awards even
though the agreements at issue were not clear on the point. JX 1629 at 5; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. There
are other troubling facts relating to the change-in-control payments, including that Franklin arranged for his long-time legal
counsel to advise the Board with respect to the payments and the payments ultimately resulted in the lead negotiators
for Jarden receiving substantially more in Merger consideration than Jarden's other stockholders. See JX 1145; JX 1234;
JX 1235; JX 1236; Trial Tr. 534:18–536:11–18 (Franklin); JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 362:20–22. Respondent argues
the RSAs that made up most of the Merger consideration differential Franklin and the other Jarden managers received
were owed to them “in the regular course absent a sale.” Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Opening Post-Trial Br. (“ROB”) at 57.
The Merger agreement, however, terminated the employment contracts under which the RSAs were granted. See JX
1235. Franklin and the other Jarden managers claimed they were contractually owed the 2017 and 2018 RSAs under
their employment agreements before the separation agreements even existed. JX 906 at rows 15–17; JX 1057; JX 1072;
JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. The Board then justified the disconnect by explaining the 2017 and 2018 RSAs
served as consideration for the commitment to add two more years to the non-compete covenants. JX 1565 at 146. Of
course, when the dust settled, the separation agreements extended the term of the non-compete covenants by only one
year. JX 1234; JX 1235; JX 1236.
305 JX 1805; Trial Tr. 546:11–17 (Franklin); JX 438; JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 50:25–54:4; JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 269:6–
19.
306 By so finding, I do not intend to suggest that Franklin or any Jarden fiduciary breached any fiduciary duty. That inquiry
is beyond the scope of this appraisal proceeding. See In re Unocal Expl. Corp. S'holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 340 (Del.
Ch. 2000) (noting that a breach of fiduciary finding is beyond the scope of statutory appraisal).
307 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software Inc., 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015).
308 Id. at *17.
309 JX 1817 at ¶¶32–33, 41–43.
310 Trial Tr. 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (“We wanted as part of—the deal terms, to get control of the company. Because there
was no way that, without our leadership of the change agenda, those synergies were going to be realized.”); JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 153:15–19.
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311 JX 1269 at 3.
312 JX 1565 at 85.
313 JX 1228 at 7. Bain had estimated synergies ranging from $585 million to $1 billion, comprised of $500–$700 million in
cost synergies and $85–$320 million in revenue synergies. JX 1139 at 50.
314 JX 1817 at ¶40; JX 1816 at ¶183;
315 JX 1100 at 18; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 100:2–5, 101:15–16.
316 JX 1100 at 18.
317 Trial Tr. 649:5–8 (Polk); JX 2022 (“The premium is designed to get Newell management control.”); JX 1804 (Polk Dep.)
at 100:2–5, 101:15–16 (When asked “how did you come to the conclusion that a modest premium to their current market
valuation would give Newell control,” Polk responded “I knew that it was a quid pro quo” and “[i]f we were going to pay a
premium for the asset, we need management control.”). Of course, Polk clarified that control was necessary to achieve
the synergies since Newell was not satisfied that Jarden management would take the steps needed to create synergies.
See Trial Tr. 686:17–22 (Polk).
318 JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 115:4–9.
319 Trial Tr. 476:3–5 (Franklin).
320 Trial Tr. 598:10–21, 599:14–600:6, 614:4–18, 678:12–6 (Polk); JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 62:20–63:2; JX 1779 (Tarchetti
Dep.) at 29:6–30:9; JX 674 at 2 (September 2015 Polk email, emphasizing the “tons of synergies” to be realized by
employing the Project Renewal strategy) (emphasis in original); Trial Tr. 725:7–14, 742:3–743:19 (Torres); JX 973 at 36;
JX 1139 at 50, 56; JX 1565 at 67.
321 JX 1816 at ¶¶181–83; JX 1831 at ¶4, Figure 25; Trial Tr. 1087:23–1091:9 (Hubbard).
322 JX 1816 at ¶188 (“These results indicate that the market expected nearly all of the synergy value to accrue to Jarden
shareholders, consistent with academic research finding that most of the benefits of mergers accrue to target-firm
shareholders.”); Trial Tr. 1090:18–20 (Hubbard).
323 BMC Software, 2015 WL 6164771, at *17.
324 To be clear, and as explained below, I am satisfied from the evidence that the Merger Price exceeded fair value. It is less
clear, however, what exactly justified the premium Newell was willing to pay for Jarden. This is partially a product of the
complications in valuing synergies where the merger consideration includes stock, versus a strictly cash-for-stock merger.
In such a transaction, shareholders of both constituent corporations remain shareholders in the continuing combined
enterprise. Thus, both groups—acquirer shareholders and target shareholders—are able to participate pro rata in
gains arising out of the merger. Therefore, a premium to the target's shareholders cannot be justified, as in a cash
acquisition, on the premise that it is the only way to permit those shareholders to share in the gains arising from
the merger.
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of Director
Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 881, 884 (2003).
325 As noted, news of the potential merger between Jarden and Newell leaked to the public on Monday, December 7,
2015. See JX 1150 at 1–2; JX 1148; PTO ¶164; JX 1164; Liz Hoffman, Dana Mattioli & Dana Cimilluca, Newell
Rubbermaid, Jarden in Merger Talks, The Wall Street Journal (2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/newell-rubbermaid-
jarden-in-merger-talks-1449521419 (last visited July 19, 2019). The last day Jarden stock was traded without being
affected by news of the merger negotiations was Friday, December 4, 2015. JX 1231 at 2. On that day, Jarden stock
closed at $48.31 per share. JX 1816 at ¶47.
326 ROB at 2.
327 Trial Tr. 1267:17–1268:5 (Hubbard) (“I've seen nothing in the record that would suggest to me the unaffected stock price
is not the right anchor [for fair value].”).
328 Trial Tr. 323:15–326:14 (Zmijewski). See also Trial Tr. 1021:2–9 (Hubbard) (“Does Dr. Zmijewski in his reports dispute
that either Newell or Jarden traded in an efficient market? A. Not in his reports, no. Q. And did you hear that in his
testimony? A. I did not. I was present, and I didn't hear that.”).
329 JX 1816 at ¶45. See also JX 2032, Jonathan Berk & Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance 301 (Pearson Education Limited,
4th ed. 2017) (“Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance”); JX 2515, Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation: Tools and
Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset 4 (Wiley, 3d ed. 2012) (Damodaran, Investment Valuation); JX 2516,
Tim Koller et al., McKinsey & Co., Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies 37–38 (Wiley, 6th ed.
2015) (“Koller, Valuation”).
330 JX 1816 at ¶45.
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331 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 302.
332 JX 1816 at ¶45; Trial Tr. 323:15–324:4 (Zmijewski) (acknowledging that one “can look to stock price to corroborate a fair
value conclusion”); Trial Tr. 1017:11–14 (Hubbard) (“For the unaffected stock price to be relevant, Your Honor, to your
consideration, you need to believe that it's an unbiased indicator of the value of the firm. That's an efficient market.”).
333 Dr. Hubbard stated,
[t]here are tests for whether a market is efficient, tests that economists suggest, but tests that have been widely used
in courts. So I used a number of factors that capture the scope of the firm, whether analysts follow it, transactions
cost, liquidity, and so on. I do those tests for both Jarden and Newell and conclude that both trade in an efficient
market, semi-strong form.
Trial Tr. 1017:11–14 (Hubbard).
334 Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Pre-Trial Br. at 6.
335 JX 1816 at ¶44, Figure 10.
336 JX 242, Robert W. Holthausen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory, Evidence & Practice 301–03
(Cambridge Business Publishers, 1st ed. 2014) (“Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation”).
337 JX 1345, Duff & Phelps LLC, 2016 Valuation Handbook: Guide to Cost of Capital (Chapter 3) 9 (John Wiley, 2016) (“Duff
& Phelps, Valuation Handbook”).
338 JX 1816 at ¶46.
339 Id. at ¶48.
340 Id.
341 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 73.
342 JX 1816 at ¶¶47–48.
343 Id. at ¶47.
344 Id. at ¶48.
345 Id.
346 Id.; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 73 (“The term efficient market is also sometimes used to describe
a market that, along with other properties, is without arbitrage opportunities.”) (emphasis in original).
347 JX 1816 at ¶49; JX 2514 at 8–11; Trial Tr. 1019:2–16 (Hubbard).
348 Id.
349 JX 1816 at ¶51.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at ¶52.
353 Id. at ¶¶52–53.
354 Id.
355 Id. at ¶54.
356 Id.
357 The Merger marks the rare instance where two public companies of comparable size, comparable capital structure and
comparable stock trading patterns combine. As Dr. Hubbard explained, for most of the reasons one can conclude that
Jarden traded in an efficient market, the same can be said for Newell. Id., Figure 15.
358 Id. at ¶58.
359 Id. at ¶60. See also id. at ¶62 (“According to the analysts covering Newell at the time, consumer recession fears, merger
integration risks, and the high initial leverage resulting from the Merger were key factors affecting Newell's stock price.”).
360 Jarden is justified in pointing out that while he raised the criticisms, Dr. Zmijewski did “not explicitly opine on whether or
not any of these factors actually depressed Jarden's [unaffected] market price relative to fair value.” JX 1826 at ¶98. See
also JX 1828 at ¶90 (Dr. Zmijewski making observations regarding the Unaffected Market Price but not correlating them).
361 JX 1828 at ¶90; JX 1826 at ¶98.
362 Id.
363 JX 1818 at ¶30.
364 Id. at ¶¶29–31.
365 JX 1826 at ¶¶99–100.
366 Id., Figure 17.
- 131 -
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 44
367 Id.
368 Id. at ¶¶101–04.
369 JX 1818 at ¶31.
370 Id.
371 Trial Tr. 1022:21–1023:14 (Hubbard).
372 JX 1826 at ¶¶101–04.
373 Id. at ¶¶103–04. I acknowledge, and understand, Petitioners' “tethering” argument, but I reject it as not supported by the
credible evidence. The argument is that the market was not efficient as of the Merger because, after the announcement
of the Merger, “Jarden's stock price was tethered to Newell and to the perception of the stockholders of both companies
that there was a large risk that Jarden could not be successfully integrated.” Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. at 60. Newell's
stockholders may have reacted to that risk, as reflected in the stock's performance after the announcement, but there
is no evidence that Jarden's stockholders, or the market, associated that risk with Jarden. See Trial Tr. 1020:12–23
(Hubbard); JX 2514 at 9; JX 1816 at ¶¶184–90.
374 JX 1826, Figures 18, 19.
375 Id. That the November Projections did not really move the needle is not surprising. They were optimistic, to be sure, but
their projected growth was consistent with prior forecasts, albeit at the top of the range. JX 927 at 1; Trial Tr. 106:1–
107:3 (Lillie). They were also not out of line with the views of several of the many analysts that followed the Company.
See, e.g., JX 1401; JX 1407; JX 1439.
376 JX 1818 at ¶¶37–39.
377 JX 1826 at ¶¶108–12; JX 2505 (Zmijewski Dep.) 318:23–319:4, 320:8–11. Dr. Zmijewski's opinion that the market had
not assessed Jarden's acquisitions of Jostens and Waddington, as best I can tell, is nothing more than speculation. The
fact that the market reacted poorly to the Jostens acquisition does not mean it did not understand it. Nor is there credible
evidence that the market did not know, or understand, that Jarden had leveraged up to do the Jostens and Waddington
deals.
378 Trial Tr. 1029:3–9 (Hubbard) (“academics differ in opinions on whether there is or isn't [a conglomerate discount]”); JX
1826 at ¶111 & n.176 (citing academic commentary rejecting the notion of a conglomerate discount).
379 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 32–33.
380 JX 1826 at ¶¶108–10; Trial Tr. 1029:10-21 (Hubbard); Trial Tr. 335:9–21 (Zmijewski) (“Q. So the holding company
structure of Jarden, whatever its affects may be, were the operative reality of Jarden. Correct? As of the merger date?
A. That's true.”).
381 JX 2505 (Zmijewski Dep.) at 319:22–320:16; JX 1818 at ¶¶37–39.
382 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) 117:10–17; Trial Tr. 378:14–17 (Franklin).
383 JX 1826 at ¶¶106–07. See also JX 59, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of
the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2007).
384 JX 1818 at ¶30.
385 JX 1519 at 68; JX 1514 at 2.
386 JX 1562; Trial Tr. 821:6–828:1, 830:7–835:11 (Waldron).
387 JX 2502.
388 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) 201:19–24.
389 Trial Tr. 404:1–9 (Franklin); JX 900.
390 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) 241:11–14.
391 JX 900 at 2.
392 Id. at 65.
393 Id. It is not entirely clear to me that Dr. Zmijewski feels as strongly about his comparable companies valuation of Jarden
as Petitioners do. See JX 1828 at ¶8 (“I do not consider revenue multiples to be reliable to value Jarden ....”).
394 JX 1816 at ¶200.
395 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 510, 527–30; Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard) (“If you use [a]
comparables [analysis], you have to be sure they are really comparable or you are introducing error yourself.”).
396 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 527–29.
397 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 345.
398 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 20.
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399 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 296.
400 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 345–46.
401 Id. at 346; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 528–29.
402 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346. See also JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710; Damodaran, Investment
Valuation at 462 (“A comparable firm is one with cash flows, growth potential, and growth risk similar to the firm being
valued .... The implicit assumption being made here is that firms in the same sector have similar risk, growth, and cash
flow profiles and therefore can be compared with much more legitimacy”).
403 Id. Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard) (“I mean, it's really just a restatement of garbage in, garbage out. If you don't have
genuine comparables, you're not going to get much out of the approach.”)
404 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 529–30.
405 Id. at 529.
406 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346.
407 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 296–97 (emphasis supplied). See Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard)
(“Given the difficulty of finding comparables for this company in particular, this is a methodology that I used for
completeness and for the record for the Court, but it would not be a principal method I would advocate that the Court
center on.”). See also JX 1826 at ¶17.
408 JX 1816 at ¶194; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 335 (“Empirical evidence shows that forward-looking multiples are indeed
more accurate predictors of value than historical multiples are.”).
409 The EBITDA multiples valuation is generally considered more reliable than a revenue multiples approach because the
EBITDA approach accounts for firms' operating efficiency and is not affected by leverage differences between firms. JX
2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710.
410 Id. at 710, 714; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334–36; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 532.
411 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334; Trial Tr. 159:7–14 (Zmijewski) (“Well, value is derived from what's going to happen or
what you expect to happen in the future, so looking forward is always better than looks backward.... If historical information
doesn't predict the future, it's not useful at all. It's only the forward-looking information that's useful.”).
412 Id. at 335–36.
413 Trial Tr. 294:16–20 (Zmijewski); JX 1818 at ¶55 (“I base my set of comparable companies on those companies identified
by Jarden's CEO, Mr. Lillie and the comparable companies used by Jarden's financial advisor, Barclays.”); JX 1828 at
¶¶68–70. I note it is not clear that Dr. Zmijewski drew his peer set from the right Barclays list. The list endorsed by
management was prepared by Barclays' equity analyst team while Dr. Zmijewski drew his list from the one prepared by
Barclays' investment banking team. Trial Tr. 264:23–268:14 (Zmijewski). Moreover, I find Dr. Zmijewski's narrow focus
on the Barclays list as the sole basis for his comparable companies peculiar given the extent to which he is critical of the
Barclays Fairness Opinion. See JX 1818 at ¶¶1–42; JX 1826 at ¶¶46–47.
414 JX 1826 at ¶17; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 511 (“The key
issues in valuing companies using market multiples are choosing appropriate comparable companies that would be priced
similar to the company being valued and the making adjustments to the financial numbers used so that distortions to the
valuation do not arise from accounting differences or certain events that can affect the financial statements in ways that
render the numbers less useful for a market multiple valuation.”). Dr. Zmijewski's decision apparently to ignore Barclays'
qualification that its peer set would have to be adjusted to account for qualitative differences between Jarden and the
peer set was never adequately explained. Trial Tr. 294:24–296:24 (Zmijewski); JX 1565 at 127–28; JX 1205 at 11, 17.
415 JX 1816 at ¶¶194–96.
416 JX 1818 at ¶57.
417 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 525. Given his willingness to defer to peer sets prepared by
others, it is surprising that Dr. Zmijewski failed to reconcile his exclusion of Kimberly-Clark and Colgate-Palmolive from
his peer set with the fact that those companies were included in the peer sets developed by several of the analysts who
followed Jarden. JX 1826 at ¶¶43–45.
418 Dr. Hubbard flagged Dr. Zmijewski's size discrepancy in his rebuttal report. As Dr. Hubbard noted, although the market
capitalization of Kimberly-Clark and Colgate-Palmolive were, respectively, 4.6 and 6.0 times larger relative to Jarden,
three of Dr. Zmijewski's selected peers were correspondingly smaller than Jarden. JX 1826 at ¶¶40–43. WD-40 Company,
Energizer Holdings and Helen of Troy were 7.3, 3.9 and 3.7 times smaller than Jarden, respectively, yet each of
these firms remained in Dr. Zmijewski's peer set. Id. Dr. Zmijewski provided no credible justification for the disparate,
asymmetrical treatment of large and small companies in his peer set. Id. See also Trial Tr. 935:6–936:17 (Zenner); JX
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1827 at ¶¶45–47 (credibly addressing the fallacy created by Dr. Zmijewski's inconsistent approach to exclusion and
inclusion of comparables based on size).
419 JX 1826 at ¶¶15–17.
420 Trial Tr. 1103:21–24 (Hubbard).
421 JX 1816 at ¶195.
422 JX 1826 at ¶¶38–35. Dr. Hubbard's peer set included firms with core business lines comparable to Jarden's core business,
namely housewares, household appliances, consumer durables, apparel and personal products industry actors. JX 1816
at ¶195.
423 JX 1826 at ¶17.
424 JX 1818 at ¶¶55–57. As noted, Dr. Zmijewski offered no empirical analysis of Jarden's growth, risk, or value drivers as
compared to any of the firms in his peer group. Id. But see JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at
529–30 (“... simply selecting close competitors is not sufficient to ensure the companies are comparable .... Once we
identify competitors, we analyze both the company being valued and the competitors with respect to characteristics that
determine the variation in market multiples—such as future growth prospects, risk future profitability, and future expected
investment requirements.”).
425 The party sponsoring a comparable companies valuation has the burden of proving that the target has validly assessed
peers. See In re Appraisal of SWS Gp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017). Petitioners have not met
that burden. In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that Jarden, itself, employed a comparable companies analysis,
among other approaches, when it performed internal valuations. But Petitioners have not proffered those valuations
as evidence of Jarden's fair value. Instead, they have presented Dr. Zmijewski's version of a comparable companies
analysis, which differed substantially from the Company's valuations. Accordingly, they had the burden of proving that
the Zmijewski comparable companies valuation was a reliable indicator of fair value. For reasons I have explained, I have
determined they have not carried that burden. In other words, the fact the Company employed comparable companies
analyses in the past to value Jarden might be evidence that the methodology can work for Jarden, but the appraiser
still has to apply the methodology in a principled way. That principled application of the methodology is what is lacking
here. As a final note, for what it's worth, I did find Dr. Zmijewski's approach to selecting a proper multiple for Jarden
to be more credible than Dr. Hubbard's approach, particularly given that he focused his multiples analysis on Jarden's
2016 and 2017 projected earnings, as prescribed in the valuation texts, while Dr. Hubbard based his multiples analysis
on Jarden's historical EBITDA and revenue data. Compare JX 1818 at ¶¶74–76 (Zmijewski) with JX 1816 at ¶¶194–
200. See JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710, 714; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334–36; JX 242,
Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 532 (expressing preference for using forward-looking projections over
a firm's historical earnings data when determining a proper multiple). Of course, this observation is worth little given the
lack of credible evidence that Dr. Zmijewski created a proper peer set.
426 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997). See also M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737
A.2d 513, 525–26 (Del. 1999) (reiterating the Chancellor's role “as an independent appraiser” and observing that “[i]n
discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has the discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models
as its general framework or to fashion its own”).
427 Dr. Zmijewski made two DCF calculations: an industry-specific DCF, which incorporated his comparable companies
analyses (“Composite DCF”), and a Jarden-specific DCF (“Jarden-Specific DCF”). JX 1818 at ¶¶70–72.
428 JX 1816 at ¶149; JX 1831 at ¶3.
429 Pet'rs' Pre-Trial Br. at 33.
430 JX 2514 at 14. Indeed, as Jarden points out, “over 83% of value in each of [Dr.] Zmijewski's DCFs is from the terminal
period.” Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Answering Post-Trial Br. at 60.
431 JX 1565 at 143.
432 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9; JX 1818 at ¶51, Ex. VI-7A.
433 I adopt Dr. Zmijewski's 35.0% marginal tax rate for Jarden because Dr. Hubbard made no effort to support his effective
tax rate of 36.3%. JX 1816 at ¶¶96–97; JX 1828 at ¶¶9–11. A 35% marginal tax rate comports with the tax rates applied
by Barclays, Centerview, Goldman Sachs and Jarden management—all of which set Jarden's marginal tax rate between
33% and 35%. JX 1828 at ¶¶9–10, 24.
434 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9; JX 1818 at ¶51, Ex. VI-7A.
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435 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9. I track Dr. Zmijewski's free cash flows analysis with respect to the tax rate because I agree
with him that Dr. Hubbard's approach to estimating Jarden's tax rate in the projected years is not adequately supported.
JX 1828 at ¶¶9–11.
436 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 256.
437 Id. (“[W]e estimate the value of the remaining free cash flow beyond the forecast horizon by including a[ ] ... one-time
cash flow at the end of the forecast horizon .... [The terminal value] represents the market value (as of the last forecast
period) of the free cash flow ... at all future dates.”).
438 Trial Tr. 300:17–24 (Zmijewski) (“I paired the comparable companies risk assessment with a lower growth rate because
the comparable companies ... were expected to perform at a lower growth rate. And for the Jarden-specific risk
assessment, I used the midpoint of the expected inflation and expected GDP growth.”)
439 JX 1816 at ¶¶84–85.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 308.
443 Trial Tr. 930:2–9 (Zenner) (“So it's a little bit like saying I baked gluten-free bread for you, but I added some wheat
because the consistency is going to be better. So it's kind of saying I'm providing organic growth, but I'm adding some
tuck-in transactions.”).
444 For Jarden, “tuck-ins” were defined as an acquisition where the target company's last twelve months (“LTM”) of revenue
was less than 1.0% of Jarden's LTM revenue. JX 1828 at ¶¶46–47.
445 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 306–07 (“no firm can grow forever at a rate higher than the growth rate
of the economy in which it operates”); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 122.
446 JX 1816 at ¶¶87–92; JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
447 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
448 Id. at ¶¶53–54.
449 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–47.
450 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–54, Ex. VI-2. Polk estimated Jarden would grow at 3.0% (mirroring U.S. GDP growth), while Bain
forecasted Jarden's growth to be between 2.0% and 4.0%. Id.
451 Id. at ¶¶67–69.
452 Id.
453 Id. at ¶¶70–72.
454 JX 1816 at ¶¶86–92.
455 Id. at ¶¶89–90, Figure 20.
456 Id. at ¶¶89–92, Ex. 5A.
457 JX 1826 at ¶¶32–34, Figure 6. Dr. Hubbard maintains that the Company's 3.0% to 5.0% growth projections in the years
following 2015 do not agree with its 2.2% historic organic growth because management incorrectly failed to account for
“tuck-in” acquisitions. Id.; JX 1816 at ¶¶90–92.
458 JX 1816 at ¶¶90–92, Ex. 5A; JX 1826 at ¶¶32–34, Figure 6.
459 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–48.
460 Trial Tr. at 1116–18 (Hubbard); JX 1831 at ¶8.
461 JX 1831 at ¶8.
462 JX 1826 at ¶32 (“[I]n recent history, tuck-ins contributed approximately 1.8 percentage points to the “organic” growth
reported by management, indicating that Jarden would need to continue tuck-in acquisitions in order to achieve the five
percent growth in the Proxy Projections.”).
463 Trial Tr. at 1116–18 (Hubbard); JX 1831 at ¶8.
464 JX 1816 at ¶¶86–90.
465 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–48.
466 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
467 I note that the literature cautions against relying on comparable companies when estimating terminal value because
inconsistencies in projected growth rates between the target company and those of the peer group can either overvalue
or undervalue the target business. JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 212.
468 Trial Tr. 215:20–216:17 (Zmijewski); JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 216–17.
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469 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
470 JX 1816 at ¶¶149–150; JX 1818 at ¶¶70–72; JX 1831 at ¶3.
471 Trial Tr. 195:18–20 (Zmijewski) (“He's using accounting data as if it were economic concepts. That doesn't work. And so
that's my major disagreement with him.”); Trial Tr. 197:14–17 (Zmijewski) (“These are all economic concepts. They're not
—you can't sort of say here's an accounting number and it matches this. These are economic concepts, not accounting
concepts”).
472 JX 63; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 235–37.
473 Id.; JX 1828 at ¶¶37–38.
474 JX 1828 at ¶¶34–35, 45. Dr. Zmijewski never expressly sets his TIR at 4.9%, but implicitly determines that net investment
in 2021 and onward will equal $60 million, or approximately 4.9% of operating profits. JX 1826 at ¶¶54–55, 62, 66–67,
Figure 14. Dr. Zmijewski also assumed that depreciation will equal capital expenditures in the Terminal Period, and that
Jarden's cash investment required to drive terminal growth will grow coequally with Jarden's other financial metrics. JX
1818, Ex. VI-6A (Dr. Zmijewski made some adjustments to the historical financial data such that normalized depreciation
is equal to normalized capital expenditures of $308 million).
475 Trial Tr. 1045:21–1046:2 (Hubbard).
476 JX 1816 at ¶94.
477 Trial Tr. 1055:16–18 (Hubbard).
478 IR = g/RONIC, where g is the terminal growth rate and RONIC is the return on new invested capital. JX 1816 at ¶94; JX
2516, Koller, Valuation at 31; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 312–14.
479 JX 1816 at ¶94. As discussed in more detail below, Dr. Hubbard calculates WACC as follows: Jarden's capital structure
weights 36.1% debt and 63.9% equity, coupled with a cost of debt (after tax) of 3.20% and a cost of equity of 9.74%,
results in a WACC of 7.38%. JX 1816 at ¶128, Ex. 15.
480 Trial Tr. 196:9 (Zmijewski) (“Well, I have four issues.”).
481 Trial Tr. 196:11–16 (Zmijewski).
482 Trial Tr. 197:19–198:17 (Zmijewski).
483 Trial Tr. 198:7–15 (Zmijewski).
484 Trial Tr. 198:18–199:6 (Zmijewski).
485 Trial Tr. 199:7–11 (Zmijewski).
486 Trial Tr. 1046:11–1049:23 (Hubbard); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 102, 250–56; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment
Valuation at 291, 299–300.
487 JX 1816 at ¶¶93–95, Ex. 10A; JX 1826 at ¶¶54–61.
488 JX 1816, Exs. 5A–5D (compare Ex. 10A starting at FY10 with Exs. 5A, C, D starting at FY11).
489 Trial Tr. 1055:14–18 (Hubbard) (“I just don't know of firms and industries that have both high and rising forever returns on
invested capital.”); Trial Tr. 1051:12–16 (Hubbard) (“you can't simply change your growth, particularly your real growth,
which is what is being done in this experiment, and not have any additional investment”); JX 2514 at 21 (a graph depicting
the dramatically outsized ROIC implicated by Dr. Zmijewski's TIR); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 19; JX 2515, Damodaran,
Investment Valuation at 302; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 711.
490 This sets the TIR at the midpoint between Dr. Hubbard's TIR of 33.9% and Jarden's historic average investment rate of
21.6%. It also assumes a ROIC for Jarden of 11.2%, which is reasonable given Jarden's innovative and highly acquisitive
growth strategy and a WACC of 6.94% (as discussed below). JX 1828 at ¶39.
491 Trial Tr. 1066:21–23 (Hubbard) (“Q. And if we could, did you estimate the weighted average cost of capital for purposes of
your DCF analysis? A. I did. Both Professor Zmijewski and I tendered estimates of the weighted average cost of capital.”);
JX 1816 at ¶¶98–129; JX 1818 at ¶¶65–66.
492 JX 1816 at ¶¶98–99.
493 Id.; JX 1818 at ¶¶46–49; Trial Tr. 190:1–3 (Zmijewski) (“[WACC] is a standard calculation. You calculate the equity costs
of capital, the after-tax debt cost of capital. You weight those two.”).
494 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
495 Trial Tr. 244:2–6 (Zmijewski) (“[W]e have the same risk-free rate. We have a different equity risk premium, a slightly
different beta. He doesn't use a size premium. I do. So we have some differences in our calculations here.”).
496 JX 1818 at ¶68; JX 1816 at ¶98; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 269.
497 JX 1818 at ¶49; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 269–72.
498 JX 1816 at ¶99; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 215–19.
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499 See Trial Tr. 1070:2–6 (Hubbard).
500 JX 1816 at ¶¶100–03; JX 1818 at ¶63.
501 Id.
502 JX 1818 at ¶64.
503 Id.
504 JX 1816 at ¶98.
505 Id. at ¶¶100–04, Figure 21.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Id. at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 86–87.
509 JX 1816 at ¶¶98–99.
510 Id. at ¶¶104–05.
511 Id.
512 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 217.
513 JX 1816 at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1818 at ¶63. See also Trial Tr. 161 (Zmijewski) (explaining how he accounted for
convertible securities).
514 JX 1818 at ¶64.
515 JX 1816 at ¶¶103–07, Figure 21.
516 JX 1816 at ¶105; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
517 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
518 Id. at 295; JX 1816.
519 JX 1816.
520 Id. at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 86–87.
521 JX 1816 at ¶¶103–07, Figure 21.
522 Id. at ¶105.
523 Id., Ex. 11A.
524 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 211. See also JX 1816 at ¶106; JX 1818 at ¶63.
525 Id.
526 JX 1818, Ex. VI-5.
527 Id. at ¶64.
528 JX 1816 at ¶¶108–09. Trial Tr. 1218:11–13 (Hubbard) (Q. “You measured Jarden's cost of debt by using yield to maturity.
Correct? A. I did.”).
529 Id.
530 JX 1828 at ¶20; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 412 (“When the firm's debt is risky, however, the debt
yield will overestimate the debt cost of capital, with the magnitude of the error increasing with the riskiness of the debt.”).
531 Trial Tr. 1213:16–18 (Hubbard).
532 JX 1818 at ¶64; JX 1816 at ¶110.
533 Id.
534 JX 1816 at ¶110; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 278–87; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 385–92.
535 JX 1818 at ¶64; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 279; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 208; JX 2032, Berk
& DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 387.
536 JX 1816 at ¶111; JX 1818 at ¶64.
537 Id.
538 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 155; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 275–76; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo,
Corporate Finance at 411–12.
539 JX 1818 at ¶58; JX 1816 at ¶112; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 279; JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at
2–14; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 183; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413. See
Trial Tr. 187:10–13 (Zmijewski) (“beta is a measure of risk of a company or an asset that you—that you can measure
statistically using a statistical model.”).
540 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 183. See also JX 1816 at ¶¶113–20.
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541 Id.
542 Id.
543 Id.
544 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 283–84. See JX 1816 at ¶114.
545 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 188.
546 Id.; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413. See JX 1816 at ¶115.
547 JX 1816 at ¶¶111–20; JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
548 JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
549 Id. at ¶¶60–61, Ex. VI-4.
550 Id. at ¶¶59–61, Ex. VI-5; JX 1828 at ¶16. Dr. Zmijewski explained that the Jarden-Specific Beta was higher due to a “lack
of precision relative to the precision [of] using a set of comparable companies” and because of Jarden's higher long-term
growth relative to that of his comparable companies. JX 1818 at ¶¶60–61.
551 JX 1816 at ¶¶114–16.
552 Id. at ¶¶117–20.
553 Id.
554 Id. at ¶¶114–16. Dr. Hubbard noted that the single year daily beta of 1.18 was “not substantially different” from his two-
year weekly beta of 1.22. Id. at ¶¶117–20.
555 Id. at ¶¶114–16.
556 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 286.
557 Id. at 283–85; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 306 (“... if we have a set of truly comparable
companies, we feel we can gain precision in our estimate of the cost of capital by using multiple companies.”) (emphasis
supplied).
558 JX 1828 at ¶¶12–16.
559 Trial Tr. 1068:13–1069:15 (Hubbard); JX 1826 at ¶¶72–75.
560 JX 1818 at ¶29 (“More specifically, I discuss ... complexity of Jarden's information and holding company (or platform)
business model strategy”).
561 Trial Tr. 104:7–105:18 (Lillie), 262:19–263:23 (Zmijewski) (“None of those companies is an apple-to-apple comparison
to Jarden or each other. Comparable Companies—there just isn't any such thing as a twin company. It doesn't exist.”).
562 JX 1816 at ¶¶45–50. In addition, both experts' beta estimates are positive, which indicates a parallel correlation with
changes in the overall market.
563 JX 1816 at ¶¶112–20.
564 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 284; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation 183, 187–95.
565 Id.
566 JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
567 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 192–95; JX 1816, Ex. 22F; JX 1818 at ¶¶60–61.
568 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 286; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 192–93.
569 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 281; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413; JX 241, Holthausen & Zmijewski,
Corporate Valuation at 295.
570 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 187.
571 JX 1816 at ¶121.
572 See Trial Tr. 1072:2–4 (Hubbard) (“So the question is, what is the equity risk premium. And this is one where economists
have a range of views.”).
573 JX 1816 at ¶¶122–24. See Trial Tr. 1072:5–8 (Hubbard) (“My own view in my own work and in the work I'm tendering
here is that the so-called historical risk premium is the best measure of the equity risk premium.”). See also JX 2515,
Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 161 (“In practice, we usually estimate the risk premium by looking at the historical
premium earned by stocks over default-free securities over long time periods.”).
574 JX 1828 at ¶18. See Trial Tr. 1072:8–15 (Hubbard) (“There is an alternative view ... a so-called supply-side risk premium.
I'm not quite sure why that word, because it's not about supply and demand, it's really about whether you include price
earnings multiples expansion. That number is lower.”) See also JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at 11.
575 JX 1828 at ¶17.
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576 JX 1816 at ¶126. Dr. Hubbard took the mid-point of the Long-Term Historical ERP at 6.9% and Supply-Side ERP at 6.03%
to produce his 6.47% ERP estimate for Jarden. Trial Tr. 1072:16–19 (Hubbard) (“I prefer the historical risk premium. I'm
cognizant of the fact Delaware courts have also paid attention to the supply-side risk premium. So I picked the midpoint
of the two.”).
577 JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at 5.
578 JX 1828 at ¶18. The lower Supply-Side ERP is supported by Duff & Phelps' later recommended estimates of adjusted
Long-Term ERP of 5.0% as of March 31, 2018. See Trial Tr. 1073:1–4 (Hubbard) (“But if one's view is your interest
in supply side is governed by Duff & Phelps' recommendation, Duff & Phelps has, indeed, changed its recommended
approach.”).
579 JX 1818 at ¶64.
580 JX 1826 at ¶78; Trial Tr. at 1078:4–9 (Hubbard) (“I don't have a size premium. He does. My quibble is more the way he's
estimated it, given the data source he has. But, again, for the Court's consideration in the interest of the Court's time,
I don't think these are super important.”).
581 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 320–21 (discussing the “empirical evidence that the CAPM
overstates the returns to large firms and understates the returns to small firms”).
582 JX 1818, Ex. VI-5.
583 JX 1816 at ¶127.
584 JX 1818 at ¶66.
585 JX 1816 at ¶11.
586 I note that this WACC is within the range calculated by Centerview but below the WACC calculated by Goldman Sachs,
Deutsche Bank, RBC and Barclays.
587 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
588 JX 1816 at ¶95; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 313.
589 See JX 1818 at ¶51.
590 I took the average of the revenue growth rates for the provided fiscal years of 2017–20 to determine the percentage
increase.
591 I took the average of the capital expenditure growth rates for the provided fiscal years of 2017–20 to determine the
percentage increase.
592 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 585. See JX 1818 at ¶60.
593 In other words, I added the discounted cash flows from each time period in the FY16–FY21 range—$558 million, $646
million, $675 million, $687 million, $698 million, $13.3 billion respectively—to arrive at the total enterprise value.
594 JX 1818 at ¶¶69–72; JX 1816 at ¶¶130–47.
595 JX 1816 at ¶¶143–47.
596 See Trial Tr. 1079:17–21 (Hubbard) (“Maybe I should start with the bottom line. If you were to look at all of these
[enterprise value adjustments], they're a little over a dollar a share, and I think $1.06 altogether, because they go in
different directions.”).
597 JX 1816 at ¶139.
598 Trial Tr. 1081:17–20 (Hubbard) (“[E]ssentially you want to add back excess cash that the company has. And we both
agree on that, and we both agree on what the total cash was. It was $799 million.”).
599 JX 1816 at ¶140.
600 Id.
601 Id. at ¶141.
602 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 309; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 440.
603 JX 1816 at ¶142.
604 Id., Ex. 18C.
605 Id., Ex. 18A.
606 Id.
607 JX 1818 at ¶70. Dr. Hubbard adjusted his final share count number to align with Dr. Zmijewski's number after double
counting Jarden's restricted stock. JX 1831.
608 JX 1565 at 242.
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609 As explained above, the DCF Analysis makes the following assumptions: WACC equals 6.9%; Terminal Growth equals
3.1%; ROIC equals 11.2%; FY21 Revenue Growth equals 5%; FY21 Capital Expenditure as a percent of Revenue equals
2.6%; Fully Diluted Share Count equals 219.9 million.
610 Drs. Hubbard and Zmijewski both agree on Jarden's Revenue numbers for FY16–FY20 reported in Standard and Poor's
Capital IQ. See JX 1816, Ex. 9; JX 1818, Ex. VI-7A.
611 Drs. Hubbard and Zmijewski both agree on Jarden's Capital Expenditure numbers for FY16–FY20 as derived from
Standard and Poor's Capital IQ and Jarden's FY10-15 10K. See JX 1816, Ex. 9; JX 1818, Ex. VI-1.
612 Time Period is calculated based on the mid-year convention used by Dr. Hubbard. JX 1816, Ex. 16. I note, for 2016, the
mid-point uses the period from April 15, 2016 to December 31, 2016. Id.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Zurn, Vice Chancellor.
In this appraisal action, I must determine the fair value of
each share of the subject company on the closing date of its
acquisition. I find that the process by which the company was
sold bore several objective indicia of reliability, which were
not undermined by flaws in that process. I therefore find that
the deal price is persuasive evidence of fair value, and give
no weight to other valuation metrics. I deduct some synergies,
but find others were not adequately proven. I undergo that
synergies analysis solely to fulfill my statutory mandate,
rather than to effectuate any transfer of funds between the
parties, because the company prepaid the entire deal price and
has no recourse for a refund under the appraisal statute.
I. BACKGROUND1
This appraisal action generated an extensive record. During
six days of trial, the parties introduced 1,336 exhibits and
lodged seventeen depositions in evidence.2 Five experts and
six fact witnesses testified live. These are the Court's findings
based on a preponderance of the evidence.
Respondent Panera Bread Company (“Panera” or the
“Company”) is a national bakery-cafe concept in the United
States and Canada.3 Panera is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of Delaware, with headquarters in
St. Louis, Missouri.4 Until July 18, 2017, Panera's stock was
listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange under the symbol
“PNRA.”5
On that date, JAB Holdings B.V. purchased Panera for
$315.00 per share.6 That entity is a private limited liability
company incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands that
indirectly has a controlling interest in JAB Holding Company,
LLC.7 JAB Holding Company, LLC is a private limited
liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware
and headquartered in Washington D.C. that indirectly has held
a controlling interest in Panera since the acquisition.8 JAB
Holding Company S.à.r.l. has an ultimate controlling interest
in JAB Holdings B.V., JAB Holding Company, LLC and
Panera.9 I refer to all of these entities collectively as “JAB.”
In the wake of JAB's acquisition, certain dissenting Panera
stockholders (“Petitioners” or “Dissenting Stockholders”) are
entitled to an appraisal of the fair value of their Company
shares in accordance with their demands.10 Petitioners hold
785,108 shares of Panera's common stock.11 Petitioners
include Short Hills Capital Partners, holding 35,800 shares of
Panera common stock;12 Weiss Asset Management, including
2017 Arlington, LLC, holding 154,669 shares of Panera
common stock;13 Canyon International LLC, holding 31,794
shares of Panera common stock;14 and Yellowstone Global
LLC, holding 47,692 shares of Panera common stock.15 Each
of the Petitioners demanded appraisal before the vote on the
merger, held the appraisal shares through the merger date, and
maintained their appraisal demand.
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*2  Relevant non-parties include Panera board members
Domenic Colasacco, Fred K. Foulkes, Larry J. Franklin,
Diane Hessan, Thomas E. Lynch, William W. Moreton,
Ronald M. Shaich, Mark Stoever, and James D. White.16
Shaich founded Panera in 1981.17 He served on the board
from 1981 to December 2018 in various capacities, including
Chairman, Co-Chairman, Executive Chairman, and Non-
Executive Chairman.18 Shaich served as Chief Executive
Officer from 1984 to May 2010, when he stepped back from
the Company to co-found an organization called “No Labels,”
which he hoped would reduce partisanship in American
politics.19 During this time, Shaich remained Panera's largest
stockholder and Executive Chairman, and Moreton served
as CEO.20 In 2012, Moreton had a family issue and asked
Shaich to return to a greater leadership position.21 Shaich
agreed and served as Co-Chief Executive Officer, along with
Moreton, from March 2012 to August 2013.22 At that time,
Moreton stepped down as Co-Chief Executive Officer, and
Shaich resumed his role as sole Chief Executive Officer until
January 1, 2018.23 The market and the restaurant industry
both recognize Shaich as a visionary.24
Moreton joined Panera's board in May 2010, after serving as
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer from
October 1998 to March 2003 and Executive Vice President
and Co-Chief Operating Officer from November 2008 to
May 2010.25 Moreton also served as President and Co-Chief
Executive Officer from March 2012 to August 2013, Chief
Financial Officer (Interim) from August 6, 2014 to April 15,
2015, and Executive Vice Chairman from August 2013 to July
18, 2017.26
Colasacco, the lead independent director, served as an outside
director along with directors Hessan, Foulkes, Franklin,
Lynch, Stoever, and White.27
Panera's relevant management includes Blaine Hurst, who
began serving as Panera's Chief Executive Officer after
Shaich left that post in January 2018.28 Prior to that
time, Hurst served as Executive Vice President and Chief
Transformation and Growth Officer from December 2010 to
December 2016.29 Then, Hurst served as Panera's President
from December 2016 to January 2018.30
Michael Bufano has served as Panera's Chief Financial
Officer, since April 2015.31 Bufano also served as the Vice
President of Planning from July 2010 to August 2014.32
Andrew Madsen was Panera's President from May 2015 to
December 9, 2016, when he left the Company.33
A. Shaich Founds Panera And Leads It Through
Unmatched Growth.
In 1980, Shaich founded a single 400-square-foot cookie
store.34 That store would eventually become Panera. In 1982,
Shaich merged the cookie store with a small regional bakery
called Au Bon Pain.35 That entity purchased the Saint Louis
Bread Company in 1987.36 Shaich took this company public
in 1991,37 rebranded the Saint Louis Bread Company as
Panera in 1997, and divested the Au Bon Pain division in
1999.38 After the divestiture, Shaich changed the company's
name to Panera Bread Company.39 After divesting Au Bon
Pain, Panera stock traded at $6.00 per share.40
*3  Panera pioneered a new restaurant segment called
“fast casual,” which found a niche between “quick service
restaurants like McDonald's and Wendy's and restaurants like
that and casual dining, full sit-down service.”41 From 2000
to 2010, Panera expanded rapidly into a national restaurant
chain.42 Panera operated in three segments: company bakery-
cafe operations, franchise operations, and fresh dough and
other product operations.43 By 2004, Panera's stock was
trading around $30.00 per share, and by 2010, it was trading
around $70.00 per share.44
Despite the Company's growth, by 2010 or 2011,
Shaich felt “great distress” because Panera's same store
sales were weakening and market share gains slowed.45
Increasingly, Panera faced competitive pressures and needed
to differentiate for future growth.46 In response to these
pressures, Shaich spent his time as Executive Chairman
focusing almost exclusively “on a range of strategic and
innovation efforts for Panera.”47 During this time, Shaich
wrote “the Amazon memo” on how he would compete with
Panera if he were not part of the Company.48 His vision
focused on changing the guest experience, creating a new
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ordering system, and providing a delivery service.49 After
discussing these initiatives with Moreton, Shaich led the
effort to prototype these ideas during the 2010–2012 period
before re-assuming a management post as co-CEO in 2012.50
In 2013, Panera signaled to the market that it was “deploying
significant transaction-driving initiatives.”51 By early 2014,
Fortune magazine featured Panera's “big bet on tech,”
detailing how Shaich's early prototypes had developed into
new company initiatives.52 After launching that technology in
fourteen cafes, the Company formally announced the Panera
2.0 initiative in April 2014.53 Panera 2.0 offered “a series of
integrated technologies to enhance the guest experience”54
through “new mechanisms for ordering, payment, food
production, and, ultimately, consumption.”55 Panera 2.0
enhanced ordering through Rapid Pick-Up, fast lane kiosks,
and online/mobile ordering.56 Panera also committed to
“operational excellence” with new production equipment and
systems to increase capacity and accuracy.57 Along with
these changes, Panera focused on “activat[ing] innovation in
store design.”58 To adopt these initiatives, Hurst “create[d]
a ‘digital flywheel’ whereby all systems and consumer
touchpoints—point of sale (PoS), back of house, integrated
customer data, big customer data, one-to-one marketing—are
interconnected for operational gain.”59
These initiatives rolled out in stages. In 2014, the Company
kicked off Panera 2.0 with Rapid Pick-Up, an advanced
ordering system.60 Over the next two years, the Company
rolled out the remaining Panera 2.0 initiatives to all company-
owned bakery-cafes.61
*4  Panera developed other initiatives during this period of
innovation. In 2013, the Company rolled out two initiatives
including Panera at Home, providing consumer packaged
goods, as well as Panera catering hubs, which were attached
to bakery-cafes.62 In 2015, Panera launched its “Food As
It Should Be” campaign, developing “clean food” without
“artificial colors, flavors, preservatives, and sweeteners.”63 In
2016, Panera rolled out its national delivery program.64
While leading Panera through these initiatives, in early
February 2015, Shaich informed the board that he wanted to
step away from Panera and pursue other endeavors.65 Shaich
had returned to Panera when Moreton needed him. And
although Shaich extended his time with the Company through
2015, he did not want to remain at Panera forever.66 Shaich
explained to the board that after working on innovations as
Executive Chairman during the 2010 to 2012 period, he “had
come back to transform” Panera and felt he had “done [his]
work in getting [Panera 2.0] going.”67 The board outlined a
succession plan during a board meeting held on February 26,
2015.68 The identified succession candidate, Madsen, became
Panera's president in May 2015 with the intention of replacing
Shaich as CEO in 2016.69 But the board did not view Madsen
as a suitable replacement,70 so Shaich stayed on as CEO.
Shaich annually reminded the board of his desire to leave.71
At the time of the merger, Shaich owned approximately six
percent of Panera's outstanding stock.72
B. Panera Tracks Its Initiatives Through A Five-Year
Strategic Plan And Five-Year Financial Model.
In May 2015, management assembled all of Panera's new
initiatives into a strategic plan (the “Five-Year Strategic
Plan”).73 To track the financial effects of these initiatives,
management also created a five-year financial model (the
“Five-Year Financial Model”) that tracked “between 15 and
30 key initiatives and many projects underneath each of them
that we had various assumptions on, how they would perform,
how they would roll out” and forecasted five years of future
results.74 Management based the Five-Year Financial Model
on the Five-Year Strategic Plan and would evaluate them side-
by-side “to really understand what the vision involved and the
costs involved in what we saw.”75 This Five-Year Financial
Model operated as a “roadmap” that management updated
every six months and that the board discussed, at least in part,
at every meeting.76
*5  At its core, the 2015 Five-Year Financial Model set a goal
to double earnings per share over the next five years and “re-
engage” double-digit earnings growth, including projected
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization
(“EBITDA”) of nearly $750 million by 2019.77 Shaich
recognized that “[f]ew companies have taken on as audacious
a path to renewal.”78
Some board members were skeptical. Moreton described the
Five-Year Financial Model as “what's classically called a
hockey stick projection” that faced “healthy skepticism in the
- 143 -
In re Panera Bread Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2020)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
board.”79 Lynch wrote to Shaich in October 2016, “I worry,
though not with a lot of basis, that we are overestimating
our future earnings power. We are now in a negative 3
transaction comp environment and I am concerned that we
could be overestimating our ability to fight this headwind.”80
Moreton recognized management risk-adjusted the Five-
Year Financial Model “in part,” but “major” risk remained
around execution.81 Colasacco considered Panera's Five-Year
Strategic Plan as “not impossible, not a lie, not a bad faith
effort in any way,” but “one possible range of scenarios that
could play out[.]”82 Some analysts agreed: “[W]e remain
on the sidelines as PNRA's stock appears to incorporate the
benefits of its strategic initiatives and the outlook is not
without risks.”83
C. Investors React, And Panera Weighs Its Options.
In reaction to the Five-Year Strategic Plan, an investment fund
called Luxor Capital threatened a proxy contest because it
opposed the “very significant capital spending” necessary to
support the plan.84 The board engaged Goldman Sachs & Co.
LLC (“Goldman”) in March 2015 to advise it in a strategic
review of potential opportunities to maximize stockholder
value.85 On June 25, 2015, Goldman presented potential
strategic alternatives alongside valuation scenarios under the
Five-Year Strategic Plan.86
*6  Consistent with the Five-Year Financial Model,
Goldman “assume[d] 100% implementation success with
no probability weighting adjustment.”87 For this reason,
Goldman called the Five-Year Strategic Plan “aggressive”
because “everything would have to go exactly as was
foreseen,” which “[t]hey didn't think [ ] was very likely.”88
Goldman advised that Panera's “growth initiatives were too
early on in the game for the market ... to give [Panera]
full credit for [the Five-Year Strategic Plan].”89 Goldman
evaluated a potential sale and advised that a financial sponsor
would not have interest in Panera,90 but identified a “limited
number of potential strategic buyers,” with Starbucks as the
most likely.91 At the end of the meeting, the board determined
that while the Company would, as it had done in the past,
continue to observe the markets and consider activities in
the best interest of shareholders on an ongoing basis, given
current conditions it was not in the best interest of the
Company and its stockholders to engage in a process to
initiate and pursue a strategic transaction or solicit interest
from potential purchasers at this time.92
After consulting with Goldman, Panera agreed to some of
Luxor's demands.93 Luxor dropped their remaining demands
after Panera “convince[d] them that [its] G&A actually was
average to low for the industry as a whole, and the technology
investments were necessary for initiatives.”94
D. Panera Counteracts Failures And Plants Seeds For
Future Rewards.
In 2016, following the adoption of the Five-Year Strategic
Plan, Panera reduced its estimate for 2019 EBITDA by almost
$128 million as “revenues hadn't increased in line with”
expectations and the Plan was not “going quite as smoothly
as [Panera] had hoped.”95 Panera offset the initiatives’ high
costs by orchestrating share buybacks, refranchising, and
implementing nonstrategic cost reduction.96
In the wake of this setback, Shaich led efforts to publicize
the Five-Year Strategic Plan to generate market recognition.
Through “hundreds”97 of presentations, Shaich shared
Panera's plan of “sustained double-digit EPS earnings
growth.”98 The market responded and gave Panera “a great
deal of credit for the initiatives already done.”99 Panera's
stock rose to $214.54 by July 2016.100
E. Panera and Shaich Weigh Their Options.
In the midst of Shaich's PR campaign, Shaich received an
unusual call from Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz, proposing
a visit.101 Shaich discussed the visit with Colasacco and other
board members, explaining, “Howard doesn't come up on a
Saturday afternoon for just anything. Maybe he [i]s interested
in a transaction.”102 To prepare, Shaich asked Goldman for
an updated comparison of selected restaurant companies that
Goldman had presented the year before in 2015.103 This
comparison included updated financial metrics for Starbucks
and other restaurants in the fast growth, quick service, and
casual dining segments.104
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*7  When Schultz and Shaich met on July 31, 2016, Schultz
proposed a collaboration between Starbucks and Panera
“whereby Panera would provide food to Starbucks for lunch
and breakfast and [Starbucks] would upgrade [Panera's]
coffee program.”105 After the meeting, Shaich updated
Moreton, Colasacco, and Lynch.106 Lynch viewed this as
“[t]he first step of the dance,” so that Starbucks could pursue
“a potential acquisition attempt by Starbucks of Panera.”107
Colasacco commented that the proposed collaboration was
“[c]ertainly worth exploring further, though raises many
questions.”108 And Moreton thought it was “interesting ...
even if not tying every thing up in a nice bow.”109
At the August 2 board meeting, the board reviewed elements
of the Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Financial
Model, per usual.110 During the executive session of
that meeting, Shaich informed the board about Starbucks’
proposed collaboration.111 Moreton characterized the board's
response by explaining, “if [Starbucks] wanted to take
advantage of our food and things, the best way to do that
would be to acquire the company.”112 With that directive,
Shaich had a new focus for future conversations with
Schultz.113
Schultz had invited Shaich to Seattle to visit Starbucks’
roastery that fall;114 the teams met October 4 through 5.115
Starbucks came to discuss a joint venture, with Starbucks
selling Panera's food and Panera selling Starbucks coffee.116
Shaich used this opportunity to attempt to solicit an offer.117
Both Shaich and Schultz discussed their companies' “very
intimate strategic plans.”118 During the visit, Shaich pitched
Schultz the Five-Year Strategic Plan.119 On October 26,
Shaich rejected Schultz's joint-venture idea, but floated
the idea that Starbucks could purchase Panera.120 Schultz
responded: “we're really interested in this. Let's get a group
of people to work on it.”121
Moreton worked with Shaich to interface with Starbucks
and help conduct financial analyses.122 In November,
the companies discussed their shared goal “to determine
whether [the] companies can unlock significant value by
combining.”123 Panera proposed EBITDA and synergies
figures for the combined companies, which Starbucks
generally found reasonable.124 Starbucks took this analysis
and ran the numbers internally.125 At the end of
November,126 Schultz called Shaich to explain that after
giving it “some serious thought,”127 Starbucks was “not
going forward” with the transaction.128 Although Starbucks
viewed the combination as a “pretty good idea,” Starbucks
could not “get to [Panera's] public market price, let alone pay
a premium”129 and “there were other things going on within
Starbucks.”130 The parties did not discuss any further.131
*8  In tandem with Panera's conversations with Starbucks,
in August 2016, Shaich acted on his own initiative and asked
Goldman to facilitate an introductory meeting with JAB.132
Goldman inquired after JAB's CEO Olivier Goudet,133 but
JAB postponed meeting with Panera until “early the next
year”134 because JAB was busy pursuing an acquisition that
fall.135
F. Panera Reaches An “Inflection Point,” And Shaich
Engages With JAB.
Although Panera continued to face competitive pressures,
it experienced impressive growth and success with its
initiatives. Panera's stock price rose from $170.00 per share
in 2014 to $210.00 per share in early December 2016.136
As of October 2016, Panera was the ninth most valuable
restaurant company in America with a market capitalization
of $4.5 billion.137 Panera completed its Panera 2.0 rollout
for company-owned bakery-cafes by the end of 2016.138 And
by the end of 2016, Panera served approximately 9 million
customers per week, making it one of the largest food service
companies in the United States.139
By January 13, 2017, Panera removed all of its “No No List”
ingredients in pursuit of its “clean food” goal.140 Panera hit
another benchmark on February 8, 2017, when MyPanera
accounted for 51% of the Company's transactions, becoming
the largest customer loyalty program in the restaurant
industry.141 Other Panera 2.0 initiatives experienced success,
with digital orders representing 26% of sales142 and the Rapid
Pick-Up Program representing about 9% of sales.143
On February 7, 2017, Shaich announced 2017 to be
Panera's “inflection point”144: “[w]ith peak investments and
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significant scale behind us, we are now focused on completing
the rollout of our initiatives and reaping the benefits.”145 In
particular, “[t]he company has guided to double digit EPS
growth for 2017.”146 The market reacted positively to this
announcement and Panera's stock rose $20.00 that day.147
In this positive environment, Shaich prepared to meet JAB's
Chief Executive Officer, Olivier Goudet, and Head of
M&A, David Bell.148 Shaich prepared for the meeting with
Goldman, who arranged his introduction to JAB.149 Shaich
informed some of Panera's directors before the meeting, and
Colasacco helped Shaich gather JAB's public information.150
JAB hosted Shaich at its Washington, D.C. office on
February 9.151 During the meeting, Shaich presented Panera's
standard external investor presentation.152 Bell interpreted
the presentation as a way to try to entice JAB to come
and make an offer for Panera.153 During his pitch, Shaich
discussed his thirty-year career at Panera, but was “very
uncertain” about his personal plans.154 Shaich saw that
Goudet's eyes lit up as Shaich discussed Panera.155
*9  On Friday, February 24, Shaich, Goudet, and Bell had
a follow-up phone discussion during which JAB expressed
its interest in acquiring Panera.156 The next day, Shaich and
Colasacco met to discuss JAB's expression of interest.157
At this time, Shaich did not engage a financial advisor or
engage in negotiations.158 Shaich planned to inform the rest
of the board at the upcoming Wednesday, March 1 board
meeting.159
At that board meeting, Shaich informed the full board
of JAB's interest.160 Shaich did not mention that he had
initiated the conversation with JAB.161 The board discussed
Shaich's introductory meeting and conversations with JAB,
as well as JAB's potential interest in an acquisition of the
Company.162 “[T]he Board authorized Mr. Shaich to continue
conversations with JAB and to report back to the Board with
an update as to the discussions and the status of any offer.”163
At that time, the board did not retain a financial advisor, as it
had not received a formal offer.164
At this same meeting, the board reviewed 2016 financial
results and tracked them against the Five-Year Strategic
Plan and the projections in the Five-Year Financial
Model.165 Panera management typically updated the Five-
Year Financial Model every spring and fall since May
2015.166 In March, management updated the Five-Year
Financial Model in preparation for merger discussions with
JAB.167
G. JAB Makes An Offer, And Both Parties Secure
Advisors.
On March 10, 2017, Shaich met with Bell and Goudet in
Washington D.C.168 JAB offered to acquire Panera at a
price of $286.00 per share in cash.169 At this time, Panera's
stock was trading at $234.91; the offer represented a 21.7%
premium.170
JAB was a serial acquirer that maintained a “playbook”
for their acquisitions.171 Following that playbook, JAB
conditioned their offer to Panera on (i) a confidentiality
provision; (ii) a public support measure for Shaich and certain
affiliates; (iii) a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out; (iv)
matching rights; and (v) a 4.0% termination fee.172 JAB's
terms did not include a financing or regulatory condition.173
JAB expressed the desire and ability to sign on April 7,
2017, with an announcement on April 10, 2017.174 At trial,
Bell explained the “playbook.”175 Regarding the deal's speed,
JAB was “not interested in a protracted negotiation that
results in significant management distraction, so they always
go very quickly.”176 Because of this short timeline, JAB
also never discusses post-merger leadership roles during
negotiations.177 Bell also explained that a bilateral deal is part
of the JAB playbook in part because it typically leads to the
lowest price.178
*10  JAB hired Ernst & Young in March 2017 to conduct
their due diligence review of Panera.179 JAB conducted their
diligence in five days because Panera's public information
and “transparency is off the charts.”180 During the process,
Bell expressed satisfaction with the smooth diligence and was
“really impressed by the speed and quality of the data.”181
He also noted that Panera was one of the “cleanest companies
they have ever seen.”182
As for financing, Goudet told Shaich that JAB would
“use [Goldman] for our financing, so it is logical we take
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them on the buyside.”183 Shaich and Moreton were not
concerned about using another advisor, despite Panera's
prior relationship with Goldman.184 JAB recommended that
Panera use Adam Taetle from Barclays or David Ciagne from
Morgan Stanley because it was “important [for Panera] to
pick someone who understands [JAB's] playbook, otherwise
could be dangerous.”185 Ciagne was JAB's coverage banker
at Morgan Stanley.186
Upon receipt of an offer, on March 14, the board engaged
advisors. The board retained Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
(“Sullivan & Cromwell”) as the board's outside legal counsel
for the potential transaction with JAB.187 Frank Aquila
served as Sullivan & Cromwell's lead partner on the
matter.188 Shaich proposed engaging Barclays Capital or
Morgan Stanley as Panera's financial advisor,189 but did
not tell the board that JAB had suggested those firms, or
specifically Ciagne.190 After deliberation and discussion,
the board directed the Company to explore a potential
engagement and selected Morgan Stanley as its financial
advisor.191 Specifically, on Aquila's recommendation, Panera
selected Michael Boublik of Morgan Stanley.192 Boublik had
not worked for JAB, and neither Bell, nor anyone else at JAB,
knew him.193
*11  On March 15, Morgan Stanley cleared an initial
conflicts check.194 Two days later, Morgan Stanley gave
Panera a key request list that included the Five-Year Strategic
Plan, and started putting together initial valuation metrics.195
Then, on March 20, Sullivan & Cromwell informed the
board that Morgan Stanley “had cleared an initial conflicts
check on March 15 and the parties were now negotiating an
engagement letter for the transaction.”196
On March 29, Panera management and Morgan Stanley
met to review the Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-
Year Financial Model as updated after the March 1 board
meeting.197 Paul Kwak, a Vice President of M&A at
Morgan Stanley,198 prepared questions about Panera's Five-
Year Financial Model.199 In conducting its analysis, Morgan
Stanley “immediately noticed that [management projections]
were clearly more bullish and had higher growth, higher
margins than what the street consensus was,”200 but used the
Five-Year Financial Model to develop its management case
DCF analysis.201
On March 30, the bank sent its engagement letter.202 Panera
agreed to pay Morgan Stanley $42 million: $8 million
became payable upon execution of the merger agreement,
and the remainder was contingent upon closing.203 The
disclosure letter identified the scope of conflict and formally
disclosed all of Morgan Stanley's prior dealings with JAB.204
Morgan Stanley disclosed they “have provided, currently
are providing, and/or in the future may provide, certain
investment banking and other financial services to the
Company, The Potential Buyer, and the Buyer Related
entities.”205 Morgan Stanley also included in the letter that
other than Patrick Gallagher, no senior deal team member “is
a member of the coverage team for the Potential Buyer or the
Buyer Related Entities.”206
Even though Panera's deal team did not include any JAB
coverage bankers, a JAB coverage banker twice passed
messages between the JAB and Panera deal teams. First,
on March 27 (before execution of the engagement letter),
Ciagne emailed Boublik to communicate JAB's fears that
Morgan Stanley was not doing enough to assure Panera that
JAB could finance the deal.207 Second, on April 1, Boublik
caused Ciagne to deliver the board's message to JAB that
“Panera is serious, and there has to be a higher price.”208 The
board did not know that Ciagne had previously communicated
with Boublik about financing.209 Indeed, Shaich and Moreton
learned about that communication for the first time at trial.210
H. Panera Rejects JAB's Offer, And JAB Compresses The
Timeline.
On March 14, the board met to discuss JAB's $286.00
offer.211 The board agreed that JAB would need to raise its
offer and authorized Shaich to pursue further discussions in
pursuit of a higher price.212 The board instructed Shaich to
inform JAB “that the Board would not agree to any proposed
offer for the Company that was not significantly higher than
the $286.00 per share currently proposed by JAB.”213
*12  The next day, Morgan Stanley conducted initial
valuation work with Panera's trading history, trading
multiples, and precedent transaction multiples.214 From
this and JAB's bidding precedents, Morgan Stanley was
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comfortable that it could negotiate a price that was above
$300.00.215
On March 17, Morgan Stanley advised Shaich and Moreton
on JAB's historical bidding approach and helped them
formulate a strategy to raise JAB's offer price.216 Shaich
stayed up until 3 a.m. digesting JAB's historical bidding
approach.217 While reviewing, Shaich wrote to Moreton that
he wanted to push JAB on price; Moreton cautioned him not
to push it too hard by being too greedy, because “pigs get fat,
hogs get slaughtered.”218
The next day, on March 18, Shaich informed JAB that
although the board approved continued discussions and
targeted due diligence, it expected that JAB would have to
increase their $286.00 offer north of $300.00 per share.219
JAB agreed to discuss the possibility of offering a higher price
internally and to get back to Shaich on March 20.220
On March 20, JAB made a second offer of $296.50 per share,
with the warning that JAB would “not go one penny over
299. We're not going to hit 300.”221 Panera's stock had closed
at $255.24 the day before, so the offer represented a 16.2%
premium to that trading price.222 The board met that same
day to review the second offer.223 The board “supported
continued discussions with JAB and JAB initiating due
diligence on the Company but expressed its expectation that
any final offering price be significantly higher.”224 Boublik
agreed and commented, “I would hope that we get another
collective move of at least the same magnitude.”225
On March 22, Shaich and Moreton communicated to Bell and
Goudet the board's expectation to Bell and Goudet that JAB
find additional value in the Company.226 Shaich explained,
“You've made a meaningful move once, and I and my board
appreciate that, but it's going to take another meaningful move
once again ... I'm confident that once we sit down and go
through our business plan and you've done your diligence
you'll be able to get there.”227
A few days later, on March 26, JAB and Panera signed a
confidentiality agreement and discussed the due diligence
process.228 Bell testified that when JAB makes an offer
without a financing contingency, they conduct due diligence
at “the appropriate level” “to have this minimum amount of
information in order to ensure that [they] could get the debt
commitments” from their lenders.229 In these discussions,
JAB asked Panera to move up the transaction with an
anticipated announcement during the week of April 3.230
Shaich recognized that JAB wanted to move quickly,231 but
responded that it was “material” to Panera that JAB “robustly
(and genuinely) understand the drivers in the business [s]o
they can fully appreciate the value that we understand is here
and seek from them.”232
*13  Shaich and Moreton also spoke with their legal and
financial advisors about the feasibility, benefits, and risks
of JAB's proposed accelerated timeline.233 The transaction
was the fastest in Kwak's career.234 Nevertheless, Panera's
advisors said that they had adequate time.235 The board liked
the shortened timeline, valuing less distraction.236 It was
feasible for the board because of its extensive review of the
Five-Year Strategic Plan, Panera's financial results, and the
Five-Year Financial Model.237 Shaich understood that the
Company's future value lay in its initiatives, so he conditioned
the compressed timeline on meeting with JAB to review the
Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Financial Model.238
JAB agreed and the parties agreed to work toward entering
into a definitive agreement during the week of April 3.239
On March 27, JAB's counsel provided Sullivan & Cromwell a
draft merger agreement and a draft voting agreement.240 The
board did not counteroffer on deal price or deal terms at that
time.
Also on March 27, the Company learned that a Bloomberg
reporter had called Bell inquiring about a possible sale
of Panera.241 Shaich wrote in an email that he learned
this through “a desperate call from [D]avid [B]ell [after]
Bloomberg called him inquiring about Panera.”242 At trial,
Shaich commented that during the call, Bell had “anxiety in
his voice” and “was very nervous and concerned about it.”243
Despite the JAB playbook's tenet of confidentiality,244 JAB
did not walk after the leak. Instead, JAB began their diligence
in Panera's data room on March 28.245
While JAB was conducting their due diligence, Morgan
Stanley presented its initial valuation analysis to the board.246
At the March 30 board meeting, Morgan Stanley presented
seven different valuation metrics to guide the negotiations
and frame JAB's outstanding offer of $296.50.247 Morgan
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Stanley also identified and ranked “Potential Interlopers”
by their strategic rationale and ability to pay.248 In
order, these included Starbucks, Chipotle, Restaurant Brands
International (“RBI”), Dunkin’, Domino's, McDonald's,
Yum!, and Darden.249 Morgan Stanley ruled out financial
sponsors,250 focused on strategic buyers like Starbucks,
and explained why others were unlikely to compete.251
In its analysis, Morgan Stanley recognized that Starbucks
had “[p]reviously engaged with [Panera] in acquisition
discussions,” and “[h]ad mentioned concerns that acquisition
multiple would be above where Starbucks traded.”252
*14  This analysis fit with Shaich's and the board's deep
knowledge of the industry.253 According to Shaich, the “big
three” were not viable options: Starbucks had just passed
on Panera months earlier; Chipotle was in an E. coli crisis;
and RBI had just acquired Popeyes.254 As for the remainder,
Shaich knew Dunkin’ very well, had discussions with them,
and knew they were 100% franchised, operated at smaller
volume, and would not be interested in Panera.255 Shaich
knew Domino's CEO as a dear friend and understood their
business was 100% franchised and 100% pizza and that they
were not acquiring.256 Shaich previously had discussions
with McDonald's and knew that, based on mistakes in their
acquisition history, they had pulled back and were not
acquiring, so Panera “wouldn't be for them.”257 Shaich also
had discussions with Yum! years earlier and knew that, at
the time of the merger, Yum! faced activist pressure to leave
China and also would not run company stores.258 Finally,
Shaich knew that Darden was acquiring Cheddars and faced
activist pressure.259 Shaich explained: “[I]t was just patently
clear to me that, knowing what I know, and knowing these
people and where this had played out, that there really wasn't
a viable interested party.”260 The board agreed. Moreton
explained that “there was nobody else out there talking to
[the board] about potentially acquiring [the Company], nor
did [the board] think there would be.”261
I. JAB Reviews Panera's Five-Year Strategic Plan And
Five-Year Financial Model And Makes Their Final Offer.
Shaich met with four JAB leaders on March 31, as well as
two of their advisors.262 The group met for three to four
hours, and Shaich presented a deck titled “Five-Year Strategy
& Financial Model.”263 The Company presented nonpublic
information, including the status of the Five-Year Strategic
Plan and the financial projections contained in the Five-Year
Financial Model.264 Days later, on April 2, JAB confirmed
its pre-diligence estimates for cost savings265 and internally
revised their target price upwards from $290.00 to $305.00
per share.266
The next day, on the morning of April 3, Bloomberg reported
that Panera was exploring strategic options, including a
possible sale of the Company to potential suitors such as JAB,
Starbucks, and Domino's.267 In response to the leak, Panera's
stock price jumped to $261.87, an 8% increase from the pre-
public speculation price, and closed at $282.63.268
Later that day, on April 3, Shaich, Hurst, and Bufano met
with JAB's senior partners including Goudet, Bell, Peter Harf
(JAB senior partner), Bart Becht (JAB partner and chairman),
and two of their advisors.269 The Company presented a
deck also titled “Five-Year Strategy & Financial Model,”270
which was substantially similar to the deck delivered to the
other JAB leaders on March 31.271 Both decks contained
an in-depth look into the Five-Year Strategic Plan and the
Five-Year Financial Model.272 Both decks discussed Panera's
opportunities in international franchising,273 “Panera At
Home” (including coffee),274 and technology.275
The April 3 deck contemplated “other opportunities” that
would stem from combining JAB and Panera.276 These
opportunities included joint efforts in consumer packaged
goods (“CPG”), coffee, international expansion, technology,
marketing, real estate modeling, sourcing, and franchising.277
The parties did not quantify the amount of savings generated
by these efforts.278 After this discussion, Bell explained that
JAB
*15  did some back-of-the-envelope math and got excited
about it. But since we had no discussion with anyone about
it, and it was a short period of time, we didn't, quote/
unquote, put it in the model, financially. But I will tell
you––you even heard it earlier—coffee was core to our
strategy of doing this. It's just something that was difficult
for us to quantify at the time we were doing diligence.279
JAB did not quantify any growth opportunity synergies either
before or after diligence.280
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Also on April 3, Panera countered JAB's draft merger
agreement and proposed lowering the termination fee from
4.0% to 2.5% of the equity value of the transaction.281 In
response to that counter, also on April 3, JAB communicated
to Shaich a “best and final” offer of $315.00 per share and
a 3.0% termination fee.282 The $315.00 offer represented
a 34.1% premium from the March 10 trading price of
$234.91 and a 20.3% premium from the March 31 pre-public
speculation trading price of $261.87.283 JAB informed Panera
that this offer would expire when the United States market
opened on April 5.284
J. Morgan Stanley Offers Its Fairness Opinion, And
Panera Approves The Deal.
At 9:00 p.m. on April 3, Morgan Stanley's fairness committee
met to discuss the proposed transaction between Panera and
JAB, and found that the $315.00 per share offer exceeded
the historical trading range, analyst price targets, public
trading benchmarks, and the street discounted equity value
analysis.285 The analysis also showed that the $315.00 per
share offer fell within the range of precedent transactions,
management discounted equity value analysis, and both the
street and management discounted cash flow analyses.286 The
committee prepared to present these findings to the board the
next day.
On April 4 at 9:30 a.m., the board held a meeting to
discuss JAB's “last and final” offer.287 Shaich, Bufano, and
Hurst presented highlights from the “Five-Year Strategic
Plan & Financial Model” previously shared with JAB
leaders.288 During this meeting, management also reviewed
the Company's full Five-Year Financial Model with the
board.289
Morgan Stanley presented its fairness committee's
findings.290 The analysis included the evolution of merger
discussions; a summary of JAB proposals with implied
transaction multiples; a JAB company and precedent
transaction overview; Panera's historical stock performance,
next-twelve-month multiple measurements, and valuation
comparables; and analyst perspectives on Panera.291
Morgan Stanley also presented its preliminary standalone
valuation summary from both a street case and an internal
management case based on the Five-Year Model.292 The
discounted cash flow analysis for the street case ranged
from $231.00 to $318.00 per share, while the management
case ranged from $300.00 to $410.00 per share.293 The
board discussed these valuations at length and asked Morgan
Stanley questions about the underlying assumptions.294
Morgan Stanley explained that the management case reflected
assumptions for Panera's various initiatives and that “all those
initiatives had to go right in order to achieve this management
case and then ... there was execution risks in executing or
in getting all those initiatives to the point that management
was assuming within their management case.”295 While
Morgan Stanley highlighted the effect of these assumptions,
it accepted management's data in creating the management
case and did not test it for reasonableness.296 Morgan Stanley
concluded that the merger consideration of $315.00 per share
“was fair to and in the best interests of, from a financial point
of view, the Company's shareholders and that it would be
prepared to issue an opinion to the Company and its Board to
that effect.”297
*16  After the board discussed their perspectives on the
proposed transaction and the valuation of the Company, “[t]he
directors expressed their strong support for the proposed
transaction, noting particularly that the price was fair for
the Company's shareholders and that the deal protection
mechanisms in the merger agreement were not preclusive to
an alternative proposal for the Company's shares.”298 The
board then recessed and reconvened at 4:00 p.m. for the final
review of the proposed transaction.299
At that time, Sullivan & Cromwell updated the board
about the merger agreement, the voting agreement, and
the non-competition agreement.300 Boublik orally delivered
Morgan Stanley's fairness opinion (confirmed the next day
in writing)301 that the merger was fair from a financial
point of view to Panera and its stockholders.302 The board
unanimously approved the proposed resolutions to adopt,
execute, and deliver the merger agreement.303
On April 5, Panera and JAB issued a joint press release
announcing the merger.304
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K. Panera Solicits And Obtains Stockholder Approval.
On May 12, Panera filed a preliminary proxy statement
on Schedule 14A recommending that Panera's stockholders
vote in favor of the merger.305 On June 1, Panera issued a
definitive Schedule 14A proxy statement, by which Panera
notified all stockholders of their appraisal rights for their
shares of Panera common stock pursuant to 8 Del. C. §
262, and attached a copy of 8 Del. C. § 262 as Annex C
to the proxy.306 On June 16, Panera issued supplemental
disclosures.307 On July 11, Panera stockholders approved the
merger at a special meeting, at which over 97% of votes cast
favored the merger, representing 80.26% of the outstanding
shares.308
The merger closed on July 18.309 No potential bidders
emerged at any time, including after Bloomberg's March 27
request for comment or after the parties announced the deal
on April 5.310 As of the merger date, Panera operated 910
company-owned bakery-cafes and 1,132 franchisee bakery-
cafes across 46 states, the District of Columbia, and Ontario,
Canada.311
On November 8, Panera announced that effective January 1,
2018, Shaich would step down as Chief Executive Officer
of Panera and remain with the Company as Executive
Chairman, and Hurst would succeed Shaich as Chief
Executive Officer.312
L. Dissenting Stockholders Seek Appraisal.
In early July 2017, thirty Dissenting Stockholders notified
Panera of their desire to exercise their appraisal rights
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262 over a collective 1,863,578 shares
of Panera common stock.313 The Dissenting Stockholders did
not withdraw their demands within sixty days of the effective
date of the merger.314
Between August 16, 2017 and September 13, 2017,
Dissenting Stockholders filed five separate petitions seeking
appraisal relating to the merger. The Court consolidated those
petitions into this action.315
Between December 19, 2017 and May 10, 2018, Panera
prepaid twenty-nine of the Dissenting Stockholders the full
amount of the merger consideration, $315.00, and statutory
interest accrued through the payment date, for each share of
Panera common stock beneficially owned.316
*17  Certain Dissenting Stockholders withdrew their
demands, and Panera and these Dissenting Stockholders
jointly stipulated to dismiss their petitioners from this
action.317
The Court held a six-day trial between April 1 and April 8,
2019. Post-trial briefing was completed on August 1.318 The
Court ordered supplemental briefing on August 22,319 which
the parties completed on September 27.320 The Court held
post-trial argument on October 7.321
II. ANALYSIS
Petitioners contend that the fair value of their shares is
$361.00.322 Petitioners support this valuation with a three-
pronged approach. They give no weight to deal price.323
Instead, they give 60% weight to a discounted cash flow
model prepared by their expert, Israel Shaked, professor
of finance and economics at Boston University's Questrom
School of Business.324 Petitioners attribute 30% of their
valuation to Shaked's comparable companies analysis, and
10% to his precedent transaction analysis.
Throughout this proceeding, including at trial, Respondent
pursued a valuation of $304.44.325 Respondent argued that
deal price minus synergies deserves dispositive weight.
Respondent's expert was Glenn Hubbard, the Dean and
Russell L. Carson Professor in finance and economics at
the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University, as
well as professor of economics at Columbia University.326
Seizing on Bell's trial testimony regarding revenue synergies,
Respondent lowered its valuation to $293.44 in post-trial
briefing. Respondent seeks a refund of any difference
between its prepayment at $315.00 per share and fair value.
A. Legal Standard
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger
on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a
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judicial determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of
their shareholdings.”327 “Section 262(h) unambiguously calls
upon the Court of Chancery to perform an independent
evaluation of ‘fair value’ at the time of a transaction ... [and]
vests the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with significant
discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine
the going concern value of the underlying company.”328
The determination of fair value is intended to ensure the
stockholder is “paid for that which has been taken from
him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going concern.”329
Valuation of the corporation as a going concern must be
“based upon the operative reality of the company as of the
time of the merger, taking into account its particular market
position in light of future prospects.”330 “Given that ‘[e]very
company is different; every merger is different,’ the appraisal
endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible process.’ ”331
*18  “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have
the burden of proving their respective valuation positions
by a preponderance of [the] evidence.”332 In evaluating
the parties’ positions, “[n]o presumption, favorable or
unfavorable, attaches to either side's valuation,”333 and
“[e]ach party also bears the burden of proving the
constituent elements of its valuation position ..., including the
propriety of a particular method, modification, discount, or
premium.”334 Because the Court determines fair value based
on an adversarial presentation blending facts, opinions, and
argument, the Court's conclusions in one appraisal proceeding
may not squarely inform its conclusions in another.335
The appraisal exercise occurs in the context of the efficient
market hypothesis, “long endorsed” by the Delaware
Supreme Court.336 “It teaches that the price produced by an
efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair
value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert
witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives
of a well-heeled client.”337 In view of this principle, the
Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged “the economic
reality that the sale value resulting from a robust market check
will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and ...
second-guessing the value arrived upon by the collective
views of many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the
matter is hazardous.”338 At the same time, the Delaware
Supreme Court does not view “the market [a]s always the
best indicator of value, or that it should always be granted
some weight.”339 “There is no presumption that the deal price
reflects fair value.”340 “[T]he persuasiveness of the deal price
depends on the reliability of the sale process that generated
it.”341 If the sale process is not open or sufficiently reliable,
“the deal price should not be regarded as persuasive evidence
of fair value.”342
*19  There is no checklist or set of minimum characteristics
for giving weight to the deal price.343 Indeed, Delaware
Supreme Court precedent announced in “Aruba, Dell, and
DFC do[es] not establish legal requirements for a sale
process.”344 A deal price serves as a persuasive indicator
of fair value where the sale process bears “objective indicia
of fairness that rendered the deal price a reliable indicator
of fair value.”345 Vice Chancellor Glasscock described a
“Dell compliant” process as one “where (i) information
was sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so that
(ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue
impediments imposed by the deal structure itself.”346
In Stillwater, Vice Chancellor Laster recited several
objective indicia of reliability approved by the Delaware
Supreme Court: negotiations “[at] arm's-length”;347 board
deliberations without “any conflicts of interest”;348 buyer
“due diligence and recei[pt of] confidential information
about [the company's] value”;349 and seller “extract[ion of]
multiple price increases.”350 The Delaware Supreme Court
has particularly stressed the absence of post-signing bidders
as an objective indicator that the sale process was reliable and
probative of fair value.351
The presence of objective indicia of reliability does not
establish a presumption in favor of the deal price.352
Where these indicia are present, I must determine whether
they outweigh weaknesses in the sale process, or whether
those weaknesses undermine the persuasiveness of the deal
price.353
B. Panera's Sale Process Was Sufficiently Reliable To
Make Deal Price Persuasive Evidence Of Fair Value.
I find several objective indicia of reliability in this case. As a
prefatory matter, Panera's stock traded in an efficient market,
such that indicia of reliability in Panera's sale process support
giving weight to deal price.354 First, as Petitioners’ process
expert James Redpath recognized, the parties negotiated in an
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arm's-length transaction.355 Redpath similarly conceded that
the board was independent, and labored without conflicts of
interest.356
*20  Second, JAB assessed Panera's value using both
Panera's extensive public information and focused due
diligence into Panera's confidential information.357 In DFC,
deal price was the best evidence of fair value in part because
it was “informed by robust public information[ ] and easy
access to deeper, non-public information.”358 Bell found
Panera's “transparency [was] off the charts[,]”and JAB's legal
advisors shared the view that “much of [JAB's diligence]
is check the box and that they have reviewed everything
that is public.”359 Shaich explained that he presented the
Five-Year Strategic Plan “hundreds of times” to “internal
groups, external groups” and “every investment conference”
he attended (“twenty a year”) “to get everybody to understand
[ ] what's the vision and where we were.”360
In addition, JAB received and reviewed the specific
nonpublic information that Shaich believed would lead JAB
to see greater value in Panera.361 After reviewing that
information, JAB internally raised their offer from $296.50
to $305.00, as the information confirmed a “[s]ignificant
[c]ash [o]pportunity” through working capital and other
cost savings.362 Ultimately, JAB offered Panera $315.00.363
Although JAB limited their access to non-public information,
they did so as a natural result of Panera's widespread public
dissemination of meaningful information.
Third, Panera used Boublik's guidance364 and Shaich's
doggedness to extract two price increases.365 Even operating
under their own preferred terms of engagement, JAB raised
their price twice. The board rejected JAB's initial $286.00
offer, communicating its expectation that JAB would find
more value for the Company during the diligence process.366
Boublik agreed and encouraged Shaich, the lead negotiator,
and Moreton, a board negotiation advisor, to seek additional
value.367 When JAB revised their offer to $296.50, JAB
also explained that they would not raise the offer a penny
over $299.00.368 This was still too low for the board.369
Shaich and Moreton listened to Morgan Stanley's guidance
and believed the Company could break JAB's stated ceiling
price without giving a counteroffer.370 Morgan Stanley was
right. After conducting diligence, confirming its anticipated
cost savings, and reviewing the Five-Year Strategic Plan and
Five-Year Model, JAB raised its price to $315.00.371
*21  Fourth, no other potential bidders emerged, despite
a leak during negotiations and nonpreclusive deal
protections.372 A leak gives potential bidders notice of the
transaction and an opportunity to bid.373 According to Kwak,
leaks typically happen at the tail end of a process,374 and a
potentially interested buyer with the capacity to acquire a $7
billion company would “have the experience and the know-
how and the team members to know that you do need to move
swiftly because at any point they could sign a transaction with
the rumored buyer.”375 Kwak explained that when a rumored
transaction surfaces, coverage bankers immediately identify
and contact potential buyers “to explore whether th[ose]
compan[ies] ha[ve] interest in pursuing an acquisition.”376
The first evidence of a leak emerged on March 27, when
Bloomberg called JAB for a comment. The leak concerned
Bell greatly, evidencing that JAB feared another bidder might
surface. The transaction became public on April 3, when
Bloomberg published its article.377 No bidders surfaced.
Further, no third-party bidders expressed interest or submitted
a bid during the three-month post-signing period after the
parties announced the deal.378 Panera's deal protections
included a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out, matching
rights, a 3% termination fee, and 104 days between signing
and closing.379 Morgan Stanley considered each post-signing
protection to be customary or insufficiently preclusive to post-
signing bidders.380 Kwak viewed a 3 to 4% break-up fee
as “typical” and 3% as “customary,”381 and recognized that
even “customary” matching rights “may discourage in a way
and make it more challenging” for other bidders to come
forward, but such rights would not prevent them.382 Kwak
testified at trial that an interested bidder “could contact and
put forth an offer to the company.”383 Kwak concluded there
was sufficient time between signing and closing, noting, “[I]f
there was someone, we would have expected to at least get
some form of an inbound.”384
Petitioners have not meaningfully challenged the terms
Panera's post-signing passive market check, or offered any
evidence that an interested bidder did not have a reasonable
chance to bid.385 To the contrary, Redpath conceded, “[t]here
was sufficient time for a topping bidder to emerge post-
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signing.”386 After the leak and the public deal announcement,
other market participants “failed to pursue a merger when they
had a free chance to do so.”387 “The failure of any other party
to come forward provides significant evidence of fairness,
because ‘[f]air value entails at minimum a price some buyer
is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in
the market would pay.’ ”388
*22  In particular, none of the “big three”389 potential
bidders that Morgan Stanley identified—Starbucks, Chipotle,
and RBI—showed any interest in bidding for Panera, both
before and after the parties announced the deal. Chipotle knew
about the leak before the deal signed, but did not express
interest before or after signing.390 Both RBI and Chipotle
sent post-announcement congratulatory messages to Morgan
Stanley after the parties announced the deal.391
Finally, Panera solicited all logical buyers consistent with
its knowledge of the Company's value and the market. The
Delaware Supreme Court has identified “outreach to all
logical buyers” as a key indicator of reliability.392 Petitioners
contend that Panera engaged in a closed, single-bidder
strategy during the pre-signing process. Respondent asserts
that Panera engaged “all logical buyers.”393
In Dell, the board similarly limited its pre-signing canvass to
two bidders, based on its financial advisor's recommendation
that those two firms were “among the best qualified potential
acquirers” and that “there was a low probability of strategic
buyer interest in acquiring the company.”394 The Dell board
also conducted a go-shop, soliciting interest from sixty-
seven potential bidders.395 As a result, the Supreme Court
determined the deal price “deserved heavy, if not dispositive,
weight.”396
Panera led outreach to all logical buyers: Starbucks and
JAB. The negotiations with the two companies followed the
same pattern. Shaich asserted Panera's value based on the
Five-Year Strategic Plan to “sell[ ]” the company, or solicit
interest,397 listened to gauge interest, and then consulted with
the board.398 The failed negation with Starbucks prepared
Shaich and the board to negotiate with JAB.
As a recap, in June 2015, Goldman identified several potential
strategic bidders, and identified Starbucks as Panera's most
likely buyer.399 Starbucks was the most likely bidder because
Panera was “such a valued company” “trading at very high
multiples.”400 Goldman concluded a financial buyer was
unlikely, and the board understood that financial sponsors
were limited and none could afford the Company.401 With
that analysis, the board decided that it should remain an
independent company, but that “the Company would, as it had
done in the past, continue to observe the markets and consider
activities in the best interest of shareholders on an ongoing
basis.”402
*23  About a year later, in July 2016, Starbucks initiated
a possible collaboration403 and the board instructed Shaich
to solicit Starbucks’ interest in an acquisition.404 In August
2016, Shaich started the conversation with JAB, another
potential buyer that was conducting acquisitions at “huge
multiples.”405 Shaich explained:
I saw an article in Nation's Restaurant News, I think [JAB]
had just done an acquisition. They were buying companies
every six months at huge multiples. And I thought they
were at least worth getting to know in some way, so I picked
up the phone and called Goldman, said do you know these
guys and can you introduce me. That was August.406
After August, Panera continued its negotiations with
Starbucks, which concluded by December 2016.407 JAB
expressed interest in meeting with Shaich, but with another
ongoing acquisition, JAB did not engage with Shaich until
February 2017.408 After JAB expressed interest in acquiring
Panera on March 24, Shaich probed Goldman for more
information about the acquisition landscape, especially after
RBI announced its acquisition of Popeyes on February 21.409
Goldman replied, “Best buyer today is a JAB, with a long
term perspective that counters near term valuation trends.
Or Starbucks. Or a merger with someone like Chipotle.”410
Shaich shared Goldman's analysis with Colasacco.411
As conversations with JAB proceeded, Morgan Stanley
identified the same four strategic primary strategic buyers
as Goldman: JAB, Starbucks, Chipotle, and RBI.412 Morgan
Stanley also excluded other potential acquirers. Morgan
Stanley recognized that Dunkin and Dominos were highly
leveraged like RBI and all three would have difficulty paying
all cash.413 Beyond this, Morgan Stanley recommended that
Dunkin and Dominos also had “slightly different business
models” and lacked a clear strategic fit.414 With this guidance
from both Goldman and Morgan Stanley, the board viewed
- 154 -
In re Panera Bread Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2020)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15
JAB as the only remaining logical bidder. Like Goldman,
Morgan Stanley viewed Starbucks as the only other potential
buyer that could afford Panera,415 but the board had already
exhausted that option.416 The board knew that Chipotle was
recovering from a food safety crisis and otherwise focused
on share buybacks.417 And the board knew that RBI had
agreed to acquire Popeyes.418 The board concluded that no
other bidders were out there.419 Morgan Stanley confirmed
the board's conclusion: “JAB represents the buyer with the
most interest, wherewithal, and ability to pay and would
be a good fit.”420 Moreton summarized, “we had just gone
through the key strategic buyer. Starbucks had told us no.
And Morgan Stanley and Goldman had told us there were no
financial bidders out there. So we really thought this was an
opportunity to see if we could get a price that was reasonable
for shareholders.”421 The leak added certainty to the board's
conclusion.422
*24  Petitioners argue that a logical buyer universe of only
two buyers is “absurd” because “Panera could not have
known buyers were ‘out’ without ever conducting a market
check.”423 The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when
“the directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which
to evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may approve
that transaction without conducting an active survey of the
market.”424 And “if a board fails to employ any traditional
value maximization tool, such as an auction, a broad market
check, or a go-shop provision, that board must possess an
impeccable knowledge of the company's business for the
Court to determine that it acted reasonably.”425
I find that the board possessed a robust body of evidence
that it used to determine the universe of logical buyers.
The board's impeccable knowledge of the market in the pre-
signing phase, and the lack of interested bidders in the post-
signing phase, leads me to find that the board led outreach
to all logical buyers. Because Panera engaged with Starbucks
first, JAB's confidentiality requirement did not preclude the
board's outreach to all logical buyers. The absence of a
wider canvass or go-shop does not change the reliability of
Panera's outreach.426 This decision was confirmed when no
other bidders came forward either after the leak or during
the post-signing passive market check. The preponderance of
the evidence shows that the board used its knowledge of the
market and its advisors’ advice to engage all logical buyers in
a value-maximizing process.
Panera's deal process bears many indicia of reliability,
including an arm's length negotiation, a disinterested and
independent board, numerous price increases, no emerging
bidders post-leak or post-announcement, and outreach to
all logical buyers. The process also terminated with an
open passive post-signing market check. I therefore turn to
the weaknesses in the process to determine whether they
undermine its reliability.
C. Weaknesses In Panera's Process Do Not Undermine
The Deal Price's Reliability.
Petitioners point to weaknesses in the pre-signing process that
they believe undermine the deal price's reliability. They focus
on actions taken by the board, Shaich, and Morgan Stanley.
In all, I find that the transaction's flaws do not undermine its
numerous indicia of reliability.
1. The board did not undermine the deal process.
Petitioners characterize the pre-signing phase as exhibiting
the board's “apathy,” ignorance, and “flat-footed[ness].”427
According to Petitioners, these traits manifested in the board's
failures to 1) authorize Shaich's initial outreach to JAB, 2)
oversee the negotiations, 3) negotiate with a proper valuation,
4) reject JAB's confidentiality and speed provisions, and 5)
negotiate deal protections.
First, while the board had authorized Shaich to solicit
Starbucks’ interest in acquiring Panera,428 Shaich did not
obtain specific board authorization for his August 2016
outreach to JAB. Shaich's independent outreach did not
generate a response until early 2017. At that time, when JAB
offered to meet with Shaich, Shaich informed Colasacco and
other board members.429 When JAB expressed an interest
in acquiring Panera on February 24, 2017, Shaich informed
Colasacco the next day,430 and informed the board three
business days later on March 1.431 Thus, although Shaich
initiated Panera's outreach to JAB, he timely and fully updated
the board when JAB expressed interest in a transaction.432
Shaich did not negotiate for a role post-merger or negotiate for
change-in-control compensation.433 Petitioners provided no
evidence that the outreach alone––Shaich's only act that was
not specifically authorized—led to any diminution in value
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or in the board's power to negotiate or decline a transaction
with JAB.
*25  Second, while Shaich initiated and led the negotiations,
the board exercised active oversight. The board of directors
“has the sole power to negotiate the terms on which
the merger will take place and to arrive at a definitive
merger agreement embodying its decisions as to those
matters.”434 The preponderance of the evidence shows the
board negotiated the terms of the merger and unanimously
approved the final merger agreement.
A CEO's rogue negotiations can undermine a deal process.
In Jarden, the CEO “immediately took charge and, consistent
with a stereotypical ‘cut to the chase’ CEO mentality, he laid
Jarden's cards on the table before the negotiations began in
earnest and before the board and its financial advisors had
a chance to formulate a plan.”435 Beyond this, the Jarden
CEO failed to inform the board of the negotiations.436 He
also did not receive authorization from the board to suggest a
price, make counteroffers, or negotiate his “change-in-control
compensation,” but did so anyway.437 These facts contributed
to the Court's finding that the merger price was not a reliable
indicator of fair value.438
I do not find similar troubling facts in this case. Unlike in
Jarden, the board directed Shaich's negotiations, and Shaich
observed the bounds of the board's authorization. Shaich
informed the board of JAB's interest before JAB made
an offer.439 At that time, the board authorized Shaich to
“continue the conversations with JAB and report back to the
Board with an update as to the discussions and the status of
any offer.”440 When JAB offered to acquire Panera on March
10, 2017, for $286.00 per share, Shaich formally informed
the board on March 14.441 The board instructed Shaich to
move forward with the discussions,442 but directed him to
communicate to JAB that the board “would not agree to any
proposed offer for the Company that was not significantly
higher than the $286.00.”443
The board also used Sullivan & Cromwell as its outside legal
counsel for the potential transaction with JAB.444 Sullivan &
Cromwell advised the board during its March 14 meeting and
helped the board select financial advisors.445 On March 15,
the board initiated the process to retain Morgan Stanley as
its financial advisor.446 From then on, Shaich and Moreton
worked with the board and Morgan Stanley to adopt a proven
strategy to raise JAB's price through diligence.447
When JAB raised their offer to $296.50 per share on March
20,448 Shaich informed the board that same day.449 At
the meeting, the board considered the offer, and “various
directors asked questions and provided their thoughts and
comments.”450 Shaich testified that “the board supported
[him] in pushing” JAB to a higher price451 and “expressed
its expectation that any final offering price be significantly
higher.”452
*26  Shaich conveyed that message to JAB and focused on
generating additional value through the diligence process.453
When JAB asked to move up the announcement by a week,
Shaich discussed this proposal with Moreton, Bufano, and
the Company's legal and financial advisors, and explained he
did not find the compressed timeline material; he cared about
JAB understanding Panera's value.454 Accordingly, Shaich
told JAB that “[w]e think we need to spend some more time
with you so we can show you the prospects in our plan, in
order to get you comfortable at a value that my board and I can
support.”455 While Shaich led diligence meetings between
Panera and JAB, the board counteroffered against JAB's 4.0%
termination fee, proposing 2.5%.456
At the culmination of JAB's diligence, Shaich informed the
board of JAB's final offer.457 The board then reviewed the
Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Model,458 vetted the
deal with Morgan Stanley,459 and ultimately “expressed their
strong support for the proposed transaction.”460 Later that
same day, the board reconvened to discuss the proposed
merger with Sullivan & Cromwell.461 After discussing
the proposed merger, the board unanimously approved the
proposed resolutions to adopt, execute and deliver the merger
agreement.462 The preponderance of the evidence shows that
the board directed Shaich's negotiations and “arrive[d] at
a definitive merger agreement embodying its decisions as
to th[ose] matters.”463 Petitioners have likewise failed to
prove that Shaich acted outside the bounds of the board's
authorization.
Third, Petitioners assert the board negotiated in the dark,
without a formal valuation by its advisors. The board entered
negotiations with an existing deep knowledge of internal
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metrics of Panera's value. During the negotiations, the board
analyzed seven valuation metrics with Morgan Stanley. When
considering JAB's final offer, the board evaluated Morgan
Stanley's standalone valuation for Panera.
Initially, the board did not have a full valuation, but it
had steeped itself in management's numbers. At several
prior board meetings, the board reviewed parts of the
Five-Year Strategic Plan and Five-Year Financial Model.
Without a valuation, the board was not prepared to make
a counteroffer when JAB's initial offer came in,464 so it
limited its negotiating position to general pricing guidance.
This dovetailed with Morgan Stanley's advice, based on JAB's
bidding precedents, to focus on raising JAB's ceiling.465
On March 14, the board instructed Shaich to convey to JAB
that it would not agree to any proposed offer for the company
that was not significantly higher than $286.00.466 Again,
when JAB raised its offer to $296.50 and stated a max price
of $299,467 the board did not think JAB's $296.50 was high
enough and directed Shaich to communicate to JAB that they
expected additional value.468
*27  Morgan Stanley met with management to review
Panera's updated Five-Year Financial Model, an essential
input for Morgan Stanley's valuation.469 Morgan Stanley
incorporated these numbers into its implied transaction
multiples and illustrative valuation matrices.470 On
March 30, Morgan Stanley presented its preliminary
valuation analysis to the board.471 This presentation
contained two illustrative valuation matrices, Panera's
historical stock performance, next-twelve-month multiples,
operating comparables, valuation comparables, precedent
transactions, and JAB's precedent transaction overview.472
This presentation did not include Panera's standalone
valuation.
Morgan Stanley's full valuation, including Panera's
standalone valuation, came on April 4, the day after the
board received JAB's final $315.00 per share offer.473 Also
on April 4, the board discussed the updated Five-Year
Financial Model.474 The standalone valuation included two
DCFs: the management case generated from Panera's Five-
Year Financial Model, and the street case generated from
consensus of broker projections.475 The board assessed these
metrics using its knowledge of the Five-Year Financial
Model. When reviewing the management case DCF, Morgan
Stanley cautioned the board that risks could prevent Panera
from reaching the valuation predicted using the Five-Year
Financial Model. Morgan Stanley explained that “[y]ou've got
to believe that 80+% of your value is in the terminus” and
highlighted risks in competition and execution.476 The board
asked questions about “assumptions used in the presentation
and differences among the various valuation techniques.”477
The board ultimately decided that the management case
“wasn't the proper way to look at the valuation.”478 Morgan
Stanley presented its oral fairness opinion for the transaction,
which it would provide in writing the following day.479 After
Morgan Stanley left, the board met in executive session and
discussed the transaction and the Company's valuation.480
The board found JAB's $315.00 offer consistent with its
understanding of Panera's value and unanimously approved
the transaction.481
It is problematic that the board, through Shaich, gave early
guidance toward a price that was not “deeply in the $300s,”482
but this pricing guidance was not a potentially binding
counteroffer, and did not set a ceiling on the price. The
board rejected JAB's initial offer because it knew Panera's
value from its continual review of the Five-Year Financial
Model. Panera's strategy of pressuring JAB to raise its ceiling
ushered in an offer that Morgan Stanley opined was fair and
the board found consistent with its understanding of Panera's
value. The board checked its understanding of Panera's value
against Morgan Stanley's seven valuation metrics on March
31. And the board reviewed and discussed the Company's
standalone value in depth on April 4 by reviewing the Five-
Year Financial Model and Morgan Stanley's DCF valuations.
Although the board did not have each of these valuation
metrics at the outset of the negotiations, it reviewed each of
them before it accepted JAB's final offer.
*28  Fourth, while JAB conditioned its offer on
confidentiality and speed, Panera's board valued those traits
as a way to minimize disruption. The board had enacted
confidentiality protections in its discussions with Starbucks,
too. In both negotiations, Shaich and other board members
used their Gmail accounts.483 Shaich did this because he
worried “intensely” about disruption.484 At trial, Shaich
explained:
I am very sensitive to any discussion about anything that
could be perceived as a potential acquisition and upsetting
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the company. ... It would upset our relationships with our
franchisees, our vendors, and, quite frankly, would shut
down the work on this transformation plan for three to
six months, whatever time period that would be the basic
discussion in the company.485
Thus, JAB's desire for speed benefitted the Company.486
Moreton explained it was “to our advantage to go quickly
from the standpoint we don't want to disrupt our people
either, if things got out in the press. So everyone said they
had adequate time, so we said, Okay. Let's shoot for it.”487
Colasacco agreed: “I would like this period to be as short
as possible, because I believe that eventually management
becomes aware, general management becomes aware. In the
due diligence process—other processes, it's hard—it's very
hard to keep a secret.”488
This internal practice aligned with Morgan Stanley's guidance
to limit outreach outside of Panera. Morgan Stanley advised
that JAB would “walk away if [Panera] or its advisors talk[ed]
to other parties.”489 Morgan Stanley encouraged compliance:
Based on our familiarity with [JAB's] behavior, we did
believe that their threat to walk was real. And we do see
potential buyers throughout our projects really do walk
away if, for example, a deal leaks or they get roped into an
auction process, because there are certain buyers that just
have no interest being in part of an auction process.490
Redpath confirmed that “if you were serious about JAB,
you would need to pursue those discussions on an exclusive
basis.”491
When JAB sought to accelerate the process by one week,
Shaich conditioned the tight timeframe on “a full vetting
of the five-year and our strategic presentation because for
[Panera] this is a discussion of value” to ensure that JAB
would “robustly (and genuinely) understand the drivers in
the business [s]o they [could] fully appreciate the value
that we understand is here and seek from them.”492 The
board also ensured Panera's advisors had adequate time.493
After conducting diligence and attending these meetings, JAB
internally revised their target price upwards to $305.00 per
share494 and eventually offered $315.00.495
*29  Finally, contrary to Petitioners’ complaint, the board
negotiated for less restrictive deal protections. Panera's
deal protections included a no-shop provision with a
fiduciary out, matching rights, and a 3% termination fee.496
During negotiations, the board achieved a reduction in
the termination fee from 4.0% to 3.0% by counteroffering
2.5%.497 Kwak testified, “a 3 percent break-up fee is
customary. And our rule of thumb is, generally for a
transaction of this size, 3 to 4 percent is typical.”498 Kwak
testified that the deal's no-shop with the fiduciary out and
matching rights were also customary.499 Redpath agreed.500
The board successfully negotiated a lower termination fee.
Otherwise, it assented to the no-shop with a fiduciary
out because the board understood that JAB was the only
remaining logical buyer. The board otherwise assented to
the deal terms, including matching rights, which its advisors
viewed as “customary.”501 Petitioners have not shown that the
board failed to challenge JAB's suggested deal protections.
Instead, the board “bargain[ed] for value in negotiating the
deal protections and only acceded to the termination fee when
it reached terms regarding price and deal certainty that it
viewed as attractive.”502
The preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding
that the Panera board was apathetic, ignorant, or flat-footed.
Rather, I find that the board started the negotiations well
versed in Panera's financials and projections; empowered
Shaich to press JAB to raise its price and fully consider
Panera's internal evidence of value, and supervised the
negotiations; obtained a full valuation in time to meaningfully
consider JAB's final offer within JAB's compressed timeline;
and successfully negotiated less restrictive deal protections.
The board's performance does not render Panera's pre-signing
process unreliable.
2. Shaich's personal interests did not undermine the sale
process.
Petitioners contend that Shaich led negotiations despite
personal conflicts, specifically his desire to retire. Shaich's
prior attempts to step down had been unsuccessful, and
Shaich disliked aspects of running a public company.503
According to Petitioners, Shaich acquiesced to JAB's demand
for exclusivity and left value on the table so that he could
separate from the Company.504
In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court used the deal price as
the most reliable indicator of value when making its fair value
determination.505 That was true even though the company's
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top executive had conflicting incentives over retirement. At
trial, this Court found that these conflicts did not undermine
the deal price as an indicator of fair value because the
conflict “would not have changed [the company's] standalone
value.”506 The Stillwater Court recently synthesized the role
of conflicts in evaluating fair value: the “critical question” in
considering a CEO's motivation is whether “personal interests
undermined the sale process.”507
*30  A CEO's significant stock holdings may align her
personal interests with the company's. “When directors or
their affiliates own ‘material’ amounts of common stock, it
aligns their interests with other stockholders by giving them
a ‘motivation to seek the highest price’ and the ‘personal
incentive as stockholders to think about the trade off between
selling now and the risks of not doing so.’ ”508 Alternatively,
a CEO's personal interests can derail negotiations and cast
doubt on the reliability of deal price as a fair value. In
Norcraft, the Court found the CEO was as focused on securing
a role with the future company as he was on securing the
best deal price.509 During the process, the CEO negotiated to
divert funds from the merger into tax receivable agreements
that would benefit him personally.510
Petitioners have not proven that Shaich was conflicted or
otherwise uncommitted to obtaining the best price possible
because he wanted to retire. The record shows that when the
Company needed him, Shaich came back to his role as Co-
CEO with Moreton. And when Moreton had to step down,
Shaich stayed on. Then, when Shaich's successor failed to
materialize, he promised he would not leave the Company
in a lurch.511 Shaich repeatedly prioritized the Company's
success over his preferred professional trajectory. Unlike
the executive in Norcraft, Shaich did not negotiate future
employment with JAB,512 even with analyst speculation at
closing that Shaich could now “run the company privately[,]
[n]ot a bad deal!”513
The record shows that Shaich was intent on driving the
price upwards. During the negotiations, the board cautioned
Shaich, holding him back: on March 17, Moreton cautioned
not to push it too hard by being too greedy, because “pigs
get fat, hogs get slaughtered.”514 The next day, Shaich
informed JAB that they would have to increase their initial
offer beyond $300.00 per share.515 During the negotiations,
Morgan Stanley described Shaich as “supremely focused on
finding a good home for the company and preserving the
legacy of the business he's built for 35 years.”516 No evidence
disturbs this conclusion.
My perceptions of Shaich from trial do not fit with
Petitioners’ theory. Shaich testified that he would not have
sold Panera without getting the best price.517 I believe him.
Shaich's commitment to realizing value for Panera appeared
to run deep. In my view, his commitment stemmed from
his pride in Panera, a desire to reward those who had built
Panera with him, and an attachment to Panera itself.518
Correspondence between Moreton and Shaich on the date of
the sale shows Shaich's perspective. Moreton wrote:
Ron - I imagine that you have thought about Louie and
your Dad more than a few times these past few days.
This morning I woke up thinking of George Kane and him
asking you: Ronnie - how much cash do we have. The
answer today would be quite a lot. I am sure George (and
your Dad and Louie) are resting peaceful and are incredibly
proud of you. You have touched so many lives ... especially
mine.519
Shaich replied, “Wonderful and very sad ... Indeed I was
thinking about my dad yesterday. He always told me to take
the money ... I always ignored him ... Though that has never
been my way [t]his is probably the right time ...”520 Shaich's
trial testimony on this email was credibly emotional.
*31  After weighing all the evidence, I am convinced that
Shaich would not, and did not, agree to a deal after a 35-year
career before he found the right place and value for Panera.
Shaich wanted to exit Panera and he led the negotiations.
Those parallel facts do not convince me that either he or the
impartial board accepted a low offer—or any offer—because
of Shaich's personal goals. Shaich's desire to retire did not
undermine the deal process or diminish Panera's standalone
value. “As a matter of professional pride, he wanted to sell
[Panera] for the best price he could.”521
3. Morgan Stanley's actions and advice did not undermine
the pre-signing process.
Petitioners view Morgan Stanley as a conflicted advisor
because of the firm's late conflict disclosures, financial
incentives, and backchannel discussions about financing via
a JAB coverage banker. Petitioners also try to cast doubt on
the adequacy of Morgan Stanley's representation. Respondent
counters that Morgan Stanley informed the board of its prior
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work with JAB, and the board determined Morgan Stanley
was not conflicted; Panera and Morgan Stanley used JAB's
coverage banker to drive up value; and Morgan Stanley's
financial incentives aligned with Panera's stockholders. I take
each in turn.
a. Morgan Stanley disclosed its prior JAB work to the
board.522
On March 15, the board initiated the process to retain Morgan
Stanley as its financial advisor.523 Moreton testified that he
participated in those discussions, and that Morgan Stanley
had disclosed its prior work for JAB.524 Nothing in the
record casts doubt on this testimony.525 Then, on March
20, Sullivan & Cromwell informed the board that Morgan
Stanley “had cleared an initial conflicts check on March 15
and the parties were now negotiating an engagement letter
for the transaction.”526 Morgan Stanley provided its formal
disclosure of past work with JAB on March 30, but the board
already knew that Morgan Stanley had previous engagements
with JAB.527 There is no indication that these disclosures
changed the board's view of Morgan Stanley's ability to serve
as its financial advisor. Moreton reflected on the disclosures
and testified:
[Y]ou wonder if it might be an advantage because they
might understand JAB. And certainly, I had faith in the fact
that the people that were going to work on the transaction
on our behalf were of the utmost integrity, and so it
didn't bother me individually or the board as a collective
whole.528
*32  The facts here diverge from those in Jarden, in which
the board “made no inquiry” about advisor conflicts and
“there [wa]s no indication that either [the CEO] or [the
advisor] made any effort to disclose their past relationships
to the board.”529 In this case, Morgan Stanley shared its past
JAB work twice, including a formal representation letter. The
board reviewed the formal disclosure in advance, even if only
by a few days, before approving the deal. Petitioners have
provided no basis to conclude that the timing of Morgan
Stanley's disclosures undermined Panera's sale process.
b. Morgan Stanley's financial incentives were
commonplace and unremarkable.
Contingency clauses are standard in financial advisor
agreements and seldom create a conflict of interest.
“Contingent fees for financial advisors in a merger context
are somewhat ‘routine’ and previously have been upheld
by Delaware courts.”530 This Court has recognized that
“[c]ontingent fees are undoubtedly routine; they reduce the
target's expense if a deal is not completed; perhaps, they
properly incentivize the financial advisor to focus on the
appropriate outcome.”531
Petitioners contend that Morgan Stanley's compensation
relied on the signing and closing of the deal with JAB. Morgan
Stanley's $40 million fee was contingent in part on signing
for $8 million and in part on closing for $32 million.532
The fee contingency does not specify that the signing and
closing must have involved JAB for Morgan Stanley to be
compensated under the terms of the agreement. Contrary to
Petitioners’ contention, the fact remains that, had another
bidder emerged, Morgan Stanley's compensation would result
from a “proposed sale of the Company” to “any buyer.”533
A conflict in advising a company in favor of a sale rather
than in remaining a standalone company is possible. No
such conflict exists here. Morgan Stanley presented the board
with a full valuation analysis that included a standalone
valuation based on a number of metrics, including the
comparatively high management case based on the Five-
Year Strategic Plan. And although Petitioners contend that
Panera should not have agreed to JAB's price because its
standalone value was far higher, the $315.00 offer still fell
within the management case's valuation range.534 Rather than
accepting the management case, the board recognized that
there was execution risk to the Five-Year Strategic Plan,
including that Shaich would not be there to guide Panera
3.0 and beyond. Both the board and Morgan Stanley found
that the price was fair for the Company's stockholders. In
any event, Morgan Stanley's fairness opinion would not have
precluded a board determination that it was better for Panera
to remain a standalone company.
c. Both parties used Morgan Stanley coverage contacts
outside the deal team to press their respective advantages.
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In its disclosure letter, Morgan Stanley advised that with
the exception of Gallagher, no senior deal team member
“is a member of the coverage team for the Potential Buyer
or the Buyer Related Entities.”535 Morgan Stanley did not
create a wall between its JAB coverage team, including
Ciagne, and its Panera senior deal team.536 Kwak testified
that Morgan Stanley “didn't set up a wall because there was
no conflict[.]”537
*33  Ciagne, as a member of JAB's coverage team, relayed
two communications between the deal teams. In the first, on
March 27, JAB told Ciagne to tell Boublik that JAB feared
Morgan Stanley was not doing enough to assure Panera that
JAB could finance the deal.538 In the second, on April 1,
Boublik told Ciagne to tell JAB “Panera is serious, and there
has to be a higher price.”539 Although the board did not know
that Ciagne passed JAB's message to Boublik,540 the board
used Ciagne to pass its own message to JAB.541
Petitioners point to Ciagne's involvement as a fatal flaw
in Panera's process. If this channel affected the deal price,
it would have increased it. JAB limited their message to
JAB financing, while the Company used it to ratchet up
pressure and leverage the price. In my view, this flaw did not
undermine a fair process.
d. Petitioners have not shown that Morgan Stanley's
advice was inadequate.
JAB's negotiation playbook contains four key principles:
bilateral, confidential, friendly, and fast.542 The playbook
earned respect in the marketplace because JAB had intimated
they would walk if their counterpart did not follow it.543 But
on one occasion when a JAB target, Krispy Kreme, pushed
JAB to deviate to the target's advantage, JAB still closed the
deal.544 Morgan Stanley knew about Krispy Kreme's success,
and Petitioners fault Morgan Stanley for not counseling
Panera to similarly pursue a go-shop or reduced termination
fee.
Petitioners fail to acknowledge that Morgan Stanley informed
the board of Krispy Kreme's negotiation process and advised
Panera to adopt a similar negotiation strategy.545 Morgan
Stanley educated Shaich and Moreton “very quickly” on
JAB's negotiation playbook and assisted them in developing
their own strategy.546 On March 17, Boublik sent Shaich
and Moreton a proposed script and slide decks summarizing
“JAB Historical Bidding Precedents” and “JAB Merger
Backgrounds.”547 Morgan Stanley presented these detailed
precedent analyses when the board was “thinking about
strategies in terms of how to go back to JAB in terms of
negotiation ... to show that JAB has bid up from their initial
bid in the past and ... to show how much they had bid up after
their initial bid.”548 Shaich reviewed this deck and used it to
inform his negotiation strategy.549
Moreton viewed these decks as “very important” because
“they were able to show us, in the bidding precedents, how
JAB's transactions had gone from the initial discussions and
initial bids, through due diligence, to the end, and how
they had a history of raising their offer price as they went
through.”550 Shaich stayed up digesting this deck until 3
a.m.,551 and later thanked Boublik “for [his] very valued
input,” noting “it really made a difference in how [Shaich]
approached it ... particularly relative to the history of their
other deals.”552
*34  The JAB Merger Backgrounds deck detailed the Krispy
Kreme offer, strategy, and negotiation timeline. After JAB
made Krispy Kreme an initial offer, Krispy Kreme asked
for more time because it did not have a complete long-
term financial plan and felt it could not yet “appropriately
assess JAB Holdings’ indication of interest.”553 While Krispy
Kreme was securing this information and advisors, JAB
postponed the Krispy Kreme negotiations until after it closed
an acquisition with Keurig Green Mountain, Inc.554 While
JAB was working on the Keurig deal, a financial buyer
expressed interest in Krispy Kreme, but did not engage in
negotiations.555 Four and a half months after the initial
offer, JAB and Krispy Kreme resumed their negotiations.556
Krispy Kreme's board insisted on additional value based on
their internal diligence, and threatened a go-shop unless JAB
increased the price and reduced the termination fee.557 JAB
accepted Krispy Kreme's counteroffer, resulting in a 12%
bid premium and a reduced termination fee.558 Petitioners
assert that Krispy Kreme negotiated for six months, when in
reality, JAB postponed negotiations while pursuing another
deal. Once they resumed negotiations, they lasted forty-five
days.
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In comparison, Shaich initially reached out to JAB in August
2016, but JAB was pursuing another transaction at the time.
At the conclusion of that deal, Panera and JAB negotiated
for forty days. Unlike Krispy Kreme, Panera's board did not
need additional time to educate itself on Panera's long-term
financial plan: the Five-Year Financial Model was the board's
catechism. Like Krispy Kreme, the board insisted that JAB
find additional value through diligence.
Petitioners assert that Morgan Stanley should have advised
the board to seek a go-shop like Krispy Kreme. Krispy Kreme
had another interested bidder. Panera's board and Morgan
Stanley understood that there were no other bidders out
there with the interest and capacity to purchase Panera.559
Accordingly, instead of pursuing a go shop, the board
obtained a lower 3.0% termination fee and conditioned JAB's
timeline on a review of the Five-Year Strategic Plan and
Five-Year Financial Model, which generated an additional
$18.50 in value.560 In the end, no other party expressed
an interest in acquiring Panera, which confirms the board's
understanding that a go-shop would not result in a higher
price for Panera stockholders. Morgan Stanley did not fail to
advise the board about prior negotiating strategies. Rather, I
find Morgan Stanley helped the board implement a proven
negotiation strategy, with the lessons learned from the Krispy
Kreme transaction, to generate additional value.
Next, Petitioners contend that Morgan Stanley provided
inadequate substantive advice by failing to perform a
leveraged buyout (“LBO”) analysis, thereby failing to assess
a financial sponsor's ability to purchase Panera. Morgan
Stanley understood that “for an LBO of [$]6 to $7 billion,
putting in equity that represents more than 60 percent of the
total purchase price is just not what financial sponsors do
for their LBO.”561 Petitioners’ process expert agreed that it
was unlikely that a financial sponsor would be interested in
Panera,562 and Petitioner's valuation expert failed to perform
an LBO analysis.563 Petitioners have not shown any flaw with
Morgan Stanley's focus on strategic bidders. This is especially
true when Morgan Stanley found that financial sponsors could
not afford Panera, and identified only one bidder besides JAB
that could afford Panera: Starbucks.564
*35  To Petitioners, Morgan Stanley's most significant
shortcoming is its failure to evaluate Panera's standalone
value until the final day of the transaction. Petitioners have
not shown that the board did not know Panera's standalone
value before it approved the merger. The board had a deep
knowledge of Panera's performance and projections derived
from the Five-Year Strategic Plan that it reviewed at every
meeting,565 including the March 1 board meeting.566 The
board received and reviewed Morgan Stanley's full valuation
before voting for the merger.567 That valuation included a
standalone valuation derived from the Five-Year Strategic
Plan.568 Petitioners have not shown that reviewing the
valuation earlier would have convinced the board to reject
JAB's offer, or that the valuation even encouraged remaining
a standalone entity. The deal price fell within the range of
the management case DCF.569 While the board had very little
time with the valuation, this flaw did not undermine value,
particularly given the board's facility with Panera's financials.
In all, I find that some of the Company's pre-signing deal
decisions were sub-optimal. Morgan Stanley's JAB coverage
banker was involved in the deal communications, Shaich
pushed for an offer “not deep in the 300s” before the board
received a full valuation, and the accelerated timeline meant
the board had very little time with Morgan Stanley's valuation.
I find that these issues did not undermine the sale process
“so as to prevent the deal price from serving as a persuasive
indicator of fair value.”570
Panera's board had a deep knowledge of the market and
of Panera's value. The board led discussions with the two
logical bidders, which were identified by the board through
their extensive personal knowledge, and by Goldman in
2015, Goldman in 2017, and Morgan Stanley in 2017. The
board negotiated with JAB according to their advisors’
strategy, which was tailored to JAB and executable based
on the board's working knowledge of Panera's value. The
board authorized Shaich to lead these negotiations, which he
did in reliance on board members and Morgan Stanley; in
full transparency to the board; and in relentless pursuit of
value. That strategy successfully extracted two price increases
totaling $18.50 per share and a lower termination fee, and
generated a final offer that the board concluded was fair in
view of Morgan Stanley's comprehensive valuation. Panera's
outreach to the only two logical buyers resulted in a deal
that both the board and its advisors identified as fair to its
stockholders. Accordingly, I find Panera's deal process to be
persuasive evidence of fair value.
D. Respondent Has Proven $11.56 In Synergies.
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Section 262 mandates that I determine fair value “exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger or consolidation.”571 I must
“exclude from any appraisal award the amount of any
value that the selling company's shareholders would receive
because a buyer intends to operate the subject company, not
as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger
enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be extracted.”572
This excludes not only “the gains that the particular merger
will produce, but also the gains that might be obtained from
any other merger.”573 And because deal price is a persuasive
metric of fair value in this case, I must also “excise[ ] a
reasonable estimate of whatever share of synergy or other
value the buyer expects from changes it plans to make
to the company's ‘going concern’ business plan that has
been included in the purchase price as an inducement to
the sale.”574 Respondent bears the burden of proving any
downward adjustment to deal price.
*36  Respondent contends that the Court should excise
$21.56 per share from the deal price because it proved that
JAB anticipated, and paid for, synergies from deploying their
characteristic management framework. Respondent identifies
three categories of such synergies: incremental cost savings,
incremental leverage tax benefits, and revenue synergies.
Petitioners generally assert that JAB is a financial sponsor,
not a strategic buyer, and specifically challenge Respondent's
evidence of synergies.
Panera's board and financial advisors viewed JAB as a
strategic buyer,575 and JAB identified Panera as a strategic
acquisition.576 JAB had previously acquired Einstein Bros.,
Caribou Coffee, and Krispy Kreme.577 JAB identified Panera
as a “Fresh Baked / Coffee Adjacency” that would fill gaps
in their portfolio by expanding JAB's holdings in the coffee
and fresh baked lunch category.578 Even if JAB were not a
strategic buyer, labeling them as a financial acquirer would
not do the work Petitioners hope it would. “[I]n theory, if the
acquisition of a company by a financial acquirer is at a market
price that includes speculative elements of value which arise
only from the merger, that acquisition value may exceed the
going-concern value.”579 That is the case here.
JAB has a three-pronged “playbook” that they implement
after a deal closes. That playbook addresses people, cost
and cash, and growth.580 Under the people prong, JAB
develops a “short list of CEO candidates,” installs a “CFO
and establish[es] Product Management Office,” assesses
the “management team,” and deploys the “JAB ownership
model.”581 Under their cost and cash prong, JAB identifies
“[q]uick wins in cash, working capital (particularly AP),
[and] cost structure” to implement a “cash and cost
discipline culture.”582 As for growth, JAB conducts target-
specific analyses and identifies strategic opportunities from
combining companies under its umbrella.583 JAB approached
Panera with the intention of extracting synergies through
these plays. JAB's pre-diligence model, setting a target
price of $290.00, was based in part on value gains from
implementing their playbook at Panera.584
First, JAB measured the investment opportunity for its cash
and cost prong, recognizing Panera's lack of “discipline
culture” in working capital and supply chain.585 JAB's initial
investment model outlined $300 million in working capital
savings.586 JAB had successfully implemented working
capital changes at Krispy Kreme, Caribou Coffee, and Peet's
Coffee.587 JAB planned similar changes for Panera by
increasing the Company's days payable outstanding from
about four to about fifty to ninety days.588
*37  As for cost savings opportunities, JAB identified
potential savings in SG&A, store level efficiency, and
supply chain amounting to $70 to over $100 million.589 To
accomplish this, JAB hoped to cut public company expenses,
optimize franchise costs, introduce procurement savings, and
reduce waste.590
After performing due diligence, JAB concluded their
diligence confirmed “significant” opportunities for cash and
for cost savings.591 JAB confirmed $300 to $500 million
by maximizing working capital, more than $30 million in
procurement savings, $18 million in SG&A optimization,
$15 million in supply chain optimization, and $2.5 to $5
million in public company costs.592 JAB expanded working
capital estimates as “[Panera] currently has the lowest [days
payable outstanding] across nearly all public peers and much
lower than other JAB Beech assets.”593 At this point, JAB
recognized that they would have to pay more than their early
target price594 and raised their internal target offer from
$290.00 to $305.00.595
In addition to the management playbook, JAB applied their
bedrock negotiation playbook principle of not conditioning
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their deal on receiving financing approval, and securing
financing during the diligence phase.596 Respondent noted
that because JAB financed $3 billion for the deal, Panera
would carry greater debt than it did as a standalone value.597
JAB quantified their anticipated debt and associated tax
effects when they formulated their target deal price.598
Hubbard found that “[i]nternal documents show that JAB
anticipated significant synergies from the acquisition of
Panera, and factored these synergies into their valuation of
Panera.”599 Hubbard found that with increased debt, Panera
would have higher interest tax deductions, generating a
merger-specific tax synergy of $9.18 per share.600 Hubbard
agreed with the cost and cash synergies as well, finding
synergies totaling $37.29 per share.
Petitioners argue that these cost savings and tax synergies are
not merger-specific synergies because Panera management
could have also made these changes.601 In support,
Petitioners cite Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx,
Inc., in which this Court found that the record contained
insufficient evidence to support a finding that the respondent
formed its bid on, or believed that there were, merger-specific
cost savings.602
That is not true of this case. Panera's management culture
and priorities did not support the changes JAB intended to
make. Panera was in the “habit” of paying its vendors within
four to six days603 and invested in extensive initiatives.604
JAB's “Cash Opportunities” arose from Panera's failure
to “focus on working capital at all” while spending “top
dollar to get the best without ever re-engineering costs out
of the business.”605 Panera forecasted cost savings, but
limited its changes to sourcing and process improvements.606
Any overlap between Panera's forecast and JAB's playbook
demonstrates differences in scale. As an example, Panera
evaluated “FDF” and G&A savings in its forecast, predicting
new cost savings between $300,000 and $600,000 each year
from 2018–2021;607 JAB projected $18 million in its first
year alone.608 JAB believed that it could achieve much
greater savings because of its expertise in executing those
savings across their portfolio companies.609 When Hurst saw
JAB's plan, he thought JAB had “lost their freakin’ minds
based on SG&A savings.”610 JAB contemplated “Day 1
[p]laybook implementation.”611
*38  As for the tax synergies, Petitioners argue that Panera
could “re-leverage its balance sheet as it saw fit” so the tax
deductions associated with JAB's $3 billion financing were
not an element of value arising from the merger.612 Petitioners
concede that Panera's debt increased “dramatically” after the
transaction, from $480 million to $2.7 billion.613 Here, unlike
in Huff, the evidence shows JAB had similarly financed other
deals in the past and saw value in doing it again with Panera,
while Panera intentionally maintained low debt.614
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that JAB
formed its bid in anticipation of applying its management
playbook to Panera to generate merger-specific savings.
Before JAB made an offer, it recognized that it could realize
working capital and cost savings when it ran its plays on
Panera. JAB formed its initial offer in view of that predicted
value. JAB confirmed it could realize that value during due
diligence, and that conclusion informed their offer price. JAB
predicted additional value in tax savings from increasing
the Company's debt through JAB's characteristic financing
technique. Hubbard calculated the combined value of these
synergies at $37.29 per share.615 I find that by running its
plays on Panera, JAB predicted $37.29 in value arising out of
the merger.
Hubbard estimated that JAB built in 31% of these synergies,
or $11.56, into the merger price.616 In support, Hubbard
cites a 2013 Boston Consulting Group study of 365 deals
that analyzes the “median portion of synergies shared with
the seller.”617 Petitioners object to the BCG study's breadth
and its lack of specificity across industry or comparable
companies. Respondent cites Solera for the proposition
that this study is an appropriate estimation of synergies
belonging to the buyer.618 But the adoption of a methodology,
expert opinion, or metric in one appraisal action does not
mandate its adoption in a different appraisal action.619 This
Court's previous acceptance of Hubbard's proffered study is
not conclusive in this case. Instead, I find that Petitioners
have not cast doubt on the reliability of this study, or
put forward a more appropriate percentage. Respondent has
proven deduction of cost and tax synergies of $11.56 per share
by a preponderance of the evidence.620
*39  I turn now to JAB's third playbook prong of growth,
in which Respondent sees revenue synergies. Unlike the cost
and cash playbook prongs, JAB did not quantify these growth
opportunities in its models. JAB recognized that while it is
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“relatively simplistic to quantify potential cost savings[,] [i]t's
much more difficult to quantify for-sure growth areas, even
though they may be extremely important.”621 Leading up
to and throughout trial, Respondent and its expert presented
a fair value that did not quantify any revenue synergies
attributable to JAB's growth opportunities. This is consistent
with the record evidence and both parties’ experts’ opinions.
In their pre-diligence model, JAB identified growth
opportunities for coffee, technology, international expansion,
and CPG.622 At a March 31 meeting, Panera also identified
opportunities in international franchising, CPG (including
coffee), and technology.623 After this meeting, on April 2,
JAB created its post-diligence model, expressly clarifying
that CPG, coffee, and international expansion were “Growth
Areas Not in [the] Investment Model[.]”624 In this same
model, as explained, JAB increased its internal target price to
$305.00 based on quantified anticipated cost savings.625
At an April 3 meeting, the parties again discussed
opportunities for CPG, coffee, international expansion,
technology, as well as marketing, real estate, food sourcing,
and franchising.626 Bell testified that these strategic growth
opportunities played a role in JAB's decision to increase their
offer from $305.00 to $315.00627 because JAB
did some back-of-the-envelope math and got excited about
it. But since we had no discussion with anyone about it, and
it was a short period of time, we didn't, quote/unquote, put
it in the model, financially. But I will tell you—you even
heard it earlier—coffee was core to our strategy of doing
this. It's just something that was difficult for us to quantify
at the time we were doing diligence.628
Bell testified that JAB took a “leap of faith” on these “strategic
opportunities,” and justified the $10.00 increase with their
“back-of-the-envelope” calculations.629 Later, Bell testified
that coffee procurement was not a “back-of-the-envelope”
calculation because JAB “hadn't done the analysis.”630
After trial, Respondent latched onto a new synergy theory
that deducted $10.00 per share for these growth or
revenue synergies. Respondent's post-trial position finds
no support from its expert. Hubbard did not include any
revenue synergies in his analysis.631 When pressed, Hubbard
affirmatively declined to adopt Bell's testimony, as he saw
no support for it in the trial exhibits or in his work for
Respondent.632 “Thus, in its zeal to reach a desired litigation
outcome, Respondent finds itself in the awkward position
of advancing a position at odds with its own expert ....”633
At post-trial argument, Respondent's counsel explained that
they “never asked [Hubbard] to adjust his opinion” because
the trial strategy required Hubbard to stick with his synergy
analysis, leaving counsel to argue the additional $10.00 in
synergies in post-trial briefing.634
*40  This series of events casts doubt over Respondent's
post-trial position on revenue synergies. At bottom,
Respondent puts forward conclusory fact testimony
contradicted by JAB's contemporaneous financial modeling
and rejected by its expert. There is no evidence that
JAB quantified revenue synergies. JAB's financial modeling
assumes the opposite: “no uplift ... from any strategic synergy
opportunities.”635 JAB's contemplation of potential growth
opportunities is insufficient to prove ten dollars’ worth of
revenue synergies in JAB's best and final offer price. Further,
JAB provided no evidence to support the conclusion that all
ten dollars inured to JAB's benefit and should be excised
from the amount paid to stockholders. Hubbard did not find
any revenue synergies, and therefore did not apportion any.
Respondent has failed to prove revenue synergies that would
support an excise of $10.00 from the deal price. In all,
Respondent has proven $11.56 from its cost savings and tax
synergies. The deal price minus synergies valuation method
yields a price per share of $303.44.
E. The Supplied Alternative Valuation Methodologies Are
Unreliable.
While Respondent asserts that deal price minus synergies
deserves dispositive weight, Petitioners press three alternative
valuation methodologies: discounted cash flow (“DCF”),
comparable companies, and precedent transactions.636 In
the context of a persuasive deal price, I disregard those
methodologies for the reasons that follow.
1. Petitioners have not proven their DCF model's
reliability.
“While the particular assumptions underlying its application
may always be challenged in any particular case, the validity
of [the DCF] technique qua valuation methodology is no
longer open to question.”637 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
“cautioned against using the DCF methodology when market-
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based indicators are available.”638 Compared to a persuasive,
market-based deal price metric, “the DCF technique ‘is
necessarily a second-best method to derive value.’ ”639
Petitioners and Respondent each introduced a DCF valuation
prepared by their expert. Hubbard introduced a DCF that
generated a value of $291.71 per share.640 He gave his DCF
no independent weight, but viewed it solely as corroborative
of his deal-price-minus-synergies value of $303.44.641
In a “very subjective” weighting exercise, Shaked gave sixty
percent weight to his DCF model, which generated a value
of $354.00 per share, exceeding the deal price by $39.00.642
By this model, Shaked asserted over a billion dollars was
left on the table.643 The experts are approximately $63.00
per share apart. Because Petitioners are urging the Court to
give significant weight to Shaked's DCF model, they bear the
burden of convincing the Court that the model is sufficiently
reliable to merit weight in the face of Panera's reliable deal
process.
Petitioners have fallen short: Shaked's model as presented
at trial is of questionable reliability. The primary flaw is
Shaked's concession regarding the investment rate for the
terminal period. In his report, he put forward an investment
rate of 3.1% that he “conservative[ly]” cushioned with a
$116 million buffer, as “kind of an extra slack for the
maintenance.”644
*41  Hubbard put forward a 35.6% investment rate.645 This
rate was based on the principle that “growth isn't free,”646
particularly in the extraordinarily competitive restaurant
industry.647 He anchored his investment rate in Panera's
historical investment rate,648 and utilized the formula IR=g/
RONIC, where the investment rate equals the terminal
growth rate over the return on new invested capital.649
Hubbard set RONIC equal to the weighted average cost of
capital (“WACC”) on the premise that “[i]n a competitive
industry, abnormal profits tend to vanish over time.”650
In Respondent's view, Shaked's original investment rate
assumed “startlingly high returns on ROIC [ ( [return on
invested capital) ] forever.”651
When Shaked took the stand at trial, he addressed this
criticism by presenting for the first time a “corrected”
ROIC chart with an investment rate that diverged from,
and was significantly higher than, the investment rate in his
report.652 Shaked did not base his “corrected” chart on the
analysis found in his report or mentioned in his deposition.
Notwithstanding this correction, Shaked did not adjust his
DCF with the “corrected” investment rate.
When Hubbard applied Shaked's corrected investment rate
to his other DCF inputs, he found “the valuation attached to
this [investment rate] is $100 off the one he is tendering.”653
Hubbard testified that if Shaked were to plug his corrected
33% investment rate into his DCF, this would erase much of
the difference between the experts’ DCF calculations.654
After Hubbard's testimony, Shaked took the stand as a rebuttal
witness, but did not address his failure to adjust his DCF
in light of his corrected investment rate.655 Shaked's trial
concession on his investment rate weakens his credibility: he
abandoned the rate in his report after learning of Hubbard's
criticisms, but stood by his DCF reliant on that rate, even after
Hubbard pointed out the inconsistency.
Shaked's original, unadjusted investment rate is a significant
driver of his DCF model. Hubbard pointed to this aspect
of Shaked's model to explain the wild swings in value
when substituting different perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”)
inputs. Under Shaked's initial model, inputting the different
growth rates from banker-supplied DCFs creates outputs
that are $1.3 billion apart.656 This sensitivity to PGR arises
because Shaked initially assumed such a low investment rate
while predicting outsized growth.657 Because “the perpetuity
growth rate and the investment rate are linked,” changing
the PGR in Shaked's original model would cause “a very
large swing in his DCF value.”658 Shaked described his
model's sensitivity to PGR based on his low investment rate
as a “built-in problem.”659 Given the significant impact of
Shaked's initial investment rate on his DCF, his concession
on that input and failure to adjust the model introduces fatal
unreliability.
Above, I determined that the market guides my analysis of
this transaction. The Supreme Court has “cautioned against
using the DCF methodology when market-based indicators
are available.”660 Shaked's shift in his investment rate, the
fact that he did not adjust his DCF to accommodate that shift,
and the significance of his original investment rate to the
output of his DCF render his model unreliable. Petitioners
have failed to carry their burden to establish that Shaked's
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DCF model is a sufficiently reliable indicator, particularly in
the shadow of a reliable market-based deal price. I do not
attribute any weight to this metric.661
2. There is not a suitable peer group for a reliable
comparative companies analysis.
*42  “[B]efore a comparable companies multiples analysis
can be undertaken with any measure of reliability, it
is necessary to establish a suitable peer group through
appropriate empirical analysis.”662 “If, and only if, a proper
peer set can be selected, the next step in the comparable
companies analysis is to select an appropriate multiple and
then determine where on the distribution of peers the target
company falls.”663 Where the experts’ identified companies
are “too divergent from [the company] in terms of size,
public status, and products, to form meaningful analogs
for valuation purposes,”664 this Court will disregard this
valuation metric.665
The parties dispute the relevant peer group and argue that
neither expert tested the reasonableness of the comparable
companies selected. Hubbard selected comparable companies
by reviewing equity analysts’ reports in the year before the
merger date and selecting the firms mentioned by three or
more analysts at least once.666 As a result, Hubbard included
companies that operate outside the fast casual segment,
including full-service restaurants like Brinker International,
Darden Restaurants, Texas Roadhouse, and The Cheesecake
Factory.667 Hubbard found this analysis produced fair values
ranging from $218.58 to $310.99668; he did not afford any
weight to his comparable companies analysis, but viewed it as
corroborative of deal price.669 Petitioners question Hubbard's
peer group as it includes much smaller companies, including
sectors other than fast casual, and does not widely overlap
with the comparable companies the bankers identified.
Meanwhile, Respondent highlights that weakness in Shaked's
metric. Shaked used a peer group identified by at least 75%
of bankers involved.670 These results exclude all of the fast
casual companies the bankers contemporaneously identified,
except for Chipotle.671 It also included and excluded
similarly situated companies. For example, Shaked included
McDonald's and Burger King, but excluded Wendy's; he
included Domino's, but excluded Papa John's.672 Shaked
found this approach resulted in fair values falling between
$377.00 and $382.00 per share; he weighed this valuation at
30%.673
Where an expert defers to a peer set without conducting
a “meaningful, independent assessment of comparability”
between the seller's business and the business of its peer
companies it “is not useful and, frankly, not credible.”674
Neither expert presents a reliable empirical analysis to show
a suitable peer group; both sets have material weaknesses.
For that reason, I do not find comparable companies as
a fair measure of value. Instead, I view both parties’
comparable companies analyses as an attempt to corroborate
their preferred valuation. I decline to afford them any weight.
3. There are insufficient comparable precedent
transactions to generate a reliable valuation metric.
*43  Both parties’ experts performed a precedent transaction
analysis.675 Hubbard selected precedent transactions by
reviewing eleven transactions that Morgan Stanley included
in its April 4, 2017 presentation to the board.676 He
“calculated valuations that are corroborative using multiples
of EV/EBITDA based on ... precedent transactions” that led
to a price per share range of $143.58 to $236.22.677 Hubbard
used this data point as corroborative and gave it no weight678
because a precedent transaction analysis is “model-based”
while “the market evidence is the real world.”679
Shaked conducted a precedent transaction analysis by using
data from the FactSet database filtered by acquisitions of
restaurant companies in the United States or Canada with
an enterprise value over $1 billion.680 He then compared
Panera's forecasted revenue growth to the upper quartile
EBITDA multiples of three comparative transactions and
conducted an analysis that led to a price per share range of
$338.00 to $361.00 with a midpoint of $350.00 per share.681
Even though Shaked explained at trial that he “was not really
very thrilled with getting only three transactions[,]”682 he still
afforded it 10% weight.
The accuracy of these analyses depends, as with a comparable
companies analysis, on the closeness of the comparable
transaction. As Morgan Stanley recognized, there was not
a “particular transaction that should serve as a direct
- 167 -
In re Panera Bread Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2020)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28
comparable.”683 I find that neither sample size is reliable
enough to afford it weight.
F. Respondent Is Not Entitled To A Refund Of Its
Prepayment.
I turn now to the relief sought. The Company prepaid
Dissenting Stockholders the full deal price, or $315.00 per
share. Petitioners have obtained more than fair value, which I
have found to be $303.44. The Company seeks a refund in the
amount of the deducted synergies, or the difference between
fair value and prepayment, plus interest on that amount.
Petitioners and Respondent did not agree to a clawback
provision in the event Respondent overpaid. Respondent cites
no support for its request. Like others who have thought about
this issue, including counsel's firm, I find the request for a
refund has no present basis in Delaware's appraisal statute.684
Under Section 262(h), a surviving corporation seeking
to lessen the significant amount of interest that can
otherwise accrue in an appraisal action can prepay petitioning
stockholders “an amount in cash.”685 As the General
Assembly explained, “[t]here is no requirement or inference
that the amount so paid by the surviving corporation is equal
to, greater than, or less than the fair value of the shares to
be appraised.”686 Upon prepayment, interest accrues only
upon the sum of the difference between the amount prepaid
and the judicially determined fair value, and any interest
accrued to date unless paid at that time.687 Section 262 does
not explicitly contemplate any refund. Accordingly, appraisal
litigants sometimes stipulate to a clawback provision in their
prepayment agreement.688
*44  “Under Delaware law, the appraisal remedy is entirely
a creature of statute.”689 “The goal of statutory construction
is to determine and give effect to legislative intent.”690 “The
courts may not engraft upon a statute language which has been
clearly excluded therefrom by the Legislature.”691 “[S]uch
action would place the court in a position of making law.”692
Nor may this Court “assume that the omission was the result
of an oversight on the part of the General Assembly.”693
Where, as with Section 262, “a statute is silent on a particular
matter, the otherwise detailed nature of the statute in other
respects can be significant.”694 “[I]n drafting Section 262(h),
the General Assembly made a determination as to the proper
balance of the competing interests of appraisal petitioners,
who have been cashed out of their preferred investment
and denied the ability to invest the merger consideration in
the market pending outcome of the case, and respondents,
against whom too large an interest award may operate as a
penalty.”695
Here, the only permissible conclusion is fortunately a logical
one: the General Assembly intended to omit a refund
mechanism. In 2016, the General Assembly enacted an
optional and scalable prepayment scheme without mention
of a refund. It did so in the shadow of the Model Business
Corporation Act (the “Model Act”), adopted by the majority
of other states, which is a mandatory and fixed prepayment
scheme: it mandates prepayment of what the corporation
believes is fair value to stockholders who purchased their
stock before the merger was announced, and permits it for
stock acquired after the merger announcement.696 Other
amendments to Section 262 have tracked the Model Act,
evidencing a legislative awareness of its content.697 The
Model Act is silent on the effects of overpayment, like
Section 262, and has been interpreted to allow petitioning
stockholders to keep any overpayment.698
Commentators have also interpreted Section 262’s silence as
an indication that overpayment is not recoverable.699 This
Court has not yet resolved the issue.700 I conclude Section
262 does not explicitly provide for a refund, and that therefore
I cannot order one. I am not the first to conclude that the
Court must stay within the bounds of Section 262’s plain
language. In 1948, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that because the operative version of Section 262 did not
provide for interest, the judiciary could not award it.701
More recently, before the prepayment provision was enacted,
Vice Chancellor Glasscock found he was unable to order
prepayment.702 After those exercises in judicial restraint,
amendments in the statute soon followed.703 I will not
encroach on the General Assembly's prerogative.704
III. CONCLUSION
*45  For the reasons discussed above, I find the fair value
of the Company's common stock at time of the merger
was $303.44, calculated as deal price minus synergies.
Respondent chose to prepay the $315.00 deal price to the
Dissenting Stockholders. Because Respondent is not entitled
to a refund of the difference between $315.00 and $303.44,
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Petitioners have received more than fair value. The parties
shall submit a stipulated implementing order.
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Company's confidential information”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 355–56 (same).
350 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *23 (citing Aruba, 210 A.3d at 139; Dell, 177 A.3d at 28).
351 Id. (citing Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure simply
because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding contest against
each other.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 (“Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at
which no class of buyers in the market would pay.”); id. at 33 (finding that absence of higher bid meant “that the deal
market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,” which “suggests the price is
already at a level that is fair”)).
352 Id. at *22.
353 Cf. id. (synthesizing the three recent Supreme Court appraisal decisions in Aruba, Dell, and DFC).
354 This point does not appear to be in serious dispute. Petitioners’ opening post-trial brief did not assert that Panera's stock
did not trade in an efficient market. The parties discussed the efficiency of the market for Panera's stock only while talking
past each other about whether weight should be given to Panera's stock price. Compare D.I. 138 at 60–65, and D.I.
141 at 23, with D.I. 140 at 40–46. Out of an abundance of caution, I make the unsurprising finding that Panera “ha[d]
many stockholders; no controlling stockholder; ‘highly active trading’; and ... information about the company [was] widely
available and easily disseminated to the market.” See Dell, 177 A.3d at 25 (citation omitted). Panera also had a large
market capitalization, substantial public float and trading volume, a low bid-ask spread, a high number of equity analysts,
and a rapid response to transaction rumors. See id. at 7, 25. Hubbard's report on these factors was persuasive and
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supported by evidence presented at trial. JX0982 at 58–61; Hubbard Tr. 1504:11–1505:14, 1506:11–24. In my view,
these straightforward factors are plainly present and provide conclusive evidence of an efficient market for Panera's stock.
This conclusion is undisturbed by Shaked's analyses of market reactions to Panera news, which I find to be plagued by
subjectivity in what is “new and material” information, and a failure to account for trading volume. See JX0988 at 83–
84, 90–92.
355 Redpath Tr. 635:6–9. Redpath is a senior investment banking partner at Cypress Associates, a “nationally recognized
investment banking firm.” See id. 499:9–14, 505:18–21.
356 Id. 635:24–638:9, 643:12–644:8. Petitioners claim a special committee was necessary here, but Petitioners cannot point
to a conflict that a special committee could remedy where Panera had seven independent board members on its nine-
member board.
357 JX0476 at 2; JX0583 at 1.
358 172 A.3d at 349.
359 JX0461 at 1; JX0581; accord JX0476 at 2 (“Remember, this is a very clean public company, so have to tone down the
voluminous generic requests ....”).
360 Shaich Tr. 921:7–9, 948:2–18, 960:8–961:3, 962:17–23; see, e.g., JX0194 at 1; JX0192 at 5, 11; JX2028 at 3, 17; JX0032
at 51; JX0041 at 5, 22; JX0064 at 2; JX0260 at 4–5, 15; JX0331 at 3–4; JX0345 at 4–5, 14; JX0029; JX1039; JX0063
at 3; JX0304.
361 JX0490; accord Moreton Tr. 840:7–23.
362 JX0593 at 49–50. These findings are discussed further in Section II(D), infra.
363 PTO ¶ 161.
364 Kwak Tr. 1206:15–1207:6; accord Moreton Tr. 821:7–14 (“Q. Did Panera at any time in the negotiations give a, quote,
unquote, counteroffer in the sense of a specific price point at which it would agree to a deal? A. No. We never did. This
was part of the strategy that Morgan Stanley helped craft, that there was no reason to do that. At this point, it was just
a push for more.”).
365 Shaich Tr. 999:9–1002:4.
366 PTO ¶¶ 139, 141; JX0448 at 1; accord Moreton Tr. 822:1–8 (“JAB's transactions had gone from the initial discussions and
initial bids, through due diligence, to the end, and how they had a history of raising their offer price as they went through.”).
367 Moreton Tr. 820:4–13; accord JX0519 at 1.
368 PTO ¶ 140; accord Shaich Tr. 1002:9–23; JX0483.
369 PTO ¶ 141 (“The Board supported moving forward with further discussions and due diligence but again expressed its
expectation that any final offering price be significantly higher.”).
370 See Moreton Tr. 821:7–822:8.
371 PTO ¶ 161.
372 Id. ¶¶ 148, 159; Kwak Tr. 1215:24–1218:2.
373 In re Appraisal of Solera Hldgs., Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018) (analyzing Dell and commenting
that “[g]iven leaks in the press that Dell was exploring a sale ... the world was put on notice of the possibility of a transaction
so that any interested parties would have approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about pursuing a
deal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. DFC, 172 A.3d at 376 (identifying “the failure of other buyers to pursue the
company when they had a free chance to do so” as an objective indicator of fairness supporting deal price).
374 Kwak Tr. 1216:11–1217:16.
375 Id. 1216:11–23.
376 Id. 1216:24–1217:16.
377 JX0609.
378 Kwak Tr. 1242:11–1243:3. In Kwak's view, the leak gave interested bidders sufficient time to come forward before signing.
Id. 1242:11–23. Redpath agreed. JX0985 at 76 (“There was sufficient time for a topping bidder to emerge post-signing.”).
379 PTO ¶¶ 132, 161; JX0789 at 71–75, 79–81; see also JX0772 at 97–100, 106–107.
380 See, e.g., Kwak Tr. 1240:14–21, 1241:10–24.
381 Id. 1241:10–15.
382 Id. 1241:16–24.
383 Id. 1241:5–9.
384 Id. 1242:11–23.
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385 This Court has recently posited that deal price is persuasive evidence of fair value, even with a limited pre-signing
outreach, if the merger agreement's deal protections are sufficiently open to permit a post-signing passive market check
in line with what decisions have held is sufficient to satisfy enhanced scrutiny. Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *24–30. As
Stillwater’s holdings have been appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, I limit my holding today to the unremarkable
conclusion that no bidders emerged in the face of nonpreclusive deal protections. But with the aid of the parties’ briefing
on the issue, it seems to me that Panera's post-signing market check would survive enhanced scrutiny and therefore
under Stillwater, would support deal price as fair value. For example, in C & J Energy, the parties bargained for a suite
of deal protections, including a no-shop clause subject to a fiduciary out, a 2.27% termination fee, and a post-signing
passive market check lasting 153 days. See C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps., 107 A.3d 1049,
1063 (Del. 2014). The Delaware Supreme Court explained that under this suite, “a potential competing bidder faced
only modest deal protection barriers,” id. at 1052, and “there were no material barriers that would have prevented a rival
bidder from making a superior offer,” id. at 1070. In support, the Delaware Supreme Court approvingly cited In re Dollar
Thrifty Shareholder Litigation, 14 A.3d 573, 612–13, 615 (Del. Ch. 2010). In Dollar Thrifty, this Court found the board
used reasonable judgment to deal exclusively with the buyer without conducting a pre-signing market check where deal
protections included a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out, matching rights, a 3.9% termination fee, and a passive post-
signing market check lasting 126 days. Id. at 592–93, 614–16. And in In re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation,
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this Court's damages ruling where the trial court determined damages based
on a quasi-appraisal theory that the company should have remained a standalone company. 211 A.3d 137 (Del. 2019)
(TABLE), aff'g In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig., 2018 WL 5018535 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018). At trial, this Court found
that the sale process as a whole was sufficiently reliable to reject a DCF methodology where the process included a fifty-
day passive, post-signing market check with a suite of deal protections, including a no-shop with a fiduciary out, unlimited
matching rights, and a 3.5% termination fee. PLX, 2018 WL 5018535 at *2, *26–27, *44, *55. Panera's deal protections
differ little from those in C & J Energy, Dollar Thrifty, and PLX. Panera's 3.0% termination fee falls on the low end of
the range presented by these deals. As for the time between announcement and closing or injunction, Panera's falls in
the middle. Each deal contained a no-shop provision with a fiduciary out, and Dollar Thrifty and PLX included matching
rights. Panera's deal protections fall within what Delaware courts have held to satisfy enhanced scrutiny.
386 JX0985 at 76.
387 DFC, 172 A.3d at 376; accord Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *35.
388 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *42 (quoting Dell, 177 A.3d at 29); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 32–34; Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 136.
389 Shaich Tr. 1019:18–1020:13.
390 See JX0700 at 2.
391 See id.; JX0654 at 1–2. The other referenced potential bidder in the Bloomberg article, Domino's, expressed that it was
not interested and was not “having any conversations regarding the purchase of Panera” because it has “a lot more
opportunity for growth in pizza.” JX0609 at 2, 4.
392 Dell, 117 A.3d at 35.
393 Id.
394 Id. at 9 (quoting In re Appraisal of Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub
nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017)).
395 Id. at 12.
396 Id. at 23.
397 Compare Shaich Tr. 970:14–21; 971:20–973:3, with id. 978:8–979:18; accord Bell. Tr. 1147:11–1148:8.
398 Compare Shaich Tr. 968:9–969:5, with id. 980:8–981:4, 983:7–984:13.
399 JX0019 at 18; Shaich Tr. 955:7–956:3, 958:1–19; accord Moreton Tr. 770:22–771:19.
400 Shaich Tr. 955:18–23; accord Moreton Tr. 770:22–771:19.
401 Shaich Tr. 956:14–957:7.
402 JX0019 at 2; accord JX0022 at 3–4 (Goldman's November 4, 2015 board presentation confirming the board's decision
to remain a standalone company due to the broader market trends).
403 See JX0110; JX0118; JX0772 at 56.
404 JX0125 at 4; Moreton Tr. 795:10–796:17.
405 Shaich Tr. 976:11–23.
406 Id.
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407 Id. 975:15–24; Moreton Tr. 798:23–799:10.
408 Shaich Tr. 976:24–977:6; accord JX0318; JX0334.
409 JX0399 at 1–2.
410 Id.
411 Id. at 1.
412 JX0625 at 4; JX0631 at 23. The companies that Petitioners cite as potential buyers were identified by Morgan Stanley
and passed over because of fit or limitations. See JX0631 at 23–24; JX0625 at 4.
413 See JX0625 at 4.
414 Id.
415 JX0631 at 23; accord Kwak Tr. 1226:21–1227:12.
416 Shaich Tr. 974:11–22, 975:23–976:10, 1019:18–1020:5; accord JX0625 at 4 (“There were conversations with Starbucks
last year, they ultimately declined to proceed citing that Panera was trading too richly (and it has since only traded up).”);
JX0772 at 56; Moreton Tr. 798:23–799:10.
417 Shaich Tr. 1020:6–9; JX0631 at 23.
418 See JX0631 at 23.
419 Moreton Tr. 811:19–812:17 (“[T]here was nobody else out there talking to [the board] about potentially acquiring [the
Company], nor did [the board] think there would be.”); see also id. 912:7–11 (“[T]here was nobody else to reach out
to ... [w]e went through the process.”). Market analysts confirmed this conclusion after the Bloomberg leak: “[W]e believe
Starbucks is the only one with any real (even slight) probability. We also note that JAB might be interested, given its
acquisitions of Krispy Kreme, Einstein/Noah, Keurig, Caribou, and Peet's Coffee. ... All-in, we suspect JAB would be the
more likely suitor than Starbucks, as we believe a newly minted CEO and a relatively sizable acquisition would increase
Starbucks’ risk profile.” JX0609 at 12–13.
420 JX0625 at 4.
421 Moreton Tr. 824:3–12.
422 JX0625 at 4 (“Since the leak yesterday, no one has come forward to express an interest.”).
423 D.I. 140 at 17.
424 Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
425 In re OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 4599662, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
426 Petitioners point to Morgan Stanley's label of “Potential Interlopers” in claiming that Panera should have contacted
additional potential bidders. As explained herein, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Panera contacted all
logical buyers. Morgan Stanley's label, which they later changed to “Potentially Interested Parties,” does not disturb this
result. Compare JX0552 at 14–15, with JX0631 at 23–24; accord Kwak Tr. 1237:11–20. And even if the use of the term
“interlopers” signaled a fear of intruders, as explained herein, Morgan Stanley advised the board to negotiate for less
restrictive deal terms, enabling another interested party to bid.
427 D.I. 139 at 20, 48.
428 See JX0116; JX0122 at 1; JX0125 at 4; accord Moreton Tr. 794:8–795:13, 796:3–8.
429 See JX0338; Shaich Tr. 977:17–978:7; accord Moreton Tr. 803:7–11 (“Did any of the directors know about Mr. Shaich's
discussions with JAB before the March 1st board meeting? A. Certainly, I did. I believe Domenic did, and perhaps Tom
[Lynch] did.”).
430 See JX0287 at 9; accord Shaich Tr. 980:11–981:4.
431 JX0408 at 3–4; accord Moreton Tr. 802:17–803:11. Moreton described Shaich's “typical way of communicating [as]
concentric circles, first with [him], and then Domenic [Colasacco], our lead director, and Tom Lynch, and then the board
as a whole.” Moreton Tr. 794:2–7. Shaich testified about this procedure, and explained that on an unspecified date he
informed the board that he used Goldman to reach out to JAB. See Shaich Tr. 1048:2–23. Shaich had followed this
same pattern in the Starbucks negotiations. When Schultz proposed a collaboration with Panera on July 31, 2016, Shaich
informed Moreton, Lynch, and Colasacco that evening, and informed the board two days later on August 2. See JX0118;
JX0116; JX0122 at 1; JX0125 at 4; accord Moreton Tr. 793:14–795:13.
432 JX0408; Shaich Tr. 983:7–984:13.
433 JX0421 at 1; Bell Tr. 1109:17–1111:8.
434 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mergers and Acquisitions 56 (2d ed. 2009) (citing 8 Del. C. § 251(b)); accord 8 Del. C. § 141
(“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors ....”).
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435 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *24 (footnote omitted).
436 Id. at *9, *24.
437 Id. at *24.
438 Id. at *25.
439 JX0408 at 3–4 (Shaich reported, “while no offer had been made during those discussions, Olivier Goudet, Chief Executive
Officer of JAB, and David Bell, Head of M&A of JAB, indicated that JAB had internally discussed the potential for a
transaction with the Company and JAB was considering making an offer to buy the Company”); accord Shaich Tr. 977:23–
978:7.
440 JX0408 at 4.
441 PTO ¶ 134.
442 JX0421 at 1–2.
443 PTO ¶ 134.
444 Id. ¶ 77.
445 Id. ¶¶ 134–135; JX0466 at 2.
446 PTO ¶ 137.
447 JX0455, JX2019; Kwak Tr. 1206:15–1207:6, 1208:6–1209:9; Moreton Tr. 821:7–14, 821:15–822:8; Shaich Tr. 996:15–
1000:11.
448 PTO ¶ 140;
449 Id. ¶¶ 140–41; see JX0448 at 1.
450 See JX0448 at 1.
451 Shaich Tr. 1004:14–18.
452 PTO ¶ 141; JX0448 at 1.
453 See JX0494 at 1; JX0491; JX0490; JX0519.
454 See JX0491.
455 JX0494 at 1; accord JX0490.
456 PTO ¶ 160.
457 Id. ¶ 163.
458 Id. ¶ 164; JX0608; JX0629.
459 PTO ¶ 165; JX0631.
460 JX0628 at 3.
461 PTO ¶ 167.
462 Id.; JX0630 at 2.
463 Bainbridge, supra note 434, at 56.
464 See Kwak Tr. 1214:18–1215:14 (“I don't remember that we suggested that [the board] not offer a number. But ... as an
advisor, we certainly were not in a position to make any recommendations of a number at that time because we had not
completed our valuation analysis.”).
465 See supra Section II(C)(3)(d).
466 PTO ¶ 136. Moreton explained that “significantly higher” would “convey that [the board] had to get the best price that
we could, and that we thought that they had to go over their ceiling. And we thought that when they had a chance to go
through and do the diligence on the company, that they would be able to do that.” Moreton Tr. 823:14–824:2. In rejecting
JAB's initial offer, Shaich explained, “[i]n order for our Board to get fully comfortable with and supportive of a transaction,
your value will need to reflect a price ‘that begins with a 3’ ... [a]lthough I am not suggesting you need to be deeply in
the $300s, I am also not talking about $300.00 either.” JX2019 at 2.
467 PTO ¶140; accord Shaich Tr. 1002:9–23; JX0483.
468 PTO ¶ 141; JX0448 at 1.
469 PTO ¶ 151.
470 See JX0552 at 3, 6.
471 PTO ¶ 153; JX0545; JX0552.
472 See JX0552.
473 PTO ¶¶ 161, 165.
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474 Id. ¶ 164; JX0608; JX0629; Moreton Tr. 831:22–832:5.
475 See JX0628 at 2.
476 JX0625 at 3–4.
477 JX0628 at 2; accord Moreton Tr. 843:14–845:3.
478 Moreton Tr. 843:14–845:3.
479 PTO ¶¶ 167, 171; JX0630 at 1; JX0647.
480 JX0628 at 3.
481 PTO ¶ 167; JX0628 at 3 (stating that after conferring as a board, “[t]he directors expressed their strong support for
the proposed transaction, noting particularly that the price was fair for the Company's shareholders and that the deal
protection mechanisms in the Merger Agreement were not preclusive to an alternative proposal for the Company's
shares”); JX0630 at 2.
482 JX2019 at 2.
483 Compare JX0118, and Shaich Tr. 969:6–10, with JX0318 at 1, and JX0435, and JX0491, and Shaich Tr. 1000:12–23;
1004:19–1005:7.
484 Shaich Tr. 1000:15–23, 1004:19–1005:13.
485 Id. 969:6–16; accord id. 957:8–24.
486 JX0581 (stating JAB is “not interested in a protracted negotiation that results in significant management distraction, so
they always go very quickly”).
487 Moreton Tr. 827:17–24.
488 Colasacco Dep. 142:11–25; see also id. 143:6–9 (“[A] short period, a yea or nay period on whether [JAB] would ... have
an actual interest in signing an agreement was a positive.”).
489 JX0418 at 2.
490 Kwak Tr. 1197:16–1198:7.
491 Redpath Tr. 658:1–11.
492 JX0491.
493 Moreton Tr. 827:17–24; accord Kwak Tr. 1233:14–20.
494 JX0593 at 65.
495 PTO ¶ 161.
496 Id. ¶¶ 132, 161; JX0789 at 71–75, 79–81; see also JX0772 at 97–101, 106–107.
497 PTO ¶¶ 160–61.
498 Kwak Tr. 1241:10–15.
499 Id. 1240:14–21, 1241:16–24.
500 JX0990 at 39.
501 Kwak Tr. 1241:16–22 (“Q. And there were also matching rights in the merger agreement here. In Morgan Stanley's view,
did matching rights prevent other bidders from coming forward? A. It doesn't prevent. It may discourage in a way and
make it more challenging, but it doesn't prevent other bidders from coming forward.”).
502 Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 614.
503 See Shaich Tr. 1077:11–1079:14.
504 Petitioners present a secondary contention that Shaich was apathetic on price because he focused on closing a deal so
that he could liquidate and diversify his assets. There is no evidence in the record that he wished to liquidate. Redpath
Tr. 645:12–646:11 (identifying no evidence of Shaich's intent to liquidate his Panera assets); Shaich Tr. 1022:20–1023:1
(“I hadn't diversified in 36 years. Why was I going to start now?”). For this reason, I focus my analysis on the potential
conflict from Shaich's desire to step away from Panera.
505 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
506 See Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *32–34 (citing Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 WL
922139, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), reargument denied, 2018 WL 2315943 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018), judgment
entered (Del. Ch. 2018), rev'd and remanded, 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019)).
507 Id. at *32.
508 Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 670–71 (Del. Ch. 2014) (quoting Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 600); see also Merion
Capital, 2016 WL 7324170, at *22 (noting the CEO in “particular had an incentive to maximize the value of his shares,
because he planned to retire.”).
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509 Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., 2018 WL 3602940, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018), judgment
entered, (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2018).
510 Id.
511 Shaich Tr. 1017:23–1018:10.
512 Bell Tr. 1109:17–1111:8; Shaich Tr. 1023:10–13; Hurst Tr. 1349:14–1350:10.
513 JX0777 at 2.
514 JX0435; accord Moreton Tr. 822:9–823:1.
515 JX2019 at 2.
516 JX0582 at 1.
517 Shaich Tr. 1024:7–1025:14.
518 See, e.g., Moreton Tr. 856:11–857:15 (“Mr. Shaich went to bed thinking about Panera and how to make it better and woke
up thinking about Panera and how to make it better. He had the shareholders’ interests in mind at all times.”); Shaich Tr.
1021:10–1022:19 (“This was my life, and I very much wanted to maximize the value for that, and I very much wanted to
do something that served all the constituencies of our company. In particular, our shareholders, who had hung with me
through some tough times, and I wanted to deliver for them.”).
519 JX0657.
520 Id.
521 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *34.
522 As I determined above, although Shaich passed along JAB's suggestion that the board should choose either Barclays or
Morgan Stanley, the board's legal advisor recommended Michael Boublik of Morgan Stanley, and the board followed that
recommendation. See JX0466 at 2. Boublik did not have preexisting relationships with JAB. JAB did not select Panera's
financial advisors.
523 PTO ¶ 137.
524 Moreton Tr. 816:11–21.
525 Even Petitioners’ process expert conceded that Morgan Stanley cleared conflicts. Redpath Tr. 673:16–674:1.
526 JX0448 at 1.
527 JX0562; Kwak Tr. 1222:7–16; accord Moreton Tr. 833:21–834:1 (“[Q.] Was this the first time that the board was learning
that Morgan Stanley had previous engagements with JAB? A. No. The board knew about it immediately, as we did, so
this was just more formal.”).
528 Moreton Tr. 816:22–817:7; see also Kwak Tr. 1197:6–1197:10 (testifying that “because [Morgan Stanley] had team
members that [were] familiar with [JAB's] strategy, we were able to, very quickly, have discussions with Ron Shaich and
Bill Moreton and to educate them on JAB's practices in the past”).
529 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *15 n.194.
530 Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *23 (citing In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc., 2011 WL 864928, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4,
2011); In re Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1005 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
531 Atheros, 2011 WL 864928, at *8.
532 JX0789 at 52–53.
533 JX0594 at 1; Kwak Tr. 1190:15–17.
534 JX0631 at 19, 38; Kwak Tr. 1280:22–1281:5.
535 JX0562 at 3.
536 Kwak Tr. 1195:1–16, 1293:3–12, 1294:24–1295:2.
537 Id. 1293:3–12.
538 See JX2021.
539 Moreton Tr. 837:9–838:9; accord JX0582 at 1 (“[O]ur goal is to have [Ciagne] deliver a message that (i) suggests our
very strong confidence in [the] business and (ii) points to our valuation expectations, directionally.”).
540 Shaich Tr. 1068:21–1070:1; Moreton Tr. 905:7–908:11.
541 Moreton Tr. 837:23–838:9 (“The purpose was not for this individual, who I never met, to negotiate. It was simply for one
more message to Olivier that the price has to be over $300 and they have to do the best that they can. So we were pulling
every lever we could think of to try to get the price increase.”).
542 Bell Tr. 1107:24–1108:17.
543 Kwak Tr. 1197:16–1198:7.
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544 JX0455 at 13–23.
545 Id. at 5, 13–23.
546 Kwak Tr. 1196:22–1197:10 (attributing Morgan Stanley's insights into the JAB playbook to Gallagher, who was a JAB
coverage team member), 1206:15–1207:6; accord JX0431 at 1; JX0432.
547 PTO ¶ 138; JX0455.
548 Kwak Tr. 1202:5–1203:9.
549 Shaich Tr. 997:6–998:3.
550 Moreton Tr. 821:15–822:8.
551 See Shaich Tr. 996:10–997:5.
552 JX0456 at 2. At trial, Shaich explained how Boublik “pushed [him] at some critical times when there was a question to
push for more price, and to push against JAB for more price.” Shaich Tr. 995:18–996:6; see also id. 1003:11–21 (“He
pushed me intensely. I mean, you know, there's this question, you don't want to blow this up. On the other hand, you
want to push for as much as you can get, X plus 1. And Michael and I went through, and we went through their precedent
history, and I think the sense was it was a wise, all considered, smart bet to push this deal further, even though this was
already a very attractive offer for the company.”).
553 JX0455 at 15.
554 Id. at 17.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 18.
557 Id. at 21.
558 Id. at 5.
559 Kwak Tr. 1200:4–17 (sharing Morgan Stanley's perspective with the board that “it wasn't likely that the potentially
interested parties that we had, considering at that time their strategic rationale and a potential combination with Panera,
and ... their ability to pay an all-cash offer ... [were] going to be likely to compete with a transaction that JAB had put
forth”); Shaich Tr. 1021:13–16 (“[I]t was just patently clear to me that, knowing what I know, and knowing these people
and where this had played out, that there really wasn't a viable interested party.”).
560 JX0491; accord JX0490.
561 Kwak Tr. 1199:9–24; see also id. 1228:18–1229:5.
562 See Redpath Tr. 663:10–664:22.
563 See generally JX0983.
564 Kwak Tr. 1226:21–1227:12; Shaich Tr. 1019:18–1020:5.
565 Shaich Tr. 951:21–952:2.
566 See JX0407 at 1, 46–205; JX0408 at 2–3.
567 See JX0631.
568 Id. at 15–20.
569 Id. at 19.
570 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *30.
571 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation ....”).
572 Aruba, 210 A.3d at 133 (quoting Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2004)).
573 Id. (citing Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *1; Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 60–64 (Del. Ch. 2007);
Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 355–56).
574 Id. (citing Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *1; Highfields Capital, 939 A.2d at 59–61; Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 343); see also
DFC, 172 A.3d at 368 (recognizing that a “going concern” valuation requires the court to excise “any value that might
be attributable to expected synergies by a buyer, including that share of synergy gains left with the seller as a part of
compensating it for yielding control of the company”).
575 Shaich Tr. 956:4–957:7; Moreton Tr. 824:3–12; Kwak Tr. 1200:18–1201:14.
576 See JX0400 at 3–4.
577 Id. at 4.
578 Id. at 3–4.
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579 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2014 WL 2042797, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 19, 2014), judgment entered, (Del. Ch. June
17, 2014), aff'd, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (TABLE); see also Petsmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *31 n.364
(recognizing “synergies financial buyers may have with target firms arising from other companies in their portfolio”).
580 JX0400 at 32.
581 Id.
582 Id.
583 Id.
584 See id. at 43–44.
585 Id. at 32, 34, 37.
586 Id. at 43.
587 JX0554 at 15 (“Cost rationalization and synergies. JAB's plans to achieve cost synergies and working capital
improvements could fail to materialize .... Mitigating factors: JAB has a long-track record of successful acquisitions and
integration, and have delivered expected cost savings on recent deals including Keurig Green Mountain and Krispy
Kreme.”); JX0589 at 19 (“Working Capital—Panera currently has ~ 4 days payable compared to Keurig at ~50, Caribou
at >90, and Peet's at ~ 85.”); accord Bell Tr. 1121:13–1122:10, 1123:3–23; Hubbard Tr. 1495:8–19.
588 JX0982 at 51; accord Hubbard Tr. 1666:5–13.
589 JX0400 at 37.
590 Id.; JX0589 at 23.
591 See JX0593 at 49–50.
592 JX0593 at 49–50, 52–54, 78; JX0982 at 49–50; Bell Tr. 1131:12–22. Shaked agreed with the public company cost
savings. See Shaked Tr. 368:4–16.
593 JX0593 at 49.
594 Bell Tr. 1133:9–18.
595 See JX0593 at 65.
596 Bell Tr. 1106:21–1107:23.
597 Hubbard Tr. 1493:24–1494:7.
598 See JX0593 at 69.
599 JX0982 at 41.
600 Id. at 54; Hubbard Tr. 1493:24–1494:7.
601 Petitioners’ expert testified “the company elected not to” increase its days payable outstanding. Shaked Tr. 451:2–8.
602 2014 WL 2042797, at *3. The Court explained it was not “reaching the theoretical question of under what circumstances
cost-savings may constitute synergies excludable from going-concern value under Section 262(h).” Id.
603 Hurst Dep. 219:4–23 (“[T]he general philosophy had been pay quickly, use that as leverage in some of the vendor
relationships to actually get a lower price. But it ultimately became just the habit of Panera.”); accord Shaked Tr. 451:21–
452:13.
604 JX0984 at 42 (“Panera invested over $120 million in IT from mid-2014 through mid-2017.”).
605 JX0400 at 37.
606 See JX0607 at 181–85.
607 See id. at 185.
608 See JX0593 at 78.
609 Bell Tr. 1122:4–1123:23; cf. JX0904 at 1.
610 Hurst Dep. at 203:8–24 (internal quotation marks omitted).
611 See JX0593 at 48.
612 PTO ¶ 76.
613 D.I. 139 at 58.
614 JX0593 at 77 (“The company had $332.0 million of net debt in December 2016.”); JX0238 at 16.
615 JX0982 at 55.
616 Id. at 55–56.
617 Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *28 & n.364.
618 Id. at *28 & n.364.
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619 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *1 (“The appraisal exercise is, at bottom, a fact-finding exercise, and our courts must
appreciate that, by functional imperative, the evidence, including expert evidence, in one appraisal case will be different
from the evidence presented in any other appraisal case.”); accord Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *20 (“[T]he approach
that an expert espouses may have met ‘the approval of this court on prior occasions,’ but may be rejected in a later
case if not presented persuasively or if ‘the relevant professional community has mined additional data and pondered the
reliability of past practice and come, by a healthy weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different practice should
become the norm ....’ ” (quoting Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 517)).
620 Petitioners argue that the Court should not agree with Hubbard's analysis because he “ignores the negative synergies,
or costs, that resulted from the acquisition.” D.I. 140 at 81. Petitioners have not shown that JAB failed to consider these
costs when JAB evaluated their implementation of their playbook, calculated Panera's resulting value, or formed their
offer price. I do not find that this undermines Hubbard's synergy analysis.
621 Bell Tr. 1127:13–21.
622 See JX0400 at 38–41. Possible plans included leveraging Panera's technology platform across JAB's portfolio, enhancing
Panera's in-store coffee program, focusing on CPG, increasing K-cup sales, and expanding internationally. Id. at 32.
623 See JX0564 at 131, 141–152, 154–158.
624 See JX0593 at 57–62. Although JAB had developed a “coffee procurement savings program,” they did not include these
synergies in the post-diligence model. Id. at 60–61; accord Bell Tr. 1123:3–1126:19, 1129:2–24.
625 See JX0593 at 65.
626 See JX0607 at 145, 155–169, 171–175, 229.
627 See Bell Tr. 1135:1–10 (“Q. And when you went higher, to 315, did those strategic opportunities or synergies play a role
in the decision to raise your offer from 305 to 315? A. I would say they did, because, you know, again, as a long-term
holder, we ended up for this one going to a price that was below ... a return. That we priced into a return that was below
what we initially thought we would have to do. But we took a big leap of faith on these strategic opportunities, which we
didn't quantify in the model.”).
628 Id. 1129:5–24.
629 Id. 1132:5–21; 1134:19–1135:10.
630 Id. 1168:8–21 (“Q. Coffee procurement, was that one of the ones that was on the back of the envelope? A. I don't even
think it was that, because we hadn't done the analysis.”).
631 See JX0982 at 55–56; accord Hubbard Tr. 1593:17–1594:3, 1694:22–1695:8.
632 Hubbard Tr. 1482:18–24, 1663:6–14, 1664:20–24, 1665:24–1666:4.
633 Manichaean Capital, LLC v. SourceHOV, C.A. No. 2017-0673-JRS, at 54 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2020).
634 D.I. 154 at 117:21–120:13 (“We never asked him to adjust his opinion. ... And, you know, frankly, Your Honor, that's a
trial strategy decision that I made, right? These are the sort of things that we do. And I still think that we have a strong
record evidence for this $10.”).
635 JX0593 at 64.
636 Neither party argues in favor of the unaffected stock price.
637 Pinson, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11. “The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows
that the firm will generate and when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the
end of the projection period, of the firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which
to discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated terminal or residual value.” Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990).
638 Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at *60 (citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 37–38, and DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–370, 369 n.118).
639 Id. at *61 (quoting Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359).
640 JX0982 at 84.
641 As explained, Hubbard did not accept Respondent's post-trial market value of $293.44.
642 Shaked Tr. 179:12–181:12, 239:24–241:17.
643 Hubbard Tr. 1483:15–1584:11.
644 Shaked Tr. 203:9–19 (explaining the reason for the buffer as a hypothetical: “let's assume that in my terminal year, the
maintenance will be 259, not 143. This is 81 percent increase compared to what it used to be. Last year is 143, and I
assume that it will be 259. So I build in $116 million, kind of an extra slack for the maintenance”).
645 JX0982 at 95–96.
646 D.I. 141 at 67 (citing Hubbard Tr. 1536:22–1537:7).
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647 Id. (citing JX0982 at 14–20; Goldin Tr. 1409:22–1411:24).
648 See id. at 68 (citing Hubbard Tr. 1546:17–1547:6; 1687:7–19).
649 JX0982 at 96.
650 Id.
651 See D.I. 141 at 63.
652 Shaked Direct Demonstrative Deck at 148 (“Assumed Panera will be using 2/3 of its net income to pay out dividends
and/or repurchase shares, and will have 1/3 of it flow to retained earnings (grow book value of equity).”); see Hubbard
Tr. 1571:21–1572:18.
653 Hubbard Tr. 1571:21–1572:18.
654 See id. 1570:9–1571:15.
655 See Shaked Tr. 1699:14–1742:7.
656 See id. 486:5–18.
657 See Hubbard Tr. 1536:3–21.
658 Id. 1572:19–1574:6.
659 Shaked Tr. 311:11–312:8.
660 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 37–38; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–370, 369 n.118.
661 See Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *29 (citing Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359); id. at *32.
662 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *32.
663 Id. at *33.
664 Hoyd v. Trussway Hldgs., LLC, 2019 WL 994048, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2019).
665 See Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (“[W]hen the ‘comparables’
involve companies that offer different products or services, are at a different stage in their growth cycle, or have vastly
different multiples, a comparable companies or comparable transactions analysis is inappropriate.”).
666 JX0982 at 115.
667 Hubbard Dep. 360:5–361:23.
668 JX0982 at 12–13, 120–21.
669 Id. at 123.
670 Shaked Tr. 439:23–440:18.
671 Compare JX0983 at 150–51, with JX0554 at 44, and JX0589 at 39, and JX0826 at 37.
672 See Shaked Tr. 441:9–14, 439:16–22.
673 JX0983 at 59–61.
674 Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *34.
675 See JX0982 at 121–22; JX1023; JX0983 at 59–60.
676 JX0982 at 121.
677 See id. at 123.
678 See id.
679 Hubbard Tr. 1481:13–23.
680 JX0983 at 59.
681 Id. at 59–60.
682 Shaked Tr. 255:4–17; see also id. 180:24–181:12.
683 Kwak Tr. 1210:8–1211:6.
684 See generally Charles K. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Interest in Appraisal, 42 J. Corp. L. 109 (2016); R. Garrett Rice, Give
Me Back My Money: A Proposed Amendment to Delaware's Prepayment System in Statutory Appraisal Cases, 73 Bus.
Law 1051 (2018); Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., Proposed Appraisal Statute Amendments Would Permit Companies
To Reduce Their Interest Cost—Likely To Discourage “Weaker” Appraisal Claims And Make Settlement Of “Stronger
Claims” Harder, Fried Frank M&A Briefing (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL% 20-
% 203-23-2015% 20-% 20Proposed% 20Appraisal% 20Statute% 20Amendments.pdf; Arthur R. Bookout et al., Delaware
Appraisal Actions: When Does It Make Sense to Prepay?, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (May 29, 2018),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/05/insights-the-delaware-edition/delaware-appraisal-actions.
685 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
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686 Del. H.B. 371, 148th Gen. Assem., 80 Del. Laws, ch. 265, §§ 8–11 (2016).
687 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
688 E.g., Artic Invs. LLC v. Medivation, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0009-JRS, D.I. 20 at 5 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2016) (stipulating for
clawback rights if the prepayment amount were to exceed the Court's fair value determination of the appraisal shares
along with any accrued interest); see Rice, supra note 684, at 1082 (recognizing that petitioners sometimes stipulate
to clawbacks).
689 Ala. By-Prods. Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995) (citation and internal
quotations omitted).
690 One-Pie Invs., LLC v. Jackson, 43 A.3d 911, 914 (Del. 2012) (quoting LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932
(Del. 2007)).
691 Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (Del. 1982).
692 Goldstein v. Mun. Court for City of Wilm., 1991 WL 53830, at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 7, 1991) (citing State v. Rose, 132
A. 864, 867 (Del. Super. 1926)).
693 Giuricich, 449 A.2d at 238.
694 Terex Corp. v. S. Track & Pump, Inc., 117 A.3d 537, 544 (Del. 2015), as revised (June 16, 2015).
695 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2014 WL 545958, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2014).
696 Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.24(a) (2016).
697 Compare Del. H.B. 160, 144th Gen. Assem., 76 Del. Laws, ch. 145 §§ 13, 16 (2007), and 8 Del. C. § 262(h), with Model
Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 (adopting the legal rate as the applicable interest rate for dissenting stockholders).
698 See Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.30(e); see also Rice, supra note 684, at 184–86; Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model
Business Corporation Act's Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 Law & Contemp. Probs. 231, 236 (2011) (“[I]f the corporation's
estimate of fair value is greater than the amount ultimately determined by the court, the corporation will have paid this
greater amount to the shareholder without any statutory right to require the shareholder to return the difference between
the court's determination of fair value and the corporation's estimate of fair value.” (footnote omitted)).
699 See Korsmo & Meyers, supra note 864, at 125; Bookout et al., supra note 864.
700 In Artic Investments LLC v. Medication, Inc., the company argued under an unjust enrichment theory that the Court should
find the corporation entitled to a refund for overpayment after trial. See C.A. No. 2017-0009-JRS, D.I. 15 at 24 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 28, 2017). The Court did not resolve this issue, or grant the party's proposed stipulation for a clawback provision,
before the parties stipulated to dismissal. See id. D.I. 23 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2018).
701 Meade v. Pac. Gamble Robinson Co., 58 A.2d 415, 417–18 (Del. 1948).
702 See Huff, 2014 WL 545958 at *3.
703 See 47 Del. Laws ch. 136, § 7 (1949) (affording the Court the power to award interest); Del. H.B. 371, 148th Gen. Assem.,
80 Del. Laws, ch. 265, §§ 8–11 (2016) (creating the possibility of prepayment).
704 “[T]he expression of dictum is ordinarily to be avoided.” State ex rel. Smith v. Carey, 112 A.2d 26, 28 (Del. 1955).
Accordingly, I note only that refraining from awarding a refund here does not offend my sensibilities. A refund is not
available under the Model Act, which tethers the mandatory prepayment amount to the corporation's position on fair
value, and therefore gives the prepayment amount significance in the litigation context. Under the DGCL, prepayment
is optional, and a corporation can pay any amount it chooses without making a commitment to fair value. Prepayment
under the DGCL is a business decision, made with knowledge of the company's sale process that is superior to the
stockholder's, and with counsel's prediction of how long the litigation may take and how much interest may accrue. In
my view, expressed in dictum, the case for a refund under the DGCL is less compelling than under the Model Act, which
does not provide for one.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
- 188 -
In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2018)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2018 WL 3625644
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Chancery of Delaware.
IN RE APPRAISAL OF
SOLERA HOLDINGS, INC.
CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 12080-CB
|
Date Submitted: April 6, 2018
|
Date Decided: July 30, 2018
Attorneys and Law Firms
Stuart M. Grant, Christine M. Mackintosh, and Vivek
Upadhya of GRANT & EISENHOFER P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Daniel L. Berger of GRANT & EISENHOFER
P.A., New York, New York; Lawrence M. Rolnick, Steven
M. Hecht, and Jonathan M. Kass of LOWENSTEIN &
SANDLER LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for
Petitioners.
David E. Ross and S. Michael Sirkin of ROSS ARONSTAM
& MORITZ LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Yosef J. Riemer,
Devora W. Allon, Elliot C. Harvey Schatmeier, Richard
Nicholson, and Madelyn A. Morris of KIRKLAND & ELLIS
LLP, New York, New York; Attorneys for Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOUCHARD, C.
*1  In this appraisal action, the court must determine the
fair value of petitioners' shares of Solera Holdings, Inc. as of
March 3, 2016, when Vista Equity Partners acquired Solera
for $55.85 per share, or approximately $3.85 billion in total
equity value, in a merger transaction. Unsurprisingly, the
parties have widely divergent views on this question.
Relying solely on a discounted cash flow analysis, petitioners
contend that the fair value of their shares is $84.65 per share
—approximately 51.6% over the deal price. Until recently,
respondent consistently argued that the “best evidence” of the
fair value of Solera shares is the deal price less estimated
synergies, equating to $53.95 per share. After an appraisal
decision in another case recently used the “unaffected market
price” of a company's stock to determine fair value, however,
respondent changed its position to argue for the same measure
of value here, which respondent contends is $36.39 per share
—about 35% below the deal price.
Over the past year, our Supreme Court twice has heavily
endorsed the application of market efficiency principles in
appraisal actions. With that guidance in mind, and after
carefully considering all relevant factors, my independent
determination is that the fair value of petitioners' shares is the
deal price less estimated synergies—i.e., $53.95 per share.
As discussed below, the record reflects that Solera was sold in
an open process that, although not perfect, was characterized
by many objective indicia of reliability. The merger was the
product of a two-month outreach to large private equity firms
followed by a six-week auction conducted by an independent
and fully authorized special committee of the board, which
contacted eleven financial and seven strategic firms. Public
disclosures made clear to the market that the company was for
sale. The special committee had competent legal and financial
advisors and the power to say no to an underpriced bid, which
it did twice, without the safety net of another bid. The merger
price of $55.85 proved to be a market-clearing price through
a 28-day go-shop that the special committee secured as a
condition of the deal with Vista, one which afforded favorable
terms to allow a key strategic competitor of Solera to continue
to bid for the company.
The record further suggests that the sales process was
conducted against the backdrop of an efficient and well-
functioning market for Solera's stock. Before the merger, for
example, Solera had a deep base of public stockholders, its
shares were actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange
and were covered by numerous analysts, and its debt was
closely monitored by ratings agencies.
In short, the sales process delivered for Solera stockholders
the value obtainable in a bona fide arm's-length transaction
and provides the most reliable evidence of fair value.
Accordingly, I give the deal price, after adjusting for
synergies in accordance with longstanding precedent, sole
and dispositive weight in determining the fair value of
petitioners' shares as of the date of the merger.
I. BACKGROUND
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*2  The facts recited in this opinion are my findings based
on the testimony and documentary evidence submitted during
a five-day trial. The record includes over 400 stipulations of
fact in the Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Order (“PTO”),1 over
1,000 trial exhibits, including fourteen deposition transcripts,
and the live testimony of four fact witnesses and three expert
witnesses. I accord the evidence the weight and credibility I
find it deserves.
A. The Parties
Respondent Solera Holdings, Inc. (“Solera” or the
“Company”) is a Delaware corporation with headquarters
in Westlake, Texas.2 Solera was founded in 2005 and was
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange from May
2007 until March 3, 2016, when it was acquired by an affiliate
of Vista Equity Partners (“Vista”) in a merger transaction (the
“Merger”).3
From Solera's inception through the Merger, Tony Aquila
served as Chairman of the Board of Directors (the “Board”),
Chief Executive Officer, and President of Solera.4 Over
this time period, Aquila made all top-level decisions
about product innovation, corporate marketing, and investor
relation efforts.5 After the Merger, Aquila remained the CEO
of Solera.6
Petitioners consist of seven funds that were stockholders
of Solera at the time of the Merger: Muirfield Value
Partners LP, Fir Tree Value Master Fund, L.P., Fir Tree
Capital Opportunity Master Fund, L.P., BlueMountain Credit
Alternatives Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Summit
Trading L.P., BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P.,
and BlueMountain Logan Opportunities Master Fund L.P.
Petitioners collectively hold 3,987,021 shares of Solera
common stock that are eligible for appraisal.7
B. Solera's Business
In early 2005, Aquila founded Solera with aspirations to bring
about a digital evolution of the insurance industry, starting
with the processing of automotive insurance claims.8 Aquila
viewed Solera as a potential disruptor, akin to Amazon.com,
Inc., in its specific industry.9
Solera, in its current form, is a global leader in data
and software for automotive, home ownership, and digital
identity management.10 At the time of the Merger, Solera's
business consisted of three main platforms: (i) Risk
Management Solutions; (ii) Service, Maintenance, and
Repair; and (iii) Customer Retention Management.11 The
Risk Management Solutions platform helps insurers digitize
and streamline the claims process with respect to automotive
and property content claims.12 The Service, Maintenance,
and Repair platform digitally assists car technicians and auto
service centers to diagnose and repair vehicles efficiently,
accurately, and profitably, and to identify and source
original equipment manufacturer and aftermarket automotive
parts.13 The Customer Retention Management platform
provides consumer-centric and data-driven digital marketing
solutions for businesses that serve the auto ownership
lifecycle, including property and casualty insurers, vehicle
manufacturers, car dealerships, and financing providers.14
Solera was operating in 78 countries at the time of the
Merger.15
C. Solera Expands Aggressively Through Acquisitions
*3  Solera's business was not always so diverse. During the
Company's early years, the vast majority of Solera's revenues
was derived from claims processing.16 But the claims
business was facing pressure17 as a result of maturation,18
advances in automotive technology like collision avoidance
and self-driving cars,19 and competition.20
In August 2012, Aquila implemented a plan called “Mission
2020” to increase Solera's revenue and EBITDA through
acquisitions and diversification.21 Solera aspired to become
a “cognitive data and software and services company” that
would address the entire lifecycle of a car.22
The Mission 2020 goals included growing revenue from
$790 million in fiscal year 2012 to $2 billion by fiscal year
2020, and increasing adjusted EBITDA from $345 million
to $800 million over that same period.23 To meet these
benchmarks, Solera implemented its “Leverage. Diversify.
Disrupt.” (“LDD”) business strategy.24
LDD was a three-pronged strategy. First, Solera sought
to “leverage” its claims processing revenue in a given
geographic area to gain a foothold in that area. Second,
Solera sought to “diversify” its service offerings in the
given geographic area. Third, Solera's longer-term objective
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was to “disrupt” the market by integrating its service
offerings such that vehicle owners and homeowners could
use Solera's software to manage their purchases, maintenance,
and insurance claims all in one place.25
D. The Market's Reaction to LDD
Between the formulation of Mission 2020 and the Merger,
Solera invested approximately $2.1 billion in acquisitions.26
These acquisitions often were “scarcity value transactions”
that involved Solera paying a premium for unique assets.27
The multiples Solera paid in these acquisitions not only were
relatively high but were increasing over time, generating
lower returns on invested capital.28 As a result, Solera's
leverage increased while its EPS essentially remained flat and
its EBITDA margins shrank.29
Some analysts were skeptical of Solera's evolution-through-
acquisitions strategy, taking a “show me” approach to the
Company.30 These analysts struggled to understand Solera's
diversification plan31 and complained that management's lack
of transparency about the Company's strategy impeded their
ability to value Solera appropriately.32 Aquila, the Board,
and other analysts believed that the market misunderstood
Solera's value proposition and that its stock traded at a
substantial discount to fair value.33
Compounding the challenges Solera was facing in the equity
markets, Solera was encountering difficulties in the debt
markets. Solera needed to have access to debt financing
to execute its acquisition strategy, but by the time of the
Merger, Solera was unable to find lenders willing to finance
its deals due to its highly-levered balance sheet. For example,
upon the announcement that Solera planned to issue tack-
on notes in November 2014, “the proceeds of which, along
with balance sheet cash, [were] expected to effect a strategic
acquisition,” Moody's Investors Service downgraded Solera's
credit rating from Ba2 to Ba3.34 Moody's noted that “the
company has been actively pursuing acquisitions, often at
very high purchase multiples,” and warned that “[r]atings
could be downgraded [further] if the company undertakes
acquisitions that, after integration, fail to realize targeted
margins.”35
*4  In late May 2015, management began discussing an $850
million notes offering with Goldman Sachs, the proceeds of
which the Company planned to use to fund acquisitions and
refinance outstanding debt.36 The offering fell approximately
$11.5 million short, and Goldman was forced to absorb the
notes that it could not sell into the market.37 In July 2015,
Moody's downgraded Solera again,38 commenting “[t]he
ongoing, cumulative impacts of debt assumed for acquisitions
and for the buyout of its joint venture partner's 50%
share ... plus ramped up share buybacks and dividends, have
pushed Moody's expectations for [Solera's] intermediate-term
leverage to approximately 7.0 times, a level high even for a
B1-rated credit.”39 As Aquila testified, Solera was “out of
runway” shortly before the Merger to execute the rest of its
acquisition strategy because creditors were unwilling to loan
funds to Solera at tolerable interest rates.40
E. Aquila Expresses Displeasure with his Compensation
at Solera
Solera's stock price affected Aquila personally. His
compensation was tied to “total shareholder return,” and the
majority of his stock options were underwater.41 Aquila did
not receive a performance bonus in 2011, 2012, or 2013.42
In February 2015, he emailed Thomas Dattilo, Chair of
the Compensation Committee, saying “I've poured a great
deal of time, inventions and sacrifice during this time in
the company's transition and I really need to get something
meaningful for it.”43 At one point, Aquila threatened to leave
Solera if his compensation was not reconfigured.44
The Board recognized Aquila's value to the Company
and took his request and threat to leave seriously. Dattilo
commented “the way [S]olera is structured, we would
probably need three people to replace him, and even that
would not really fulfill the Solera requirements because of the
pervasive founder[']s culture found there. ... Solera possibly
couldn't exist without Tony.”45 Although the Compensation
Committee was looking for a solution to address Aquila's
underwater stock options, they ultimately “didn't get it
done.”46
F. Aquila Privately Explores a Sale of Solera
Around the time that Aquila complained to the Board about
his compensation, he began to engage in informal discussions
with private equity firms regarding a potential transaction
to take the Company private. In December 2014, Aquila
was introduced to David Baron, an investment banker at
Rothschild Inc. (“Rothschild”).47 Aquila and Baron met again
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in January 2015, when they “talked through a bunch of
buy-side ideas” and Aquila expressed his frustration at the
disconnect between Solera's stock price performance relative
to its peers and his own views on the Company's growth
opportunities.48
In March 2015, Aquila was introduced to Orlando Bravo,
a founder of the private equity firm Thoma Bravo LLC
(“Thoma Bravo”), and Robert Smith, the founder of Vista.49
Before these two meetings, Aquila was aware that both
Thoma Bravo and Vista recently had launched new multi-
billion dollar funds.50
On April 29, 2015, Baron contacted Brett Watson, the head
of Koch Equity, to tell him, without identifying Solera as the
target, about an opportunity to invest in preferred equity.51
Baron wrote in an email to Watson: “I'd like you to speak for
as much of pref[erred stock] as possible – Ceo objective is to
try to get control back[.] I'm going to clear it w[ith] chairman/
ceo next week.”52
*5  On May 4, 2015, Baron travelled to Aquila's ranch in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, bringing with him a presentation
book that included leverage buyout (“LBO”) analyses that
the two had previously discussed.53 Two days later, during
an earnings call on May 6, Aquila raised the possibility of
taking Solera private as a means of returning money to its
stockholders while still pursuing its growth strategy:
Q (Analyst): And just if I can bring that around to [the
Solera CFO's] comment about being opportunistic in share
repurchases when you think the stock is detached from
intrinsic value, you haven't bought a lot of stock. So how
do we square that circle in terms of what you think the
Company is worth today?
A (Aquila): Look, you're bringing up a great point. So,
look, it is a chicken-or-egg story. We're going to make
some of you happy, which we're trying to go down—we're
trying to keep the ball down the middle of the fairway.
We definitely like to hit the long ball as much as we can.
But in reality, we have to do what we're doing, and we
have to thread the needle the way we are. Our only other
alternative is either to take up leverage, buy stock right now.
That's going to cause a ratings issue. That's going to cause
some dislocation. We want to buy content because we want
double-digit businesses in the emerging content world as
apps take a different role on your phone to manage your
risks and your asset. So when you think of that, we've done
a decent job. We bought, I don't know, $300 million worth
of stock back since we did the stock buying program, and
our average price is, like, $52, $53.
So we're kind of dealing with all the factors—we got the
short game playing out there. And we've got to thread the
needle. And the only other option to that is to go private
and take all the shares out.54
Aquila testified that this comment was “not preplanned,” and
he was not “trying to suggest that [going private] was a
decision that had been made.”55
A few days later, on May 11, 2015, Aquila met with Smith
from Vista and his partner Christian Sowul in Austin, Texas.56
After the meeting, Sowul followed up with Baron, saying
“we are very interested. [T]ony sounded like now is the time.
[N]ext 4-6 weeks.”57
Also on May 11, the Board commenced a series of meetings
and dinners in Dallas, Texas.58 Before these meetings,
Aquila discussed with every Board member the possibility
of pursuing strategic alternatives, given that Solera was “out
of runway” to execute its growth-by-acquisition strategy.59
Company director Stuart Yarbrough encouraged Aquila to
have these conversations with the other directors, and
explained that the Board felt Solera was “being criticized in
the market” and knew that the Company was paying higher
multiples for larger acquisitions.60
On May 12, 2015, Company director Michael Lehman
emailed Yarbrough and Larry Sonsini of the law firm Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati about the possibility of retaining
his firm to assist in reviewing strategic alternatives. Lehman
stated in the email: “Tony and the board have just begun
conversations about ‘evaluating strategic alternatives,’ ” of
which “[o]ne of the more attractive conceptual alternatives
is a ‘going private,’ which would likely mean that the CEO
would have significant stake in that entity [ ] (think Dell
computer type transaction).”61
*6  In an executive session on May 13, the Board
unanimously agreed that Aquila should “test the waters” with
financial sponsors.62 In doing so, the Board recognized that
Aquila would probably have a significant equity stake in a
private Solera, posing an “inherent” conflict in his outreach to
private equity firms.63 The Board authorized Aquila to “put
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together a target list” of large private equity firms and to “go
have discussions and see what the interest was.”64 The Board
decided to start with private equity firms and add strategic
firms later in the process because it believed that strategic
firms presented a greater risk of leaks65 and an interested
strategic bidder could get up to speed quickly.66 The Board
also wanted to focus on larger private equity firms to avoid
the complexity of firms having to partner with each other.67
At this stage, the Board prohibited “any use of nonpublic
information.”68
G. A Special Committee is Formed after Aquila “Tests
the Waters”
Between May 13 and June 1, 2015, Aquila, with assistance
from Rothschild, contacted nine private equity firms:
Pamplona, Silver Lake, Apax, Access Industries, Hellman
& Friedman, Vista, Blackstone, CVC Capital Partners, and
Thoma Bravo.69 Aquila and Rothschild had follow-up contact
with at least Silver Lake,70 Blackstone,71 and Thoma Bravo72
between June 1 and July 14, 2015. After his meeting
with Aquila, Orlando Bravo emailed Baron, saying “Unreal
meeting. I love Tony man. We want to do this deal.”73 On
July 18, 2015, Aquila reported back to the Board that Thoma
Bravo was going to make an offer for Solera.74
On July 19, 2015, Thoma Bravo submitted an indication of
interest to purchase Solera at a price between $56-$58 per
share. In the letter submitting their bid, Thoma Bravo stated
that they “are contemplating this deal solely in the context of
being able to partner with Tony Aquila and his management
team.”75
On July 20, 2015, the Board discussed the indication of
interest received from Thoma Bravo and formed a special
committee of independent directors to review the Company's
strategic alternatives (the “Special Committee”).76 The
Special Committee consisted of Yarbrough (Chairman),
Dattilo, and Patrick Campbell, each of whom had served on
multiple boards and had extensive M & A experience.77 The
Special Committee was granted the “full power and authority
of the Board” to review, evaluate, negotiate, recommend, or
reject any proposed transaction or strategic alternatives.78
The Board resolution establishing the Special Committee
further provided that “the Board shall not recommend a
Possible Transaction or alternative thereto for approval by
the Company's stockholders or otherwise approve a Possible
Transaction or alternative thereto without a prior favorable
recommendation of such Possible Transaction or alternative
thereto by the Special Committee.”79
H. The Special Committee Begins its Work
On July 30, 2015, the Special Committee met with its legal
advisors, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Richards, Layton
& Finger P.A., and financial advisor Centerview Partners
LLC (“Centerview”).80 Rothschild remained active in the
sales process and was formally engaged to represent the
Company,81 but, in reality, it also continued to represent
Aquila personally.82
*7  At its July 30 meeting, the Special Committee approved
a list of potential buyers to approach, including six strategic
companies that were selected based on their business
initiatives and stated future plans, and six financial sponsors
(including Vista) that were selected based on their experience
and interest in the technology and information services
industry and their capability to execute and finance a
transaction of this size.83 The Special Committee also
distributed to management a short document that Sullivan &
Cromwell prepared concerning senior management contacts
with prospective bidders, which, aptly for a company
focused on the automotive industry, was referred to as
the “Rules of the Road.”84 The document stated, among
other things, that “senior management must treat potential
Bidders equally” and refrain from “any discussions with any
Bidder representatives relating to any future compensation,
retention or investment arrangements, without approval by
the independent directors.”85
Between July 30 and August 4, 2015, Centerview contacted
11 private equity firms and 6 potential strategic bidders,
including Google and Yahoo!, the two that Special Committee
Chair Yarbrough believed were most likely to bid.86 Aquila
already had “tested the waters” with some of the private equity
firms that the Special Committee contacted. All six strategic
firms contacted declined to explore a transaction involving
Solera.87 At this time, the Special Committee did not contact
IHS Inc. (“IHS”), another possible strategic acquirer, because
IHS was one of Solera's key competitors and the Special
Committee had “a low level of confidence” in IHS's ability to
finance a transaction.88
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From time to time, Aquila, through Rothschild and his
legal counsel, Kirkland & Ellis LLP,89 apprised the Special
Committee on his thoughts about the sales process. On July
30, 2015, Baron told the Special Committee's legal and
financial advisors in an email that Aquila did not want IHS
included in the sales process, stating “fishing expedition, too
competitive, need 50% stock ...”90
On August 3, 2015, Aquila's counsel sent the Special
Committee a proposed “Management Retention Program.”91
This proposal stated that “an incremental $75 million cash
retention pool” should be created to align management
and shareholder incentives, and to “enhance impartiality of
management among all potential buyers.”92 The proposal
warned that under the current compensation plan, “the
program inadequately aligns management's interests with
those of stockholders and exposes the Company to risks of
losing key managers through closing” of a transaction.93
Solera did not implement this proposed “Management
Retention Program,” but the Compensation Committee did
award Aquila a $15 million bonus in August 2015.94
I. The Special Committee Solicits First-Round Bids and
News of the Sales Process Leaks
By August 11, 2015, Yarbrough viewed “the state of the world
to be one where if there's going to be a deal, it's going to
be with a private equity firm.”95 On August 10, 2015, at
the direction of the Special Committee, Centerview sent a
letter to the five remaining parties inviting them to submit
first-round bids by August 17, 2015.96 These parties had
signed confidentiality agreements and were provided Board-
approved five-year projections for the Company, which were
based on projections created in the normal course of business
but then modified in connection with the sales process (the
“Hybrid Case Projections”).97 Before the August 17 bid
deadline, Baron spoke to certain potential bidders directly
without involving Centerview.98
*8  By August 17, 2015, two potential bidders had dropped
out of the sales process, believing “that they would not be able
to submit competitive bids.”99 The remaining three financial
sponsors provided indications of interest: Vista offered $63
per share, Thoma Bravo offered $60 per share, and Pamplona
offered $60-$62 per share.100 Each made clear that they
wanted Aquila's participation in the deal.101
On August 19, 2015, news of the sales process leaked when
Bloomberg reported that Solera was “exploring a sale that has
attracted interest from private equity firms.”102 The next day,
the Company issued a press release announcing that it had
formed the Special Committee and that it was contemplating
a sale.103 Also on August 20, the Financial Times reported
that Vista was “considering a bid of $63 per share” and that
Thoma Bravo and Pamplona were “considering separate bids
for $62 per share.”104
In a further development on August 20, Advent International
Corporation, a private equity firm, reached out to Centerview
and Rothschild separately to express interest in the
Company.105 Centerview confirmed to Baron that it planned
to ignore the inquiry,106 about which the members of the
Special Committee were never informed.107 The Special
Committee also was not made aware of interest that
Providence Equity Partners, L.L.C.,108 another private equity
firm, expressed to Centerview on August 26.109 When
Centerview made Baron aware of this inquiry, he responded:
“Too late obv[iously] but Tony not a fan ...”110 Neither
Advent nor Providence gave any indication as to the price
they would be willing to pay for Solera or the amount of time
they would need to get up to speed.111
During the August 22-23, 2015 weekend, Smith traveled to
Aquila's ranch en route to his own ranch in Colorado.112
Before the meeting, Smith's team at Vista researched the size
of the option pools that Vista had offered management in
its “recent take privates” so that Smith would “know the
comps before his meeting with [T]ony.”113 Aquila did not
have authorization from the Special Committee to discuss his
post-transaction compensation at this time.114 Shortly after
the meeting, Vista began to model a 9% option pool with a
1% long-term incentive plan (LTIP), up from the 5% option
pool with a 1% LTIP that Vista had modeled before Aquila's
meeting with Smith.115
J. IHS Expresses Interest in a Potential Transaction
On August 21, 2015, IHS contacted Centerview to express its
interest in a potential acquisition of Solera at an unspecified
valuation and financing structure.116 By August 23, IHS
suggested that it would be able to submit a bid in excess of
$63 per share, and it indicated that it could complete due
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diligence and execute definitive transaction documents within
ten calendar days despite not yet having received nonpublic
information.117 The parties entered into a confidentiality
agreement on August 24.118
*9  On August 26, 2015, senior representatives of IHS,
including its CFO, attended a meeting with the Company's
management, before which Aquila had a one-on-one
conversation with IHS's CFO for 90 minutes.119 Centerview
requested numerous times that IHS's CEO Jerre Stead
attend the management meeting, but he declined even
though the acquisition would have been the largest in IHS's
history.120 By August 27, Solera had provided IHS with
non-public Company information, including the Hybrid Case
Projections.121
On September 1, IHS submitted a bid of $55-$58 per share,
comprised of 75% cash and 25% stock, and included “highly
confident” letters from financing sources.122 On September
2, Aquila travelled separately to meet with Stead personally,
who commented that IHS was “looking at another big deal as
well.”123 The next day, IHS submitted a revised bid of $60
per share, but did not specify the mix of consideration and did
not include any indication of financing commitments.124 IHS
said it could complete diligence “within a matter of days.”125
K. The Special Committee Negotiates with Potential
Buyers
On September 4, 2015, Vista and Thoma Bravo submitted
revised bids.126 Pamplona had dropped out of the sales
process by this point,127 and the Special Committee felt like
it was “moving backwards” in its negotiations with IHS.128
Both of the active bidders lowered their offers. Thoma Bravo
lowered its bid to $56 per share, attributing the drop to
“challenges in availability and terms of financing (both debt
and equity) due in part to turbulence in global financial
markets.”129 Vista lowered its bid to $55 per share, but
subsequently indicated that it could increase its price to
$56 per share.130 Vista explained that it dropped its bid
because of changes to Solera's balance sheet, increased
financing costs, and a decline in Vista's forecasted EBITDA
for Solera.131 Unbeknownst to Solera, one of the reasons
Vista lowered its bid is that it had made a spreadsheet error
in its financial model before submitting its first-round bid,
resulting in the model overstating Solera's future equity value
by approximately $1.9 billion.132 If this error had been
noticed and corrected, Vista's first-round bid would have been
closer to $55 per share, rather than $63 per share.133
On September 5, 2015, Aquila signaled that he was willing
to roll over $15 million of his Solera shares in a transaction
with any bidder.134 That day, the Special Committee met135
and decided to press for more from the bidders, proposing to
Vista that it either raise its price to $58 per share, or agree
to a go-shop and reduced termination fee to enable Solera to
continue discussions with IHS.136 Vista agreed to the go-shop
and the termination fee reduction on September 7, but also
told Centerview that day that one of its anticipated sources
of equity financing had withdrawn its commitment and that it
would need additional time to obtain replacement financing
to support its bid.137
*10  On September 8, Vista lowered its bid to $53 per
share.138 Vista told Solera that its bid would expire at
midnight, and that “[a]fter midnight, we will not be spending
any more time on” Solera.139 The Special Committee rejected
Vista's bid as inadequate that same day,140 and decided “to
let the process play out.”141 The Special Committee set
September 11, 2015 as a deadline for Vista and Thoma Bravo
to make final bids.142 On September 9, Bloomberg reported
that Solera had received bids from Vista and Thoma Bravo,
and that the Company was “nearing a deal to sell itself for
about $53 a share.”143
When September 11 arrived, Thoma Bravo offered $54
per share, expiring at midnight and contingent on Solera
“shutting off dividends” and reducing advisory fees.144 The
Special Committee said “no.”145 The press again reported
in real time, with Reuters writing that Vista and Thoma
Bravo had “made offers that failed to meet Solera's valuation
expectations,” and that Solera was “trying to sell itself
to another company”—IHS—“rather than an investment
firm.”146
The next morning, on September 12, Vista submitted an all-
cash, fully financed revised bid of $55.85 per share that
also included the go-shop and termination fee provisions the
Special Committee had requested.147 The Special Committee
tried to push Vista up to $56 per share, but Vista refused,
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saying $55.85 was its best and final offer.148 Centerview
opined that $55.85 per share was fair, from a financial point
of view, to Solera stockholders.149 Later in the day on
September 12, the Special Committee accepted Vista's offer
after receiving Centerview's fairness opinion, and the Board
approved the transaction.150 On September 13, the Company
and Vista entered into a definitive merger agreement (the
“Merger Agreement”).151
L. The Go-Shop Period Expires and the Merger Closes
On September 13, 2015, Solera announced the proposed
Merger.152 The press release stated that the purchase price
valued Solera at approximately $6.5 billion, including net
debt, “represent[ing] an unaffected premium of 53% over
Solera's closing share price of $36.39 on August 3, 2015.”153
In advance of the press release, Baron sent a celebratory email
to his colleagues, in which he noted “we were the architects
with the CEO from the beginning as to how to engineer the
process from start to finish.”154 The next morning, an internal
email of the Fir Tree petitioners praised the transaction as
yielding a “Good price!”155
The Merger Agreement provided for a 28-day go-shop period
during which the termination fee would be 1% of the equity
value for any offer made by IHS, a reduction from the 3%
termination fee applicable to any other potential buyer.156
The Special Committee reached out to IHS the day after
signing the Merger Agreement and gave IHS nearly full
access to the approximately 12,000-document data room that
the private equity firms had been given access to during the
pre-signing sales process.157
*11  On September 29, 2015, with two weeks left in the
go-shop, IHS informed Solera that it would not pursue
an acquisition of the Company. IHS noted that it “was
appreciative of the go-shop provisions negotiated in the
merger agreement ... and the fact that [Solera] had provided
equal access to information in order for IHS to consider a
bid.”158 On October 5, 2015, Solera issued its preliminary
proxy statement, which disclosed a summary of the Hybrid
Case Projections.159 The go-shop expired on October 11,
without Solera receiving any alternative proposals.160
On October 15, 2015, Vista sent Aquila a proposed
compensation package, offering Aquila the opportunity to
obtain up to 6% of Solera's fully-diluted equity.161 This
amount was later revised up, with Vista offering Aquila up
to 10% of the fully-diluted equity. Under the revised plan,
Aquila would invest $45 million in the deal—$15 million
worth of his shares of Solera and $30 million borrowed from
Vista.162 Vista's proposal positioned Aquila to earn up to
$969.6 million over a seven-year period if Vista achieved a
four-times cash-on-cash return.163
On October 30, 2015, Solera issued its definitive proxy
statement concerning the proposed Merger, which also
included a summary of the Hybrid Case Projections.164 On
December 8, Solera's stockholders voted to approve the
Merger. Of the Company's outstanding shares, approximately
65.4% voted in favor, approximately 10.9% voted against,
and approximately 3.4% abstained.165 The Merger closed
on March 3, 2016.166 The next day, Aquila signed a new
employment agreement with Solera.167
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On March 7 and March 10, 2016, petitioners filed their
petitions for appraisal. The court consolidated the petitions on
March 30, 2016. A five-day trial was held in June 2017, and
post-trial argument was held on December 4, 2017.
At the conclusion of the post-trial argument, the court asked
the parties to confer to see if they could agree on an expert
the court might appoint to opine on a significant issue of
disagreement concerning the methods the parties' experts
used to determine the terminal period investment rate in
their discounted cash flow analyses. On December 19, 2017,
the parties advised the court that they were unable to reach
agreement on a suggested expert and each submitted two
candidates for the court's consideration.
On February 22, 2018, Solera filed a motion requesting
the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs to address
the implications of certain appraisal decisions issued after
the post-trial argument. The court granted this motion on
February 26, 2018, noting in its order that it had “made
no decision about whether to proceed with an independent
expert” and would “revisit the issue after reviewing the
supplemental submissions.”168 Supplemental briefing was
completed on April 6, 2018.169
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Petitioners request appraisal of their shares of Solera under
8 Del. C. § 262. “An action seeking appraisal is intended
to provide shareholders who dissent from a merger, on
the basis of the inadequacy of the offering price, with a
judicial determination of the fair value of their shares.”170
Respondent has not disputed petitioners' eligibility for an
appraisal of their shares.
*12  In an appraisal action, the court has a statutory mandate
to:
[D]etermine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.171
Appraisal excludes any value resulting from the merger,
including synergies that may arise,172 because “[t]he basic
concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been
taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern.”173 In valuing a company as a “going concern” at
the time of a merger, the court must take into consideration the
“operative reality”174 of the company, viewing the company
as “occupying a particular market position in the light of
future prospects.”175 A dissenting stockholder is then entitled
to his proportionate interest in the going concern.176
In using “all relevant factors” to determine fair value, the
court has significant discretion to use the valuation methods it
deems appropriate, including the parties' proposed valuation
frameworks, or one of the court's own fashioning.177 This
court has relied on a number of different approaches to
determine fair value, including comparable company and
precedent transaction analyses, a discounted cash flow model,
and the merger price.178 “This Court may not adopt at the
outset an ‘either-or’ approach, thereby accepting uncritically
the valuation of one party, as it is the Court's duty to determine
the core issue of fair value on the appraisal date.”179 “In an
appraisal proceeding, the burden to establish fair value by a
preponderance of the evidence rests on both the petitioner and
the respondent.”180
B. DFC, Dell, and Recent Court of Chancery Appraisal
Decisions
*13  Over the past year, the Delaware Supreme Court has
issued two decisions providing important guidance for the
Court of Chancery in appraisal proceedings: DFC Global
Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.181 and Dell,
Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.182
Given their importance, a brief discussion of each case is
appropriate at the outset.
In DFC, petitioners sought appraisal of shares they held
in a publicly traded payday lending firm, DFC, that was
purchased by a private equity firm.183 This court attempted to
determine the fair value of DFC's shares by equally weighting
three measures of value: a discounted cash flow model, a
comparable company analysis, and the transaction price.184
The court gave equal weight to these three measures of value
because it found that each similarly suffered from limitations
arising from the tumultuous regulatory environment that was
swirling around DFC during the period leading up to its
sale.185 The court's analysis resulted in a fair value of DFC at
approximately 8% above the transaction price.186
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the
trial court.187 Based on its own review of the trial record, the
Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery's decision to
afford only one-third weight to the transaction price was “not
rationally supported by the record,”188 explaining:
Although there is no presumption in favor of the deal
price ... economic principles suggest that the best evidence
of fair value was the deal price, as it resulted from an open
process, informed by robust public information, and easy
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many
parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to
bid.189
The Supreme Court further explained that the purpose of
appraisal “is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value,” but rather “to make sure that they
receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it
reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would
fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction.”190
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*14  According to the Supreme Court, “[m]arket prices
are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques
because, unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow
model, the market price should distill the collective judgment
of the many based on all the publicly available information
about a given company and the value of its shares.”191
The “collective judgment of the many” may include that
of “equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts, [and] debt
providers.”192 The Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]his, of
course, is not to say that the market price is always right,
but that one should have little confidence she can be the
special one able to outwit the larger universe of equally avid
capitalists with an incentive to reap rewards by buying the
asset if it is too cheaply priced.”193
Several months after deciding DFC, the Supreme Court
reiterated the same appraisal thesis in Dell, where the
trial court had reached a determination of fair value at
approximately 28% above the transaction price.194 In Dell,
the Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery erred
by relying completely on a discounted cash flow analysis
and affording zero weight to market data, i.e., the stock price
and the deal price, because “the evidence suggests that the
market for Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore,
likely a possible proxy for fair value.”195 With respect to the
company's stock price, the Supreme Court explained:
Dell's stock traded on the NASDAQ under the ticker
symbol DELL. The Company's market capitalization of
more than $20 billion ranked it in the top third of the S &
P 500. Dell had a deep public float and was actively traded
as more than 5% of Dell's shares were traded each week.
The stock had a bid-ask spread of approximately 0.08%.
It was also widely covered by equity analysts, and its
share price quickly reflected the market's view on breaking
developments.196
The Supreme Court thus held that “the record does not
adequately support the Court of Chancery's conclusion that
the market for Dell's stock was inefficient and that a valuation
gap in the Company's market trading price existed in advance
of the lengthy market check, an error that contributed to the
trial court's decision to disregard the deal price.”197
With respect to the deal price, the Supreme Court said that
“it is clear that Dell's sale process bore many of the same
objective indicia of reliability” as the one in DFC, which
“included that ‘every logical buyer’ was canvassed, and all
but the buyer refused to pursue the company when given
the opportunity; concerns about the company's long-term
viability (and its long-term debt's placement on negative
credit watch) prevented lenders from extending debt; and
the company repeatedly underperformed its projections.”198
Given leaks in the press that Dell was exploring a sale,
moreover, the world was put on notice of the possibility
of a transaction so that “any interested parties would have
approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about
pursuing a deal.”199
Dell's bankers canvassed the interest of 67 parties, including
20 possible strategic acquirers during the go-shop, and the
go-shop's overall design was relatively open and flexible.200
The special committee had the power to say “no,” and it
convinced the eventual buyer to raise its bid six times.201
The Supreme Court thus found that “[n]othing in the record
suggests that increased competition would have produced a
better result. [The financial advisor] also reasoned that any
other financial sponsor would have bid in the same ballpark
as [the buyer].”202 Significantly, the Court did not view a
dearth of strategic buyer interest as negatively impacting the
reliability of the deal price, explaining:
*15  Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer
is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers
in the market would pay. The Court of Chancery ignored
an important reality: if a company is one that no strategic
buyer is interested in buying, it does not suggest a higher
value, but a lower one.203
In sum, the Supreme Court held that “[o]verall, the weight
of evidence shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not
overriding, probative value.”204 It summarized its decision as
follows:
In so holding, we are not saying that the market is
always the best indicator of value, or that it should always
be granted some weight. We only note that, when the
evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to
entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the chance for any
topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell's own votes
is so compelling, then failure to give the resulting price
heavy weight because the trial judge believes there was
mispricing missed by all the Dell stockholders, analysts,
and potential buyers abuses even the wide discretion
afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult cases.205
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Shortly after Dell was decided, the Court of Chancery
rendered appraisal decisions in Verition Partners Master
Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.206 and In re Appraisal of
AOL Inc.207
In Aruba, the court observed that the Supreme Court's
decisions in DFC and Dell “endorse using the deal price
in a third-party, arm's-length transaction as evidence of fair
value” and “caution against relying on discounted cash flow
analyses prepared by adversarial experts when reliable market
indicators are available.”208 The court further observed that
DFC and Dell “recognize that a deal price may include
synergies, and they endorse deriving an indication of fair
value by deducting synergies from the deal price.”209 Rather
than hold that the deal price less synergies represented fair
value, however, the Aruba court determined that fair value
was “the unaffected market price” of petitioners' shares,
which was more than 30% below the transaction price.210
The court identified “two major shortcomings” of its “deal-
price-less-synergies figure” that supported this conclusion
and explained its rationale for using the “unaffected market
price” as follows:
First, my deal-price-less-synergies figure is likely tainted
by human error. Estimating synergies requires exercises of
human judgment analogous to those involved in crafting
a discounted cash flow valuation. The Delaware Supreme
Court's preference for market indications over discounted
cash flow valuations counsels in favor of preferring market
indications over the similarly judgment-laden exercise of
backing out synergies.
Second, my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to
incorporate an element of value derived from the merger
itself: the value that the acquirer creates by reducing agency
costs. A buyer's willingness to pay a premium over the
market price of a widely held firm reflects not only the
value of anticipated synergies but also the value created by
reducing agency costs. The petitioners are not entitled to
share in either element of value, because both arise from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger. The synergy
deduction compensates for the one element of value arising
from the merger, but a further downward adjustment would
be necessary to address the other.
*16  Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware law has
embraced a traditional formulation of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price provides
a direct route to the same endpoint, at least for a company
that is widely traded and lacks a controlling stockholder.
Adjusting down from the deal price reaches, indirectly, the
result that the market price already provides.211
In AOL, the court similarly construed DFC and Dell to
mean that where “transaction price represents an unhindered,
informed, and competitive market valuation, the trial judge
must give particular and serious consideration to transaction
price as evidence of fair value” and that where “a transaction
price is used to determine fair value, synergies transferred to
the sellers must be deducted.”212 In doing so, the court coined
the phrase “Dell Compliant” to mean a transaction “where
(i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential
bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii)
without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself.”213 The court found that the sales process did not
satisfy this standard and ultimately determined the fair value
of petitioners' shares based on its own discounted cash flow
analysis ($48.70 per share), which was about 2.6% less than
the deal price ($50 per share).214
C. The Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that the fair value of their shares is $84.65
per share—approximately 51.6% over the deal price. Their
sole support for this valuation is a discounted cash flow
model prepared by their expert, Bradford Cornell, Visiting
Professor of Financial Economics at the California Institute
of Technology.215 Cornell also performed a multiples-based
comparable company analysis “as a reasonableness check”
but gave it no weight in his valuation.216
Respondent's expert was Glenn Hubbard, the Dean and
Russell L. Carson Professor in Finance and Economics at
the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University,
as well as Professor of Economics at Columbia University.
He concluded that the “best evidence of Solera's value is
the market-generated Merger price [$55.85], adjusted for
synergies [$1.90] to $53.95.”217 Hubbard also conducted
a valuation based on a discounted cash flow model,
which resulted in a valuation of $53.15 per share,
but found the methodology to be less reliable in this
instance.218 Hubbard further considered, as a “check,”
Solera's historical valuation multiples, analysts' stock price
targets, and valuation multiples from comparable companies
and precedent transactions.219
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This sharp divide of $31.50 per share between the experts'
DCF models is the result of a number of disagreements
regarding the proper inputs and methods to use in the analysis.
The most significant disagreements are explained later.
*17  Throughout trial and post-trial briefing, respondent
consistently maintained that the best evidence of Solera's
value at the time of the Merger was the deal price minus
synergies. Seizing on the Aruba decision, respondent changed
course during supplemental briefing, arguing that “[i]n light
of recent cases, the best evidence of Solera's fair value is its
unaffected stock price of $36.39 per share.”220
D. Determination of Solera's Fair Value
I now turn to my own independent determination of the fair
value of Solera's shares with the guidance from DFC and
Dell in mind. Those decisions teach that deal price is “the
best evidence of fair value”221 when there was an “open
process,”222 meaning that the process is characterized by
“objective indicia of reliability.”223 Such “indicia” include
but, consistent with the mandate of the appraisal statute to
consider “all relevant factors,”224 are not limited to:
• “[R]obust public information,”225 comprised of the
stock price of a company with “a deep base of public
shareholders, and highly active trading,”226 and the
views of “equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts,
debt providers and others.”227
• “[E]asy access to deeper, non-public information,”228
where there is no discrimination between potential
buyers and cooperation from management helps
address any information asymmetries between potential
buyers.229
• “[M]any parties with an incentive to make a profit
had a chance to bid,”230 meaning that there was a
“robust market check”231 with “outreach to all logical
buyers”232 and a go-shop characterized by “low barriers
to entry”233 such that there is a realistic possibility of a
topping bid.
• A special committee, “composed of independent,
experienced directors and armed with that power to say
‘no,’ ”234 which is advised by competent legal and
financial advisors.
• “[N]o conflicts related to the transaction,”235 with the
company purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale236 and “no hint of self-interest.”237
If the process was open, then “the deal price deserve[s] heavy,
if not dispositive, weight.”238 This is not to say that the market
is always correct: “In some cases, it may be that a single
valuation metric is the most reliable evidence of fair value
and that giving weight to another factor will do nothing but
distort that best estimate. In other cases, it may be necessary
to consider two or more factors.”239 Whichever route it takes,
however, the Court of Chancery is required to “justify its
methodology (or methodologies) according to the facts of the
case and relevant, accepted financial principles.”240
1. The Deal Price Less Synergies Deserves Dispositive
Weight
*18  For the reasons explained below, I find that the Merger
was the product of an open process that, although not perfect,
has the requisite objective indicia of reliability emphasized
in DFC and Dell. Thus, I conclude that the deal price, minus
synergies, is the best evidence of fair value and deserves
dispositive weight in this case. My consideration of the
evidence supporting this conclusion follows in three parts
focusing on (i) the opportunity many potential buyers had to
bid, (ii) the Special Committee's role in actively negotiating
an arm's-length transaction, and (iii) the evidence that the
market for Solera's stock was efficient and well-functioning.
a. Many Heterogeneous Potential Buyers Had a
Meaningful Opportunity to Bid
Appraisal decisions have placed weight on the deal
price when the process “involved a reasonable number
of participants and created credible competition” among
bidders.241 Here, Solera reached out to nine large private
equity funds in May and June 2015 during the “test the
waters” period.242 Then, after Thoma Bravo submitted an
indication of interest on July 19, 2015,243 the Special
Committee engaged with 18 potential bidders, 11 financial
and 7 strategic firms.244 As Hubbard testified, a “broad range
of sophisticated buyers,” both financial and strategic, had the
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chance to bid for Solera.245 Petitioners' own expert offered no
opinion “that more bidders should have been contacted.”246
Not only were the 18 potential bidders directly contacted and
aware that Solera could be acquired at the right price, but “the
whole universe of potential bidders was put on notice,”247
with increasing specificity over time, that the Company
was considering strategic alternatives.248 Aquila publicly
presaged the sales process during the Company's earnings call
on the May 6, 2015,249 and the Company confirmed it had
formed a Special Committee and was contemplating a sale on
August 20, 2015,250 the day after Bloomberg reported that
Solera was “exploring a sale that has attracted interest from
private equity firms.”251
The press revealed not only the identities of potential buyers,
but also the approximate amounts of their bids. On August
20, 2015, for example, the Financial Times reported that
Vista was “considering a bid of $63 per share,” with Thoma
Bravo and Pamplona “considering separate bids for $62 per
share.”252 On September 9, 2015, Bloomberg reported that
Solera had received bids from Vista and Thoma Bravo, and
that the Company was “nearing a deal to sell itself for about
$53 a share.”253 Two days later, Reuters wrote that Vista and
Thoma Bravo “had made offers that failed to meet Solera's
valuation expectations,” and that the Company was “trying
to sell itself to another company”—IHS—“rather than an
investment firm.”254 The visible threat of other buyers made
the sales process more competitive.255 Given these public
disclosures, any potential bidder knew in essentially real time
that Solera was exploring a sale and the approximate price
levels of the offers.256 Yet no one else ever seriously showed
up to make a topping bid.
*19  Petitioners point out that Advent and Providence were
excluded from the sales process, but whether either would
have bid competitively is unknown. Notably, when Advent
and Providence expressed interest to Solera's bankers, neither
provided any indication as to their ability to pay or their
sources of financing; rather, their introductory emails were
perfunctory, suggesting to me that they were just “kicking
the tires.”257 There also is no evidence that either of them
followed up to express any further interest in Solera, either
before or during the go-shop period.258
The fact that only one potential strategic bidder—IHS—made
a bid does not undermine the reliability of the sales process
as a price discovery tool. That six potential strategic acquirers
declined to explore a transaction involving Solera shows that
six sophisticated, profit-motivated actors were offered the
opportunity to participate in a sales process to acquire the
Company, yet none was interested enough to even sign a non-
disclosure agreement.259 As noted above, our Supreme Court
forcefully made this point in Dell:
The Court of Chancery stressed its view that the lack of
competition from a strategic buyer lowered the relevance
of the deal price. But its assessment that more bidders—
both strategic and financial—should have been involved
assumes there was some party interested in proceeding.
Nothing in the record indicates that was the case. Fair value
entails at a minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—
not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would
pay. The Court of Chancery ignored an important reality:
if a company is one that no strategic buyer is interested
in buying, it does not suggest a higher value, but a lower
one.260
The record shows, furthermore, that the mere presence in the
sales process of IHS, as a strategic bidder that was one of
Solera's key competitors, incentivized the financial sponsors
to put forth more competitive bids.261
The record also reflects that the Company provided all
seriously interested bidders access to deeper, non-public
information after they signed non-disclosure agreements.
Although the Special Committee initially excluded IHS from
the process due to competitive concerns and doubts about
its ability to finance a deal,262 once news of the sales
process leaked out, the Special Committee worked promptly
to accommodate IHS. After IHS contacted Centerview on
August 21, 2015 to express interest,263 representatives of
Solera and IHS held a management meeting by August 26,264
and Solera provided IHS with the Hybrid Case Projections
by August 27.265 And, after IHS's CEO failed to attend
the management meeting on August 26, Aquila traveled
separately to meet him.266 IHS ultimately declined to make a
topping bid during the go-shop period, but it was not for lack
of access to information. Solera gave IHS nearly full access to
the approximately 12,000-document data room,267 and IHS
specifically commented that it “was appreciative of ... the
fact that [Solera] had provided equal access to information in
order for IHS to consider a bid.”268
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*20  Finally, I am not persuaded by petitioners' argument
that “[t]he sale of Solera took place against the backdrop
of extraordinary market volatility,” such that it “was not
the product of a well-functioning market.”269 According to
petitioners, the court should not rely on the Merger price
as evidence of fair value because there was macroeconomic
volatility, “evidenced by the VIX spiking to an [sic] historic
high [on August 24, 2015] and sharp declines in global equity
markets,”270 which constrained potential bidders' ability to
finance and willingness to enter a deal.271 In support of this
theory, petitioners called Dr. Elaine Buckberg as an expert on
market volatility.272
Buckberg testified that “investors are less willing to proceed
with investments in the face of substantial uncertainty and
volatility,” and that when investors “do decide to proceed
with an investment in the face of such uncertainty, they
would expect to be compensated for the additional risk with
a lower price.”273 In that vein, Yarbrough, the Chairman of
the Special Committee, candidly acknowledged that market
volatility impacted “the financing side, [it] was making it
more difficult on the debt financing side, and I think it also
trickled over into the equity piece, too.”274
As an initial factual matter, it is questionable whether the
level of market volatility during the sales process was as
extraordinary as petitioners suggest. On August 24, 2015,
the VIX closed at 40.74.275 Although petitioners describe
this as the VIX's “highest point since January 2009” and
“a level exceeded only six times in the VIX's twenty-seven
year history,”276 that assertion appears to be an exaggeration.
As Hubbard testified, the August 24 closing VIX has been
exceeded on 157 days in the VIX's history.277 The August 24
spike also was relatively short-lived. By August 28, just four
days after closing at 40.74, the VIX had fallen back to “about
26,” and had fallen further by September 11, the last trading
day before the Special Committee accepted Vista's $55.85
bid.278 Including the spike on August 24, the “average VIX
was 19.4 in August 2015 and 24.4 in September, as compared
to an average of 19.7 since 1990.”279
Even accepting that market volatility impacted the sales
process by increasing financing costs and decreasing the
price that financial sponsors were willing to pay, petitioners'
argument is unavailing in my opinion for two reasons. First,
Buckberg made no attempt to quantify the impact of volatility
on the Merger price.280 Second, and more importantly,
petitioners' position ignores that they are only entitled to the
fair value of Solera's stock at the time of the Merger, not to the
best price theoretically attainable had market conditions been
the most seller-friendly.281 As the Supreme Court pointedly
explained in DFC:
Capitalism is rough and ready, and the purpose of an
appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value that might have been procured
had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather,
it is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for
their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in
an arm's-length transaction.282
*21  The record demonstrates that the Merger price “resulted
from an open process, informed by robust public information,
and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which
many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.”283 Thus, consistent with our high court's recent
teachings, economic principles suggest that the Merger price
is what petitioners “deserve to receive” for their shares.
b. A Fully-Empowered Special Committee Actively
Negotiated the Merger
Reliance on the deal price as evidence of fair value is
strengthened when independent representatives of a target
company actively negotiate with potential buyers and
demonstrate a real willingness to reject inadequate bids.284
Here, the record indicates that Solera's Special Committee
was both competent and effective.
On July 20, 2015, the day after receiving an indication
of interest from Thoma Bravo, the Board delegated to the
Special Committee the “full power and authority of the
Board” to review, evaluate, negotiate, recommend, or reject
any proposed transaction or strategic alternative.285 The
authorizing resolution further provided that Solera could not
do a deal without the Special Committee's approval.286 All
three directors on the Special Committee were independent
and experienced.287 Yarbrough, the Chairman of the Special
Committee, testified knowledgeably and forthrightly at trial
about the process undertaken by the Special Committee,
which was aided by reputable legal and financial advisors.288
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Petitioners tellingly make no effort to impugn the motives of
any of the members of the Special Committee.
The record also demonstrates that the Special Committee
actively engaged with the bidders, did not favor any one
in particular, and expressed a willingness to walk away
from bids that it did not find satisfactory. The Special
Committee twice rejected bids that it considered inadequate
—Vista's bid at $53 per share289 and Thoma Bravo's bid
at $54 per share290—each time without the safety net of
another offer.291 The Special Committee's initial decision
to defer inviting IHS into the sales process was reasonable,
given its concerns about protecting Solera's competitively
sensitive information and about IHS's ability to finance a
transaction.292 In any event, that decision became academic
after news of the sales process leaked in the press, at which
point the Company promptly engaged with IHS for over
two weeks before signing a deal with Vista. Critically, as
a condition of that deal, the Special Committee extracted
the right to conduct a go-shop and for a reduced 1%
termination fee for IHS (as opposed to 3% for other bidders)
to facilitate continued discussions with IHS.293 And, for
reasons explained below, the negotiations with all bidders
were not skewed by an artificially low stock price, since the
market for Solera's stock before the Merger appears to have
been efficient.294
*22  Finally, the evidence shows that the Special Committee
made a thoughtful, reasoned decision to accept Vista's “last
and final” offer at $55.85 after countering with $56 and
being rejected.295 Before the Special Committee did so,
Centerview counseled the Special Committee that “[i]t is
uncertain whether extending the process will result in higher
and fully financed offers, or will lead to further deterioration
in Vista's bid” and that the “Vista bid can act as a pricing floor
while IHS is given a further opportunity to bid at a reduced
termination fee pursuant to the go-shop negotiated by the
Committee.”296 As Yarbrough testified, with that advice in
mind, the Special Committee unanimously decided to accept
Vista's offer after comparing it to the Company's stand-alone
prospects:
We then asked for Centerview to go through a presentation
analysis of [Vista's bid], with the preliminary steps to
their fairness opinion. And then we ultimately had a vote
on it, discussed stand-alone, decided that we preferred
the 55.85 and moving forward with an all-cash, riskless
deal. And so we had a unanimous vote on the special
committee, and then we had a board meeting shortly
thereafter where Centerview again presented to the board.
We made our recommendation to the board and then the
board unanimously accepted the recommendation.297
In response to this evidence, petitioners advance essentially
two arguments challenging the integrity and quality of the
sales process. I address each in turn.
Petitioners' primary challenge is that Aquila's conflicts of
interest tainted the sales process through meetings he (with
Baron's assistance) held with private equity firms before,
and on one notable occasion after, the Special Committee
was formed. Although Solera's Board could have done a
better job of monitoring Aquila and his interactions with
potential buyers, particularly after the Special Committee was
in place, those interactions did not compromise the integrity
or effectiveness of the sales process in my opinion.
The reality is that Aquila's participation in a transaction was a
prerequisite for a financial sponsor to do a deal. As petitioners
put it, “Aquila is Solera.”298 Consistent with that reality, all
of the private equity firms that later submitted bids made
clear that those bids depended on Aquila continuing to lead
the Company.299 In other words, a go-private transaction
never would have been a possibility without buyers becoming
personally acquainted and comfortable with Aquila. Thus,
Aquila engaging in one-on-one conversations with private
equity firms before the Special Committee was formed had
the utility of gauging interest in the Company to see if
undertaking a formal sales process made sense. Critically,
there is no indication in the record that any of those contacts
predetermined or undermined the process when the Special
Committee took charge.
That said, once the Company had received an indication
of interest and put the Special Committee in place, the
Special Committee should have monitored Aquila's contacts
with potential bidders more carefully. Petitioners justifiably
criticize Aquila's private two-hour meeting with Vista in
August, shortly after which Vista began to model a larger
option pool for post-Merger Solera executives.300 Although
Aquila and Sowul (a principal at Vista) both testified that
compensation was not discussed during that meeting or at any
time before the deal with Vista was signed301—and there is no
direct evidence that it was—the timing is certainly suspicious
and casts doubt on whether Aquila abided by the “Rules of
the Road” advice the Special Committee's counsel provided,
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i.e., to refrain from discussing post-Merger employment and
compensation during the sales process.302 If best practices
had been followed, a representative of the Special Committee
would have accompanied Aquila to the August meeting with
Vista as a precaution.303
*23  Even if it is assumed that compensation discussions
did occur during this meeting, nothing in the record indicates
that any of Aquila's (or Baron's) actions before or during
the sales process compromised or undermined the Special
Committee's ability to negotiate a deal.304 The record is
devoid of any evidence, for example, that Aquila participated
in price discussions with any of the bidders or influenced the
outcome of a competitive sales process. Indeed, petitioners do
not contend that Aquila ever discussed price with the Special
Committee or any bidder, nor do they contend that he played
any role in the deliberations or decision-making process of
the Special Committee more generally.
Further, the record does not show that structural issues
inhibited the effectiveness of the go-shop.305 To the contrary,
IHS indicated that it appreciated that the Company was
transparent and facilitated its diligence. There also was a
lower termination fee if IHS submitted a topping bid. In short,
IHS had a realistic pathway to success,306 but it ultimately
decided not to submit a topping bid.
As a secondary matter, petitioners advance a one-paragraph
argument that the Merger was a de facto MBO (management
buyout) because the Special Committee “knew” that if Solera
was to be sold, it was going to be sold to a private equity
firm, and all the private equity firms made clear that they
“only wanted Solera if Aquila was part of the deal.”307
Petitioners thus contend that the Merger warrants “heightened
scrutiny.”308 This argument fails for essentially two reasons.
First, contrary to petitioners' characterization of the
transaction, the Merger did not have the requisite
characteristics of an MBO. Petitioners' own expert (Cornell)
agreed that the common definition of an MBO is a transaction
“where, when it was negotiated, senior management was
a participant in the transaction as an acquirer,” but then
conceded that the Merger was not an MBO because “it
was not a joint purchase between management and another
party.”309 During the sales process, Aquila did not have an
agreement with Vista or any other bidder to participate as
a buyer in a particular transaction.310 To the contrary, he
expressed a willingness to invest $15 million in a transaction
with any of the potential buyers, not just Vista.311 Further,
Aquila was a not an “acquirer” in the Merger312 because,
before the transaction, Aquila's holdings at the $55.85 per
share were worth approximately $55 million,313 and after
the Merger, Aquila invested $45 million into the post-Merger
company.314 In short, as Cornell admitted, the Merger was
not even “similar to an MBO.”315
*24  Second, petitioners contend that MBOs should be
subject to “heightened scrutiny” but fail to explain why. As
the Supreme Court stated in Dell, even though there may be
“theoretical characteristics” of an MBO that could “detract[ ]
from the reliability of the deal price,”316 the deal price that
results from an MBO is not inherently suspect or unreliable
per se.317 Here, to repeat, the Special Committee had the
full authority to control the sales process, and exercised
that authority by deciding which bidders to contact, how
to respond to bids, and ultimately whether to approve the
Merger.
c. The Equity and Debt Markets Corroborate that the Best
Evidence of Solera's Fair Value was the Merger Price
In DFC, the Supreme Court endorsed the economic
proposition that the “price at which [a company's] shares
trade is informative of fair value” in an appraisal action when
“the company had no conflicts related to the transaction,
a deep base of public shareholders, and highly active
trading,” because “that value reflects the judgments of
many stockholders about the company's future prospects,
based on public filings, industry information, and research
conducted by equity analysts.”318 The Court in Dell reiterated
the same point, explaining that in an efficient market “a
mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available
information about a company, and in trading the company's
stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted,
consensus valuation of the company.”319 My inference from
DFC and Dell is that the Supreme Court has emphasized this
point because the price of a widely dispersed stock traded
in an efficient market may provide an informative lower
bound in negotiations between parties in a potential sale of
control.320
Here, the record supports the conclusion that the market for
Solera's stock was efficient and well-functioning, since: (i)
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Solera's market capitalization of about $3.5 billion placed it
in the middle of firms in the S & P MidCap 400 index;321
(ii) the stock was actively traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, as indicated by weekly trading volume of 4%
of shares outstanding;322 (iii) the stock had a relative bid-
ask spread of approximately 0.06%, in line with a number
of S & P MidCap 400 and S & P 500 companies;323 (iv)
the Company's short interest ratio indicated that, on average,
investors who had sold the stock short would be able to cover
their positions in about two days, which was faster than about
three-quarters of S & P 400 MidCap companies and about
half of S & P 500 companies;324 (v) at least eleven equity
analysts covered Solera during the year before the Merger;325
and (vi) Solera's stock price moved sharply as rumor of the
sales process leaked into the market.326
*25  The proxy statement for the Merger identified August
3, 2015 as the unaffected date for purposes of calculating a
premium.327 As of that date, a well-informed, liquid trading
market determined, before news of a potential transaction
leaked into the market, that the Company's stock was worth
$36.39.328 Significantly, research analysts' price targets had
been declining in the months before news of a potential
transaction, and these targets remained below the deal price
through announcement of the Merger.329 As Hubbard put it,
the takeaway from these two objective indications of value
is that “market participants playing with real money, looking
at the information that they have, don't think that the stock is
worth $55.85 during that period.”330
Despite these market realities, petitioners contend that Solera
was worth $84.65 per share—more than double its unaffected
stock price of $36.39 per share as of August 3.331 Although
one would expect a control block to trade at a higher price than
a minority block,332 petitioners are unable to explain such a
gaping disconnect between Solera's unaffected market price
and the Merger price.
Petitioners argue that the pre-Merger stock price was
artificially low because the market for Solera was not
efficient due to asymmetric information. More specifically,
petitioners contend that Solera was “poised to ‘harvest
returns’ ”333 from acquisitions it made between 2012
and 2015, but management struggled to disclose sufficient
information, due to competitive concerns, to allow the market
to value the Company properly.334 This argument ignores
evidence that many equity investors and analysts actually did
understand Solera's long-term plans, with some approving
of management's strategy but others not buying the story.335
Consider the following varied perspectives that analysts (and
one of the petitioners) expressed within just a few months
before news of the sales process leaked to the press:
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference
for footnotes336,337,338,339,340,341,342]
*26  These reviews suggest that there was disagreement in
the financial community over Solera's strategy, not that the
market as a whole did not understand it. Given the many
factors indicating that the market for the Company's stock was
efficient, the market presumably would have digested all of
these sentiments and incorporated them into Solera's stock
price. Yet Solera's pre-Merger unaffected stock price as of
August 3 was still only $36.39.
The debt market further corroborates that, given its operative
reality, Solera was not as valuable as petitioners contend.
Petitioners do not dispute that the debt market had run dry
for Solera as a public company as of the Merger. With its
leverage already rising, the Company made an acquisition in
November 2014, financing the deal with a $400 million notes
offering.343 Moody's promptly downgraded the Company's
credit rating from Ba2 to Ba3.344 In July 2015, after Solera
issued $850 million of senior unsecured notes to finance
another acquisition and retire outstanding debt, Moody's
downgraded Solera again, from Ba3 to B1.345 Further
exemplifying Solera's challenges in taking on additional debt
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to finance acquisitions, the July 2015 debt offering fell short,
and Goldman Sachs had to absorb $11.5 million of notes that
it was unable to syndicate into the market.346
By July 2015, “despite the lucrative fees that investment
bankers make from refinancing a large tranche of public
company debt and syndicating a new issue,”347 Solera had
run “out of runway” in the debt market.348 “In other words,
participants in the public bond markets weren't convinced
they would get their money back if they gave it to [Solera],
and [Solera] was not offering enough interest to compensate
investors for the risk they saw in the company.”349 Petitioners'
own expert admitted that the acquisition debt market for
Solera was tight at equity values greater than the Merger
price.350 In short, the debt market, like many equity market
participants, viewed Solera skeptically and perceived its
growth-by-acquisition strategy as laden with risk.351
*27  * * * * *
To summarize, the Merger was the product of a two-month
outreach to large private equity firms in May and June, a
six-week auction by an independent Special Committee that
solicited eleven private equity and seven strategic firms, and
public announcements that put a “For Sale” sign on the
Company. The Special Committee had competent advisors
and the power to say no to an underpriced bid, which it did
twice. The Merger price of $55.85 proved to be a market-
clearing price through a 28-day go-shop and a three-month
window-shop. No one was willing to pay more. Thus, as this
court once put it, the “logical explanation ... is self-evident”:
Solera “was not worth more” than $55.85 per share.352
2. Merger Fees Should not be Added to the Deal Price
Petitioners argue that, “if deal price is an indicator of fair
value,” the court should add nearly $450 million—or $6.51
per share—to the Merger price. According to petitioners, this
is the amount of transaction costs Vista incurred in connection
with the Merger for buyer fees and expenses, seller fees,
debt fees, and an “early participation premium” to retire
debt in connection with the transaction.353 Petitioners offer
no precedent or other legal support for this request. They
simply contend that these costs should be added because the
court's “focus should be on what Vista was actually willing to
spend to buy the Company.”354 This argument fails for two
independent reasons.
First, petitioners' argument cannot be squared with the
definition of “fair value” in the appraisal context that our
Supreme Court recently articulated in DFC when explaining
the purpose of appraisal:
[F]air value is just that, “fair.” It does not mean the
highest possible price that a company might have sold
for had Warren Buffet negotiated for it on his best day
and the Lenape who sold Manhattan on their worst. ...
[T]he purpose of appraisal is not to make sure that the
petitioners get the highest conceivable value that might
have been procured had every domino fallen out of the
company's way; rather, it is to make sure that they receive
fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it
reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would
fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction.355
The Merger price was the result of arm's-length bargaining
between the Special Committee and Vista. Perhaps Vista
would have been willing to pay more than $55.85 for the
Company, but that is irrelevant to the court's independent
determination of fair value as that term was explained in
DFC.356
*28  Second, policy concerns counsel against adding
transaction fees to the deal price in determining Solera's
fair value. If stockholders received payment for transaction
fees in appraisal proceedings, then it would compel rational
stockholders in even the most pristine deal processes to seek
appraisal to capture their share of the transaction costs (plus
interest) that otherwise would be unavailable to them in
any non-litigated arm's-length merger. This incentive would
undermine the underlying purpose of appraisal proceedings
as explained in DFC.
3. Deduction for Merger Synergies
The appraisal statute provides that “the Court shall determine
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger.”357 Thus, the “appraisal award excludes synergies in
accordance with the mandate of Delaware jurisprudence that
the subject company in an appraisal proceeding be valued as
a going concern.”358
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Synergies do not only arise in the strategic-buyer context.
It is recognized that synergies may exist when a financial
sponsor is an acquirer.359 As of trial, Vista owned 40 software
businesses, three of which (EagleView, Omnitracs, and
DealerSocket) Vista believed had significant “touch points”
with Solera from which synergies could be realized.360
Vista modeled out four different categories of synergies in
its financial analysis of the Company during the bidding
process.361 Respondent's expert presented evidence at trial
concerning three of those categories: portfolio company
revenue synergies, private company cost savings, and the tax
benefits of incremental leverage.362 In total, he calculated
total expected synergies of $6.12 per share.363 From there,
respondent's expert made a “conservative” estimate that 31%
of the value of the synergies—equating to $1.90 per share
—remained with the seller by using the lowest percentage
identified in one of three empirical studies.364
I find this evidence, which petitioners made no effort to rebut,
convincing.365 Deducting $1.90 from the Merger price of
$55.85 leads to a value of $53.95 per share. For all the reasons
discussed above, and based on my lack of confidence in the
DCF models advanced by the parties (as discussed next),
I conclude that this amount ($53.95 per share) is the best
evidence of the fair value of petitioners' shares of Solera at
the time of the Merger.
4. The Dueling Discounted Cash Flow Models
*29  Consistent with the court's duty to consider “all relevant
factors” in determining Solera's fair value,366 I consider next
the DCF models the parties' experts prepared. Compared with
a market-generated transaction price, “the use of alternative
valuation techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily a
second-best method to derive value.”367
In this action, both parties' experts created “three-stage” DCF
models consisting of (i) the five-year Hybrid Case Projections
(fiscal years 2016 through 2020), (ii) a five-year transition
period (fiscal years 2021 through 2025), and (iii) a terminal
period beginning in fiscal year 2026.368 The outcome of
these models nonetheless resulted in widely divergent DCF
valuations—$84.65 per share for petitioners, and $53.15 per
share for respondent.
As a preliminary matter, I find comfort that respondent's DCF
analysis is in the same ballpark as the deal price less estimated
synergies.369 On the other side of the ledger, given my
conclusions about the quality of the sales process for Solera,
petitioners' DCF analysis strikes me as facially unbelievable
as it suggests that, in a transaction with an equity value of
approximately $3.85 billion at the deal price,370 potential
buyers left almost $2 billion on the table by not outbidding
Vista. Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that a DCF that
results in a valuation so substantially below the transaction
price may indeed lack “credibility on its face.”371
*30  “Delaware courts must remain mindful that ‘the DCF
method is [ ] subject to manipulation and guesswork [and
that] the valuation results that it generates in the setting of
a litigation [can be] volatile.”372 “[E]ven slight differences
in [a DCF's] inputs can produce large valuation gaps.”373
A number of factors explain the gaping difference between
petitioners' and respondent's DCF analyses, and, notably,
many of these disagreements relate to how to value Solera
into perpetuity. Such assumptions about Solera's business in
the terminal period, i.e., ten-plus years into the future, are
unavoidably tinged with a heavy dose of speculation.
I highlight below some of the major areas of disagreement
between the parties. This discussion is meant to be illustrative
and not exhaustive. All of these disagreements predictably
result in a higher asserted valuation by petitioners and a lower
asserted valuation by respondent.
The most significant point of contention in the DCF models
concerns the estimated amount of cash that Solera would
need to reinvest over the terminal period.374 This “plowback”
rate is the percentage of after-tax operating profits that the
Company would need to invest to grow at a specified rate into
perpetuity.375 Using the method identified in “many leading
valuation texts including Damodaran (2012) and Koller,
Goedhart and Wessels (2015),” which petitioners' expert has
called the “traditional model,”376 respondent argues that
the required reinvestment rate is 37.1%.377 Petitioners, on
the other hand, argue that the inflation plowback formula
published in articles written by Bradley and Jarrell should
be used, resulting in a required reinvestment rate of only
16.4%.378 According to petitioners, holding all else constant
in respondent's DCF analysis, the difference between using
these two reinvestment rates yields a huge $23.90 per share
difference in Solera's valuation.379
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Another notable area of disagreement in the DCF models
is Solera's return on invested capital (“ROIC”) in the
terminal period. Respondent assumed, consistent with “a
theory this court has repeatedly cited with approval,”380
that in the long run the present value of Solera's growth
opportunities would disappear due to increased competition,
so the Company's ROIC would gradually converge with its
weighted average costs of capital (“WACC”).381 Petitioners
disagree with applying the convergence model to Solera.
They contend that the Company possesses “moats” around its
business, such as barriers to entry, competitive advantages,
and market dominance, that will give it perpetual advantages
over potential competitors.382 Petitioners thus argue that
Solera will earn a return of 4.5% above its WACC in
perpetuity during the terminal period.383 When the court
asked petitioner's expert how he landed on 4.5%, his response
was candid: “It's a little bit of a finger in the wind.”384
*31  The parties also disagree about how to account for
stock-based compensation (“SBC”) in their DCF models,
both for the discrete period and the terminal period.
Respondent applied the “cash basis” method to stock-based
compensation expense, using the cash amount that the
Company would have to spend to account for SBC as a
normalized percentage of revenue.385 Petitioners did not
independently calculate SBC and instead used the Company's
projections.386 These projections were calculated on a book
basis, benchmarked to Solera's actual stock price, and
assumed to grow at 5% annually.387
The parties also handled the contingent tax liability attached
to Solera's foreign earnings very differently. As of the Merger,
the Company had earned approximately $1.2 billion in
foreign profits, for which it had only paid taxes where those
profits were earned.388 Solera historically designated these
profits as permanently reinvested earnings (“PRE”). Before
these earnings can be repatriated to the United States or paid
to stockholders, the Company must pay the residual tax, i.e.,
the marginal amount between the U.S. tax rate and the amount
already paid internationally.389 Respondent assumed that
$350 million of foreign earnings that had been de-designated
as PRE would be repatriated as of the Merger had there
not been a deal, and that the rest of Solera's foreign profits,
both past and future, would be repatriated on a rolling basis
following a five-year deferral period.390 This repatriation
would cause Solera to pay more in taxes, decreasing the
Company's value. Petitioners, by contrast, assumed that such
taxes would never be paid because they contend the timing
of repatriation is unknown and thus these tax liabilities are
speculative.391
Finally, the parties disagreed about the amount of cash to be
added back to Solera's enterprise value in order to convert it to
equity value. This court has repeatedly held that only “excess
cash” is to be added back.392 Solera had approximately
$480 million of cash at closing.393 During the sales process,
the Company's CFO did a country-by-country analysis and
determined that Solera needed $160 million to $165 million
to fund its operations.394 Respondent used that analysis to
deduct $165 million from the Company's $480 million of cash
at closing and added back the difference, i.e., $315 million.395
Petitioners, on the other hand, added back all of the $480
million, reasoning that “with modern computer technology, a
good CFO doesn't need any wasting cash,” and that “it would
require an incompetent corporate treasurer for a big chunk of
the cash balance to be wasting cash.”396
* * * * *
There are other points of disagreement in the parties' DCF
models, but it is not necessary to detail them here. As
explained above, the Merger price was the product of “an
open process, informed by robust public information, and
easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many
parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.”397 Given the huge gap between petitioners' DCF
valuation and the Merger price, which I have found to be a
reliable indicator of value in accordance with the teachings
of DFC and Dell, I find petitioners' DCF valuation not to be
credible on its face and accord it no weight.398
*32  My decision to do so is corroborated by the fact that
nearly 88% of petitioners' enterprise valuation is attributable
to periods after the five-year Hybrid Case Projections.399 In
other words, petitioners' DCF valuation is largely a prediction
about the Company's operations many years into the future.
Such predictions, even when informed, are unavoidably
speculative, where small variances in a DCF's inputs can lead
to wide valuation swings.400
I also give no weight to respondent's DCF valuation, but
for a different reason. Although that valuation is close to
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my Merger price less synergies calculation, respondent's
own expert opined that his DCF valuation is “less reliable”
than the Merger price minus synergies valuation “given
the uncertainties ... surrounding several inputs to the DCF
valuation.”401 I agree, and will accord the value of the Merger
price minus synergies dispositive weight in this case.402
5. Respondent's Unaffected Stock Price Argument is
Unavailing
In the wake of our Supreme Court's decisions in DFC and
Dell, the Court of Chancery determined in Aruba that the
fair value of petitioners' shares in an appraisal proceeding
was the thirty-day average unaffected market price of the
company's shares, i.e., $17.13 per share.403 In reaching this
conclusion, Vice Chancellor Laster declined to adopt his deal
price ($24.67 per share) less synergies figure of $18.20 per
share because of his concerns that this figure (i) “likely was
tainted by human error,” and (ii) “continues to incorporate an
element of value derived from the merger itself: the value that
the acquirer creates by reducing agency costs.”404
In its supplemental brief, respondent argues that, “in light
of recent cases, the best evidence of Solera's fair value
is its unaffected stock price of $36.39 per share.”405 This
argument, which advocates for a fair value determination
about 35% below the deal price, reflects a dramatic
change of position that I find as facially incredible as
petitioners' DCF model. Before, during, and after trial (until
Aruba was decided), respondent and its highly credentialed
expert—a former chairman of the President's Council
of Economic Advisors406—consistently asserted that the
“market-generated Merger price, adjusted for synergies” of
$53.95 per share is the “best evidence of Solera's value” as of
the date the Merger.407 For the reasons explained above, the
court independently has come to the same conclusion.
Notably, nothing prevented respondent from advancing at
trial the “unaffected market price” argument the Aruba court
embraced. The scholarship underpinning the notion that both
synergies and agency costs are elements of value derived from
a merger that should be excluded under Section 262(h) has
been in the public domain for many years and was readily
available when this case was tried.408 Yet respondent made no
effort to advance this theory at trial and, thus, petitioners were
afforded no opportunity to respond to it. In this respect, I agree
with the sentiment Vice Chancellor Glasscock expressed in a
similar situation that “the use of trading price to determine fair
value requires a number of assumptions that ... are best made
or rejected after being subject to a forensic and adversarial
presentation by interested parties.”409
*33  As an example, even if one were to accept the legal
theory that agency costs represent an element of value derived
from the merger itself, little exists in the record to give
the court any comfort about Solera's true unaffected market
price. The $36.39 per share figure on which the Company
relies represents the closing price on a single day, August 3,
2015.410 Although the Company used that date in its proxy
statement as the unaffected date for purposes of calculating
a premium,411 and I have referenced it in this opinion a
number of times for context, the parties never litigated the
issue of Solera's unaffected market price and the court is in
no position based on the trial record to reliably make such a
determination.
With respect to the merits of the theory that agency costs
represent an element of value derived from the merger itself,
the Aruba court explained that the “concept of reduced agency
costs is the flipside of the benefits of control,” with the “key
point” being that “control creates value distinct from synergy
value.”412 This is because, as Professors Hamermesh and
Wachter explain, “the aggregation of the shares is value-
creating because a controller can then exercise the control
rights involving directing the strategy and managing the
firm.”413 They go on to argue that the “normative justification
for awarding the value of control to the controller parallels
the rationale for awarding the value of synergies to the
bidder. Efficiency requires that those who create an efficient
transaction—either through creating synergies or eliminating
agency costs—should receive the value that they create.”414
Significantly, however, a number of this court's appraisal
decisions, one of which was affirmed in relevant part on
appeal, suggest that the value of control is properly part
of the going concern and not an element of value that
must be excised under Section 262(h).415 In Le Beau v.
M.G. Bancorporation., Inc., for example, respondent used
a “capital market” approach that “involved deriving various
pricing multiples from selected publicly-traded companies,
and then applying those multiples to MGB,” the target
corporation.416 Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs rejected the
methodology because it “results in a minority valuation.”417
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The Supreme Court affirmed this determination, explaining
that the trial court's conclusion that the “capital market
approach contained an inherent minority discount that
made its use legally impermissible in a statutory appraisal
proceeding [was] fully supported by the record evidence that
was before the Court of Chancery and the prior holdings of
this Court construing Section 262.”418
Similarly, in Borruso v. Communications Telesystems
International, Vice Chancellor Lamb held that “a control
premium should be added to adjust the market value of the
equity derived from the comparable company method.”419
The court explained it reasoning as follows:
*34  [T]he comparable company method of analysis
produces an equity valuation that inherently reflects a
minority discount, as the data used for purposes of
comparison is all derived from minority trading values
of the comparable companies. Because that value is not
fully reflective of the intrinsic worth of the corporation on
a going concern basis, this court has applied an explicit
control premium in calculating the fair value of the equity
in an appraisal proceeding.420
More recently, then-Vice Chancellor Strine took the same
approach in Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc.421 There, the
court approved adjusting a comparable companies analysis by
adding a control premium where “[w]hat is being corrected
for is the difference between the trading price of a minority
share and the trading price if all the shares were sold.”422
Our Supreme Court held long ago that the going concern
value of a company must be determined in an appraisal
case “irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.”423
DFC and Dell both make the same point.424 Although
DFC and Dell are transformative decisions in my view
in their full-throated endorsement of applying market
efficiency principles in appraisal actions,425 I do not read
those decisions—both of which unmistakably emphasize the
probative value of deal price426—to suggest that agency costs
represent an element of value attributable to a merger separate
from synergies that must be excluded under Section 262(h).
Had that been the Supreme Court's intention, I believe it
would have said so explicitly.
Accordingly, I reject respondent's newly-minted argument
that Solera's closing price on August 3, 2015 of $36.39 is
the best evidence of Solera's fair value as of the date of the
Merger.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, petitioners are entitled to
$53.95 per share as the fair value of their shares of Solera,
plus interest accruing from the date the Merger closed, March
3, 2016, at the rate of 5% percent over the Federal Reserve
discount rate from time to time, compounded quarterly.427
The parties should confer and submit a form of implementing
order for the entry of final judgment consistent with this
opinion within ten business days. It is the court's intention
to unseal the expert reports in this case in their entirety
upon entry of a final judgment. If, however, a party believes
good cause exists to maintain any portion of any of the
expert reports under seal, that party must file a motion within
ten business days identifying the specific part that warrants
further confidential treatment and explaining the basis for
continuing such treatment.
*35  IT IS SO ORDERED.
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155 JX0683.0001.
156 PTO ¶ 350.
157 Id. ¶ 351; Tr. 811 (Yarbrough). Solera withheld six documents. Four of the six documents concerned Digital Garage, a
strategically sensitive new smartphone application, and the other two concerned personnel matters. Tr. 811 (Yarbrough);
PTO ¶ 139-44.
158 PTO ¶ 354.
159 Id. ¶ 355.
160 Id. ¶ 356.
161 JX0744.0001, 03; Tr. 611-614 (Aquila).
162 PTO ¶¶ 382-387; JX0760.0004.
163 JX0760.0004, 09-10.
164 PTO ¶ 5; JX0756.0069.
165 PTO ¶¶ 6-7.
166 Id. ¶ 1.
167 JX0855.0001.
168 Dkt. 122.
169 Dkt. 125.
170 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del. 1989) (citation omitted).
171 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
172 See M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999).
173 Tri-Cont'l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950).
174 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999).
175 Matter of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. 1992).
176 Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144.
177 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (citing Glob. GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc. 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) ).
178 See Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envtl., Inc., 2014 WL 1877536, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (compiling authorities); see
also In re Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 1994 WL 263558, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 25, 1994) (“[R]elevant
factors to be considered include ‘assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.’ ”) (quoting Weinberger, at 711).
179 In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899-900 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citation omitted).
180 Laidler, 2014 WL 1877536, at *6 (citing M.G. Bancorporation., Inc., v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d at 520).
181 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
182 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
183 DFC, 172 A.3d at 348.
184 In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev'd, DFC, 172 A.3d 346.
185 See id. at *21 (“Each of these valuation methods suffers from different limitations that arise out of the same source: the
tumultuous environment in the time period leading up to DFC's sale. As described above, at the time of its sale, DFC
was navigating turbulent regulatory waters that imposed considerable uncertainty on the company's future profitability,
even its viability. Some of its competitors faced similar challenges. The potential outcome could have been dire, leaving
DFC unable to operate its fundamental businesses, or could have been very positive, leaving DFC's competitors crippled
and allowing DFC to gain market dominance. Importantly, DFC was unable to chart its own course; its fate rested largely
in the hands of the multiple regulatory bodies that governed it. Even by the time the transaction closed in June 2014,
DFC's regulatory circumstances were still fluid.”).
186 DFC, 172 A.3d at 360-61.
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187 Id. at 351.
188 Id. at 349.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 370-71.
191 Id. at 369-70.
192 Id. at 373.
193 Id. at 367.
194 In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *1, 18 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), rev'd, Dell, 177 A.3d 1.
195 Dell, 117 A.3d at 6.
196 Id. at 7.
197 Id. at 27.
198 Id. at 28 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 374-77); see also id. (“[The financial advisor] did not initially solicit the interest of strategic
bidders because its analysis suggested none was likely to make an offer.”).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 29.
201 Id. at 28.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
204 Id. at 30. See also id. at 23 (“In fact, the record as distilled by the trial court suggests that the deal price deserved heavy,
if not dispositive, weight.”).
205 Id. at 35.
206 2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), reargument denied, 2018 WL 2315943 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018).
207 2018 WL 1037450 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018).
208 2018 WL 922139 at *1-2 (citations omitted).
209 Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
210 Id. at *1, 4.
211 Id. at *2-4 (internal citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
212 2018 WL 1037450, at *1.
213 Id. at *8.
214 Id. at *21. Just last week, the Court of Chancery similarly found in another case that flaws in a sales process leading to
a merger undermined the reliability of the merger price as an indicator of fair value. Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC
v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., 2018 WL 3602940, at *1-2 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018).
215 JX0898.0094-95, 200.
216 JX0898.0098.
217 Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 1 (Dkt. 106); see also JX0894.0125-26.
218 JX0894.0126.
219 Id.
220 Resp't's Suppl. Post-Trial Br. 5 (Dkt. 123).
221 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
222 Id.
223 Dell, 177 A.3d at 28.
224 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”); see also DFC,
172 A.3d at 364 (affirming Golden Telecom and restating that “§ 262(h) gives broad discretion to the Court of Chancery
to determine the fair value of the company's shares, considering ‘all relevant factors’ ”).
225 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
226 Id. at 373.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 349.
229 Dell, 177 A.3d at 32-34.
230 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
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231 Id. at 366.
232 Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 28.
235 DFC, 172 A.3d at 373.
236 Id. at 349.
237 Id.
238 Dell, 177 A.3d at 23.
239 DFC, 172 A.3d at 388.
240 Dell, 177 A.3d at 22 (citation omitted).
241 Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).
242 PTO ¶¶ 268, 271-78.
243 Id. ¶ 285.
244 Id. ¶¶ 295, 307-09.
245 Tr. 1029-31, 1036-37 (Hubbard).
246 Id. at 132 (Cornell).
247 In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017); see also Tr. 1036 (Hubbard) (“Once
a sales process became public in the Bloomberg story, anyone who wished to bid on this asset could certainly have
jumped in.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (“[G]iven leaks that Dell was exploring strategic alternatives, record testimony suggests
that [Dell's banker] presumed that any interested parties would have approached the Company before the go-shop if
serious about pursuing a deal.”).
248 Tr. 789 (Yarbrough) (“And then an upside of that is that everybody in the world knew that we were looking at strategic
alternatives at that point.”).
249 JX0214.0014-15.
250 PTO ¶ 306.
251 Id. ¶ 305.
252 JX0499.0002.
253 JX0644.0001.
254 JX0651.0001.
255 Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *18 (“Importantly, however, if bidders perceive a sale process to be relatively
open, then a credible threat of competition can be as effective as actual competition.”).
256 Leaks of the amounts of the bids theoretically could have functioned to anchor the bidding process, but Solera never
publicly confirmed the validity of these reports and petitioners have never argued that these leaks had any impact on
the competitive dynamic among bidders.
257 See JX0497; JX0556.
258 As petitioners acknowledge, it also is doubtful whether including more financial sponsors in the sales process (beyond
the eleven that the Special Committee contacted) would have meaningfully increased competition between the bidders.
Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 27-28 (Dkt. 105). See also Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *17 (citation omitted)
(“Financial sponsors ... predominately use the same pricing models, the same inputs, and the same value-creating
techniques.”).
259 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Any rational purchaser of a business should have a targeted rate of return that justifies the
substantial risks and costs of buying a business. That is true for both strategic and financial buyers.”).
260 177 A.3d at 29 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 n.154 (“[T]he absence of synergistic buyers for a company is itself relevant
to its value.”) ).
261 See Tr. 973-74 (Sowul) (“And so that party, that IHS, that strategic, could, in theory, pay a lot more than we could. And we
knew they were interested.... So we would have to pay as little as we can to maximize our returns but pay as much as we
can so that we can be competitive against a strategic.”); see also PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *29 (citation omitted)
(“Importantly, the evidence reveals that the private equity bidders did not know who they were bidding against and whether
or not they were competing with strategic bidders. They had every incentive to put their best offer on the table.”).
262 Tr. 780-82 (Yarbrough).
263 PTO ¶ 307.
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264 Id. ¶ 312.
265 Id. ¶ 313.
266 Id. ¶ 312; Tr. 442-43 (Aquila).
267 PTO ¶ 351; Tr. 811 (Yarbrough).
268 PTO ¶ 354.
269 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 28.
270 Id. at 28-29. VIX stands for the CBOE Volatility Index, which Buckberg described as “a measure of market expectations
of near-term volatility conveyed by S & P 500 stock index option prices.” JX0895.0012 (Buckberg expert report).
271 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 28-33.
272 Tr. 250 (Buckberg).
273 Id. at 253 (Buckberg).
274 Id. at 852 (Yarbrough).
275 JX0895.0026.
276 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 15.
277 Tr. 1042-43 (Hubbard).
278 Id. at 337-38 (Buckberg).
279 JX0899.0027.
280 See Tr. 295-96 (Buckberg); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 350 (“[T]he fact that a financial buyer may demand a certain rate
of return on its investment in exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not mean that the price it is willing
to pay is not a meaningful indication of fair value.”).
281 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.
282 Id. at 370-71.
283 Id. at 349.
284 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (“The Committee, composed of independent, experienced directors and armed with the power
to say ‘no,’ persuaded [the bidder] to raise its bid six times. Nothing in the record suggests that increased competition
would have produced a better result.”); PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *30 (“Had the auction not generated an offer that
the Board deemed too good to pass up, I am satisfied that the Board was ready to pursue other initiatives as a standalone
company.”); Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *19 (“Reinforcing the threat of competition from other parties was
the realistic possibility that the Company would reject the [ ] bid and pursue a different alternative.”).
285 JX0359.0002.
286 Id.
287 Tr. 754-56, 771-72 (Yarbrough).
288 Id. at 776-78 (Yarbrough).
289 PTO ¶ 334.
290 Id. ¶ 338.
291 Tr. 806-07 (Yarbrough).
292 See PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *28 (emphasis in original) (“I note that the Board considered inviting the most likely
strategic partner ... into the process, but made the reasoned decision that, without a firm indication of interest from [the
competitor], the risks of providing [the company's] most direct competitor with unfettered access to [the company's] well-
stocked data room outweighed any potential reward. Nevertheless, the evidence revealed that the Board held the door
open for [the competitor] to join the auction if it expressed serious interest in making a bid.”).
293 PTO ¶¶ 325, 339, 350.
294 See infra Section III.D.1.c.
295 Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
296 JX0633.0013.
297 Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
298 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 4 (emphasis in original).
299 JX0340.0003 (“We are contemplating this deal solely in the context of being able to partner with Tony Aquila and his
management team.”) (Thoma Bravo); JX0464.0005 (“We have been impressed by the high caliber of the management
team we have met, and look forward to forming a successful and productive partnership with them and the other members
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of the Solera management team.”) (Vista); JX0464.0008 (“Our team is ecstatic about the opportunity to partner with Tony
and other members of senior management.”) (Pamplona).
300 JX0525; JX0541.
301 Tr. 452 (Aquila), 971-73 (Sowul).
302 Tr. 782-83 (Yarbrough); JX0380.0003-05.
303 See In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Strine, V.C.) (“I believe it would have been
preferable for the Special Committee to have had its chairman or, at the very least, its banker participate with [the CEO]
in negotiations with [the buyer]. By that means, there would be more assurance that [the CEO] would take a tough line
and avoid inappropriate discussions that would taint the process.”).
304 I view Baron's statement in an email to his colleagues at Rothschild that “we were the architects with the CEO from the
beginning as to how to engineer the process from start to finish” to be puffery. The email completely ignores Centerview's
role in the sales process, and Baron's statement that he is “excited to ... market the heck out of this for future business”
betrays his motivation for exaggerating his involvement in the transaction. Notably, three recipients of Baron's email were
his superiors at Rothschild. JX0670.0002.
305 Dell, 177 A.3d at 31-32.
306 Id.
307 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 26.
308 Id. at 27.
309 JX0902.0005; see also Tr. 148-49 (Cornell).
310 JX0899.0011.
311 Tr. 589 (Aquila).
312 Tr. 1034 (Hubbard) (“Q. Was Mr. Aquila a net buyer in this transaction? A. Not the way economists would use that term,
no. Q. And how do you understand that term? A. Actually, the economic definition is pretty much as the plain English. It
would mean contributing new cash as a net buyer. That did not happen.”).
313 JX0899.0009.
314 PTO ¶¶ 382-387.
315 Tr. 148-49 (Cornell).
316 Dell, 177 A.3d at 31.
317 See id. at 6 (noting that the features of an MBO transaction that may render the deal price unreliable “were largely absent”
in the Dell MBO).
318 DFC, 172 A.3d at 373.
319 Dell, 177 A.3d at 25 (citation omitted); see also JX0894.0034 (Hubbard expert report) (“In a well-functioning stock market,
a company's market price quickly reflects publicly available information. A market price balances investors' willingness to
buy and sell the shares in light of this information, and thus represents their consensus view as to the value of the equity
of the company. As a result, finance academics view market prices as an important indicator of intrinsic value absent
evidence of frictions that impede market efficiency.”).
320 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 27 n.131 (“This is evident as the court observed that the stock price anchors negotiations and, if
the stock price is low, the deal price necessarily might be low.”).
321 JX0894.0035. The S & P MidCap 400 contains 400 firms that are generally smaller than those in the S & P 500 but
“capture a period in the typical enterprise life cycle in which firms have successfully navigated the challenges inherent
to small companies, such as raising initial capital and managing early growth.” Mid Cap: A Sweet Spot for Performance,
S & P Dow Jones Indices 1 (September 2015), https://us.spindices.com/documents/education/practice-essentials-mid-
cap-a-sweet-spot-for-performance.pdf.
322 JX0894.0035, 137.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 JX0894.0035.
326 See JX0842-43 (observing that Solera's stock rose more than ten percent on multiple times its normal daily trading volume
on August 4 and 5, 2015, and concluding that “this trading activity is consistent with trading on rumors of a transaction”).
327 PTO ¶ 363.
328 Id. ¶ 364 & Ex. A.
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329 Tr. 1052-53 (Hubbard); JX0894.0047-48.
330 Tr. 1053 (Hubbard). See also DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 (quoting Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 889-90 (Del.
2002) ) (“[A] well-informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court
could impose.”).
331 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 4.
332 See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 n.117 (“One of the reasons, of course, why a control block trades at a different price
than a minority block is because a controller can determine key issues like dividend policy.”); IRA Tr. v. Crane, 2017 WL
7053964, at *7 n.54 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (“That control of a corporation has value is well-accepted.”).
333 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 6.
334 See, e.g., PTO ¶¶ 243-44.
335 Dell, 177 A.3d at 26-27; see also id. at 24 (“[A]nalysts scrutinized [the company's] long-range outlook when evaluating
the Company and setting price targets, and the market was capable of accounting for [the company's] recent mergers
and acquisitions and their prospects in its valuation of the Company.”).
336 JX0202.0001.
337 JX0328.0001.
338 JX0350.0002.
339 JX0312.0002.
340 JX0348.0002.
341 JX0344.0002.
342 JX0319.0001.
343 Tr. 393-96 (Aquila).
344 JX0140.0003.
345 JX0310.0004.
346 Tr. 413-14 (Aquila); JX0318.0001.
347 DFC, 172 A.3d at 355.
348 Tr. 399-401 (Aquila).
349 DFC, 172 A.3d at 374.
350 See Tr. 114 (Cornell) (“[I]n this market condition, for whatever reason, there wasn't a lot of cheap debt available, and
that limited what a private equity firm's going to be able to pay and satisfy itself and its shareholders.”); see also DFC,
172 A.3d at 375 (“As is the case with refinancings, so too do banks like to lend and syndicate the acquisition debt for an
M & A transaction if they can get it done. That is how they make big profits. That lenders would not finance a buyout of
DFC at a higher valuation logically signals weakness in its future prospects, not that debt providers and equity buyers
were all mistaken. So did the fact that DFC's already non-investment grade debt suffered a downgrade in 2013 and then
was put on a negative credit watch in 2014.”).
351 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Like any factor relevant to a company's future performance, the market's collective judgment
of the effect of ... risk may turn out to be wrong, but established corporate finance theories suggest that the collective
judgment of the many is more likely to be accurate than any individual's guess. When the collective judgment involved,
as it did here, not just the views of the company stockholders, but also those of potential buyers of the entire company
and those of the company's debtholders with a self-interest in evaluating the regulatory risks facing the company, there
is more, not less, reason to give weight to the market's view of an important factor.”).
352 Highfields Capital. Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 60 (Del. Ch. 2007).
353 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 34-35.
354 Id. at 35.
355 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71 (emphasis added).
356 The Supreme Court also made clear that a deal price arrived at by using an LBO model can be the most reliable evidence
of fair value of a target company. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 350 (“[T]he fact that a financial buyer may demand a certain
rate of return on its investment in exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not mean that the price it is
willing to pay is not a meaningful indication of fair value.”).
357 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
358 Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d, 340, 343 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C).
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359 See, e.g., PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *31 n.364 (citation omitted) (noting “synergies financial buyers may have with
target firms arising from other companies in their portfolio”); Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *17 n.14 (noting
that “a source of private value” to a financial buyer is “a synergistic portfolio company”).
360 Tr. 908-16 (Sowul); JX0613.0033.
361 Id. at 908-09 (Sowul).
362 Id. at 1045-48 (Hubbard); JX0894.0066-71.
363 Id. at 1045-46 (Hubbard); JX0894.0070-71.
364 Tr. 1047-48 (Hubbard); JX0894.0070-71. This 31% figure is the “median portion of synergies shared with the seller” as
determined by a 2013 Boston Consulting Group study of 365 deals. JX0894.0070-71. Although the appraisal statute
mandates excision of synergies specific to the merger at issue, this court has used general estimates of the percentage
of synergies shared, as provided by experts, to derive appraisal value from deal price. See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 &
n.26 (relying on a “reasonable synergy discount” propounded by a party's expert).
365 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be important is that it is widely assumed that the
sales price in many M & A deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains, which is part of the premium
the winning buyer must pay to prevail and obtain control.”).
366 See 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”); DFC,
172 A.3d at 388 (“But, in keeping with our refusal to establish a ‘presumption’ in favor of the deal price because of the
statute's broad mandate, we also conclude that the Court of Chancery must exercise its considerable discretion while
also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate finance principles, why it is according a
certain weight to a certain indicator of value.”).
367 Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359.
368 JX0894.0075 (Hubbard); JX0898.0098, 0124 (Cornell).
369 See S. Muio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark Entm't Invs. Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *20 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011) (quoting Hanover
Direct, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2010 WL 3959399, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 2010) ) (noting that the court “gives more credit
and weight to experts who apply ‘multiple valuation techniques that support one another's conclusions’ and that ‘serve
to cross-check one another's results.’ ”), aff'd, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011).
370 JX0835.
371 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 36 (citations omitted) (“As is common in appraisal proceedings, each party—petitioners and
the Company—enlisted highly paid, well-credentialed experts to produce DCF valuations. But their valuation landed
galaxies apart—diverging by approximately $28 billion, or 126%.... The Court of Chancery recognized that ‘[t]his is a
recurring problem,’ and even believed the ‘market data is sufficient to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners'
expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23 billion.’ Thus, the trial court found petitioners' valuation lacks
credibility on its face. We agree.”); PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (“Moreover, the evidence does not reveal any
confounding factors that would have caused the massive market failure, to the tune of $4.5 billion (a 45% discrepancy).”);
Highfields, 939 A.2d at 52 (citation omitted) (disregarding analysis that was “markedly disparate from market price data
for [the company's] stock and other independent indicia of value”).
372 PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *40 n.439 (quoting William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (2003) ).
373 Dell, 177 A.3d at 38.
374 JX0899.0004.
375 JX0899.0045.
376 JX1419.0002, 0007.
377 JX0894.0082; Tr. 1067-68, 1189 (Hubbard).
378 JX0900.0027; Tr. 64-66, 77-81 (Cornell). Respondent not only argues that it is incorrect to apply Bradley/Jarrell, but that
petitioners also misapplied the formula. Specifically, respondent argues that petitioners erred by applying their Bradley/
Jarrell-derived investment rate to net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) instead of net cash flow (NCF). According to
respondent, this mistake resulted in improperly assuming away Solera's required maintenance investment into perpetuity.
Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 47, 51-52.
379 Tr. 103; JX0900.0007-08.
380 PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *39; see also In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 227634, at *4
n.16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011) (stating that the convergence model is “a reflection of the widely-accepted assumption that
for companies in highly competitive industries with no competitive advantages, value-creating investment opportunities
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will be exhausted over a discrete forecast period, and beyond that point, any additional growth will be value-neutral,”
leading to “return on new investment in perpetuity [that] converge[s] to the company's cost of capital”); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (discussing that “profits above the cost of capital in
an industry will attract competitors, who will over some time period drive returns down to the point at which returns equal
the cost of capital”), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
381 Tr. 1085-87 (Hubbard).
382 JX0900.0028, 32.
383 JX0900.0031.
384 Tr. 242-43 (Cornell).
385 Id. at 1059-60 (Hubbard); JX0899.0043-44.
386 Id. at 57 (Cornell).
387 Id. at 1060 (Hubbard).
388 Id. at 692-93 (Giger).
389 Id. at 1094-97 (Hubbard).
390 Id. at 1094-98 (Hubbard).
391 Id. at 70-75 (Cornell); JX0900.0040-42.
392 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017) (citation omitted) (“It is
true as a matter of valuation methodology that non-operating assets—including cash in excess of that needed to fund
the operations of the entity—are to be added to a DCF analysis.”).
393 Tr. 229 (Cornell).
394 Id. at 695 (Giger).
395 JX0894.0103; Tr. 1092-94 (Hubbard).
396 Tr. 67-68 (Cornell).
397 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
398 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35 (“When ... an appraisal is brought in cases like this where a robust sale process [involving willing
buyers with thorough information and the time to make a bid] in fact occurred, the Court of Chancery should be chary
about imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value
based on widely divergent partisan expert testimony.”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 379 (“Simply given the Court of Chancery's
own findings about the extensive market check, the value gap already reflected in the court's original discounted cash
flow estimate of $13.07 should have given the Court doubts about the reliability of its discounted cash flow analysis.”).
399 JX0898.0124.
400 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 37-38 (“Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no credible
market information and no market check, DFC valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by well-
compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these inputs can produce large valuation
gaps.”).
401 JX0894.0126.
402 Given my conclusion to accord no weight to either side's DCF model, there is no need to retain a court-appointed expert
to resolve the parties' disagreement concerning the appropriate method to determine the investment rate for the terminal
period.
403 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139, at *1, 4.
404 Id. at *2-3.
405 Resp't's Suppl. Post-Trial Br. 5.
406 Tr. 1023 (Hubbard).
407 Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 1 (emphasis added).
408 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139, at *3 n.16 (citing William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The
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HJELM, J.
*1  Penobscot Shoe Company (PSC) was a Maine-based
corporation that was founded in 1935 and that became
publicly traded on the American Stock Exchange in 1965. On
January 18, 1999, all of its outstanding shares were acquired
by PSC Acquisition Corporation, which was an entity created
by Reidman Corporation. PSC Acquisition Corporation either
paid or offered to pay PSC's shareholders the amount
of $11.75 per share. Three of those shareholders -Joseph
Nerges, Robert McCullough, and Anne Buta (the dissenters)
- declined to accept that tender offer. After satisfying the
procedural predicates necessary to preserve their rights as
dissenting shareholders, PSC commenced this action pursuant
to 13-A M.R.S.A. § 909(9) to allow the court to determine
the “fair value” of the shares held by the dissenters. See 13-
A M.R.S.A. § 909(9)(E). Trial in this matter was held over
the course of ten days in December 2002 and January 2003.
On each trial date, counsel for PSC, counsel for the dissenters
and dissenter Joseph Nerges were present. Dissenter Robert
McCullough and a representative of the ultimate acquiring
corporation, Phoenix Footwear Company, were present for
a portion of the trial proceedings. Following the completion
of the presentation of evidence, the parties filed a series of
written argument. The court has considered the parties' post-
trial written submissions in association with the evidence
itself.
The court also again commends counsel for presenting this
extraordinarily dense and factually rich case in a highly
organized and efficient manner.
A. “Fair value” and the burden of proof
Title 13-A M.R.S.A. § 909(9)(E) provides that where a
dissenting shareholder establishes entitlement to payment for
shares, “[t]he court shall then proceed to fix the fair value
of the shares.” Although the notion of “fair value” is not
defined statutorily, it has been examined by the Law Court in
at least two cases, and courts of other jurisdictions have also
considered the matter, although under statutes that often vary
from Maine's to at least some degree.
A succinct definition of “fair value” is found in In re Valuation
of Common Stock of Libby, McNeill & Libby, 406 A.2d 54,
62 (Me.1979):
The fair value of shares is to be determined on the basis of
what a reasonable and prudent observer would consider to be
a price that reflects the intrinsic value of the right of stock
ownership, without regard to any subjective mental processes
of the dissenting shareholders or any special benefit to be
derived by the acquiring corporation.
See also In re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co.,
565 A.2d 997, 1003 (Me.1989) (“ ‘The basic concept of value
under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled
to what has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate
interest in a going concern.” ’ (Quoting Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983) (emphasis deleted)).
See also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940
(Del.1985) (“... the minority shareholder shall receive the
substantial equivalent in value of what he had before.”). The
McLoon Court elaborated on this concept, holding that “[t]he
question for the court becomes direct and simple: What is
the best price a single buyer could reasonably be expected
to pay for the firm as an entirety?” 565 A.2d at 1004. As is
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noted below, however, this formulation is not to be confused
with the market value of the corporation because, taken by
itself, a business' market value may not accurately reflect its
fair, intrinsic value. Libby, 406 A.2d at 61 n.8. Nonetheless,
although the legal notion of fair value is distinct from fair
market value, “ ‘fair value’ is still obtained by considering the
behavior of market forces.” Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5
F.Supp.2d 1117, 1125 (D.Nev.1996).
*2  The method by which a shareholder's interest is
appraised evolved between the Law Court's opinions in
Libby and McLoon. The earlier case, Libby, accepted the
“Delaware block” method of business appraisal. While
recognizing that the precise process was a function of the
particular circumstances of the subject corporation, the Court
required consideration of a corporation's “stock market price,
investment value, and net asset value.” 406 A.2d at 59-60. The
appraiser must then determine the relative degrees of weight
to be assigned to the results of those three separate analyses.
Id. at 60, 61. This comparative approach does not foreclose
the appraiser from concluding that one or more of those
results is not worthy of weight; nonetheless, each of the three
conclusions must at least be considered. Id. at 60; McLoon,
565 A.2d at 1002. The appraiser then quantifies the relative
strengths and weaknesses of the three elements through a
“weighting scheme which, in his judgment, would best reflect
the ‘fair value’ of the dissenters' shares. Libby, 406 A.2d at
61. The weights are represented by a proportion in relation
to 100%, which is also the sum of the weights assigned to
the three elements. Id. The Law Court has recognized that
this weighting process is more “artistic” than “scientific” and
is not susceptible to a “precise mathematical formula.” Id.
The court will briefly note these three valuation concepts
identified in Libby, subject to further elaboration in the
subsequent discussion of these valuation methods as applied
in this particular case.
First, the stock market price of a publicly traded corporation
gains significance in the valuation of the business when
the corporate shares are traded in “a free and open market,
characterized by a substantial volume of transactions that
makes the market a fair reflection of the judgment of the
investing public....” Libby, 406 A.2d at 63. On the other
hand, if the corporation's trading market is thin (that is,
of a low volume) or where ownership of the stock is not
widely dispersed, then the fair value of the corporation may
not be accurately reflected in its stock price due to those
transactional limitation. Id. at 64.
As the second of the Libby valuation models, “[t]he
determination of investment value represents an estimate of
the corporation's earning capacity.” Libby, 406 A.2d at 65. As
a general matter, a corporation's investment value is “central”
to the appraisal analysis because a corporation's assets are
most often valued for their capacity to deliver a future stream
of earnings. Id. at 66. A corporation's investment value
is determined by establishing its “average annual earning
figure” based on its recent earnings history. Id. at 65. There is
no fixed amount of time that must be considered in order to
determine an average annual earning. However, it must be of
sufficient duration “ ‘to show the settled condition of things.”
’ Id. at 65 n.11 (quoting Dewing, The Financial Policy of
Corporations 376 (1953)). This figure is used as “a predictor
of future earnings,” id. at 65, and has been characterized as
“a representative annual earnings figure....” In re Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp. 477 A.2d 527, 535 (Pa.Super.1984).
Therefore, in determining the average annual earnings, the
appraiser must exercise “subjective judgment in excluding
from consideration those gains and losses that are viewed
as ‘extraordinary’ (i.e., gains and losses stemming from
transactions not expected to recur),” Libby, 406 A.2d at 65,
or that have no bearing on the corporation's “normal business
operations.” Id. at 68. In other words, with evidence of events
that are not reflective of future gains and losses, those events
should be excluded from consideration in order to avoid a
forecast that is artificially affected by them.
*3  After the corporation's average annual earnings have
been found, then the investment value can be calculated
by multiplying that earning figure by a capitalization ratio,
or earnings multiplier, which takes into consideration the
ongoing nature of a future investment. The function of the
capitalization ratio, as part of the investment value analysis,
is to account for “the stability and predictability of earnings
of the particular corporation.” Jones & Laughlin Steel, 477
A.2d at 535. A lower capitalization rate is associated with a
riskier investment and therefore a lower investment value. See
Libby, 406 A.2d at 66 (examining capitalization ratios of the
subject corporation with the higher ratios assigned to stronger
and more stable comparable corporations); see generally 13
Cavitch Business Organizations § 169.07[3] at 169-29 (2002)
(discussing price/earnings ratio).
The third and final valuation method identified in Libby
is an assessment of a corporation's net asset value, which
is equivalent to the net value of the corporate assets, both
tangible and intangible. Libby, 406 A.2d at 66, 69. Typically,
net asset value is of secondary importance in assessing a
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corporation's fair value, because its asset value often does not
have a meaningful relationship to its earning power, which
in turn is the more common interest of investors. Id. at 66.
If a corporation is valued in anticipation of liquidation, then
clearly its net asset value is of greater significance because
those assets would constituted the source of an investor's
return. Id. Otherwise, “[i]nvestors and speculators ... have
gradually come to give the asset-value factor practically no
weight.” Id., quoting Gibbons v. Schenley Industries, Inc.,
339 A.2d 460, 473 (Del.Ch.1975). To the extent that a
corporation's net asset value has meaning in the appraisal
of the concern's fair value, the actual fair value of those
assets - as opposed to a book value, which is derived after
consideration of depreciation - must be used. Libby, 406 A.2d
at 66-67.
Ten years after it issued its decision in Libby, the Law
Court revisited the corporation appraisal process set out in
section 909. In light of intervening developments in the
law, the Court took the opportunity to make clear that the
three appraisal methods that constitute the Delaware block
analysis are not comprehensive. Rather, the appraiser is
permitted to consider “and use any other generally accepted
and admissible valuation techniques.” McLoon, 565 A.2d
at 1003. “... [T]he value of the business entity as a whole
should be determined by the best available valuation method.”
Id. at 1004.1 Thus, the “orthodoxy” was removed from the
valuation exercise. Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 584 A.2d 490, 508 (Del.1990). The Delaware Supreme
Court in Weinberger, on which the Law Court placed heavy
reliance in McLoon, identified some of those other factors
that exceed the conventional Delaware block analysis. Those
factors include “earning prospects [and] the nature of the
enterprise.” 457 A.2d at 713.
*4  In these Maine two cases, the Law Court has also noted
factors that may not be properly considered in assessing
the fair value of a dissenter's shares. First, a dissenting
shareholder's minority interest in a corporation cannot be
discounted due to the accompanying lack of control over
corporate matters. McLoon, 565 A.2d at 1004-05. If the value
of a dissenter's interest were reduced in this way and the
shares were treated as a commodity, the dissenter could not
recover full value and instead would be penalized at the
expense of the majority shareholders. Id. at 1005. Instead, the
fair value of the dissenter's shares must be calculated as a
percentage of ownership of the entire firm after the value of
the firm as a whole is established. Id. at 1004-05.
Second, the valuation analysis is an objective and open one.
It therefore cannot rest on considerations relating to “the
subjective mental processes of the dissenting shareholders
or any special benefits to be derived by the acquiring
corporation.” Libby, 406 A.2d at 62. However, if the losses
sustained by the dissenters or the gains enjoyed by the
acquiring corporation are revealed “in the price that would be
bargained out in a completely free market between any willing
buyer and any willing seller in the absence of the merger” then
they may be considered. Id.
In assessing the fair value of corporate shares, the tender offer
price may have significance in some circumstances. Libby,
406 A.2d at 58, n.3. A tender offer price is known to include
a premium in excess of the stock market price in order to
motivate shareholders to act in redeeming their shares. In that
circumstance, the tender offer price may be higher than the
fair value of the shares; there, the dissenters are not entitled to
the tender offer price as a “floor.” Id. However, if the merger
price results from an arms-length negotiation and is free of
collusion, it “is a very strong indication of fair value.” M.P.M.
Enterprises, Inc. v.. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del.1999).
As the Libby Court also noted, any reliance on the tender
offer price must be sensitive to the possibility that that price
could represent “just the value of the company to one specific
value.” Id.
The controlling date on which the fair value is determined is
the date immediately prior to the merger. Here, because PSC
approved its acquisition by PSC Acquisition Corporation on
January 18, 2000, the court must appraise the fair value of the
dissenters' shares as of the previous day (the last day of PSC's
independent existence), January 17, 2000.
Further, the appraisal of the dissenters' shares must be
determined on the basis of information and data “which
are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the
merger....” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Here, the dissenters
contend that the valuation of their shares may properly rest
on the circumstances of PSC that existed on or prior to
the valuation date (January 17, 2000), even if information
disclosing those circumstances was not available until a later
date. This position, however, is contrary to law that is well
established at least in Delaware. The dissenters' argument
is also undermined by the nature of the valuation inquiry.
Ultimately, the determination of value is predicated on a
market or transactional concept: what is the highest price a
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller for the entire
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corporation? See McLoon, 565 A.2d at 1004; Libby, 406 A.2d
at 62.
*5  For the reasons noted above, the actual market price
(namely, the stock market price of a publicly traded
corporation) is not dispositive because the characteristics of
the relevant market may inhibit its participants from arriving
at the fair or intrinsic value of the concern. However, other
valuation methods ultimately are framed in terms of the
ultimate inquiry identified in Maine by McLoon and Libby.
Thus, for example, under the investment valuation method,
in the end one must ask how must an investor would be
willing to pay in order to gain the right to benefit from a
stream of future income while tolerating the risks created
by the uncertainty of future expectations. Consequently, the
fair value of a corporation (or a proportionate ownership
interest of that concern) as of a specific date necessarily rests
on information that is available to the hypothetical willing
buyer on that specific date. If information is unavailable until
some time subsequent to the valuation date, then as of the
valuation date a knowledgeable and informed buyer could not
consider that information in assessing the maximum price he
or she would be willing to pay for the corporation as a whole.
Here, there is no claim that PSC itself or any of the entities
involved in the PSC acquisition concealed information or
otherwise prevented the disclosure of relevant valuation data.
Thus, for these reasons and under the precedent of Weinberger
and a well-established line of Delaware cases that includes
the seminal case of Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d
71, 72 (Del.1950),2 the court disregards those portions of
valuation opinions that rely on information that was not
available as of the valuation date.
Maine legal authority has not addressed the allocation of the
burden of proof in valuation cases such as the one at bar.
With respect to the statute, PSC's arguments to the contrary,
the court cannot conclude that the terms of section 909(9)
(E) impose the burden of proving fair value on the dissenting
shareholders. By its plain terms, see Brent Leasing Co., Inc.
v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 90, ¶ 6, 773 A.2d 457, 459
(when construing a statute, the court first looks to the plain
meaning of the statutory language), the statute requires the
dissenters to establish that they have satisfied the procedural
predicates to seek relief in the courts. Here, PSC has stipulated
that the dissenters have done so. Section 909(9)(E) goes on
to provide, “The court shall then proceed to fix the fair value
of the shares.” (Emphasis added.) The plain language of the
statute distinguishes between the initial procedural burden
that the dissenters must carry, and then the substantive process
by which the court assesses the fair value of their shares. The
valuation process required by the statute is set out in decidedly
neutral terms: it is framed with reference to the appraiser's
responsibility and not to the burdens that a party may have in
a trial setting.3
*6  Under Delaware law, a court examines evidence of
the fair value of corporate shares as part of its assessment
of all aspects of an acquisition or merger transaction.
Thus, the inquiry covers not only the price but also
the transaction itself, and those examinations are unified
(although a review of caselaw suggests that in practice, those
two issues are examined separately as part of the overall
consideration of the transaction's entire fairness).4 Kahn v.
Lynch Communications Systems, 669 A.2d 79, 84 (Del.1995).
However, when the court “address[es] the fair price aspect
of the merger transaction,” id. at 86, the assessment of the
evidence is governed by shifting burdens of proof. Initially,
the party defending the merger (tender offer) price must
demonstrate its fairness. Id. at 88. Upon “a sufficient showing
of fair value of the company ..., the party attacking the
merger was required to come forward with sufficient credible
evidence to persuade the finder of fact of the merit of a greater
figure proposed.” Id. The preliminary, “sufficient” showing
that the proponent of the tender offer price must make is a
prima facie case. Citron, 584 A.2d at 508, quoted in Kahn,
669 A.2d at 88.5
The nature of the substantive issues presented in Kahn
and Citron make clear that the burden analyses found in
those cases is appropriate here. In both of those Delaware
cases, the dissenting shareholders raised claims regarding
both aspects of the entire fairness question: fair dealing and
fair price. Further, both of those cases involved a parent-
subsidiary acquisition. Because of these circumstances,
there is heightened sensitivity to the rights and interests
of shareholders, and the legal framework governing the
examination of such cases reflects that concern. In Citron, the
acquiring corporation (DuPont) was the majority shareholder
of the target entity (Remington). Under Delaware law, the
entire fairness of the transaction was at issue. 584 A.2d
at 500. Ordinarily when the acquiring corporation is a
majority or controlling shareholder of the target corporation,
the corporation bears the burden of establishing that entire
fairness. 584 A.2d at 500. However, due to particular
circumstances that mitigated the problematic effects inherent
in a parent-subsidiary acquisition, the burden of proving
unfair dealing was placed with the dissenters. Id. at 502.
See also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937
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(Del.1985). Nonetheless, despite those mitigating factors that
had the effect of handing to the dissenters the burden of
proof on a major issue, the corporation retained the burden of
making a prima facie case that the merger or tender offer price
was fair. 584 A.2d at 505; see note 5 supra. Further, despite
the basic circumstances that triggered additional protections
for the dissenters, those dissenters were still required to carry
a burden of rebutting the corporation's valuation evidence. Id.
at 505; see note 5 supra.
*7  The contrast between Citron and Kahn is useful. In the
latter, there did not exist the mitigating factors that, in the
former, required the dissenters to prove unfair dealing. Rather,
in Kahn, the corporation retained the burden of demonstrating
that the merger was the result of a fair transactional process.
Even under that circumstance, which was more favorable to
the dissenter than in Citron (where mitigating factors operated
to shift the burden on transactional fairness to the shareholder)
and in the case at bar (where the fair dealing issue has not
been raised), the court still looked to the shareholder to satisfy
a burden of rebutting the corporation's evidence on fair value.
Therefore, a review of caselaw from the influential Delaware
jurisprudence reveals that where a corporation presents a
prima facie case that the tender offer price represented the fair
value of the target corporation, the dissenting shareholders
must shoulder the burden of rebutting that valuation evidence.
The court does not construe these cases to suggest that a
corporation bears no burdens on valuation in those cases
where dissenters do not allege that the transaction was
infected by unfair dealing (that is, where there is no claim
that the transactional process was flawed due to culpable
conduct or other factors). The cases simply do not support that
position, and PSC has not presented any separate authority to
that effect.
Therefore, here the court adopts the procedural framework
developed by the Delaware courts. In construing Maine's
dissenting shareholder statutes, the Law Court has freely
drawn on the Delaware models of valuation analysis and has
even integrated new approaches as they have developed in
the Delaware courts, as is demonstrated by the Law Court's
treatment of Weinberger. The body of generally relevant law
that has evolved in Delaware is quite developed, and the
parties at bar have drawn freely on that law. The court finds
it appropriate to adopt the approach of the Delaware courts in
examining the parties' evidence of corporation valuation.6
This approach is not inconsistent with that suggested in
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 Del.Ch. LEXIS 28, at *64
(Feb. 22, 1988), aff'd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del.1989). Construing
its function under the Delaware statute that provides that the
court “shall appraise” the fair value of the dissenter's shares,
the trial court there found that even where the parties have
failed to determine a value (that is, even when the parties have
failed to prove something), the court must make a finding of
value nonetheless. Except in extraordinary cases, corporate
share have some value, and the court must assess that value.
That appraisal can only be conducted on the basis of the
evidence presented by the parties to the dispute, and the
affirmative application of a burden structure, such as that
identified in Kahn, is the conventional and orderly approach
to that task. Perhaps in an unusual case where the court is
completely dissatisfied with the analysis presented by the
parties at bar, the default analysis suggested in Cavalier Oil
would be warranted. That, however, is not the situation here.
B. Historical background (evolution of PSC and development
of merger)
*8  PSC was founded in 1935 by Philip Lown and Max
Kagan, who both were experienced in the shoe industry. The
business was located in Old Town. The company specialized
in the production of moccasins and loafers, and it incorporated
the talents and heritage of members of the nearby Penobscot
community. In the 1940's, PSC developed a product line
that ultimately became known as Trotters. Trotters, in their
essence, were moccasins with integrated fashion features.
These shoes were sold nationally, including at prominent
retail stores. Through the mid 1960's, PSC grew. In 1964,
its gross sales were $13.5 million, and the company was
profitable (its net income exceeded $900,000). The next year,
PSC was converted to a publicly held and traded corporation.
It eventually was sold on the American Stock Exchange.
Through 1968, its sales continued to increase and exceeded
$22 million that year, with net profits of nearly $1.4 million.
Max Kagan died in 1969. For the thirty years following
his death, PSC experienced a cyclical pattern of relative
highs and lows. During that period of time, its annual gross
sales fluctuated between $12 million and $22 million. Due
to fundamental changes in the shoe industry, in 1971 PSC
acquired a foreign importer and began to import shoes.
Despite this, PSC continued its domestic manufacturing
operations for two more years. However, the company
suffered losses in three consecutive years beginning in 1971.
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In 1973, the remaining founder, Lown, wanted to retire.
PSC agreed to permit Lown to redeem his PSC shares but
that redemption was to be preceded by an extension of the
identical offer to all other corporate shareholders. In that way,
shareholders not as closely associated with PSC would have
the first opportunity to take advantage of the same benefit
that might be extended to Lown. Then, if sufficient funds
remained for PSC to acquire Lown's interest, it would do
so-and it did do so. Nearly one-third of PSC's shares were
involved cumulatively in these transactions.
With Lown's retirement, Max Kagan's son, Irving Kagan,
became board chair and CEO. He had been president of the
company since his father's death in 1968, although in reality,
by force of personality, Lown appears to have carried out
many of the responsibilities associated with that position.
When Kagan acquired additional management responsibility
and authority in 1974, PSC began a limited course of
increasing sales and profitability. It developed a private label
business (in which its shoes, given a modified appearance,
were sold under another label, mostly by large retailers), and
it closed the import subsidiary. By 1980, PSC's gross sales
had returned to a level of $22 million, comparable to its sales
in the late 1960's, and its net earnings were $1.7 million, also
comparable to the earlier period of relative success.
However, substantial increases in the domestic sale of
imported shoes caused PSC to have renewed financial
troubles. By 1984, PSC's gross revenues had fallen to nearly
half of its 1980 level, $12 million, and its net income was
$360,000-twenty percent of its 1980 net earnings. However,
with further changes in its strategy (most notably, purchasing
shoe components from foreign manufacturers, using its
domestic facility only for assembling those pieces, and by
terminating its private label production), by 1988, PSC had
swung back to a stronger condition: $18 million in gross sales,
and $1.3 million net earnings. During that time of resurgence,
PSC placed distribution emphasis on independent retailers, as
opposed to the larger retailers (mostly department stores) who
were increasingly drawn toward imported shoes. However,
those independent stores began to play a diminishing role
in the overall retail market, and PSC suffered from that
phenomenon because of its reliance of them. Consequently,
because of that and because of changes in fashion trends,
PSC again experienced a downturn and suffered a three year
period of consecutive annual losses between 1989 and 1991.
The next year, 1992, brought flat sales levels. In 1993, PSC
commissioned an outside entity to conduct an assessment of
its options. In fact, as part of that process, PSC had some
contact with Advest, which was given the investment banker
role in the acquisition at issue here. With alternatives of
liquidation or sale to a third party, PSC chose to continue as
an independent concern. Kagan retired that year from his day-
to-day management responsibilities, although he continued as
a member of the board.
*9  Sales figures though the mid 1990's remained as low as
they had been in recent times (roughly $12 million in gross
sales). Its annual net earnings were less than $250,000. In
1996, PSC developed a three year recovery plan and in fact
met its modest earnings goal the first of those years, when its
gross earnings increased by roughly 20%. In 1997, however,
PSC fell far short of its target despite the best efforts of PSC
personnel. The goal for 1997 was then substituted as the 1998
goal.
As of 1998, Kagan and his sister collectively owned in excess
of 54% of PSC's outstanding shares. Kagan approached the
board of directors in mid-1998 and expressed an interest in
redeeming his shares of the corporation. The board agreed
to consider the option of selling the company to a third
party. Taking advantage of business relationships involving
some of the PSC board members, the board interviewed
representatives of between four and six investment banking
firms. In the late fall of 1998, PSC engaged Advest in that
capacity. Advest's work relating to the PSC sale was led
and coordinated by its employee, Rex Green. Under the
fee arrangement between PSC and Advest, Advest was to
be compensated for its sales efforts based on the amount
that a buyer paid to acquire PSC shares. See Dissenters'
exhibit 49. That compensation (“the success fee”) consisted
of several tiers of percentages tied to that sale price,
supported by a minimum fee of $250,000. The incremental
percentages increased with a higher transaction price. Thus,
Advest's compensation would increase geometrically if PSC's
shareholders received a higher tender offer price. In addition
to the task of acting as a broker in marketing and attempting to
orchestrate a sale of PSC, Advest also agreed to provide PSC
with a fairness opinion regarding the merits of any proposed
sale.
Advest then assembled a list of entities that, from Advest's
view, could have an interest in acquiring PSC. See Dissenters'
Exhibit 72. These prospective contacts included other
businesses in the shoe industry and firms that might have
other reasons to be interested in the acquisition (most
importantly, financial investors who were not otherwise
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associated with the shoe industry). The list resulted from
suggestions made by PSC itself as well as from Advest's
own contacts, its research of other transactions and from
informational sources such as trade associations. From the
final roster of potential interested parties, Advest contacted
more than fifty companies or firms. Of these, fifteen or
twenty potential buyers had enough interest to justify Advest's
submission of a confidential memorandum that provided
those parties with more information about PSC and its
condition. From that group, five or six of those entities
continued in the process.
Ultimately, two shoe companies-Daniel Green Company
(DGC) and Valley Lane Industries Company-made offers to
acquire PSC. Their initial expressions of interest were not the
product of Advest's marketing efforts. In early 1999, Daniel
Green's president, James Reidman, had a telephone call
with PSC's comptroller, David Keane, to express sympathies
for the unexpected death of PSC's president in late 1998.
During that call, Reidman mentioned almost parenthetically
that DGC would have an interest in acquiring PSC if the
opportunity arose. This expression of interest was eventually
relayed to Advest, which then communicated directly with
DGC during the negotiation and sale process. Similarly, a
representative of Valley Lane had some contact with Irving
Kagan, and Kagan referred the matter to Advest.
*10  After the death of PSC's president, Kagan agreed to
return as the company's CEO, and he was compensated
for that work. He declined, however, to become president
again and instead reconfigured that position so that three
senior members of PSC's management, who in turn would
function under Kagan's direction, would discharge the day-
to-day responsibilities of the president. Nonetheless, Kagan
was integrally involved in the operations of the company,
and the court accepts his testimony that, despite the personal
and professional loss that he and others associated with PSC
suffered with the death of the president, he was invigorated by
his renewed involvement in the company.7 Both prior to and
subsequent to his change in roles within the company, Kagan
was closely involved in the developments that ultimately led
to DGC's acquisition of PSC.
PSC's earnings for 1998 (which was treated as the second
year for purposes of the three-year plan, following the
disappointing performance in 1997) and 1999 improved from
the preceding period of time. PSC's decision-makers believed
that its stronger, recent performance put the company in good
position to be acquired on favorable terms.
The first quantified expression of interest for PSC that could
be taken seriously was submitted by DGC in late March
1999. That offer, which followed DGC's review of certain
financial records of PSC under a confidentiality agreement,
was presented at $8.50 per share and was subject to a number
of conditions. See Dissenters' exhibit 83. At that time, the
stock price of PSC shares was at or near that level. That
offer was far below PSC's expectations, and, much to the
unhappiness of Reidman, who had submitted the offer on
behalf of DGC, PSC did not make a counteroffer. Several
weeks later, DGC-on its own initiative-increased its offer to
$10.50. See Dissenters' exhibit 84. Because this offer was
sufficient to maintain PSC's interest, DGC then was permitted
to examine additional PSC financial records as part of its due
diligence analysis. However, in early May, Advest advised
DGC that it was not willing to engage in “formal negotiations
at the $10.50 share valuation” that DGS had proposed earlier.
See Dissenters' exhibit 176.
In the meantime, Valley Lane continued its interest in
acquiring PSC and, in late April, advised PSC that it was
considering a purchase price of somewhere between $9 and
$11.25 per share. See PSC exhibit 28. In early May 1999,
Advest made a formal presentation to Valley Lane regarding
PSC, and Valley Lane representatives were afforded access
to PSC records. After those events, Valley Lane advised PSC
that it was interested in acquiring PSC, but at a price of
$8.50 per share-less than the amount they suggested initially.
See id., exhibit 30. PSC rejected the offer and did not
attempt to pursue the matter with Valley Lane because PSC's
board members felt that is was not in the range where such
discussions were warranted. Nonetheless, because Advest
considered Valley Lane to be a knowledgeable and legitimate
player in the shoe industry, it considered Valley Lane's more
informed assessment, reflected in its reduced offer, to be
instructive of the limited potential for sale. Advest conveyed
this observation to PSC and recommended that PSC intensify
its efforts to deal with DGC.
*11  As part of that process, Advest constructed and
provided DGC with a model that represented the synergistic
virtues of DGC's acquisition of PSC. In early June, PSC
submitted a counteroffer to DGC, consisting of combined
consideration of $11.25 per PSC share, and receipt of as many
as 700,000 shares of DGC corporate stock. See Dissenters'
exhibit 95. DGC then made a further offer of $11 .50 per
share, subject to a $.50 per share earnout that would be
determined on the basis of PSC's financial performance
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through a future date. Throughout this time, however, PSC
was quite wary about PSC's financial condition and was
uncertain whether DGC had the resources necessary to
consummate an acquisition without exposing PSC's investors
to DGC's perceived weaknesses. It appeared that DGC was
having difficulty making the financial arrangements that
could support an offer acceptable to PSC. In this context,
PSC declined to agree to a $1.5 million termination fee that
DGC had sought in the event that the parties could not come
to terms. In fact, even though the prospects of a sale to
DGC were real, Advest recommended that PSC authorize
it to continue to market the company in an attempt to find
a contingent buyer. At that point, however, PSC and DGC
continued their discussions on an ongoing basis. A deal
between PSC and DGC appeared to be increasingly likely, and
Advest did not pursue that alternative course.
In early September 1999, Advest, represented by Green and
several others, met with the PSC board to assess the status
of PSC's negotiations with DGC and, more specifically,
to discuss the merits of the then-existing tender offer of
$11.75 for each share of PSC stock. Advest expressed its
“preliminary opinion” that DGC's tender offer represented the
fair value of PSC shares. See dissenters' exhibit 122 at p. 3.
At some point during 1999, Reidman approached Kagan
directly and proposed to purchase the interest of the Kagan
family members, which constituted a majority of outstanding
shares. Even prior to any discussion about the price Reidman
would be willing to pay for those shares, Kagan promptly
rejected that suggestion because such a transfer would not be
beneficial to all shareholders.
Ultimately, on October 6, 1999, the PSC board of directors
met to consider a sale of PSC to PSC Acquisition Corporation
(with the expectation that the ultimate buyer would be
DGC) based on a tender price offer of $11.75 per share.8
That figure represented was the midpoint of the range that
accompanied the offer in which the earnout was included.
(Several days earlier, PSC had notified Reidman Corporation
that it would accept a tender offer price of $12 per share.
Reidman rejected that demand and replied that it would
not exceed $11.75 per share.) Despite its previous proposal
that involved a transfer of DGC shares, in the end PSC
insisted that DGC acquire its shares with cash and not
through a stock transfer, because of PSC's concerns for
DGC's financial stability. Therefore, PSC rejected alternative
proposals for financing structures that Reidman represented
were backed by personal and other guarantees. At the October
6 board meeting, Advest expressed its opinion that that tender
offer price reflected the fair value of the company's shares.
See Dissenters' exhibit 17. The board members concluded
unanimously that the tender offer price protected the best
interests of the corporation's shareholders and unanimously
approved the proposed agreement. The agreement was subject
to the condition that PSC Acquisition Corp. would acquire
80% of the outstanding shares of PSC corporate stock no later
than November 16. See dissenters' exhibit 176 at “Annex A”
dissenters' exhibit 169.
*12  The agreement was announced publicly the next day.
Pursuant to the agreement, in November PSC Acquisition
Corporation acquired more than 80% of the outstanding
shares of PSC based on the agreed tender offer price. A
shareholders' meeting was held on January 17, 2000, for the
purpose of considering and voting on the planned acquisition.
On that date, the merger was approved. As of then, Nerges
owned 133,300 shares; McCullough owned 12,000; and Buta
owned 3,000.
C. Fair value analysis
The evidence in this case includes the testimony of two
experts in the field of corporate finance: the dissenters' expert,
Raymond Neveu, and PSC's expert, Rex Green. Both experts
examined PSC as a source of investment value. Additionally,
however, in contrast to Neveu's analysis, Green considered
the fair value of PSC on several other bases: how PSC's
value as an entity compared to the values of other publicly
traded corporations in the apparel industry; how it compared
to publicly traded corporations that had been sold in their
entirety within several years prior to January 2000; and PSC's
net asset value. Finally, the experts considered-and rejected-
any suggestion that the inherent, fair value of PSC should be
gauged on the basis of its fair market value. The Delaware
block method prescribed by the Law Court in Libby requires
the court to at least examine the merits of a corporation's
investment, net asset and fair market values. Further, although
the Law Court's expansion of the corporation valuation
methodology, as reflected in its decision in McLoon, does not
specifically endorse either of the two comparative models that
Green has proposed, the court finds that those approaches
certainly fall within the scope of “other generally accepted
and admissible valuation techniques.” McLoon, 565 A.2d at
1003. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider these additional
appraisal tools as well.
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In addition to the testimony of the two expert witnesses,
the trial record includes valuation opinions presented by at
least four witnesses who were not designated as experts but
who were permitted to offer those opinions by virtue of their
ownership of shares of PSC corporate stock. See, e.g., State
v. Doray, 359 A.2d 613, 614 (Me.1976).9 These witnesses
included two of the three dissenting shareholders, and two
former members of PSC management, including Kagan. The
testimony of the dissenters and Kagan in particular10 cannot
be dismissed out of hand, because the dissenters have a
background in the investing world, and because Kagan offers
an intimate knowledge of the PSC's history in the footwear
industry and of its financial track record. However, in the end,
the court concludes not to give weight to the testimony of any
one of them.
The expertise of both Neveu and Green are not susceptible to
reasonable challenge. Although their roles in this case have
a different genesis and although the opinions of both have
their strengths and weaknesses, their basic competence to
offer expertise to bear on the disputed issues is established
on this record and has not been seriously challenged by any
party. On the other hand, none of the other witnesses was even
been designated as an expert, and therefore, in that procedural
context, they were permitted to testify only because of the fact
that they happened to own shares of PSC stock. Thus, from
that procedural perspective, none of the parties has held out
any of these four former shareholders as an expert. In the case
of the dissenters themselves, that means that as parties to this
action they have not even held themselves out as experts.11
This has inherent significance, but it also has an important
procedural consequence. Because they are non-experts but
offering, in essence, expert opinions, the opposing party or
parties are substantially inhibited in their opportunity for
meaningful cross-examination. For example, because these
non-expert witnesses are not subject to the provisions of
Article VII of the rules of evidence, there is no limit to the
basis for their opinions-which, as the court understands Maine
law, they are entitled to present. Thus, during his testimony
about the interplay between PSC's overfunded pension and
the company's overall valuation, Nerges testified that he read
and relied a book on pensions. Similarly, McCollough, a
stockbroker, testified that he conferred with a colleague who
is familiar with retirement accounts, and he also had his wife
talk to store clerks about PSC's brands of shoes. Because of
the informal manner in which that evidence was allowed to
be introduced into the record, PSC was crippled in its ability
to inquire meaningfully about the basis for the resulting
opinions. Conversely, the dissenters would face the same
difficulties in testing the opinions of Kagan and Keane. That
problem has real significance, because the patently uncertain
nature of that underlying information and the impediments to
followup inquiry on cross-examination makes it difficult for
the court to determine how much reliability that information
is entitled to have.
*13  Consequently, because the parties presented the
testimony of clearly qualified expert valuation witnesses,
and because the opinion testimony of the non-experts -
although admissible under Maine law-is more marginal and
potentially misleading due to the absence of real safeguards
that ordinarily accompany expert testimony, the court chooses
not to assign weight to the valuation opinions of those non-
experts.12
Neveu, the dissenters' expert, relied on two intrinsic valuation
methods: the discounted future cash flow model, and
the Damodaran formula.13 PSC's valuation expert also
relied heavily on the former. Additionally, however, Green
considered other methodologies and rested his ultimate
opinion in part on those alternative approaches. The court will
address the several valuation approaches that were used in this
case, beginning with the three that constitute the Delaware
block method endorsed by the Libby Court, followed by the
other methods that were included in the parties' presentations.
1. Stock market price
PSC had been a publicly traded corporation, listed on AMEX,
since the mid 1960's. However, trading of those shares was
very thin. Approximately 1.4 million shares were outstanding
and owned by only 107 shareholders of record. See dissenters'
exhibit 176 at p. 6. Just between themselves, Kagan and his
sister owned more than half of those shares. See dissenters'
exhibit 212 at p. 28 (54.1% of the outstanding shares as of
January 1999). Additionally, Nerges owned nearly another
10% of PSC stock. Id. In large part because of the substantial
proportional holdings in the hands of very few investors,
the trading volume of PSC shares was light. Indeed, during
some weeks, no PSC shares were traded at all. See generally
dissenters' exhibit 122 at p.6.
During the ten year period preceding the acquisition, PSC's
stock price fluctuated between a low of less than $2 per share
(1990), see dissenter's exhibit 17 at p. 35, and a high in excess
of $12, see dissenters' exhibit 176 at p. 5.
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Neither of the experts has attached any weight to PSC's stock
market price in formulating their fair value opinions. Because
of the very thin market associated with PSC stock in public
trading, the court agrees that the market price of PSC does not
embody probative evidence of its fair value. See Libby, 406
A.2d at 64.
2. Market value: comparison of PSC to other publicly held
corporations
One of the several valuation methods used and advocated
by PSC is one in which several important aspects of
PSC's financial condition are compared to those of similar
corporations in the same industry.14 On the basis of those
comparisons, some relative insight can also be drawn to
the value of ownership interest in PSC. This model has
been described helpfully as “valuation by analogy.” Jay
W. Eisenhofer and John L. Reed. Valuation Litigation, 22
Del. J. Corp. L. 37, 118 (1997) (“Eisenhofer”). Using this
approach, Green identified a handful of companies that, in
his judgment, had similar attributes to PSC, and he then
identified a relevant financial feature (“operating results,”
id.) of those comparable companies that could be measured
against a similar feature of PSC. Here, Green used several
such factors, including revenues and EBITDA (the amount
of gross sales or revenue, less the costs of generating that
revenue and general operating assets, see dissenters' exhibit
17 at p. 19, n. 1; Steiner, 5 F.Supp .2d at 1130). Then, a “value
indicator,” see Eisenhofer, supra, such as total enterprise
value (which is the “market value of equity plus debt less cash
and equivalents,” see dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 18) or price
per share, is identified. A ratio is then established between the
comparable's operating results and its known value indicator.
This results in a multiple, or capitalization rate, that can be
applied to the same operating result of the subject corporation
in order to arrive at the same type of value indicator (which
is the unknown, in this equation) for that subject entity.
*14  Here, after Green derived multiples from the group
of comparable corporations, he applied them to PSC and
arrived at a preliminary value per share of PSC stock. Green
then made two adjustments: he increased this raw result to
integrate a control premium, and he then reduced that product
to account for a “small business risk discount.” On the basis
of these computations, he arrived at a value range of $11 to
$13 per PSC share.
In its substance, this general comparative approach is the
same one described by the Libby Court as is used to determine
“investment value.” 406 A.2d at 65-66. As Green pointed out
at trial, this model has qualitative advantages over the other
principal approach used in this case, which is a valuation
method based on an assessment of future earnings and cash
flow. Rather, this comparative market approach is predicated
on ascertainable historical data and does not depend on the
more speculative process of attempting to project future
events and performance. This comparative process measures
investor response to significant financial characteristics of
corporations that have important similarities to the subject
concern and that have a direct relationship to the comparable
company's value indicators. In other words, the process
allows inquiry into how an investor assesses a corporation on
the basis of those salient features that constitute the reasons
for the investor's decision. The analysis then rests on an effort
to replicate that investor behavior to attempt to gain insight
into how the market would treat the subject corporation, based
on the way it did in fact treat the comparables.
However, it also has several inherent weaknesses. First, it
is a market-based analysis. The ultimate objective in this
valuation process is not to determine the fair market value
of PSC, but rather its fair or intrinsic value. However, as
is noted above, the notions of market conduct can never be
divorced entirely from the fair value analysis because, as the
McLoon Court noted, the test is, “What is the best price a
single buyer could reasonably be expected to pay for the firm
as an entirety?” 565 A.2d at 1004. Further, the comparative
market analysis is weakened by the reality that the subject
corporation can and never will be a mirror image of the
comparable companies. Inevitably, there will be differences.
This has implications for at least two steps of the comparative
process: it bears on the choice of comparables,15 and it
bears on the quality of those similarities between the subject
corporation and those entities that are used as comparables.
Here, as comparables, Green selected five corporations that
are part of the footwear industry. See dissenters' exhibit 17
at p. 20. The only objection that the dissenters appear to
press regarding the selection of these comparables is the
inclusion of Maxwell Shoe Company, whose operating results
have the effect of reducing the composite multiples derived
from the group of five comparable corporations.16 As Green
pointed out, however, it is important to consider a small
size company such as Maxwell because PSC itself is small.
Inclusion of Maxwell thus helps to establish some relevance
between the data generated from those comparables and the
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fair value of PSC. Indeed, one could argue credibly that
if a company of Maxwell's size were not included among
the group of comparables, then the remaining corporations
would not be comparable in the first place. See In re:
Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485, 489
(Del. Ch.1991) (considering the relative sizes of comparables
and the subject corporation, in determining whether a valid
comparison may obtain). Therefore, the court finds that the
comparable companies used by Green in this aspect of his
valuation analysis are valid and that the multiples derived
from those companies' financial performance can properly be
applied here.
*15  There are two more significant issues affecting this
comparative analysis: the PSC's performance figures to
which Green applied the multiples that he derived from the
comparable companies; and Green's use of a “small company
risk discount.” Beyond this, there is also the question of
whether it is proper to use a multiple of book value.
(a) Calculation of relevant PSC performance figure
As part of the comparative analysis involving similar
public companies, Green was required to establish figures
that represented particular aspects both of the comparable
companies' performance and of PSC's performance. As is
noted above, two of the three performance categories that
Green used were EBITDA for the last twelve months
(“LTM”) preceding the issuance of the opinion, and net
income both for 1998 and as projected for 1999. In calculating
the EBITDA and net income figures for PSC, Green did
not make specific account for transactions that the dissenters
maintain resulted in extraordinary and nonrecurring gains or
losses.17
This “investment value,” as it is described in Libby, requires
the appraising court to adjust earnings figures so that the
figure is representative of actual sales performance and is not
skewed by gains or losses unrelated to sales performance.
406 A.2d at 65. In fact, during the period covered by the
EBITDA and the 1999 net income figures that Green used in
the comparable analysis, PSC incurred expenses that could
only be described as extraordinary and nonrecurring. These
expenses were associated with the untimely death of PSC's
president, Paul Hanson, at the very end of 199818 and with
the DGC merger transaction itself.
PSC paid a death benefit equivalent to Hanson's annual salary
plus $5,000. On the basis of David Keane's testimony that
Hanson's salary was between $150,000 and $160,000, the
court finds that the death benefits paid by PSC was $160,000.
PSC also incurred merger-related expenses. A portion of
these expenses is shown in dissenters' exhibit 171. The
portion shown there is $635,000. This includes $11,666
(for present purposes, rounded to the nearest thousand) for
the cost of directors' and officers' liability coverage. In
fact, the total premium for that coverage was $70,000. See
dissenters' exhibit 15. Because the record does not establish
that these two figures associated with the insurance coverage
are cumulative, the court will treat the amount noted in
dissenters' exhibit 171 as overlapping with the bill found
in the other exhibit. Although some corporations provide
and pay for this coverage as a matter of course, historically
PSC had affirmatively elected not to obtain such coverage
and instead relied on its own corporate assets to cover any
liability that would be within the scope of such coverage (in
effect, self-insurance). However, specifically because of the
exposure created by the complexities of corporate merger and
acquisition, PSC obtained D and O coverage. Because that
expense was a direct outgrowth of the merger process and
would not have been incurred otherwise, it should be treated
identically to the other merger-related disbursements.
*16  Additionally, PSC incurred merger-related legal fees
of approximately $10,000 beyond the legal fees included
in exhibit 171.19 See dissenters' exhibit 174 (a statement
for legal services prepared subsequent to the creation of
dissenters' exhibit 171.)
Thus, the total amount of PSC's extraordinary and
nonrecurring expenses for the relevant time period is
$863,000 ($160,000 + $635,000-$12,000 + $70,000 +
$10,000).
Identification of these extraordinary and non-recurring
expenses does not end the analysis on this point. In order that
a valid comparison can be drawn between the comparable
companies and PSC on the basis of those performance figures,
they must be calculated the same way. Otherwise, the analogy
fails. Therefore, it is necessary to include extraordinary
and nonrecurring expenses in PSC's earning figures if but
only if the same categories of figures for the comparable
companies also include their extraordinary and nonrecurring
gains and losses. Green testified that he did not factor in PSC's
extraordinary and nonrecurring expenses in part because he
did not know in fact if the figures for those comparable
companies also reflected them.
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Despite this concern, the court concludes that the earnings
figures used by Green should be adjusted to reflect that during
the relevant time periods, PSC incurred in excess of $860,000
in extraordinary and nonrecurring expenses unrelated to the
generation of earnings. At least two reasons support this
result. First, the Libby Court encourages-if it does not require-
this adjustment. Second, the evidence reveals that it is the
common practice for corporations to use such expenses to
offset gross receipts. Indeed, as Keane testified, PSC itself
used the merger-related expenses as offsets against income.
Therefore, in order to create a more accurate basis for
relating PSC's financial performance to that of the comparable
corporations, these expenses should be included.
The treatment of these expenses differs between an analysis
of the EBITDA figure and the net income figure, because the
two figures represent very different concepts. EBITDA means
earnings before taxes and interest payments. PSC's EBITDA
for the twelve months immediately preceding the issuance of
the fairness opinion was $3,364,000. See dissenters' exhibit
17 at p. 19. Because this is the amount of PSC's pre-
tax earnings, the entire amount of the extraordinary and
nonrecurring expenses may properly be added to that amount,
resulting in an adjusted EBITDA of $4,227,000.20 When the
relevant capitalization rate is applied to the difference, there
is an increase of $3.81 per share ($863,000 x 6.2 /1,404,000
shares21) beyond the figure of $17.70 reached by Green,
resulting in a total calculated value per share of $21.51.
A different approach must be used when integrating PSC's
extraordinary and nonrecurring expenses into it 1999 net
income. This figure represents PSC's post-tax earnings. This
is demonstrated by the fact that the 1998 net income figure
of $1,486,000 is set out as the net, post-tax figure included
as historical information in PSC's 1999 financial statement,
which was released on January 14, 2000, prior to the valuation
date. See dissenters' exhibit 178 at cover letter and p. 3.
Therefore, the total amount of PSC's extraordinary and
nonrecurring expenses for 1999 cannot properly be added to
the amount of the company's net income because, without
consideration of the tax liability for those expenses, the net
income would be overstated by the amount of the tax liability.
Before that calculation is made, it should be noted that the
Advest fairness opinion used an estimate of the amount of
PSC's net income for 1999, because the fairness opinion
was finalized prior to the end of PSC's 1999 fiscal year; his
estimate was $2,167,000. See dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 19.
The company's 1999 financial statement provides the actual
figure, $1,678,000, which should be used here. See dissenters'
exhibit 178 at p. 3.
*17  In 1999, PSC's taxable income was $3,154,000. On that,
it paid income taxes of $1,476,000, which reveals an effective
tax rate of 47%. The court is willing to assume that the
same effective tax rate would apply to the extraordinary and
nonrecurring expenses ($863,000), if those expenses had been
subject to taxation. This means that PSC would have retained
$457,000 of the income used to pay those expenses, if the
expenses had not been paid. This net amount must be added
to PSC's actual 1999 net income before the capitalization
rates are applied. The resulting figure is $2,135,000, which is
actually quite close to the figure used by Green because his
projected net income for 1999 ended up too high.
When Green's net income analysis is modified in this way,
it results in a value of $17.18 per share ($2,135,000 x
11.3/1,404,000 shares).
Once a value per share is calculated on the basis of EBITDA
and other performance data, the per share value of any non-
operating assets must then be added. Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at
1128-29. For the reasons noted below, PSC in fact had non-
operating assets in the form of excess cash and marketable
securities. Green has accounted for much of this in his
EBITDA-based calculations. Beyond this, the dissenters do
not argue that his treatment of non-operating capital is flawed.
Thus, the court makes no further adjustments with respect to
this asset.
(b) Small company risk discount
After Green calculated a value per PSC share based on
performance data, he made two further adjustments. First, he
increased that PSC share value by 30% as a control premium.
Then, he reduced that product by a 40% ”small company risk
discount.” Not surprisingly, the dissenters do not challenge
Green's application of a control premium. However, they
argue that the small company risk discount is actually a
marketability or illiquidity discount, which is improper under
Maine law. These discounts are conceptually distinct and
must be considered independently.
“A control premium is an increase in the price of shares
sold as part of a majority block, which someone will pay
in order to gain control of a company.” Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d
at 1124. Here, the multiples that Green derived from the
financial data of the comparable companies ultimately relate
to the value of shares that are traded as part of a minority
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block in those concerns. The goal of the valuation process
at bar is to establish the value of PSC as an entirety and,
from that, to calculate the dissenters' proportional ownership
interest of the entire enterprise. Because a majority or control
block is inherently more valuable than a minority block,
Green reasoned that the initial calculated values of PSC shares
must be adjusted (specifically, increased) by a premium in
order to recognize the inherently more valuable quality of a
controlling ownership, rather than the minority interest that
is the basis for the capitalization rates extracted from the
comparable companies. At least one court has rejected the
use of a control premium. In Steiner, the court concluded
that just as a minority discount understates the intrinsic value
of a block of minority shares, a control premium overstates
it. Id. However, other courts have held that application
of a control premium is a valid method of countering an
“imbedded minority discount” that is inherent in a market
comparable. Bomarko, Inc. v. International Telecharge, Inc.,
794 A.2d 1161, 1186 (Del. Ch.1999). Further, PSC advocates
the use of that premium here, and the dissenters do not
disagree. Therefore, the court adopts Green's use of the
control premium and the level of that premium (30%).
*18  Green then applied what he described as a small
company risk discount to reach his final value of PSC based
on this comparative model. Green explained that PCS was a
small, non-diversified company that posed a greater amount
of risk to investors than do the comparable companies.
Accordingly, to account for this disparity in the nature of the
subject corporation and the comparables, he reduced the value
of a PSC share by 40%. The dissenters argue here that the
small company risk discount is really a disguised minority or
illiquidity discount prohibited by McLoon and that even if it
is as Green claims, it is an improper component of the market
comparable analysis.
The dissenters have called into question the true nature of this
discount. Indeed, the evolution of Advest's fairness opinion
certainly fuels this argument. When Green, as Advest's
representative, met with the PSC board in early September
1999 to offer interim advice on the merits of DGC's offer,
he provided a valuation analysis. That analysis included the
same type of comparative assessment that Advest later used
in the October fairness opinion and that Green used in his
capacity as a valuation expert at trial. As part of Advest's
presentation at the September 7 board meeting, the board was
presented with the following observation: “Given the relative
lack of liquidity in the public marketplace for PSO's [PSC's]
stock, a discount to other comparable companies of 20%-45%
is appropriate.” Dissenters' exhibit 122 at p. 10. Further,
in a footnote to some quantitative data submitted to the
board, Advest noted: “A number of institutionally accepted
valuation studies suggest that reasonable marketability or
illiquidity discounts for shares of a public companies [sic]
with market characteristics similar to PSO [PSC] generally
range between 20% and 45%.” Id. at p. 11, n.2. As is discussed
below in connection with the question of whether the tender
offer price is indicative of fair value, Kagan and his sister
owned a controlling block of PSC shares. Therefore, the
remaining shares-those traded on the market-were necessarily
minority shares. This historical lack of liquidity in the market
noted by Advest must be seen as a reference to those minority
shares. If so, because that illiquidity is associated only with a
minority interest, and it cannot be injected into the fair value
analysis.
Further, despite this analysis offered in September, one month
later when Advest issued its formal and final fairness opinion,
the same market comparison analysis made no reference
to marketability or liquidity discounts. Rather, the only
discount, which, as noted, was 40%-within the range of the
marketability/illiquidity discount invoked a month earlier-
for the “small business risk discount.” Such a discount had
not been part of the comparative analysis presented to the
board at the September 7 meeting. Seeing a similar discount
factor but apparently different explanations for that discount,
the dissenters contend that the small business risk discount
is actually a marketability or illiquidity discount that was
condemned by the McLoon Court and that the change in labels
was Advest's (and Green's) attempt to disguise the error.
*19  At trial, Green testified that the liquidity reference
was erroneous and that he intended to integrate into the
comparables analysis the notion that investments in small
cap companies are riskier than investments into larger cap
companies. The court need not resolve the issue as it has been
framed here because even if this aspect of the fairness opinion
truly rests on a small business risk discount, PSC has not
demonstrated here that the discount is a proper element of the
market comparison analysis.22
The Law Court's decision in McLoon adopted the post-
Delaware block valuation framework set out by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Weinberger. 565 A.2d at 1003. Weinberger,
in turn, adopted the following standard for acceptable
valuation methods: “We believe that a more liberal approach
must include proof of value by any techniques or methods
that are generally considered acceptable in the financial
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community and otherwise admissible in court, subject only to
our interpretation of” Delaware's statute requiring the judicial
appraiser to establish “fair value.” 437 A.2d at 713.
At trial, Green explained the conceptual basis for applying
the small business risk discount, which is noted above. The
dissenters pressed him to identify any authority that supported
or advocated the use of the discount in the analytical context
of market comparables. The Advest fairness opinion, which is
the basis for Green's own opinion, stated that there are “widely
accepted studies” supporting the use of a small business risk
discount. See dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 17. However, earlier,
when Green was deposed during pretrial discovery, he said
that he used the discount because it was fair and reasonable
to do so. During that deposition, Green also testified that he
was not aware of any treatise or other authority that supported
the use of a 40% small company risk discount. At trial, Green
said that in fact the small company risk discount is a method
approved by Ibbotson, an acknowledged expert in the field.
Then, Green retreated and clarified that Ibbotson's work does
not support the use of a small company risk discount in a
company-to-company comparison. In the end, although given
full opportunity to do so, and forewarned of the issue prior to
trial, Green was unable to identify any recognized authority
to support the application of a small business risk discount in
this valuation method.
In attempting to defend his use of the discount, Green referred
to studies conducted by Advest itself, in which publicly
traded corporations were segregated into ten groups (deciles),
ranked by relative levels of capitalization. The smallest group
was itself then bifurcated. PSC was one of those 5% lowest
capitalized corporations. Because the price-earnings ratios of
the smallest groups were found to be smaller than those ratios
associated with the largest corporations, Green argues that
the risk factor for investments in the former is greater and
therefore justifies the discount he used here.
*20  As a matter of weight, however, the court is not
persuaded by that analysis. The court is troubled by Green's
unsuccessful effort to associate the discount with recognized
authority. Beyond the difficulties created by this testimony,
the evidence is that a leading scholar in the field in fact has
not recognized the use of a small company risk discount in
a comparable companies valuation approach (despite Green's
incorrect and subsequently retracted testimony that he had).
Advest's proprietary information associated with the decile
analysis is not convincing on this record. There may be
many reasons for the phenomenon of differing P/E ratios.
More importantly, if the creation and application of a small
company risk discount is as obvious as Green suggests and
flows from basic notions of reasonableness, then one would
expect someone such as Ibbotson-or any other authority in
the field-to have endorsed that method. Despite the fact that
Green was put on notice at his deposition that this issue would
be used at trial to challenge his opinion, he was unable to
correctly identify any such authority during trial.
It is worthy of note that the Libby Court did affirm application
of a discount when the multiples of comparable companies
were applied to the relevant feature of the subject company.
406 A.2d at 66. This discount was justified because the
subject company “had lagged well behind all three of its
competitors [the comparables] in all the areas investigated....”
Id. Here, in contrast, Green created and applied a small
business risk discount not because of the relative quality of
PSC as gauged against such factors as used in Libby (“sales,
profit margins, inventory turns, capital spending history, and
dividends records,” id.). Rather, the discount arose entirely
from the differential between the naked size of PSC and that
of the common or average size of the comparables. As is
noted above, PSC has not presented persuasive evidence that
an appraiser may properly discount the value of a company,
relative to the value of others, due to size alone. The analysis
proposed here by PSC is therefore not supported by Libby.
On the basis of these circumstances, the court concludes that
PSC has not demonstrated that the application of a small
business risk discount is a proper valuation method in a
company-to-company comparison. Therefore, the court does
not accept the results of that application.
Green testified that if the small business risk discount is not
used, then application of the control premium is brought into
question. However, as he himself explained at trial, the two
adjustments are distinct, and the evidence does not reveal
a persuasive reason why if one discount cannot be applied
properly, the other is also unavailable.
For these reasons, the court concludes that the control
premium may properly be used as an upward adjustment
of the value of PSC's shares when compared to similar
companies in the industry but that PSC has not demonstrated
that a small company risk discount is proper. Tracking the
chart included in Advest's October 1999 fairness opinion, see
dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 19, the implied values per share of
PSC stock are therefore as follows:
*21  •TEV multiples of LTM sales: $15.73
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•TEV multiples of LTM EBITDA: $27.9623
•Multiples of net income, 1998 sales: $17.03
•Multiples of net income, 1999 sales (actual): $22.33.24
There is no apparent and compelling reason to give greater
weight to any of these values over the others. Thus, the court
uses the mean, namely, $20.76, as the result of this analysis.
(c) Book value multiple
One of the five comparable measures that Advest and Green
used in this valuation approach was a multiple based on book
value. For the reasons set out below, the evidence does not
justify reliance on a book value appraisal analysis. Therefore,
the court does not find the book value-based comparison to
carry any probative weight, and the court disregards it as an
element of the comparable measure.
3. Net asset value
As is noted above, Neveu did not engage in a distinct analysis
of PSC's net asset value.25 On the other hand, during his trial
testimony, Green assessed PCS's net asset value and in fact
placed some weight on that value in determining his opinion
of PSC's overall fair value. As of the end of PSC's 1998-99
fiscal year, which was near the end of November 1999, the
corporation's balance sheet revealed a net asset book value
of $13,292,000. See dissenters' exhibit 178 at p. 2. As Green
analyzed the data shown on that balance sheet, he did not
know if the stated value of PSC's real estate holdings was at
a fully depreciated amount.26 (The book value of an asset is
calculated by subtracting that asset's book depreciation from
its historical cost. Libby, 406 A.2d at 67.) In an effort not
to understate the value of those assets, Green then added
a real estate appraiser's opinion of value for the real estate
and buildings to the net asset book value shown on the
corporation's balance sheet. Dividing the sum of those figures
by the number of outstanding shares, Green arrived at a NAV/
share value of $10.36.
This analysis, however, is affected by a number of significant
problems. First, it appears that the value assigned to PSC's
assets in the 1999 balance sheets are those assets' book value.
As is noted in the introductory section to this opinion, the Law
Court has made clear that book value is a distinct concept
from market value and thus does not provide a meaningful
insight into the actual value of the corporation, when the
corporation is valued on the basis of its real holdings. Libby,
406 A.2d at 66-67.
Second, it appears that the basis for Green's financial analysis
would reveal PSC's liquidation value, rather than its true
NAV. A full and proper NAV analysis must account for
the corporation's intangible assets, Libby, 406 A.2d at 66,
such as its intellectual property and goodwill. See Radiology
Associates, 611 A.2d at 496. Rather, the assets that are
categorized in PSC's balance sheet appear to be limited to
tangible assets. During his testimony, Green acknowledged
that his view of NAV would represent a component of fair
value that would be realized only if the corporation ultimately
failed. A liquidation value is obviously even more limited
than a NAV, which, as is noted below, is regarded as a
particularly inappropriate valuation method for a corporation
in PSC's circumstances. Thus, when NAV is seen more fully,
as the Libby Court treated it, as the combined net values of
both tangible and intangible assets, then Green's calculations
may significantly understate the proper net asset value of
PSC.
*22  Third, when Green supplemented PSC's balance sheet
with appraised values of the land and buildings owned
by the corporation, he used figures developed by a real
estate appraiser, Guy Chapman, who, well after January
2000, was retained to develop a fair market value that the
assets would have had as of October 6, 1999. Conceptually,
that process is valid: there is no reason why a value
cannot be established post hoc. Of the several appraisal
methods available to Chapman, he ultimately relied on the
sales or market approach. This called for him to examine
transactions of properties that he deemed comparable and
then to make adjustments based on differences between the
comparable properties and the subject properties, resulting
in a translation that would provide insight into the terms
of a hypothetical sale of those subject properties. For both
PSC parcels, he considered the same group of comparables
and ultimately selected seven of them. However, one of the
seven comparables was the subject of a sale that occurred
in July 2000-well after the January 2000 valuation date. For
the reasons discussed earlier in this order, the valuation of
PSC must be determined on the basis of information that
was available as of the valuation date. It is significant that
Chapman indicated that the property sold in July 2000 was
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the best comparable of the ones he used. See PSC exhibit
60 at p. 37; PSC exhibit 61 at p. 39. The remaining six
transactions used by Chapman occurred prior to the valuation
date. However, the improper comparison appears to have
carried particular weight in Chapman's analysis, and the court
declines to speculate about opinions that Chapman might
have reached if he had not considered the post-valuation date
sale. In the greater scheme of things, it is possible that this
flaw in the NAV analysis is not of great significance, because
the additional value attributable to the two parcels of property
is less than 10% of the total NAV assigned by Green to PSC,
and any adjustments of that figure required by the improper
basis for Chapman's opinion would not negate the fact that
the two parcels have some value. Nonetheless, it is a matter
of note.
Fourth, it is curious that when Advest conducted its fairness
analysis and submitted its fairness opinion to the PSC
board, it did not consider or rely on a NAV approach.
Rather, Advest formulated its opinion on the basis of two
categories of market comparables (namely, comparisons to
other publicly held corporations, and comparisons to recent
corporate acquisitions) and on a discounted future cash flow
model. Green spearheaded Advest's work with PSC both in
orchestrating the acquisition of the company by DGC and in
submitting the fairness opinion that directly encouraged the
PSC board to approve the transaction. Therefore, although
Green was integrally involved in those pre-merger events,
neither he nor any other Advest representative considered
the NAV approach. At trial, however, it played a modest but
nonetheless affirmative role in his valuation assessment. The
court can only infer that if the NAV assessment is helpful in
shedding light on the value of PSC as an entity, Green and
Advest would have seen fit to consider it earlier.
*23  Finally and most importantly, the NAV model must be
treated with extraordinary caution in the circumstances of this
case because of the nature of PSC's business. It is uniformly
recognized that a corporation is most valued, not for the
proportional beneficial interest in its assets that a shareholder
acquires upon purchase of shares of stock, but rather for
its forward-looking investment benefit. See, e.g., Libby, 406
A.2d at 66-67. There are exceptions to this fundamental rule.
For example, when “a corporation is undergoing an actual
liquidation,” it is proper to consider its NAV. Hansen v. 75
Ranch Co., 957 P.2d 32, 42 (Mont.1998). This, of course,
is because when a company is liquidated, it does not offer
the promise of a future income stream and has value only
for those existing assets that are to be sold. Additionally, if
corporate assets include “significant natural resource assets
or ... significant non-operating assets,” then the corporation's
NAV is entitled to meaningful weight. Radiology Associates,
611 A.2d at 496. However, the NAV valuation model is
particularly inappropriate for manufacturing and service
industries. Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1137. The nature of PSC's
business is clearly distinguishable from those where NAV
has been given evidentiary significance in valuation cases,
and, in fact, PSC clearly falls into the category of corporate
concerns where NAV is affirmatively regarded as an improper
valuation tool.
When the conceptual objection to NAV assessment is
combined with the specific analytical problems that apply
to this particular case, the court concludes that NAV is
not a proper factor in determining PSC's fair value. If the
NAV approach in this case were supported by better quality
evidence, then the court might have been inclined to give
that valuation evidence some weight. Although the amount of
that weight would not be significant, the long-term history of
PSC was not particularly dynamic: its financial performance
had been contained within well-defined parameters and the
best efforts of management had not allowed PSC, as Kagan
described it, to break into the footwear industry on a larger
scale. Indeed, several years prior the DGC acquisition,
the PSC board had given some thought to the option of
liquidation, although, of course, that option was not pursued.
However, history is a guide in some measure, and in principle
an assessment of PSC's fair value should not disregard the
value of its assets. However, for the reasons noted here, there
are too many problems with the quality of the NAV analysis
to allow its results to play a role in the ultimate valuation
question.
4. Discounted future cash flow value
Both Neveu and Green assessed the fair value of PSC shares
on the basis of a discounted future cash flow analysis. Indeed,
Neveu rested his opinion largely on this valuation method,
although he also considered the Damodaran model discussed
below. The discounted future cash flow method is viewed
as a legitimate valuation analysis, Radiology Associates, 611
A.2d at 490; Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1129; see also McLoon,
565 A.2d at 1003 (noting the trial court's consideration of
a discounted cash flow analysis as part of the assessment
of a corporation's investment value), and that legitimacy is
not questioned here. In fact, when the Delaware Supreme
Court opened up the scope of acceptable valuation analyses
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in Weinberger, the discounted future cash flow analysis was
one of the two methods of assessment that the trial court was
instructed to consider on remand. 457 A.2d at 712, 714. Even
a casual survey of court opinions in stock valuation cases
demonstrates that is a commonly used method.
*24  The discounted future cash flow valuation analysis
is ultimately intended to determine, as its name suggests,
the present value of earnings that the subject corporation
will generate in the future. In this way, it is a qualitatively
different analysis than the other investment value methods,
namely, the market and acquisition comparables, because the
latter approaches rest on the subject company's past earnings.
Instead, the discounted future cash flow analysis is predicated
on projections of future performance. The subject company
is then assumed currently to have the value of those future
earnings, discounted to their present value.
There are several discrete steps in the discounted future cash
flow analysis. The first step of this valuation method is to
estimate the net cash flow over a future period of time (“the
projection period”). Radiology Associates, 611 A.2d at 490.
In evaluating the accuracy of these projections, the court may
consider whether the subject company's management was
involved in their formulation. Id. When forecasting future
net earnings, is also appropriate to consider the company's
earnings history and the condition of the industry as a whole.
Citron, 584 A.2d at 509.
Next, the appraiser must establish a residual or terminal value,
which is the sum of future net earnings for the lifetime of
the corporation not including and subsequent to the projection
period, reduced to their future value as of the end of the
projection period. Radiology Associates, 611 A.2d at 490,
492.
Third, the present value of the sum of the future net earnings
for the projection period, and the future value of the terminal
value must be established. This is accomplished through the
application of a discount rate which is equivalent to the cost
of capital, “that is, the interest rate at which the company
would have to invest the ‘present value’ in order to have the
projected future value at the end of the projection period.”
Steiner, 5 F . Supp.2d at 1132.
Finally, if the subject corporation has non-operating assets,
then the value of those assets must be added to that part of
the company's value that is based on the discounted future
cash flow, because any such non-operating assets would not
otherwise be taken into account in a model that is based
entirely on the company's capacity to generate earnings
through its business operations. Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1136;
Radiology Associates, 611 A.2d at 495.
(a) Future earnings and growth rate
During its lifetime, PSC sold and sometimes manufactured
one line of shoes, Trotters. Certain styling features of those
shoes would be changed to update them and to accommodate
fashion trends and interests. Nonetheless, there was no change
in PSC's base product. However, during the several years
leading up to the acquisition, PSC had been developing
a second line of footwear called Softwalk. When DGC
acquired PSC, Softwalk was about to be introduced into the
marketplace; PSC had planned to initially offer the Softwalk
line in spring 2000, which was half a year following the
valuation date. See dissenters' exhibit 101. The prospective
performance of this new line of shoes clearly complicates
the task of attempting to project PSC's future earnings as of
January 2000. As late as October 1, 1999, the PSC board
recognized “that any estimate of future performance [based
on the Softwalk line] was preliminary and speculative.” See
dissenters' exhibit 138 at p. 2. At the very least, it creates
uncertainty about the amount of sales that Softwalk and
PSC as a whole would generate, and it also has an impact
on PSC's balance sheet, which, in turn, reflects on PSC's
cash flow. In assessing the witness' projections of future
earnings, Green has had some advantage because he consulted
with PSC management regarding its expectations for PSC's
performance when Softwalk was to be presented to the public.
See Radiology Associates, 611 A.2d at 490. Additionally,
although projected earnings should not be based simply on
averages of past earnings data, Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1130-
particularly in the circumstances at bar, where a new product
line was to be introduced-, a company's earnings history
and the condition of the industry as a whole are proper
considerations, as is noted above. Citron, 584 A.2d at 509.
*25  The court finds Green's earnings and cash flow
projections for the projection period to be reasonable.
For 2000, he projected a significant net loss. This is
largely because of a substantial investment for non-cash
working capital. This has two components: a large build-
up of inventory, and accounts receivable. Both are closely
associated with a new product line. By the beginning of PSC's
2000 fiscal year, PSC had established a large inventory of
Softwalks in preparation for distribution to retailers. One
would expect that as Softwalk shoes were introduced on
the market and, PSC hoped, created consumer interest, there
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would be a demand for those shoes that might diminish
over time after those consumers purchased their shoes. In
order to ensure availability of Softwalks during the early
marketing efforts, PSC needed to maintain a strong inventory.
Otherwise, possible purchasers would lose interest in the
shoes. Accordingly, Green has anticipated that PSC would
need to spend a lot of cash to purchase27 the shoes that
would constitute an inventory. Over the projection period,
this expense fell considerably. This evolution is reflected in
Green's projections.
PSC anticipated that sales of Softwalk shoes would become
a significant part of its overall sales. In 1998, gross sales
attributable to Softwalks were expected to increase by $10
million over two years once the line was introduced. See
dissenters' exhibit 35. Green's projections have accounted
for this, as shown in the increase in sales from 2000 (when
Softwalks were going to be made available to the public) to
2002. Green forecasted continuing increases in sales volume
beyond that time.
Approximately one week prior to the issuance of Advest's
fairness opinion, Green had prepared a draft of that analysis.
See dissenters' exhibit 1. There is a difference in the amounts
assigned to non-cash working capital between the two
documents. See id. at p. 32; dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 32.
Green did not have a particularly satisfactory explanation
for those differences, speculating only that during that one
week interim he had had further conversations with PSC's
comptroller, who provided further information that made
its way into the final fairness opinion. That possibility is
certainly not out of the question, because the evidence
establishes that Green had substantial contact with senior PSC
representatives regarding the company's financial condition.
Nonetheless, Green's speculation remains just that. On the
other hand, there is no meaningful difference in the ultimate
assessment of present value as between the draft opinion and
the opinion in its final form. Thus, the court does not attach
significance to the internal substantive differences between
those charts. However, Green's inability to explain the reason
why he made those challenges does not escape notice.
Although Green's analysis is not without the general concerns
that are inevitable with financial projections that rest on
untested product lines, Neveu's analysis of future earnings,
see dissenter's exhibit 163, is far more problematic. First, he
leaves no accommodation for a large inventory. Beyond that,
and more importantly, Neveu chose to use an extraordinarily
high future growth rate of nearly 40%. To calculate a growth
rate, Neveu considered only the cash flow for 1999, as
revealed in PSC's historical documents, and then, in order to
derive a rate, a portion of the 2000 fiscal year performance.
However, little or no reliable information about the 2000 year
performance was available as of the valuation date. It appears
that Neveu used information that was created after the end of
the first quarter of PSC's fiscal year in late February 2000.
Because this information could not have been known as of the
valuation date, it cannot be the basis for a valuation as of that
earlier date.
*26  Further, Neveu disregarded PSC's cash flow from
1996, 1997 and 1998. These omitted data are significant,
because in each of those years, PSC suffered net losses,
when measured by cash flow. The court accepts Neveu's
explanation that his discounted cash flow model cannot
accommodate negative cash flows and, for that reason, he did
not consider them. However, this limitation of the model used
by Neveu demonstrates why it is inappropriate in this setting.
In order to determine a growth rate, Neveu could only use a
highly limited and misleading set of data as his foundation and
was forced to disregard other highly probative information
that, if considered, would have painted a very different picture
of PSC's financial standing and growth prospects. For the four
years of growth that can be established historically (1996-99),
PSC's total cash flow was $567,000. On the other hand, for
the next four years (most of the projection period defined by
Neveu), PSC would have an actual cumulative cash flow of
$17,369,000-an increase of 3,000%.28 In the court's view, this
is simply not realistic. Rather, as is shown by the Libby Court's
examination of the subject company's past earnings, 406 A.2d
at 65, losses can be considered in determining the value of a
corporation. The factual limitations imposed by Neveu mean,
in short, that he has not “cover [ed] a sufficient period to
show the settled condition of things.” Libby, 406 A.2d at 65,
n. 11, quoting Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations
376 (1953). “The “quality of the projection as to the future
benefits over some period ... is central to the reliability of the
underlying methodology of the discount cash flow method.”
Radiology Associates, 611 A.2d at 490. The quality of the
foundation for Neveu's projections, because it is limited in
time and selective in data, is poor.
Neveu recognized that a growth rate of nearly 40% was not
sustainable. Therefore, in order to avoid an analysis that was
predicated on such a growth rate, he steadily decayed that
growth rate by 10% per year and, after five years, projected
no growth at all. The court finds that this reduction or
decay in the initial growth rate is arbitrary. Neveu testified
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that he is unfamiliar with the growth rate in the footwear
industry but has a “vague” understanding that the industry
is not characterized by strong growth, except in the sneaker
market, which would not include PSC. Instead, the court
views Neveu's use of a declining growth rate as an adjustment
that is obviously triggered by an incorrect starting point: an
initial growth rate that is not reasonable or realistic.
This issue has another consequence of significance. Because
Neveu starts with an excessive growth rate which he then
scales back over the course of time, his cash flow projections
are front-loaded: although those projected cash flow values
increase over time, they are higher in the near term than they
should be. The compounded discount rate is less in early years
than it is later on. Thus, cash flow figures closer in time to
the valuation date are subject to a smaller reduction when
discounted to their present values. This creates a cumulative
cash value that is higher than the evidence warrants.
*27  For these reasons, based on the totality of the evidence
pertinent to the determination of future cash flows, the court
finds Green's analysis to be more reliable, and the court uses
his forecasted cash flows for the projection period.
(b) Terminal value
The terminal values (that is, the sum of all earnings following
the projection period, reduced to its present value as of the
end of that projection period) used by Green and Neveu are
remarkably close: Green calculated $23,465,000, and Neveu
calculated $24,505,000. For the reasons noted above, the
witness' approaches used to reach these figures may have been
quite different, but the results are similar.
(c) Discount rate
Once the amounts of PSC's future cash flow can be assessed
for the projection period and then added to the terminal or
residual value, then that calculation must be brought back
to its present value.29 As is noted above, the discount rate,
when applied to the corporation's future earnings to determine
their present worth, is the “interest rate at which the company
would have to invest the ‘present value’ in order to have the
projected future value at the end of the projection period.”
Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1132. Putting it another way, the
discount rate is the rate of return necessary to persuade an
investor to participate in the flow of future earnings and still
assume the risk associated with that investment. Here, Neveu
arrived at a discount rate, which he properly described as a
cost of capital, see Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1132, of 15.51%.
Advest and Green used a rate that started at roughly 20%.
Because a discount rate is a measure of assessing the risks
of investing, the relative level of risk associated with that
particular investment must be recognized. Both Green and
Neveu took PSC's small size into consideration.30 Even
beyond this, however, the risks generated by the unique
characteristics and condition of the subject corporation
must be taken into consideration. This particularized risk
assessment is accomplished though the use of beta, which
quantitatively embodies the company's individual level of
investment risk in relation to the market in general. Steiner, 5
F.Supp.2d at 1134. As the witnesses explained, a beta factor
of 1 is equivalent to the level of risk in the market as a whole.
See also id. A beta in excess of 1 represents a greater level
of risk than the market poses. Thus, a higher beta creates a
higher discount rate and a smaller present value because of
the greater level of risk associated with that investment. The
beta is then applied to the amount of risk that the market poses
generally, in excess of investments that are deemed risk-free.
Unfortunately (and surprisingly), despite the fact that the
identification of beta is an important step in the process of
determining a discount rate, at trial Green was unable to state
the beta that he and Advest used to arrive at their discount
rate of roughly 20%. He was able to testify, however, that
it was a higher beta than the one employed by Neveu. The
difference in the resulting discount rates used by those witness
supports that general observation. Neveu used a beta of 0.5.
This means that he created a discount rate on the premise that
an investment in PSC posed half of the systematic risk that
an investor would encounter in an alternative investment with
the characteristics of the Standard and Poors index. The court
finds that this beta is too low to adequately reflect the risk of
investing in PSC and that the beta used by Green and Advest-
whatever it may have been-is better suited to PSC, for the very
reason that it was higher than 0.5.
*28  Industry sources have established betas for many
publicly traded corporations. PSC, however, was not one of
them. In light of that problem, Neveu used the beta that
represents the footwear industry as a whole. The court finds
that this is an analytical flaw that calls all subsequent steps
into question. The trial record clearly establishes that PSC was
a very small corporation in terms of its capitalization, sales
or any other relevant measure. PSC was a participant in what
Kagan described as a “very tough industry.” Further, until
Softwalk came along, its market presence was remarkably
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undiversified because it had only one line of shoes (with some
cosmetic variations within a very limited range). Softwalk
was to be PSC's second product line, but as of the valuation
date, it was utterly untested. There was legitimate concern
that Softwalk might appeal to existing Trotters customers,
thereby damaging sales of Trotters. If Softwalk proved to be
successful, then PSC would have the economic benefits of
that alternative commercial draw. On the other hand, PSC had
made a substantial financial commitment to the new Softwalk
line, as is demonstrated by the high level of non-cash working
capital allocated by PSC in and shortly prior to 1999, and
as evidenced by the additional non-cash working capital that
Green reasonably projected for 2000 and beyond. With high
expectations for and commitment to a new product, the risk
grows commensurately.
The discount rate created by Advest and used by Green
incorporated the varying levels of risk associated with the
two product lines: the market risk for Trotters was relatively
low because it was well-established (although it had not been
sufficient to allow PSC to break out of it historically small
market share), while the risk for Softwalk was higher because
it was unproven. Advest took into account these disparate
factors and blended them. Compared to Neveu's analysis, this
approach is more sensitive to PSC's particular condition.
In this context, it is also important to recognize the historical
patterns of earnings discussed above as part of the factual
background leading to the acquisition. As Kagan succinctly
stated, despite innovations, persistence, and a high level of
attentiveness and responsiveness to market conditions over
many years, PSC had never been able to break out of a well-
defined range of earnings. Indeed, some thought had been
given to liquidation of the company several years prior to
the board's decision to seek a buyer. The company's situation
was made more difficult because of the unexpected death
of its president in late 1998. Although a leadership structure
was created, this was not a long-term solution. See dissenters'
exhibit 6 at p. 4 (minutes of September 7, 1999, PSC board
meeting, referring to Kagan's “temporary status as acting
CEO ...”). Kagan was willing to serve as an overseer of
a triumvirate of management personnel, but he also had
decided not to re-immerse himself into the business' day-
to-day operations. See generally note 6 supra. This is a
circumstance that bears on risk.
*29  As Neveu himself recognized when testifying about the
company's growth rate, PSC is not typical or representative of
the players in the footwear industry. Nonetheless, Neveu used
a risk factor is that is typical within the industry.31 From this,
the court concludes that a beta of 0.5 is not a fair assessment
of the investment risk that was found in PSC, when that
beta is measured against the industry or against the Standard
and Poors index, which consists of large and well-diversified
concerns.32
This issue is one of consequence. Using the security market
line formula underlying Neveu's calculations of the discount
rate, see dissenters' exhibit 161, if the beta for PSC were
increased only from 0.5 to 1.0 (the level of risk associated
with S & P), then the resulting discount rate is 18.8%, which
is comparable to the rate used by Advest and Green.
The dissenters note that Advest once used a discount rate of
12% for PSC. See dissenters' exhibit 46 at p.9. This, however,
was part of the “pitch document” that Advest used when the
PSC board was considering several investment banking firms,
including Advest, to represent its interest in these sales efforts.
It certainly does not reflect well on Advest or Green that they
offered what appears to be a serious financial analysis on the
basis of numbers that Green later rejected as “preposterous”
at trial. However, even Neveu's proffered discount rate is not
that low. More importantly, the reliable evidence presented
at trial demonstrates that the beta used by Neveu and the
discount rate he reached on the basis of that beta are too low,
and that the beta is best represented by a higher number.
The court readily acknowledges that this analysis less than
completely satisfactory because the record does not disclose
the beta used in the Advest/Green calculations. However, it is
known that the beta used in the fairness opinion is higher than
that used by Neveu, and the beta used by Neveu is problematic
because, when seen in the light of extrinsic circumstances, it
is too low. Therefore, to this extent, the record does allow an
assessment of the relative merits of the competing positions.
Thus, the record reveals that the better calculated present
value of future cash flow, including the terminal value, is
$12,618,000.
(d) Value of non-operating assets
The final step of the valuation method based on discounted
cash flow is to account for the value of non-operating assets.
Green and Neveu have differing opinions on the value of
those assets. Those assets are in three forms: cash, marketable
securities and an overfunded pension account.
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First, Neveu concluded that PSC had cash reserves of
$1,713,000. Of this, he concluded that PSC would need
$500,000 as operating capital and that the balance was
therefore excess. Neveu acknowledged a measure of
arbitrariness in this allocation. However, even setting this
problem aside, the evidence does not support this cash total
figure. The most reliable source of information for PSC's
financial condition as of the valuation date is the company's
annual financial report that shows its cash condition as of
the end of its fiscal year in late 1999, roughly one and a
half months prior to the valuation date. As of then, PSC had
$504,000 in cash and cash equivalents-the amount that Neveu
opined PSC needed for its ongoing operations. See dissenters'
exhibit 178 at p. 2. Instead, Neveu apparently used a projected
balance sheet that indicated that at the end of the 2000 fiscal
year (the end of November 2000), PSC would have cash of
$1,728,000. See dissenters' exhibit 248. Even if this document
had been in existence or the information available as of the
valuation date, the datum used by Neveu is not probative of
PSC's cash reserves at the relevant time. In fact, that balance
sheet suggests that PSC had no cash reserves during the first
quarter, which is when the valuation date fell.
*30  The end of year financial report shows that PSC's
marketable securities had a value of $3,985,000 as of late
November 1999. There is no evidence that these assets
constituted working capital that meaningfully contributed to
PSC's ability to conduct its business.33 Rather, the assets were
a form of financial security but not the basis for earnings.34
Both Green and Neveu treated these securities in this manner.
In the fairness opinion, Advest used a value ($4,342,000)
for non-operating assets that existed as of the end of PSC's
third quarter, which fell at the end of August 1999. Although
the end of year figures were available on the valuation date
and, obviously, at the time of trial, Green did not attempt
to make any adjustment of the figures used in the fairness
opinion. The court infers that Green saw no importance in
any such adjustment, and the court follows suit. It should be
noted, however, that although the value of PSC's investment
portfolio fell during the fourth quarter, the amount its debt
rose. The net effect is thus quite small. Nonetheless, the court
accepts the value of PSC's non-operating income as used by
Advest, and this amount must be added to the present value
of the company's future earnings.
Finally, PSC had accumulated a pension plan that became
overfunded. Fully aware of that situation, PSC management
explored the alternatives presented by that situation. Those
alternatives included eliminating future pension contributions
from employees, enhancing benefits and refunding a portion
of the overfunding to the employees. In the end, PSC elected
to maintain the account, eliminate employee contributions
and enhance benefits. The overfunded amount was not
included among the company's assets on its balance sheets.
PSC's investigation made it clear that due to excise taxes and
other consequences, the company stood to gain very little-
perhaps 10% of the overfunded amount-by liquidating the
account. This meant that the overfunded account was more
valuable to PSC (and to any potential buyer of PSC) as an
asset directly involved in its personnel operations. Therefore,
the court declines to treat all or part of PSC's overfunded
pension account as a non-operating assets whose value should
be included separately.
(e) Conclusion
For the reasons noted above, from the best available evidence,
the court concludes that as of the valuation date the present
value of PSC's future cash flow was $12,618,000. When
the amounts of debt, non-operating assets and reasonably
anticipated stock option proceeds are considered, PSC's total
implied value was $16,654,000, or $11.86 per share.
As the court has noted in this discussion, the process that leads
to this conclusion is not without problems. These problems
do not undermine the probative value of the conclusion but
rather must be borne in mind when it comes time to determine
how much weight should be given to that value.
In assessing the weight to be given to the opinions of the
two valuation experts, the court has considered the issues
of credibility and qualification that the parties have raised.
This is particularly true with respect to court's analysis
of the discounted cash flow model, which is where the
witness' opinions diverge most sharply. On several issues, the
dissenters' arguments regarding the credibility of Green and
of Advest, when its institutional role in the acquisitions is
examined, have shaped the court's findings and conclusions.
For example, as is noted below, the court is convinced
that the dual roles played by Advest in the PSC-DGC
merger amounted to a conflict, either in appearance or
reality. Advest's interest in seeing the transaction through
to consummation, thereby generating a significant success
fee, was inimical to its more dispassionate responsibility
of providing the PSC board with an objective assessment
of whether it should accept the terms offered by DGC.
Although the testimony reveals that it is not uncommon
for the marketing entity to also provide a fairness opinion,
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that practice does not liberate the investment banking firm
from, at the very least, the appearance of competing goals.
Based largely on this factor, although in combination with
several others, the court attaches no weight to the PSC
board's decision to accept the terms of the tender offer,
notwithstanding commentary from a secondary source that
those terms, when accepted by a board, are presumed
to represent the fair value of a corporation, and places
on the dissenters the burden to prove the contrary by
clear and convincing evidence. See Principles of Corporate
Governance, supra, § 7.22(b).35 Also, as is noted in this
order, the court is troubled by, among other things, Green's
transition between references to illiquidity discounts and a
small business risk discount, by the evidentiary absence of
analytical support for the use of a small business risk discount,
and his inability to cite the beta used by Advest in fashioning
a discount rate that is central to the discounted cash flow
analysis. Because of these problems, the court has rejected the
use of a small business risk discount has reduced the weight
that the court gives to the results of Green's analysis based on
this approach.
*31  While recognizing these and other legitimate challenges
that the dissenters have pursued, the court also has considered
Green's opinions on their merits. The court has found
circumstances, such as those noted above, that affect the
weight and reliability of evidence. Nonetheless, where the
opinions offered by Green are shown to have support in the
evidence and rest on reasoning that appears to be sound,
the court is willing to give weight to those observations and
conclusions.
The court has engaged in the same type of scrutiny for
the analysis presented by Neveu. As is noted above, for
example, his relative lack of familiarity with the footwear
industry weakens some aspects of his opinions. Further, his
efforts at valuation were less broad than those of Green and
Advest because he considered only two related models. Thus,
although his academic credentials are more extensive that
Green's, the more narrow scope of his inquiry affects the
overall weight that his opinions warrant. Finally, it became
evident during the trial that to a significant degree, Neveu
relied on information that did not exist or was not reasonably
available as of the valuation date. For the reasons discussed
earlier in this order, the court concludes that this is not a
proper way to establish valuation as of a date certain (here,
January 17, 2000). This analytical flaw affects the weight to
be given to his analysis generally, and it also put Neveu in
a position where, during trial, he had to engage in some ad
hoc calculations to reconstruct the basis for several of his
opinions. This clearly detracted from his presentation.
In short, the court has considered the many points made by all
of the parties regarding the credibility and competence of the
designated opinion witnesses. The conclusions reached by the
court therefore rest in part on these considerations.
5. Market value: comparison of PSC to recently sold publicly
held corporations
As part of the valuation efforts of Advest and of Green,
PSC was gauged against comparable companies that had
been acquired recently. This valuation technique, which
is analytically similar to the market comparable approach
discussed above, is considered to be legitimate. See
Eisenhofer at p. 119. The question of whether a transaction
involved a legitimately comparable company rests on such
factors as the time when the transaction occurred, the size of
the transaction, and the industry or field in which the acquired
comparable is a participant. Id.
Here, although the characteristics of the comparable
companies cover something of a range, the dates of those
comparables acquisitions are within several years of the
PSC-DGC merger. The most dissimilar comparable was
involved in an acquisition that occurred within 6 months
of the valuation date at issue here. This means that the
transactions that are more remote in time involve companies
that bear structural and operational similarities to PSC, and
the transaction with the least similar company occurred close
in time to the date of importance here. Thus, when these
factors are placed in balance, the court concludes that the
blended comparisons are probative of PSC's own value.
*32  Green used the same comparative process implicated
in the market comparison approach noted above. Relying on
TEV multiples associated with sales and EBITDA, Green
derived a range of value for PSC stock of between $13.70
and 19.90. For the same reasons that are germane to the
comparison analysis involving similar companies discussed
above, the EBITDA figure used by Green must be increased
by $863,000 to account for extraordinary and nonrecurring
expenses. When the EBITDA multiple of 7.1 is applied to that
increase, the result is an additional $4.36 per share ($863,000
x 7.1/1,404,000). This suggests a calculated value per share
of $24.26, based on the EBITDA multiple. No change in
warranted on the sales multiple because PSC's gross sales
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figure had not been reduced by the amount of its extraordinary
and nonrecurring expenses.
With this valuation analysis, Green did not apply a control
value premium to that initial calculation. That premium is
unnecessary (and, in fact, inapplicable) because the measure
derived here is of a control block of the acquired company.
In contrast, the multiple flowing from the market comparison
approach was based on a minority position in the comparable
company. Because of that fact, an adjustment was needed
because PSC was sold as an entity. Therefore, in the
acquisition comparable model, Green correctly did not apply
a control premium.
As with the market comparable approach, however, Green
applied a small company risk discount to the value of PSC
shares derived directly from the comparables' multiples. For
the identical reasons set out above,36 on this record, PSC
has not established that the small business risk discount
constitutes a proper adjustment to the value of PSC shares as
derived directly from multiples. Therefore, the value of PSC
shares computed on the basis of comparable acquisitions, but
without the small business risk discount, is between $13.70
and $24.26. See dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 27. The court
chooses the midpoint, namely, $18.98, as the result of this
analysis.
6. Damodaran price/sales model
In addition to the discounted cash flow model, Neveu also
considered the fair value of PSC, and thus of PSC shares,
on the basis of the Damodaran relative valuation model
that examines the price of PSC shares as a function of its
sales. Under this approach, earnings per share are calculated
for a period of several recent years (Neveu used historical
performance data for 1996-99 and projections for 2000), and,
based on the same cost of capital used in the discounted cash
flow analysis and growth rates derived from historical data, a
price per share is calculated for the projected 2000 earnings.
On the basis of that approach, Neveu arrived at a value per
share of $25.28. See dissenters' exhibit 162.
Because of several substantial flaws in the application of this
model to PSC, the court concludes that the approach does
not have sufficient reliability here to support its inclusion
in the valuation exercise. First, Neveu himself testified
that of the two intrinsic value methods he used in this
case, the discounted cash flow method is the more reliable.
However, for the reasons noted above, the court does not have
confidence in that analysis or its results as Neveu has applied
it here. Thus, if the Damodaran model is even less reliable
than the discounted cash flow method, then it deserves no
weight at all as applied in this case.37
*33  Second, the ultimate step in Damodaran's analysis
is to apply a price/sales ratio to projected sales revenues,
calculated on a per share basis, for a certain year. Here, Neveu
applied that ratio to projected sales for 2000. Neveu himself
acknowledged, however, that those 2000 sales projections
were based on data for the first quarter of PSC's 2000 fiscal
year. That quarter ran from late November 1999 to late
February 2000. The valuation date here is January 18, 2000.
Thus, the data that formed the core of Neveu's calculations
were not in existence as of the valuation date. For the reasons
discussed above, the valuation of PSC must be established
on the basis of information that was in existence as of the
valuation date. It also bears note that the gross sales figure
in excess of $32 million that Neveu projected for 2000 is
in a different league from any annual earnings that PSC
had ever generated. While sales projections should not be
based entirely on an extrapolation of historical performance,
Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1030, one must keep an eye toward
the realities of the industry and, at least in a general way, the
capacities demonstrated in the past by the subject corporation,
Thus, despite Neveu's efforts to reconstruct his calculations
on the basis of data that pre-dated the valuation date, the court
concludes that the foundation for the Damodaran analysis as
applied here is analytically flawed for that reason.
Finally, the long-term growth rate that Neveu calculated and
then applied is subject to real doubt. Neveu calculated that
rate to be 13.31%. This represents the rate of growth that
PSC would be expected to sustain indefinitely. That growth
rate is one variable used to determine a price/sales ratio. As
Green pointed out during his testimony, because of the way
the growth rate is included in the equation used to determine
that ratio, the quantification of that long-term growth rate
has a huge impact on the result. In the Damodaran equation,
the denominator is reduced by the long-term growth rate. If
the long-term growth rate is pegged too high, then the price/
sales ratio is also too high, and the resulting value per share
is similarly affected. Here, a perpetual 13.31% growth rate
would be extraordinary, substantially outpacing the economy
as a whole and the footwear industry in particular. Damodaran
himself finds a growth rate for the footwear industry at
roughly half the rate that Neveu assigns to PSC. For the
reasons set out above, PSC's historical inability to break out
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of its well-established cyclical pattern of sales performance
and the significant problems afflicting the footwear industry
surely do not support the rosy promise of an ongoing annual
growth rate of 13%. If the industry's growth-rate of roughly
7% were used, then the price-sales ratio would fall by a factor
of more than 3, from the .9238 calculated by Neveu to .259.38
Without the need to address other issues regarding the data
that Neveu used as a foundation for his price-sales relative
valuation model, the court concludes that as applied in this
case, it is not sufficiently reliable to be included as a basis for
the valuation of PSC.
7. Market value: price of tender offer
*34  PSC argues that the circumstances leading to the tender
offer, and the board's decision to accept DGC's tender offer,
constitute evidence that those terms reflected PSC's fair value.
See M.P.M. Enterprises, Inc., 731 A.2d at 797. There clearly
is some evidence to support this observation. The transaction
between PSC and DGC was arms-length and free of evidence
of collusion or other malfeasance. Advest had conducted
a reasonable search for possible buyers. Although the two
firms that extended purchase offers (DGC, through PSC
Acquisition Corp., and Valley Lane) came into the process by
means other than Advest's efforts, Advest had identified both
of those firms as potentially interested parties. See dissenters'
exhibit 72. It is therefore reasonable to infer that if they
had not expressed an interest in purchasing PSC under the
fortuitous circumstances surrounding that expression, then
Advest would have made contact with them in the normal
course, just as it did with fifty or more other concerns that
Advest felt might be attracted to PSC. Further, the limited
response to PSC's availability, despite Advest's reasonable
marketing efforts, is noteworthy. Finally, a central reason why
PSC became available for acquisition was Kagan's interest in
liquidating his interest in the company. See dissenter's exhibit
212 at p.6.39 However, the evidence demonstrates that Kagan
was not willing to sell his interest at any price. If that had been
the case, he would have been inclined to accept-or even give
thought to-Reidman's offer to acquire the shares that he and
his family owned. Instead, Kagan rejected that proposal out
of hand because he felt it would not promote the best interests
of PSC's other shareholder.
Despite these factors that support PSC's theory that the tender
offer price itself should be given weight in the fair value
analysis, there is meaningful evidence to the contrary. First,
the court must consider the converse of the circumstance just
noted: although Kagan was vigilant to the interests of PSC's
shareholders, the fact remained that he wanted to sell his
shares. As he said during a conversation with Nerges and
with another member of PSC's top management, he (Kagan)
would not have been an advocate for the sale of PSC earlier
in his career. The court takes this comment to mean only that
Kagan's estate and financial planning objectives would not
have motivated him to sell his interest in PSC at a different
time in his life. Nonetheless, Kagan's candor reinforces the
point that he made a different type of decision than he would
under circumstances when he was not as eager to liquidate his
position with PSC.
Second, Advest (represented by Green) met with the PSC
board on September 7, 1999. As of that date, DGC had made
an offer to purchase PSC stock at the tender offer price of
$11.75. The purpose of the September 7 meeting was to
provide Advest with an opportunity to advise the board, at
least preliminarily, of the merits of DGC's offer. In fact, Green
recommended to the board that it continue to pursue a possible
sale to DGC. That recommendation was based in part on a
liquidity discount. See dissenters' exhibit 122 at pp. 10, 11
n.2. For the reasons noted above, this is an improper factor
in the valuation analysis under Maine law if such a discount
is limited to minority holdings. During all times that are
relevant to this case, Kagan and his sister collectively owned a
majority of PSC shares. Thus, the shares that were traded were
necessarily within a minority block. Therefore, the market
conditions that limited the liquidity of shares affected only
those minority shares. Advest also advised the board that, in
its opinion, the tender offer of $11.75 represented fair value
“given today's market conditions....” See dissenters' exhibit
122 at p. 9. These aspects of the opinion that Advest relayed
to the PSC board were therefore framed heavily in terms of
the market performance of PSC stock.
*35  Advest subsequently presented the board with its
formal fairness opinion at a meeting held on October 6. As
is discussed above in reference to the market comparable
valuation method, Advest by then had eliminated any
reference to liquidity discounts in its opinion. Compare
dissenters' exhibit 122 at pp. 10, 11 n.2, with dissenters'
exhibit 17 at p. 19. Advest expressed its opinion that a tender
offer price of $11.75 per PSC share was fair. The board
members unanimously agreed to accept the offer.
In making that decision, the board considered the following
factors: “[c]urrent market conditions, the relationship
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between the consideration to be received by stockholders in
the Offer and the Merger on the one hand and the historical
and recent market price for the shares on the other hand, and
the fact that the market for the shares was very illiquid, thus
restricting the ability to sell shares at current market prices.”
See dissenter's exhibit 176 at p. 12 (par. (ii)). The board
considered a number of other factors but declined to assign
relative weight to them; rather, the board considered the
“totality of the information presented to it and considered by
it,” which, of course, would include Advest's fairness opinion.
See id. at p. 13. At least for purposes of the fair value analysis
that constitutes the core of this case, the liquidity discount
applicable only to a minority block of shares is an improper
factor. Such a discount may even be improper when applied to
the corporation as a whole. See Borruso, 753 A.2d at 460. See
generally note 22 supra. The references made by the board
to the illiquidity of PSC shares (which, as noted above, most
likely refer to the minority shares-those not owned by Kagan
and his sister) and to “market conditions” create the distinct
impression that the basis for the board's decision, heavily
influenced by the content of Advest's presentation, did not
cohere with notions of fair value under Maine law. When the
tender price accepted by the board is likely to be based in part
on valuation factors that have been expressly rejected by the
courts, the probative worth of that tender price is called into
substantial question.
PSC also argues that the formula for Advest's compensation
is evidence that the tender offer price of $11.75 represents fair
value. The tiered levels of compensation certainly provided
Advest with a stronger financial incentive to secure the
highest available offer than if the percentages declined
relative to higher offers. However, PSC's argument ignores
the reality that despite Advest's reasonable efforts to find
buyers for PSC, DGC was the only party that PSC took
seriously. With no other prospects on the horizon, Advest's
own interests would have been best served if PSC accepted
the tender offer of $11.75-which, of course, it did. Although
a higher tender offer would have accrued to Advest's self-
interest because of a proportionately higher percentage of
its success fee, there were no other prospective buyers,
and negotiations with DGC had settled in the range within
which the actual tender offer fell and therefore did not
create an expectation that DGC could be persuaded to
increase its offer meaningfully. Thus, in the abstract, if
Advest's recommendations were premised on the amount of
its compensation, then it would not be expected to recommend
something less than fair value. In reality, however, if PSC
accepted the offer that it had in hand, then Advest would also
have the certainty of a considerable success fee, which would
be more attractive than the prospects of rekindling a search
for other possible buyers. Thus, the scaled terms of Advest's
compensation do not support a realistic argument that Advest
would have counseled against DSC's offer if it was below fair
value.
*36  In some circumstances the tender offer price may be
treated as a legitimate factor in assessing a corporation's
fair value. Indeed, it has been noted that “the institutional
competence of a disinterested board in valuation will
normally exceed that of the court.” Principles of Corporate
Governance, supra, § 7.22, comment d. This court has
no quarrel with that general observation. However, based
on evidence regarding this particular transaction, the court
concludes that Advest's decision to commend the tender offer
of $11.75 to the board, and the decision of the PSC board to
accept that tender offer of $11.75 were not rendered under
circumstances that entitle that price to valuation weight.
For that reason, the court also rejects the dissenters' argument
that the price of PSC stock near the time of the board's
October 1999 decision is evidence that the tender offer price
was inadequate. During the period of time leading up to
the events of late 1999, the price of PSC stock had been
rising rather steadily. See generally dissenters' exhibit 172
at pp. 4-5. In fact, this circumstance was the subject of
some discussion among representatives of PSC and Advest.
Advest expressed its feeling that this rise in price might have
been caused by speculation about a possible merger, which
would make the ownership of PSC shares more attractive. In
light of the historical limits of the value of PSC stock, that
possibility cannot be overlooked. Further, fair value cannot be
determined on the basis of “any appreciation or depreciation
of shares in anticipation of” the corporate transaction. 13-A
M.R.S.A. § 909(1). Thus, the increased price of PSC shares
during this time does not bear on the fair value of those shares.
The dissenters have argued that PSC was particularly
attractive to DGC because of evidence that the latter was
experiencing financial difficulty at the time of the acquisition.
From this, the dissenters contend that what they view as
PSC's financial strengths, including its earning prospects,
could be offset against DGC's losses and that this synergistic
effect is relevant to valuation. However, even assuming that
the evidence supports these observations about the condition
of the two companies, these corresponding attributes of
these two particular companies would result in a “special
benefit[ ] to be derived by the acquiring company” and thus,
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under Libby, are not a proper consideration for this valuation
analysis. 406 A.2d at 62.
8. Assessment and weighting of valuation methods
At this point in the valuation analysis, the court “must assess
the relative deficiencies of the ... [valuation] elements and ...
arrive at a weighting scheme which ... would best reflect the
‘fair value’ of the dissenters' shares.” Libby, 406 A.2d at 61.
The court's examination of the valuation models applied to
this case follows the framework of the burden allocation
discussed at the outset of this order. With respect to each
particular model, the court has considered the quality of
PSC's valuation evidence and then that of the dissenters.
Of the various valuation methods that were implicated by
the evidence in this trial, only three of them have sufficient
reliability to warrant inclusion in the final weighting process.
In the court's view, the others, for the reasons set out above,
suffer from flaws that are significant enough to prevent them
from shedding light on the value of PSC as an entity.
*37  The three methods that do have probative value in
this final analysis are (1) PSC's market value based on
comparisons between PSC and other similar publicly traded
companies;40 (2) PSC's discounted future cash flow value;
and (3) PSC's market value based on comparisons between
PSC and similar publicly held corporations that have been
sold recently.
In determining the relative weights to be assigned to the
results of these three valuation methods, it is helpful to note
that the discounted future cash flow approach is sometimes
regarded as favored. Cede & Co. v. Technocolor, Inc., 1990
Del.Ch. LEXIS 259, at *23-24 (Del.Ch. Oct. 19.1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 758 A.2d 485 (Del.2000) (noting that “in
theory” the discounted future cash flow model is the best
technique); see also Principles of Corporate Governance,
supra, § 7.22, Reporter's Note 1. The weight that this
valuation result might otherwise deserve is weakened because
as of the valuation date, the amount of PSC's future earnings
was much more difficult to forecast due to the imminent
introduction of an entirely new product line to supplement the
single existing line. Evidence of value based on this model
is also weakened because Green was unable to provide some
basic information about the analysis created by Advest and on
which he now relies. However, for the reasons noted above,
this valuation method is an important one in this case for at
least three reasons. First, a meaningful part of the analysis is
in fact supported by direct or indirect evidence. Second, from
a more conceptual perspective, it rests on a forward-looking
projection, providing a useful counterpoint to the two market
models that have survived to this part of the overall valuation
analysis. Third, the discounted future cash flow analysis bears
directly on the essence of this valuation exercise: to assess
the merits of a present investment, which, by definition, is the
acquisition of a right to enjoy future benefits.
The other two remaining valuation methods are conceptually
similar to each other: both rest on a comparison between PSC
and the other companies in two settings. The strength of these
two comparative approaches is the historical foundation that
suffers less from the uncertainties of forecasting that is central
to the discounted future cash flow analysis. These models also
are useful in conjunction with the cash flow model because of
the very different analytical approach. Thus, the comparative
approaches are a sound complement to the internal, projective
analysis of the cash flow approach.
In light of these considerations, the court concludes that the
discounted future cash flow valuation results should be given
equal weight to the combined valuation results derived from
the two comparative models. In this way, the forecasting
model has the same value as the historical, comparative
model. However, because two comparative models are used
here, their combined effect should not outweigh that of the
discounted future cash flow approach. This weighting scheme
reveals the following result:
(1) PSC's value based on
 
 
comparisons between PSC and
other
 
 
similar publicly traded companies
 
$20.76 x 0.25 = $5.19
 
(2) PSC's discounted future cash
 
 
flow value $11.86 x 0.50 = $5.93
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(3) PSC's value based on
 
 
comparisons between PSC and
similar
 
 
publicly held corporations that
have
 
 
been sold recently
 
$18.98 x 0.25 = $4.75
 
Total (fair value per PSC share)
 
$15.87
 
*38  As of the valuation date, the fair value of Joseph Nerges'
133,300 shares was $2,115,471.00; the fair value of Robert
McCullough's 12,000 shares was $190,440.00; and the fair
value of Anne Buta's 3,000 shares was $47,610.00.
D. Interest
Title 13-A M.R.S.A. § 909(9)(G) requires that a judgment
entered in a dissenting shareholder action “include an
allowance for interest at such rate as the court may find
to be fair and equitable in all the circumstances....” Unlike
prejudgment interest in cases governed by the provisions
of 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602, where the purpose of prejudgment
interest is to motivate the parties toward “expeditious
litigation,” an assessment of interest here is a “substantive
right, intended to reimburse the Dissenters for the lost use of
their money during the pendency of the appraisal proceeding
while the corporation retained control and use of it.” McLoon,
565 A.2d at 1007. However, the interest rate applied to a
judgment in this type of case need not match actual interest
rates in the market. Id. at 1006.
The evidence in this case has revealed several useful concepts
and touchstones on the issue of interest. First, risk is relevant
to establishing a rate of return. Second, the interest rate
of a risk-free investment is roughly 6.5%. See dissenters'
exhibit 161. Third, an investor would expect an annual rate
of return of roughly 15% from an investment that shares the
characteristics of those companies represented in the S & P.
Id. Fourth, PSC itself has shown that an investment in PSC
would be riskier than one from which investors would require
a 15% return. Finally, during the pendency of this action,
the statutory rate of prejudgment interest, which the McLoon
referee properly considered, 565 A.2d at 1006, was fixed
administratively at 8.0%.41 Until that administrative policy
went into effect, prejudgment interest as calculated under 14
M.R.S.A. § 1602(1)(B) ranged from a high of 6.375% (June-
August 2000) to a low of 1.46% (November 2002) during the
pendency of this case.
Here, by court order, DGC elected to purchase a bond to
secure payment to the dissenters in an amount equal to the
value of their shares calculated at the tender offer price. While
that bond has been in effect, the shareholders presumably
have not been exposed to risk on the amounts guaranteed by
the bond.
Based on the totality of these factors, the prejudgment
interest rate shall be 8% compounded annually. Although
an interest rate of 8% does not reach the level of market
rates for an investment that includes some element of risk, it
need not do so. Additionally, notwithstanding the difference
between the purposes of section 1602 prejudgment interest
and prejudgment interest in this case, the rate applicable here
should not be lower than the rate that applies elsewhere. The
rate available under section 1602 is designed to encourage
attentiveness to the litigation at hand. In other words, the rate
set in that statute, either directly or by means of a formula,
reflects a judgment that such a rate is necessary and sufficient
to encourage “expeditious litigation.” From that, it follows
that if the rate of prejudgment interest here were lower than
that standard, then one or more parties to this type of action
would not be motivated to move the case along at a proper
pace. Consequently, the dissenters would be deprived of the
use of their money for a longer period of time. Thus, the rate
used here, which is also the rate specifically endorsed by the
Law Court in McLoon, balances the factors noted in that case.
E. Costs and attorney's fees
*39  Title 13-A M.R.S.A. § 909(9)(H) sets out the standards
for assessment of costs and attorneys' fees. The dissenters
have made a claim for an award of these expenses. However,
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up to this point, the parties have not addressed these elements
of the dissenters' claims in a meaningful way because, prior
the issuance of a judgment, any discussion of these issues
would have been premature.
The parties may submit any bills of costs pursuant to the
process established by 14 M.R.S.A. § 1501 et seq. As part of
those submissions, the parties may file argument on the issue
of who may be entitled to an award of costs. Additionally,
the dissenters may file arguments and other materials in
support of their request for an award of attorneys' fees. Any
such submissions on this issue shall be filed within the time
allowed for submission of a bill of costs. Any objection, and
any subsequent reply to any such objection, shall be filed
within the time established for submissions on a bill of costs.
The entry shall be:
For the foregoing reasons, judgments are entered for
Joseph Nerges in the amount of $2,115,471.00; for Robert
McCullough in the amount of $190,440.00; and for Anne
Buta in the amount of $47,610.00. Those parties shall be
entitled to prejudgment interest of 6%, compounded annually.
Claims for costs and attorneys' fees shall be submitted through
the process set out in this order.
DISSENTING SHAREHOLDERS' RULE 60(a) MOTION
TO ALTER OR AMEND TO CORRECT CLERICAL
ERRORS
NOW COME The Dissenting Shareholders, Joseph Nerges,
Robert McCulloch and Anne Buta, by and through their
undersigned attorneys, and hereby move, pursuant to Rule
60(a) M.R.Civ.P., to correct two clerical errors in the Court's
Decision and Judgment viz: the spelling of Dissenting
Shareholder Robert McCulloch's name; and the correction of
the typographical error in the judgment setting forth interest
rate at 6% instead of 8%. The Rule provides that such errors
can be corrected by the Court at any time and both are clearly
simply typographical errors, not affecting the substance of the
Court's opinion or decision.
For those reasons, the judgment should be altered and
amended to set forth the correct spelling Dissenting
Shareholder McCulloch, and also to set forth the correct
interest rate in the judgment.
ORDER
Upon Motion made by the Dissenting Shareholders, pursuant
to Rule 60(a) M.R.Civ.P., and for cause shown, the Court
having made two clerical errors in its original Opinion and
Judgment, it is ORDERED that the Court's Opinion and
Judgment dated May 29, 2003 is hereby amended as follows:
1. In all places, including the judgment, where the name
of Dissenting Shareholder Robert McCullough appears, the
spelling of his name shall be deemed corrected, and for all
purposes shall be deemed as McCulloch;
2. The judgment is corrected to reflect that the interest rate
awarded to the Dissenting Shareholders as part of the Court's
Decision, and as reflected in the written Opinion, is 8% not
6% and the Judgment shall be deemed amended accordingly.*
All Citations
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 21911141
Footnotes
* The erroneous reference to 6% is in the Docket Entry. The substance of the order makes clear the Court's intent to
assess interest at 8%.
1 The analysis in McLoon rests heavily on the Delaware case of Weinberger, in which the Supreme Court of Delaware
rejected a valuation method that is limited to the three Delaware block method and opened the appraisal process to any
relevant and admissible valuation technique. 457 A.2d at 713. The controlling Delaware statute, however, is different than
13-A M.R.S.A. § 909(9)(E), because the former expressly requires the court to “take into account all relevant factors....”
Del.Code Ann., tit. 8, § 262(h). Section 909(9)(E) is not as expansive. Nonetheless, the Law Court has adopted the
Delaware courts' approach as set out in Weinberger .
2 In Tri-Continental, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the
nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger
and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an inquiry as to the
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value of the dissenting shareholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing the value.” 74 A.2d at 72
(emphasis added).
3 Neither Libby nor McLoon make any reference to the allocation of the burden of proof. Appellate decisions in other
jurisdictions typically are expressly vague about those burden issues, even in the context of challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence. See, e.g., Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp. 413 A.2d 137, 143 (Del.1980) (“It is thus apparent that no rule of
thumb is applicable to weighting; rather, the rule becomes one of entire fairness and sound reasoning in the application
of traditional standard and settled Delaware law to the particular facts of each case.”); Piedmonte v. New Boston Garden
Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1153 (Mass.1979) (without referring to a burden of proof, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court concludes that weightings by trial court were “reasonable” and within its discretion).
4 The Delaware courts have characterized these two elements as “fair dealing and fair price.” Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
The former rests of notions of “when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.” Id. In the case at bar, the
dissenters have not made arguments to challenge the fairness of the merger process. See, e.g., Citron, 584 A.2d at
504-05 (examples and analysis of claims of unfair dealing). Rather, the dissenters contend that the merger price did not
reflect the fair value of PSC. This is an inquiry that, from the Delaware perspective, considers “the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects,
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.” Id. Because this is precisely the
issue presented for resolution, it is appropriate to draw on the burden of proof framework established in Delaware when
its courts consider such a claim.
5 The trial court in Citron framed its conclusion in the following terms: “The defendants' [corporations'] valuation evidence
persuades me that it was [fair]. The plaintiff's [dissenter's] contrary evidence is unpersuasive and insufficient to discharge
her burden of proving that the merger price was unfair.” 584 A.2d at 505. Thus, the trial court imposed burdens on both
the corporation and the dissenting shareholder.
6 It should be noted that another framework for burdens of proof has been suggested in secondary authority. See American
Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and RecommendationsIONS § 7.22(b) (1994). There, in
an arms-length acquisition or merger, a board's decision to accept a tender offer presumptively demonstrates that the
offer amounts to fair value. Any dissenting shareholders then have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
evidence that the fair value is different from the terms embodied in the tender offer. The court's research did not reveal
any actual caselaw adopting or mirroring this procedural approach, and none of the parties has proposed or advocated
it here. Instead, the court accepts the burden allocation established in Delaware law, which the Law Court generally has
found to be persuasive.
7 Sometime after the PSC board approved the sale of the corporation to DGC, Kagan had a conversation with Nerges
and said that he (Kagan) would not have sold his interest in the company if he were ten years younger. This expression
is consistent with a reference in one of the merger documents filed by PSC that Kagan wanted to sell his shares for
purposes of estate-planning and other financial goals. See Dissenters' exhibit 212 at p. 6.
These facts are not inconsistent with the court's finding that Kagan was fully engaged in working actively for the company
following the death of its president in late 1998. The court construes the evidence to demonstrate that despite Kagan's
sense of satisfaction in going back to work unexpectedly for the company that had been an integral part of his life for
many years, he was at a stage of his life where he did not want to do that indefinitely. On the other hand, the court finds
that although Kagan wanted to sell his interest in the corporation, his interest was to protect and promote the interests
of all of PSC's shareholders. If his sole or primary interest was to liquidate his holdings without regard to the interest
of others, he would have accepted the offer extended to him privately by Reidman, noted in the text below, to sell his
shares and then let the other shareholders fend for themselves. This sensitivity toward the rights and interests of the
other shareholders goes back as far as the 1970's, when PSC established a process by which Lown could redeem his
shares but only after other shareholders were given the first opportunity to benefit as Lown wanted to benefit.
8 Putting it more precisely, under the terms of the agreement, PSC would be acquired by PSC Acquisition Corp, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Reidman Corporation. Reidman Corporation owns a substantial minority interest in Daniel Green
Corporation. James Reidman, whose contact with PSC in early 1999 began the acquisition process, is the CEO and
president of both concerns. Many of the proposals under which DGC itself would acquire PSC's shares included financing
arrangements, all of which PSC found unacceptable. Therefore, in September 1999, Reidman Corporation became the
prospective buyer, and the transaction was structured as a cash-only deal. See Dissenters' exhibit 176. At the end of
March 2000 (several months after PSC Acquisition Corp. acquired PSC), Reidman Corporation sold all outstanding
shares of PSC stock from PSC Acquisition Corp. to DGC. See generally dissenters' exhibit 243. DGC is now known as
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Phoenix Footwear Group. In this opinion, the court may refer to the acquisition as one by DGC of PSC (although that
result did not obtain directly) because that was the intent and the ultimate result.
9 The admissibility and extent of a non-expert's opinion testimony was the subject of considerable discussion among
counsel and the court during the trial. The parties' arguments and the court's rulings are set out on the record. The issue
to be addressed here is the weight that the court should assign to that testimony.
10 The fourth non-expert opinion witness was David Keane, who held several management positions with PSC prior to and,
for awhile, following the merger. Although he was permitted to offer his opinion of value because he had owned some
PSC shares, the record does not reveal a more substantive justification for attaching meaningful weight to that testimony
in this complicated appraisal analysis.
11 Indeed, during a colloquy involving this issue during the trial, Nerges' counsel stated expressly that Nerges was not
offered as an expert. This avoided any consequence caused by the absence of an expert disclosure under the court's
rules and orders, but it directly implicates the concerns addressed in the text of this order.
12 Because the court's treatment of this evidence rests on the manner in which the opinions of the non-experts' testimony
were formulated and presented, the court does not reach the merits of those opinions. It should be noted, however, that if
the court did assess those merits beyond the discussion in the text, considerable problems would need to be addressed.
For example, Nerges testified that his opinion of nearly $24 per share is based on the addition of PSC's net asset book
value to a combination of its investment value and market comparables. However, for the reasons discussed below, this
general analysis is flawed. First, book value is not a proper way to calculate net asset value. Second, net asset value
cannot be added to investment value (or some other value) unless those assets are distinct from the assets needed to
generate earnings. (It is interesting - and perhaps ironic-to note that if Nerges' estimate of PSC's net asset value were
removed as a component of his final opinion of fair value, the result would be fair value of $12.82 per share, which is not
far from Green's assessment, but which is substantially different from Neveu's.) Additionally, Nerges testified that he was
not familiar with the methodology used by his own expert; this clearly affects the weight that would be given to Nerges'
valuation testimony. There are a number of other problems with Nerges' analysis as well. However, the court does not
address them because the more significant financial analyses were presented by the designated experts.
13 As is noted above, two of the dissenters themselves also considered a second approach, net asset value, in forming their
own fair value opinions. However, the court does not give those non-expert opinions any meaningful weight here.
14 Green also used this comparative model in a separate part of his analysis when he compared PSC to transactions of
entire corporate entities. This part of his analysis is discussed separately below.
15 “At some point, the differences become so large that the use of the comparable company method becomes meaningless
for valuation purposes.” See In re: Radiology Associates, Inc. Litigation, 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch.1991).
16 As the dissenters themselves characterized it in their written summation, a debate about the Green's comparables would
amount to a “quibble.”
17 The third performance figure was gross sales. Green's failure to account for extraordinary and nonrecurring expenses
would not affect this top-line figure.
18 Despite the year of his death, the president died while PSC was in its 1999 fiscal year, and so the expenses that PSC
incurred as a result of his death had an impact on the company's 1999 financial condition.
19 This amount does not include fees paid to Rudman and Winchell, PSC's Maine counsel. For two reasons, the court
declines to include evidence of the firm's bills with the merger-related expenses. First, it cannot be determined from the
bills admitted into evidence whether they related entirely to merger issues or whether the firm may have provided other
legal services that gave rise to ordinary and recurring legal costs. Second, in order to maintain a level of discretion in the
face of a potential acquisition, Rudman and Winchell served as a conduit for a number of PSC's merger-related billings
and payments. The trial record does not satisfactorily establish that the bills already accounted for in the figure noted in
the text are not also reflected in the firm's bills to PSC.
This amount also excludes legal fees paid to PSC's out-of-state counsel beyond those noted in dissenters' exhibits 171
and 174. Although some of that additional legal work clearly may have been merger-related, the evidence is not sufficient
to satisfactorily segregate legal expenses that were for other purposes.
20 The EBITDA used by Green in Advest's October 1999 fairness opinion was for the period between approximately
October 1998 and September 1999(LTM). The amount of merger-related expenses shown in dissenter's exhibit 171 was
compiled no later than December 1999. Thus, this information would have been available to a reasonable investor on the
valuation date in January 2000. The exhibit demonstrates that PSC did not actually take those expenses until October and
November 1999, which was after Advest rendered its fairness opinion. However, it appears that most of those expenses
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had been incurred prior to the date of the fairness opinion. The most accurate financial picture of PSC as of the valuation
date would account for those expenses.
This might mean that the “last twelve months” is advanced by about three months (from an ending point in late September
or early October 1999 to mid-January 2000). However, either way, an entire year is covered, and, in arguing that the
October 1999 fairness opinion accurately depicted PSC's fair value as of the valuation date several months later, Green
testified that there were no significant changes in PSC's financial condition between October 1999 and January 2000.
Therefore, the court does not find that this possible shift in dates compromises the substance of the analysis.
21 Close to the valuation date, this was the number of outstanding shares of PSC stock. See dissenters' exhibit 176 at p. 6.
However, there also was a balance of 16,000 stock options as of the date of the fairness opinion. See dissenters' exhibit
17 at p. 19, n.4, and p. 36. The court found no evidence of whether the three individual holding those options exercised
them. However, the exercise prices support an inference that they would be exercised. Thus, the court calculates the
dissenters' proportional ownership interest in PSC on the predicate that there were 1,404,000 outstanding shares, each
with equal value.
22 If Green's characterization of the marketability discount as “not relevant,” when that discount was used in the September
7 analysis, can be interpreted to mean that such a discount is analytically improper, then Green may have given too much
away, although the court need not and therefore does not reach this issue. Maine law clearly provides that the valuation
of a dissenter's shares may not be influenced by the fact that those shares may constitute a minority or non-controlling
interest in corporate ownership and decision-making. McLoon, 565 A.2d at 1005. Rather, the value of a minority interest
is the “full proportionate value” of those shares. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1141 (Del.1989), quoted
in McLoon, 565 A.2d at 1005. A minority discount has the effect of creating different values for shares of stock in the
same company: a share included in a minority block is deemed to have less value than a share included in a controlling
block. A minority interest is also less marketable and therefore more illiquid. Minority and marketability/illiquidity discounts
therefore are related in their effect when either type of discount is applied at the shareholder level. See Casey v. Brennan,
780 A .2d 553, 571 (N.J.Super.2001), aff'd 801 A.2d 245 (2002); cf. Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindos, Inc., 63 P.3d 353,
360 (Colo.2003) (closely held corporation). Consequently, if any of those discounts is applied at the shareholder level,
then the value of shares held by a minority shareholder is understated.
On the other hand, some courts have held that an otherwise proper discount may not be objectionable as long as it applies
to all shares of stock. A discount that is applied only to some shares issued by a corporation results in the harm identified
in McLoon. However, when the discount is applied at the corporation level rather than at the shareholder level, then it may
become a tool used to value the entire corporate entity in which a minority shareholder holds a proportionate interest.
Balsamides v. Protameen Chemicals, Inc., 734 A.2d 721, 733 (N.J.1999) (recognizing that the value of a corporation
as a whole may be discounted when its shares of stock are illiquid, as in a closely held corporation); Cavalier Oil, 564
A.2d at 1144-45. But see Borruso v. Communications Telesystems, 753 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. Ch.1999) (holding that an
illiquidity discount is improper even at the corporation level, because that discount is “based on trading characteristics of
the shares themselves, not any factor intrinsic to the corporation or its assets.”). Here, Green applied a discount while
determining the value of PSC as an entirety. Because the discount was not applied to only selected shares, such as
those of the dissenters, then the abstract application process by itself might not violate the principles adopted in McLoon.
Despite the dissenters' argument to the contrary, the holding in Pueblo Bancorporation does not foreclose application
of a marketability discount at the corporation level. Rather, it specifically addressed the question of whether the value
of minority shares in a closely-held corporation could be discounted because of their illiquidity: “The trial court must
determine the value of the corporate entity and allocate the dissenting shareholder his proportionate ownership interest of
that value, without applying a marketability discount at that shareholder level. The court of appeals decision is affirmed.”
63 P.3d at 369 (emphasis added).
However, here, the court need not address the question of whether the application of an illiquidity discount at the
corporation level is proper. Green testified at trial that he did not mean to apply the concept of a marketability or illiquidity
discount and instead relied on the distinct concept of a small business risk discount. For the reasons stated in the text, the
court concludes that the record does not support this latter approach. From that conclusion, the court declines to return
to Green's original characterization, which he appears to have rejected during his trial testimony, and formally consider
the merits of that abandoned position.
23 $21.51 x 1.3 (control premium) = $27.96.
24 $17.18 x 1.3 = $22.33.
25 It is worthy of note, however, that an aspect of this valuation method plays a part in Neveu's discounted cash flow
assessment. In calculating the present value of PSC's future cash flows, Neveu had excluded from consideration PSC's
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non-operating assets, which consisted of a significant portfolio of marketable securities and what he deemed to be “excess
cash.” Because he concluded that these assets exceeded the amount of capital needed to fund its business operations,
they were not properly considered in determining the prospects for future earnings. Because they were not considered in
that part of the discounted cash flow analysis, but because those assets have financial value, that value must be added
to the present value of PSC's future cash flow. Therefore, although Neveu did not use the net asset value approach
as Green did, Neveu did consider the value of PSC's non-operating assets as a component of the corporation's overall
intrinsic value.
26 Those holdings consisted of two parcels of improved real estate located in Old Town.
27 Several years prior to the acquisition, PSC had completely ended its role as a shoe manufacturer and instead “outsourced”
its products, meaning that it had foreign manufacturers fabricate and assemble the shoe components, which were then
brought into the United States and sold by PSC under its label.
28 On this point, Neveu testified that the proper basis for comparison would be the actual past earnings generated between
1996 and 1999, and the present value of future earnings between 2000 and 2003. However, the point of this comparison
is to determine what the actual earnings were and will be for similar periods of time, rather than how much those future
earnings are worth in present dollars. Nonetheless, even if the comparison were based on the present value of those
future earnings, the increase would be more than 2,000%, and the conclusion from this exercise is just as pointed.
29 Note that this means that the post-projection period future cash flows are discounted for present value two times: first,
to determine the value of those cash flows as of the terminus of the projection period, and then second to establish the
present value of that future value. See, e.g., Steiner, 5 F.Supp.2d at 1130. Because this amounts to a bifurcated discount
in order to account for two separate periods of time, it does not result in a repetitive or overlapping reduction.
30 Outside authorities on corporate valuation endorse the use of a small company risk discount or premium when determining
a discount rate. However, as is discussed above in connection with the market comparable approach, this factor cannot
be properly injected in a corporation-to-corporation or stock-to-stock comparative analysis.
31 In attempting to defend his use of a 0.5 beta, Neveu testified to several published betas for other footwear companies.
Because those figures were published in 2002, they cannot be used here as part of an analysis to determinate a valuation
as of January 2000. Thus, the court disregards that evidence.
32 The Steiner court noted some factors that it used in determining a proper beta. There, the court relied on evidence that
the subject company was risk-averse, that it had a “well-diversified client base,” that a long history of steady growth, that
it was an attractive borrower, and that it was a large company. 5 F.Supp.2d at 1134. Rejecting the argument that the
corporation was “a risky little private company beset by various financial problems,” the court assessed a beta of 0.75. Id.
Here, to the extend that general comparisons may be drawn, those factors would make PSC seem a riskier proposition
than the company examined in Steiner because, although PSC was managed conservatively and was a favored borrower
because of its securities portfolio, it was small, it had never achieved steady growth and it was in a very difficult industry.
33 PSC's comptroller testified that these investments provided some benefit to the company's business because they gave
the company some leverage in its financing arrangements. However, it does not appear that this feature of the company's
assets were central to its operations and, in any event, both Green and Neveu have treated these securities as non-
operating capital.
34 One court has noted that substantial cash assets reduce the value of a corporation because cash assets generate little
or no earnings, thereby reducing the investment appeal of that concern. Gibbons, 339 A.2d at 465.
35 These standards and burdens of proof suggested by ALI, which none of the parties has advocated, are different than those
adopted here. Instead, the court has adopted the allocation and standards of those burdens flowing Delaware caselaw,
which has been influential in the development of this area of law in Maine. The court notes the ALI recommendations only
to point out the views of some commentators regarding the evidentiary effect of a board's decision and the significance
of the evidence that the court has rejected here.
36 In its October 1999 fairness opinion, Advest used the identical explanation to support its application of the small business
risk discount as it did with the market comparable analysis. See dissenters' exhibit 17 at p. 26. This included the same
reference to “widely accepted studies” supporting the use of a small business risk discount and which Green was unable
to cite during his testimony both at his deposition and trial.
37 Neveu and Green disagree whether the Damodaran analysis is proper for valuation purposes. That question need not
be resolved in light of Neveu's own general assessment about the relative degree of reliability that might be attached
to this methodology.
38 Using Damodaran's formula found in dissenters' exhibit 162, the calculations would be as follows: 2,131/21,665 x 15.76
x 1.425 / (15.51-7).
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39 Dissenters' exhibit 212 is a confidential memorandum that Advest used in its efforts to market PSC. Among other things,
that document provides information about the background of and reasons for the prospective sale. The document notes
Kagan's personal interest for liquidating his position with PSC and also notes that PSC then had a strong management
team, therefore making the company an attractive prospect for acquisition. This latter consideration does not appear to
be a reason why Kagan and the board hoped to secure a buyer for PSC in the first place. Rather, it is significant because
it signifies that PSC was in a sound managerial condition, which could increase the price that a buyer would be willing
to pay to acquire the company. Thus, the quality of management relates more to the timing of the sale rather than to
the reasons for it.
40 Again, the Libby Court described this as the “investment value” model.
41 That decision was made in December 2002 by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court and was responsive to uncertainty
created when the District Court's jurisdictional limit of $30,000 in civil actions was legislatively repealed. Accordingly, as of
December 16, 2002, prejudgment interest was set at 8% except in those cases based on a contract or note that included
a set term of interest. Because prejudgment interest is determined by the prevailing rate as of the month a judgment is
issued, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 1602(1)(B), that rate would apply here if this case were governed by section 1602.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
*1  Petitioners Merion Capital L.P. and Merion Capital II
L.P. (together, “Merion”) brought this statutory appraisal
proceeding to determine the fair value of their shares
of stock in Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS” or
the “Company”). The valuation date is January 2, 2014,
when Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (“Fidelity” or “FNF”)
completed the merger by which it acquired the Company (the
“Merger”). This post-trial decision determines that the fair
value of the Company's common stock at the effective time
of the Merger is $37.14.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over four days. The parties submitted 357
exhibits and lodged eight depositions. Four fact witnesses and
two experts testified live. The following facts were proven by
a preponderance of the evidence.
A. The Company
At the time of the Merger, the Company provided integrated
technology products, data, and services to the mortgage
lending industry, and it had a market leading position
in mortgage processing in the United States. Its business
operated through two principal divisions: Transaction
Services (“Services” or “TS”) and Technology, Data &
Analytics division (“Analytics” or “TD & A”).
The primary segment within the Services division focused
on loan originations. It supported lenders by facilitating
many of the steps necessary to originate a loan. Most of the
originations, however, were not new loans, but refinancings
of existing loans. The Services division also had a segment
that supported lenders, servicers, and investors by facilitating
many of the steps necessary to foreclose on a property.
The Analytics division focused on providing ongoing support
to lenders and loan servicers. Its “MSP platform” automated
many of the loan servicing functions performed during the life
of a loan. A smaller business segment specialized in troubled
loans.
B. The Company's Origins
The Company started as the financial and mortgage services
division of Alltel Information Services. PTO ¶ 11. In 2003,
Alltel sold that division to Fidelity, which is a leading provider
of (i) title insurance, escrow, and other title-related services,
and (ii) technology and transactional services for the real
estate and mortgage industries. Id. ¶¶ 6, 11. Thomas H. Lee
Partners (“THL”) is a private equity firm that worked with
Fidelity on the acquisition but did not co-invest at the time of
the deal.
Fidelity reorganized the former Alltel division as part of a
subsidiary called FNF National Information Services, Inc.
(“FNF Services”). PTO ¶ 11. In 2005, THL invested in FNF
Services. In 2006, Fidelity spun off FNF Services. Id.
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In 2008, FNF Services spun off the Company. Its shares
traded on the New York Stock Exchange until the Merger
closed. Id. Because of the Company's historic ties to Fidelity,
the Company continued to share an office campus with its
former parent (although occupying separate buildings). The
two companies also shared private jets, hangar facilities, and
server space.
C. The Effect Of The Great Recession On The Company's
Business
*2  The Company's spinoff coincided with the Great
Recession of 2008. Although devastating to many
households, the financial crisis was a boon to the Company,
because loan defaults drove key segments of its business.
Revenue grew by approximately 80% from pre-recession
levels to peak in 2010. JX 111 at 21.
But the Company also was involved in some of the
problematic loan protocols that led to the Great Recession,
colloquially known as “robo-signing.” In 2010, the United
States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and attorneys general from all fifty states
commenced civil and criminal investigations into the
Company's practices. Stockholders also filed lawsuits. PTO
¶ 12.
D. Fidelity's Early Overtures
In April 2010, amidst the negative publicity from the
robo-signing allegations, Fidelity, THL, and the Blackstone
Group made an unsolicited offer to buy the Company. The
Company's board of directors (the “Board”) retained the
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman”) as its financial
advisor. The discussions did not go far. PTO ¶ 13.
In early 2011, THL and Blackstone approached the Company
again. Goldman continued in its advisory role. Again, no deal
was reached. PTO ¶ 14.
In late 2011, the Company's CEO retired due to medical
issues. In October, the Board hired Hugh Harris to serve as
President and CEO. He also became a director.
Harris had ties to Fidelity. In 2003, he worked for Fidelity and
THL as a consultant on the Alltel deal. Afterwards, Fidelity
hired Harris to run one of the new business units. Harris
continued to work for FNF Services after its spinoff. He
retired in 2007, before the Company's spinoff in 2008.
Harris also had ties to THL. In addition to consulting on the
Alltel deal, he worked with THL for several years in the mid–
1990s. Tr. 9 (Harris). He also was a friend of and owned
hunting land with one of THL's principals. Tr. 12 (Harris).
Given these relationships, the Board excluded Harris from its
deliberations about any potential transaction with THL and
Fidelity, and Harris recused himself from voting as a director.
The Board determined that Harris could, however, “do all the
normal things that the CEO would do as far as presenting the
company, the business, what was going on with the company,
our projections, our results, et cetera.” Tr. 25 (Harris); see
PTO ¶ 7.
In late November 2011, THL reached out to Harris. He
referred the call to Lee Kennedy, the Company's Chairman.
This time, the discussions progressed further. In December,
the Company and THL signed a confidentiality agreement. In
February 2012, after conducting due diligence, THL offered
to buy the Company for $26.50 per share. THL's offer noted
that Blackstone and Fidelity would participate in the deal,
and THL later explained that Fidelity would contribute its
ServiceLink business to the surviving entity. The ServiceLink
business competed with LPS and was a source of synergies.
On February 28, 2012, the Board met to discuss the
offer. Goldman continued in its advisory role. The Board
determined that a transaction was potentially attractive, but
not at that price. PTO ¶ 19. The Board decided to explore
whether someone might pay more by reaching out to other
financial sponsors and strategic buyers. Tr. 27 (Harris).
In March 2012, Goldman reviewed the Company's financial
performance with the Board. After analyzing several market-
based metrics, Goldman opined that “the Company was fully
valued at current trading prices.” JX 33 at 2. Goldman's
illustrative discounted cash flow analysis, which used LPS's
historical discount rate and assumed a 1% perpetuity growth
rate, produced a valuation of $25.91 per share. Id. at 17. The
Company's stock closed at $24.66 that day. Id. at 13.
*3  In April 2012, after additional due diligence, THL,
Blackstone, and Fidelity increased their offer to $28.00 per
share, comprising $26.00 in cash and $2.00 in Fidelity stock.
The Board rejected that price as inadequate. PTO ¶¶ 22–23.
In May 2012, THL, Blackstone, and Fidelity increased
their offer to $29 per share, payable entirely in cash or
in a combination of $27.00 in cash and $2.00 in Fidelity
stock. JX 38 at 2. The bidding group explained that the
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premium depended in part on anticipated synergies with the
ServiceLink business. JX 260 at 53.
By this point, with the country emerging from the Great
Recession, management was concerned that the Company's
performance would deteriorate. During a series of meetings
in May 2012, management provided the Board with updated
financial forecasts that contemplated revenue declining
approximately 25% by 2017. JX 44 at 927. The forecasts
projected that EBITDA would decrease by 7.2% through
2017 before increasing by 7.5% through 2022. Id. Despite
the weaker forecasts, the Board told THL that the proposed
consideration “was inadequate and should be raised to a price
in the $30s.” JX 44 at 3.
During the last week of May 2012, Goldman contacted
three financial sponsors: Texas Pacific Group Capital
(“TPG”), Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (“KKR”),
and Advent International. Goldman also contacted seven
potential strategic buyers: Accenture, Berkshire Hathaway,
IBM, Infosys, Oracle, Tata Consultancy Services, and
Total Systems Services. Several of the parties entered into
confidentiality agreements, conducted due diligence, and
received management presentations. None made an offer.
Five of the strategic buyers had no interest. Two said they
needed more time to evaluate the opportunity. KKR and
Advent said they could not pay a premium and meet their
internal hurdle rates. TPG was only interested if it could be
part of the THL/Blackstone/Fidelity consortium.
On June 8, 2012, THL told the Company that the consortium
would not offer more than $29.00 per share. PTO ¶ 25. The
directors felt that was a good price but remained committed
to $30.00 per share. They rejected THL's offer, but decided to
negotiate the terms of the transaction documents in case the
consortium changed its collective mind.
In June 2012, two strategic bidders—Total Systems Services
and Infosys—expressed interest in buying the Company, only
to promptly change their minds. Total Systems wanted to
team up with a financial sponsor but said it could not find
one. Infosys cited LPS's size, lack of strategic fit, and legacy
issues.
The Board and the consortium negotiated a draft merger
agreement that included a go-shop, but neither would budge
on price. One critical issue dividing the parties was the extent
of the Company's legal risk due to the pending investigations
and lawsuits. In August 2012, discussions terminated. PTO ¶
27.
E. The Board Hires BCG.
In October 2012, the Board hired the Boston Consulting
Group (“BCG”) to evaluate the Company's core businesses,
research market trends, assess the legal and regulatory
environment, and test the reliability of management's
projections. The Board also asked BCG to evaluate the
Company's strategic alternatives with a focus on two
particular opportunities: (i) continuing to operate the
Company in its existing configuration, or (ii) splitting up the
Company's two businesses.
*4  BCG would spend the next six months conducting an
in-depth review of the Company's business that included
over 120 interviews with LPS employees, customers, and
investors. Based on its work, BCG generated a report
that spanned more than 200 pages. See JX 111. Through
this process, BCG “pressure tested” each element of the
Company's five-year projections based on macroeconomic
factors, industry trends, and the Company's specific product
lines. See Tr. 226 (Schilling); Tr. 19 (Harris).
F. The Company Addresses Its Legal Problems.
On January 31, 2013, the Company announced that it had
entered into a settlement agreement with the attorneys general
from forty-six states and the District of Columbia. PTO
¶ 31. As part of the settlement, the Company agreed to
make a settlement payment of $127 million. The Company
also entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the
Department of Justice that contemplated a payment of $35
million. The Company settled the outstanding stockholder
litigation for a payment of $14 million. Although the
regulators charged some of the Company's employees with
criminal activity, they did not charge the Company. The
settlement was profoundly good news, and the Company's
shares rose 7.5% to $24.08 on the announcement. JX 71 at 1.
Part of the settlement with the Department of Justice required
the Company to operate under the terms of a consent
order. Ironically, the consent order gave the Company “a
competitive advantage” because many loan servicers were
still trying to adjust to the new post-financial crisis regulatory
regime. Tr. 61 (Harris). The Company's settlement signaled
that the Company had achieved compliance. Management
believed this would result in a “flight to quality” as customers
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chose the Company over competitors whose systems had not
yet been validated. See Tr. 61 (Harris).
Around this time, Harris told the Board he planned to retire
at the end of 2013.
G. Offers From Fidelity And Altisource
After the Company announced the settlements, two of the
Company's competitors expressed interest in buying the
Company. Fidelity was first out of the gate. On January 31,
2013, Fidelity and THL made a joint proposal to acquire
the Company for $30.00 per share, consisting of $13.20 in
cash and $16.80 in Fidelity common stock. PTO ¶ 32. The
proposal represented a premium of approximately 32% over
the Company's average closing stock price during the five
previous trading days. JX 72 at 3.
Four days later, Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A.
(“Altisource”) proposed to acquire the Company in a
transaction valued at $31.00 per share, consisting of $21.50 in
cash and $9.50 in Altisource common stock. PTO ¶ 33. The
offer represented a 28% premium over the Company's closing
price on February 1 and a 32% premium over its trailing 30–
day weighted average. JX 74 at 2. Altisource competed with
the Company's Analytics business. Tr. 30 (Harris).
During a meeting on February 6, 2013, the Board received a
presentation from the Company's finance team. They advised
the Board that 2013 would “continue to be a challenging
year for the mortgage industry and for LPS.” JX 75 at 464.
They noted that “new entrants will emerge” and that the
Company would face continuing competition from entities
like Ocwen and NationStar. Id. They projected that the
Company's revenue for 2013 would be “down about 4%
compared to 2012, with a 4% increase in [Analytics] revenue
being offset by a 9% decline in [Services] revenue.” Id. They
expected EBITDA to be flat, EBITDA margin to increase
from 26.7% to 27.5%, and earnings per share to decline from
$2.80 to $2.74 due to increased shares outstanding. Id.
*5  The Board also heard from the Company's investor
relations team. Although the Company's stock had risen by
63% in 2012 versus only a 12% increase for the S & P
500, the investor relations team believed that the market
did not appreciate the Company's strong fundamentals. To
address this, the team had launched a strategy to explain
to the market that “LPS is a stronger company today”
with “[s]ustainable competitive advantages” and “[l]ong-term
growth opportunities.” JX 76 at 497. The goal for 2013 was
to “Achieve Fair Value of LPS Securities.” Id. at 509; see
Schilling Dep. 151; see also Tr. 358 (Schilling).
Against this backdrop, the directors considered the offers
from Fidelity and Altisource. In light of Harris' prior ties to
Fidelity and THL, the Board limited his role to responding
to the overtures in his capacity as CEO. Lee Kennedy
was the Company's Chairman, had previously served as a
director of a THL portfolio company, and had served as CEO
of Information Services from 2006 until 2009. The Board
determined that he did not have a conflict. James Hunt was
a non-management director who had served as an officer of
one of THL's portfolio companies. The Board determined that
he should not be involved in any discussions about a sale.
The Board decided to tell Fidelity and Altisource that their
offers undervalued the Company and that the Company was
not interested. PTO ¶¶ 7, 34, 35.
H. More Expressions Of Interest
Over the ensuing weeks, four more unsolicited expressions of
interest arrived. One was an increased bid from Fidelity and
THL. By letter dated February 26, 2013, they increased their
proposal by 7% to $32.00 per share, with $14.72 paid in cash
and $17.28 in Fidelity common stock. PTO ¶ 36. Their letter
stated that $32.00 was the highest price they would offer. JX
89 at 99.
In March 2013, First American National Financial
Corporation expressed interest in a joint venture between
its mortgage servicing arm and the Services business. First
American's proposal valued the Services business at $450–
$600 million. First American said it could complete diligence
in four to six weeks. Also in March, two private equity firms
expressed interest in the Services business. Flexpoint Ford
LLC proposed to buy the business on a cash-free, debt-free
basis for 5.0x–5.5x normalized EBITDA. PTO ¶¶ 41–42.
Golden Gate Capital also proposed to buy the business but did
not suggest a price. PTO ¶¶ 37, 41–42.
Having received a flurry of proposals, the Board engaged
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) as
a second financial advisor. The Board decided to defer
considering the offers until after BCG completed its strategic
review.
I. The March 2013 Board Meeting
On March 21, 2013, the Board met to consider the Company's
alternatives. The meeting began with a presentation from
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BCG. Based on its six months of work, BCG projected that
without any new business initiatives, “[m]arket headwinds”
would cause the Company's revenue to decline by $470
to $510 million by 2015 and $580 to $680 million by
2017. JX 111 at 37. BCG attributed the declines to a 75–
80% drop in refinancings and a 60–70% drop in defaults.
Id. at 31. The declines would affect the Services business
disproportionately, which would suffer 95% of the net impact.
Id. at 70. The Analytics business would experience slow and
steady growth, but not enough to offset the decline in the
Services business.
BCG next presented three sets of five-year projections created
in collaboration with management: (i) a Reduced Base Case,
(ii) a Base Case, and (iii) an Optimistic Case. BCG regarded
its Base Case as “the most likely scenario.” Id. at 27. The
Base Case started with the macro-economic trend line then
added “additional initiatives and opportunities” to increase
revenue. Id. at 28. BCG identified ten initiatives, almost
all involving the Analytics business, that could generate
roughly $350 million in revenue. To succeed, the Company
would have to devote resources to all ten and capture market
share with new products. Because the Analytics division's
two biggest products already had captured 56% and 80% of
their respective markets, the bulk of the Company's growth
would come from new initiatives. See Tr. 20 (Harris); Tr. 511
(Geller); JX 111 at 51, 65. Even then, under the Base Case,
2017 revenue still would be less than 2012 revenue: Projected
6% compound annual growth rate for the Analytics business
and -11% compound annual growth rate for the Services
business, resulting in combined compound annual growth for
the Company of -3%. JX 111 at 66.
*6  The Reduced Base Case contemplated a forecast between
doing nothing and the Base Case in which the initiatives did
not fully succeed and revenue decreased by $485 million by
2017. JX 196 ¶ 89. The Optimistic Case contemplated that
the initiatives would succeed to a greater degree than the Base
Case and generate between $651 million to $1 billion in new
revenue. JX 111 at 66. BCG believed the Optimistic Case
was “achievable” but “not the most likely outcome.” Id. at
66–67. Ultimately, “everyone got comfortable with the [B]ase
[C]ase.” Tr. 20 (Harris).
During the same meeting, Credit Suisse and Goldman
made a joint presentation. Their view of industry trends
matched BCG's. See JX 114 at 4; JX 113 at 19. They also
examined stock market trends and concluded that analysts
appeared to understand the Company well because there
was little difference between their consensus forecasts and
the Company's actual performance. See JX 113 at 11. The
bankers observed that since March 2012, most analysts had
maintained a “hold” rating on the Company. The median price
target was $25.00 with a high price target of $31.00.
Using the three cases from the BCG Report, the bankers
prepared valuation models and analyzed alternatives,
including an expanded share repurchase plan, a leveraged
recapitalization, a spinoff of the Analytics business, a joint
venture involving the Services business, a sale of the Services
business, a sale of the entire Company, and a leveraged
buy-out. One analysis estimated the present value of the
Company's future stock price. Using an EBITDA multiple
of 6.0x, the bankers estimated that if LPS achieved the Base
Case, its stock would trade at $29.43 in 2015 and $41.35 in
2017. Discounted at 11%, those figures equated to present
values of $23.88 and $28.70 respectively, with the former
representing a 3% discount to the Company's current market
price and the latter a 10% premium over market. JX 113 at
23. Using an EBITDA multiple of 7.0x, the Company's stock
would trade at $35.07 in 2015 and $47.76 in 2017. Discounted
at 11%, those figures equated to present values of $28.46 and
$31.45 respectively, implying a 15% or 28% premium over
market. Id.
Another analysis used a discounted cash flow methodology to
value the Company using the Base Case. Id. at 25. It generated
the following range of values:
Discount Rate
 
Terminal Value Next Twelve Month EBITDA Multiple:
 
5.00x
 
6.00x
 
7.00x
 
8.00x
 
8.0%
 
$27.14
 
$31.78
 
$36.36
 
$40.83
 
9.0%
 
$25.76
 
$30.23
 
$34.63
 
$38.93
 
10.0%
 
$24.45
 
$28.76
 
$32.96
 
$37.12
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The bankers separately analyzed the ability of strategic
bidders and financial sponsors to finance a transaction. For
strategic bidders, the bankers examined the level of accretion
or dilution that a transaction would involve and the acquirer's
post-transaction debt-to-equity levels, without accounting
for synergies, and assuming either an all-cash deal or a
transaction involving 50% cash and 50% stock at prices
ranging from $30 to $34 per share. Id. at 42. For financial
sponsors, the bankers calculated the internal rates of return
that a sponsor could expect at prices of $28 to $33 per share,
assuming total leverage of 5.0x and a January 1, 2018 exit.
They following chart summarizes the results:
Illustrative Purchase Price Per Share
 
Exit Multiple
 
$28.00
 
$29.00
 
$30.00
 
$31.00
 
$32.00
 
$33.00
 
6.0x
 
20.3%
 
18.1%
 
16.2%
 
14.4%
 
12.8%
 
11.3%
 
6.5x
 
23.3%
 
21.0%
 
19.0%
 
17.2%
 
15.5%
 
14.0%
 
7.0x
 
26.0%
 
23.7%
 
21.6%
 
19.8%
 
18.0%
 
16.5%
 
7.5x
 
28.4%
 
26.1%
 
24.0%
 
22.1%
 
20.4%
 
18.8%
 
8.0x
 
30.7%
 
28.4%
 
26.2%
 
24.3%
 
22.5%
 
20.9%
 
Id. at 43. A financial sponsor thus could not pay $33 or more
per share and still clear a hurdle rate of 20% unless it projected
an exit at 8.0x EBITDA.
*7  At the conclusion of the Board meeting, Credit Suisse
and Goldman recommended “in light of the strategic plan
review, the indications of interest that the Company had
received and the Company's prior negotiating history with
certain of the interested parties, that the Company would be
best off if it could proceed with soliciting and evaluating
offers for the sale of the Company (or its Transaction Services
business).” JX 114 at 5. BCG “concurred that in their view,
the best alternative for the Company would be to pursue
a potential sale of the Company at an attractive price.” Id.
Management agreed, citing the “unfavorable macroeconomic
trends and the market and execution risks inherent in the
strategic initiatives.” Id.
The directors decided to task Credit Suisse with contacting
parties about a sale of the Company or the Services business.
They asked the bankers to develop a recommendation for a
sale process that the Board could evaluate and approve. PTO
¶ 43.
J. The Recommended Sale Process
To implement the Board's directive, Company management
and the financial advisors developed a list of the most likely
bidders. It included six strategic buyers (Fidelity, Altisource,
First American, Nationstar, CoreLogix, and IBM) and one
financial sponsor (Golden Gate). All had expressed interest
earlier in 2013; most had also expressed interest in 2012.
The financial advisors recommended a three-step sale
process. They proposed that “given the history of discussions
with [Fidelity],” the Company should first reach out to First
American, Altisource, Nationstar, and Golden Gate “to create
credible competitive tension in the process.” JX 115 at 1.
After getting “feedback” from those firms, the bankers would
contact Fidelity. Then, after receiving a first round of bids, the
bankers would contact CoreLogix and IBM. The bankers also
contemplated approaching other parties that were less likely
to be interested in or capable of completing a transaction,
such as Infosys. Tr. 515 (Geller). The bankers envisioned
announcing a deal on June 11, 2013.
On March 25, 2013, the Board approved the process. PTO ¶
44.
K. The Actual Sale Process
The Company and its bankers did not follow the
recommended process. Rather than delaying the approach to
Fidelity, management met with Fidelity on April 1, 2013. JX
121 at 3. During the same period, the bankers reached out to
the other parties. Everyone but Altisource expressed interest.
Altisource said it would not participate, citing the Company's
exposure to declining refinancings and defaults. PTO ¶ 46.
The Company entered into confidentiality agreements with
Fidelity, THL, Nationstar, Golden Gate, and First American.
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Management made presentations to Fidelity and Golden
Gate. Management was scheduled to make a presentation to
Nationstar, but they dropped out on April 9, 2013. PTO ¶ 51.
Fidelity and THL took less than two weeks to update their
analysis of the Company and make a revised offer. By letter
dated April 18, 2013, they offered to acquire LPS for $32.00
per share, consisting of $16.00 in cash and $16.00 in Fidelity
common stock. PTO ¶ 53. It was the same price they offered
in late February, but with more cash. Fidelity and THL
made their offer more than a month-and-a-half faster than the
timeline that the bankers had recommended.
On April 25, 2013, the Company announced results for the
first quarter. Compared to the prior quarter, revenue decreased
by 6% and EBITDA decreased by 7%. JX 133 at 3. Year
over year, revenue decreased by 3% and EBITDA increased
by 7%. As expected, the bulk of the decline came from
the Services business. The numbers matched management's
guidance and the analysts' consensus.
Management updated the Base Case in light of the Company's
first quarter (the “Updated Base Case”). The new projections
lowered the numbers for 2013 and 2014 but kept the figures
for 2015:
*8  Revenue:
 
2013
 
2014
 
2015
 
Updated Base Case
 
$ 1,868.3
 
$ 1,789.5
 
$ 1,669.7
 
Analyst Consensus
 
$ 1,861.1
 
$ 1,795.7
 
$ 1,845.9
 
% Difference
 
0.4%
 
-0.3%
 
-9.5%
 
EBITDA:
 
Updated Base Case
 
$ 523.0
 
$ 536.9
 
$ 506.6
 
Analyst Consensus
 
$ 493.7
 
$ 485.8
 
$ 503.1
 
% Difference
 
5.9%
 
10.5%
 
0.7%
 
EBITDA Margin:
 
Updated Base Case
 
28.0%
 
30.0%
 
30.3%
 
Analyst Consensus
 
26.5%
 
27.1%
 
27.3%
 
% Difference
 
5.5%
 
10.9%
 
11.3%
 
“[T]he modifications did not result in any significant impact”
on the bankers' valuations of the Company. JX 149 at 2. The
Company provided the Updated Base Case to Fidelity, First
American, and Golden Gate. PTO ¶ 45; JX 189.
L. The Board Decides To Sell The Company.
On May 1 and 2, 2013, First American and Golden
Gate submitted their indications of interest. First American
proposed to buy the Services business for $450–550 million in
cash. PTO ¶ 55; JX 145. First American said that it preferred
a joint venture and would increase its valuation of Services
by 15–20% as part of that structure. Golden Gate proposed
to have the Company contribute the Services business to a
Golden Gate controlled entity in which LPS would retain a
“substantial interest.” JX 146 at 2. Golden Gate valued its
proposal at $800 million. PTO ¶ 54.
On May 3, 2013, the Board met with its financial advisors
to discuss the proposals. The bankers generated a range of
values, including:
• Comparable companies: $21.46 to $30.35 per share.
• Precedent transactions: $28.09 to $34.00 per share.
• DCF analysis: $27.95 to $40.11 per share.
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JX 147 at 16. At the time, LPS's stock was trading around
$27.28. The Company's 52–week low was $21.14 and its 52–
week high was $30.88.
To enable the Board to compare a sale of the Company with
a transaction involving the Services business, the bankers
analyzed the EBITDA trading multiples that the latter implied
for the Analytics business, which ranged from 8.0x to 9.1x.
The Fidelity offer implied a range of EBITDA trading
multiples for Analytics of 9.3x to 10.4x. The Board concluded
that selling the Company as a whole was the better course.
In their original plan for the sale process, the bankers
envisioned using a bid from Altisource to create competition
for Fidelity. Without Altisource, the Board decided to counter
at $34.50 per share and ask Fidelity for a collar to support the
stock component. PTO ¶ 56; JX 150. After the Board meeting
on May 3, 2013, Credit Suisse conveyed this proposal to
Fidelity's banker.
Instead of having its banker respond, Fidelity's Chairman
called the Company's Chairman directly. Fidelity's Chairman
was Foley, who previously had served as the Chairman
of FNF Services. The Company's Chairman was Kennedy,
who had served as Chairman, President, and CEO of a
company that Fidelity acquired in 2006 in connection with
the spinoff of FNF Services. Kennedy then served as CEO
of FNF Services under Foley from 2006 through 2009.
The petitioners perceive Foley's call as a way for Fidelity
to capitalize on Foley's history with Kennedy and to take
advantage more generally of the relationships among Fidelity,
THL, and the members of the LPS Board.
The call took place on Sunday, May 5, 2013. Foley proposed
to split the difference between Fidelity's offer and the
Company's counter by increasing the proposed consideration
to $33.25 per share. PTO ¶ 57. The composition would remain
50% cash and 50% stock, but with a one-way collar that would
provide protection against a decline in Fidelity's stock price of
more than 7.5%. He conveyed that Fidelity wanted the right
to increase the cash component to offset the dilutive effect of
issuing additional shares.
*9  The next day, after a meeting of the Board, Credit Suisse
contacted Fidelity's banker to ask for a price increase and a
reduction in the percentage decline necessary to trigger the
collar. Fidelity refused to increase its price but offered to
improve the collar. Fidelity also agreed that if the average
price of its stock increased by more than 6% and Fidelity
substituted cash for shares, then the cash would reflect the
upside that the Company's stockholders would have enjoyed
if they received shares.
On May 14, 2013, the Board held a telephonic meeting. Credit
Suisse reported on the negotiations, and the Board instructed
management and the deal team to begin due diligence on
Fidelity and negotiate a merger agreement. The parties used
the merger agreement they had negotiated in 2012 as a
template, which included a go-shop. The parties kept the
go-shop largely because of legal advice the Board received
regarding its ability to mitigate potential legal risk. See
Carpenter Dep. 124. The concept of a go-shop was not part of
the bankers' design for the sale process.
On May 22, 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that
Fidelity and the Company were in merger talks. JX 171 at
1. In response, Macquarie Capital (USA) Inc. issued a report
titled, “Best Outcome for LPS is to be Acquired.” JX 173 at 1.
Macquarie argued that “the [loan] cycle has peaked” and the
deal would “rescue[ ] shareholders from pending fundamental
slowdown.” Id. At the time, Macquarie valued LPS at $22 per
share. Id.
M. The Board Approves The Merger Agreement.
On May 27, 2013, the Board met to consider the
agreement and plan of merger (the “Merger Agreement”). It
contemplated consideration of $33.25 per share, paid 50%
in cash and 50% in Fidelity stock (the “Original Merger
Consideration”). The formula for the stock component built in
a one-way collar that protected against a decline of more than
5% in the value of Fidelity's common stock and established
a floor for the stock component at $15.794 per share. The
Merger Agreement gave Fidelity the right to increase the cash
portion and contained a formula that specified how much gain
from an increase in Fidelity's stock price would flow through
to the Company's stockholders.
The Merger Agreement provided for (i) a 40–day go-shop that
would expire on July 7, 2013, (ii) a five-day initial match right
that fell back to a two-day unlimited match right, and (iii) a
$37 million termination fee for a deal generated during the
go-shop. Otherwise the termination fee was $74 million. The
lower fee represented 1.27% of the equity value of the deal
($2.9 billion); the higher fee represented 2.5% of equity value.
Once the go-shop ended, LPS could continue negotiating with
any party that had achieved excluded party status or if a party
made a bid that met the terms of the fiduciary out.
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Credit Suisse and Goldman opined that the transaction
consideration was fair. The bankers' valuations had not
changed materially since their earlier assessments. Credit
Suisse's ranges included:
• Comparable companies: $21.25 to $32.93 per share.
• Precedent transactions: $27.81 to $33.67 per share.
• DCF analysis: $27.67 to $39.76 per share.
JX 175 at 12. Goldman's ranges included:
• Comparable companies: $20.35 to $31.74 per share.
• Precedent transactions: $25.42 to $34.41 per share.
• DCF analysis: $26.50 to $37.25 per share.
• Present value of future share price: $21.32 to $32.97 per
share.
JX 177 at 17.
The Board unanimously adopted and approved the Merger
Agreement and recommended that the LPS stockholders vote
in favor of the transaction.
N. The Go–Shop
*10  On May 28, 2013, the bankers started the go-shop
process. They contacted twenty-five potential strategic buyers
and seventeen potential financial buyers. JX 213 at 5. Only
Altisource and two financial sponsors expressed interest and
executed confidentiality agreements. PTO ¶ 61.
The discussions with the financial sponsors never gained
traction. Altisource, however, brought in a large team and
conducted a “very rigorous level of diligence.” Tr. 277
(Schilling). Altisource accessed the data room, received a
management presentation, and was given the Company's
projections. JX 194; JX 202; Tr. 123 (Harris). Altisource
appeared serious and said they would make an offer that
included an equity component. In response, the Company
began conducting reverse due diligence on Altisource. Tr.
279 (Schilling); JX 199. Management generally preferred
Altisource over Fidelity because they thought they would
keep their jobs after a deal with Altisource. Tr. 419
(Carpenter).
On June 21, 2013, Altisource withdrew without explaining
why. JX 206; Tr. 42 (Harris). There were rumors that several
LPS clients did not want a competitor to acquire LPS. See
JX 357 at 1; Tr. 189 (Harris). Credit Suisse had previously
estimated that Altisource would face “a net revenue dis-
synergy” from acquiring the Company because many of LPS's
clients would have concerns if it were owned by a competitor,
and “any theoretical cost synergy” available to Altisource
“would likely be more than offset by the revenue dis-synergy
with customers.” JX 103.
On July 7, 2013, the go-shop ended. No one had submitted an
indication of interest, much less a topping bid.
O. The Period Leading Up To The Stockholder Vote
In July 2013, management reported on the Company's second
quarter results. Revenues decreased by 1% and EBITDA
remained flat. Year over year, revenue decreased by 9%
and EBITDA by 13%. These results were consistent with
management guidance and the consensus forecast.
On August 29, 2013, Fidelity filed a Form S–4 in connection
with the transaction. The filing included the Updated Base
Case, marking the first time it was publicly disclosed.
In October 2013, management reported on the Company's
third quarter results. Revenue declined by 10.6% and
EBITDA by 18.4%. Year over year, revenue declined
by 15.8% and EBITDA by 25%. The results fell within
management's guidance but at the lower end of the range.
They came in below analysts' consensus estimates.
On October 31, 2013, LPS filed its definitive proxy statement
relating to the Merger. The proxy statement included the
Updated Base Case.
Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Co.
recommended that stockholders vote in favor of the Merger.
At a meeting of stockholders held on December 19, 2013,
holders of 78.6% of the outstanding shares voted in favor of
the deal. Of the shares that voted, 98.4% voted in favor.
Goldman received $22.8 million for its work on the
transaction. The proxy statement revealed that Goldman had
a lucrative relationship with THL that generated $97 million
during the previous two years. Goldman had not previously
disclosed these amounts to the Board or LPS management.
They learned about the figures when they saw the proxy
statement. Tr. 171 (Harris).
Credit Suisse received $21.8 million for its work on the deal.
The proxy statement revealed that Credit Suisse had received
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$26 million from THL during the previous two years. Credit
Suisse had not previously disclosed these amounts to the
Board or LPS management. The directors learned about the
figures when they saw the proxy statement.
P. The Merger Closes.
*11  On January 2, 2014, the Merger closed. Fidelity's stock
price had increased in the interim, resulting in an increase in
the merger consideration. Fidelity elected twice to increase
the cash component, which ended up at $28.10 per share.
The collar yielded a stock component valued at $9.04 per
share. The aggregate merger consideration received by the
Company's stockholders at closing was $37.14 per share (the
“Final Merger Consideration”). The equity value of the final
deal was $3.4 billion, an increase of approximately $500
million over the value at signing. Net of $287 million in cash
and $1.1 billion in debt, the enterprise value of the deal was
$4.2 billion.
The Initial Merger Consideration of $33.25 per share and the
Final Merger Consideration of $37.14 per share represented
premiums of 14% and 28% respectively over the Company's
unaffected market price on May 22, 2013, the last trading
day before the Wall Street Journal reported on the merger
discussions. The Final Merger Consideration provided a
premium of approximately 20% over Altisource's expression
of interest in February 2013.
Evidence in the record indicates that the Initial Merger
Consideration and the Final Merger Consideration included
a portion of the value that Fidelity and THL expected to
generate from synergies.
• In May 2012, when THL, Blackstone, and Fidelity made
an offer of $29 per share to acquire the Company,
they explained that the offer price depended in part
on anticipated synergies with Fidelity's ServiceLink
business. JX 260 at 53.
• In March 2013, Credit Suisse made a preliminary
estimate that a transaction with Fidelity could generate
annual synergies of $50 to $65 million, with $40 to
$50 million coming from the combination of Services
and ServiceLink and another $10 to $15 million from
reduced corporate overhead. JX 103.
• In May 2013, in its presentation to the Board, Credit
Suisse estimated “Potential Synergies—$50mm in cost
synergies in 2013E, $100mm in 2014E and $100mm
thereafter. JX 180 at 45. Goldman estimated that “net
synergies include $100mm in run-rate cost savings.” JX
178 at 34.
• In May 2013, Fidelity made a presentation to the rating
agencies that forecasted “$75 million of [annual] cost
synergies” from the transaction. JX 164 at 4. Fidelity
cited its “strong history of overachieving forecasted
synergies.” Id. at 8.
• The press release announcing the deal attributed the
following quote to Foley, Fidelity's Chairman: “We
believe there are meaningful synergies that can be
generated through the similar businesses in centralized
refinance and default related products, elimination of
some corporate and public company costs and the shared
corporate campus. We have set a target of $100 million
for cost synergies and are confident that we can meet or
exceed that goal.” JX 186, Ex. 99.1 at 2.
• Merion internally modeled $100 million in synergies as
part of its investment analysis. JX 310.
• The respondent's expert cited an analyst report
which described the synergy estimate as “conservative,
considering business overlap between [Services] and
ServiceLink (~$2B in combined revenue) and the
potential elimination of corporate and management cost
redundancies.” JX 296 ¶ 126.
The prospect of $100 million in synergies was a significant
source of value. Using a higher discount rate than this decision
adopts, the Company's expert calculated that the $100 million
target would translate into approximately $660.4 million of
present value, or $7.50 per share. Id. ¶ 128.
Q. The Company's Post–Closing Performance
Post-closing, Fidelity divided the Company's operations into
two separate subsidiaries, combined the Services business
with its ServiceLink business, and issued a 35% interest in
each subsidiary to THL. On March 31, 2014, KPMG LLP
issued a final financial report for the combined entity. Across
the board, the Company's results came in below the Updated
Base Case.
*12  Actual
 
Updated Base Case
 
Actual v. Updated Base Case
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TD & A
 
$ 757.2
 
$ 800.9
 
($ 43.7)
 
(5.5%)
 
Transaction Services
 
$ 965.8
 
$ 1,067.3
 
($ 101.5)
 
(9.5%)
 
Total Revenue
 
$ 1,723.5
 
$ 1,868.3
 
($ 144.8)
 
(7.8%)
 
Operating Expense
 
$ 1,285.1
 
$ 1,345.3
 
($ 60.2)
 
(4.5%)
 
EBITDA
 
$ 438.4
 
$ 523.0
 
($ 84.6)
 
(16.2%)
 
% Margin
 
25.4%
 
28.0%
 
(2.6%)
 
(9.1%)
 
EBIT
 
$ 333.0
 
$ 415.1
 
($ 82.1)
 
(19.8%)
 
JX 296 Ex. 15 (summarizing documents).
R. This Litigation
Merion purchased 5,682,276 shares after the announcement
of the Merger and before the stockholder vote. Merion
demanded appraisal, did not withdraw its demand or vote
in favor of the Merger, and eschewed the Final Merger
Consideration. Merion pursued this appraisal action to obtain
a judicial determination of the fair value of its shares.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on
grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) states that
the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.
8 Del. C. § 262(h).
Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the
burden of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a
liability proceeding. “In a statutory appraisal proceeding,
both sides have the burden of proving their respective
valuation positions by a preponderance of evidence.” M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del.
1999).
Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent
elements of its valuation position by a preponderance of the
evidence, including the propriety of a particular method,
modification, discount, or premium. If both parties fail to
meet the preponderance standard on the ultimate question
of fair value, the Court is required under the statute to make
its own determination.
Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights
in Mergers & Consolidations, 38–5th C.P.S. §§ IV(H)(3),
at A–89 to A–90 (BNA) (collecting cases) [hereinafter
Appraisal Rights]. “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
means proof that something is more likely than not. It
means that certain evidence, when compared to the evidence
opposed to it, has the more convincing force and makes
you believe that something is more likely true than not.”
Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13
(Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010) (Strine, V.C.) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Under this standard, [a party] is not required
to prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence or to
exacting certainty. Rather, [a party] must prove only that it is
more likely than not that it is entitled to relief.” Triton Constr.
Co. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6
(Del. Ch. May 18, 2009), aff'd, 988 A.2d 938 (Del. 2010)
(TABLE).
*13  The standard of “fair value” is “a jurisprudential
concept that draws more from judicial writings than from the
appraisal statue itself.” Del.  Open MRI Radiology Assocs.,
P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310 (Del. Ch. 2006) (Strine,
V.C.). “The concept of fair value under Delaware law is not
equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value.
Rather, the concept of fair value for purposes of Delaware's
appraisal statute is a largely judge-made creation, freighted
with policy considerations.” Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc.,
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2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (Strine,
V.C.).
In Tri–Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950),
the Delaware Supreme Court explained in detail the concept
of value that the appraisal statute employs:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is
that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate
interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or
intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the
merger. In determining what figure represents the true or
intrinsic value, ... the courts must take into consideration all
factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the
fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends,
earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other
facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of
the date of the merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent
to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholder's
interest, but must be considered ....1
When applying this standard, the corporation “must be valued
as a going concern based upon the operative reality' of the
company as of the time of the merger, taking into account
its particular market position in light of future prospects.”
M.G. Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 525. A determination
of fair value assesses “the value of the company ... as a
going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an
acquisition.” M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790,
795 (Del. 1999).
“The statutory obligation to make a single determination
of a corporation's value introduces an impression of false
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.” In re Appraisal of
Dell Inc. (Dell Fair Value), 2016 WL 3186538, at *22 (Del.
Ch. May 31, 2016). “The value of a corporation is not a point
on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task
is to assign one particular value within this range as the most
reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based
on considerations of fairness.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2004), aff'd
in part, rev'd on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
A. The Deal Price As Evidence Of Fair Value
The Company contends that the Final Merger Consideration
establishes a ceiling for the fair value of the Company. As
the proponent of this valuation methodology, the Company
bears the burden of establishing its reliability. In this case,
the Initial Merger Consideration provides reliable evidence
of the Company's fair value at the time of signing, and the
Final Merger Consideration provides reliable evidence of the
Company's fair value at the effective time.
1. Deal Price As One Form Of Market Evidence
*14  “The consideration that the buyer agrees to provide
in the deal and that the seller agrees to accept is one form
of market price data, which Delaware courts have long
considered in appraisal proceedings.” Dell Fair Value, 2016
WL 3186548, at *22. See generally Appraisal Rights, supra,
at A–57 to A–59. Chancellor Allen summarized the law on
the use of market price data as follows:
It is, of course, axiomatic that if there is an established
market for shares of a corporation the market value of such
shares must be taken into consideration in an appraisal of
their intrinsic value. ... It is, of course, equally axiomatic
that market value, either actual or constructed, is not the
sole element to be taken into consideration in the appraisal
of stock.2
Numerous cases support Chancellor Allen's observations that
(i) pricing data from a thick and efficient market should be
considered3 and (ii) market price alone is not dispositive.4
The trial court “need not accord any weight to [values derived
from the market] when unsupported by evidence that they
represent the going concern value of the company at the
effective date of the merger.” M.P.M., 731 A.2d at 796.
“Recent jurisprudence has emphasized Delaware courts'
willingness to consider market price data generated not only
by the market for individual shares but also by the market
for the company as a whole.” Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL
3186548, at *23. If the merger giving rise to appraisal
rights “resulted from an arm's-length process between two
independent parties, and if no structural impediments existed
that might materially distort the ‘crucible of objective market
reality,’ ” then “a reviewing court should give substantial
evidentiary weight to the merger price as an indicator of fair
value.”5
*15  “Here too, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
has eschewed market fundamentalism by making clear that
market price data is neither conclusively determinative of nor
presumptively equivalent to fair value.” Dell Fair Value, 2016
WL 3186548, at *23.
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Section 262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that
the Court of Chancery should consider the transactional
market price of the underlying company. Rather, in
determining “fair value,” the statute instructs that the court
“shall take into account all relevant factors.” Importantly,
this Court has defined “fair value” as the value to a
stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to
the firm's value in the context of an acquisition or other
transaction. Determining “fair value” through “all relevant
factors” may be an imperfect process, but the General
Assembly has determined it to be an appropriately fair
process. ...
Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of “fair
value” at the time of a transaction. It vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
“all relevant favors” and determine the going concern
value of the underlying company. Requiring the Court
of Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—
to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine,
unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the
unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned
holdings of our precedent. It would inappropriately shift
the responsibility to determine “fair value” from the court
to the private parties. Also, while it is difficult for the
Chancellor and Vice Chancellors to assess wildly divergent
expert opinions regarding value, inflexible rules governing
appraisal provide little additional benefit in determining
“fair value” because of the already high costs of appraisal
actions. ... Therefore, we reject ... [the] call to establish a
rule requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the merger
price in any appraisal proceeding.
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP (Golden Telecom II), 11
A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010) (footnotes omitted).
Since Golden Telecom II, the Court of Chancery has
regularly considered the deal price as a relevant factor when
determining fair value, but it has not deferred automatically or
presumptively to the deal price. The court also has not equated
satisfying the standards of review that govern fiduciary duty
claims with carrying the burden of proof in an appraisal
proceeding. Because the two inquiries are different, a sale
process might pass muster for purposes of a breach of
fiduciary claim and yet still constitute a sub-optimal process
of an appraisal.6
*16  In evaluating the persuasiveness of the deal price, this
court has cautioned that “[t]he dependability of a transaction
price is only as strong as the process by which it was
negotiated.” Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL
2069417, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015). What is required
is “a proper transactional process likely to have resulted in an
accurate valuation of [the] acquired corporation.” LongPath
Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at
*21 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015). Under this standard, the court
will rely “on the merger price itself as evidence of fair value,
so long as the process leading to the transaction is a reliable
indicator of value and any merger-specific value in that price
is excluded.” Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015
WL 6164771, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015). “[T]he Court
will give little weight to a merger price unless the record
supports its reliability.” AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *11.
The deal price “is informative of fair value only when it is
the product of not only a fair sale process, but also of a well
functioning market.” In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp.,
2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
Evaluating the reliability and persuasiveness of the deal
price for purposes of establishing fair value in an appraisal
proceeding is a multifaceted, fact-specific inquiry. The
relevant factors can vary from case to case depending
on the nature of the company, the overarching market
dynamics, and the areas on which the parties focus. The
last is perhaps an underappreciated aspect of appraisal
jurisprudence. Because an appraisal decision results from
litigation in which adversarial parties advance arguments
and present evidence, the issues that the court considers
and the outcome that it reaches depend in large part on
the arguments that the advocates make and the evidence
they present. An argument may carry the day in a particular
case if counsel advance it skillfully and present persuasive
evidence to support it. The same argument may not prevail
in another case if the proponents fail to generate a similarly
persuasive level of probative evidence or if the opponents
respond effectively.
2. The Persuasiveness Of The Initial Merger
Consideration
The Company demonstrated at trial that the Initial Merger
Consideration provides a reliable indicator of the Company's
fair value at the time of the signing of the Merger Agreement.
Multiple factors contribute to this court's determination that
the sale process that the Board conducted provided an
effective means of price discovery.
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a. Meaningful Competition During The Pre–Signing
Phase
The first factor supporting the persuasiveness of the
Company's sale process is the existence of meaningful
competition among multiple bidders during the pre-signing
phase.7 Scholars who study auction design agree on the
importance of creating competition among multiple bidders.8
Renowned M & A practitioner Marty Lipton has contrasted
the effects of adding another interested party at the front
end of a negotiation with the effect of bargaining more
vigorously with a single counterparty at the back end. Lipton
even roughly quantified the added value of adding another
interested party: “The ability to bring somebody into a
situation is far more important than the extra dollar a share at
the back end. At the front end, you're probably talking about
50%. At the back end, you're talking about 1 or 2 percent.”9
*17  Equally important, the Company's process involved
different types of bidders, which is critical for promoting
competition.10 “[T]he most important driver of market
efficiency for [change of control] transactions [is]
heterogeneous buyers.” Subramanian, supra, at 713. Among
homogenous bidders, a sale process functions as a common-
value auction, but with heterogeneous bidders, the sale
process functions as a private-value auction.11 The latter
is better for the seller because in a private-value auction,
“honest reporting of values is a dominant strategy for
bidders.”12 Finding heterogeneous bidders generally means
involving strategic buyers.13 Financial sponsors, by contrast,
predominantly use the same pricing models, the same inputs,
and the same value-creating techniques.14 Absent distorted
market conditions, “strategic bidders are systematically
willing to pay more than financial bidders,”15 and the fact
that “average returns to [strategic] acquirers are close to zero
or even negative” suggests that acquirers pay full value for
targets, inclusive of the benefits of control and synergies. See
Gorbenko & Malenko, supra, at 2537. Financial buyers, by
contrast, generally pay lower premiums16 and are hampered
by limitations on leverage and the need to achieve their
internal hurdle rates.17
*18  In this case, the Board conducted a sale process that
involved a reasonable number of participants and created
credible competition among heterogeneous bidders during the
pre-signing phase. The process began after the Board received
five unsolicited indications of interest, with three from
strategic buyers (Fidelity, Altisource, and First American)
and two from financial sponsors (Flexpoint and Golden
Gate). The Board did not immediately enter into negotiations
or launch a sale process. Instead it awaited the results
of BCG's analysis and obtained input from management
and its financial advisors about strategic alternatives. With
the benefit of that information, including estimates of the
Company's standalone value based on BCG's scenarios, the
Board was well-positioned to solicit bids for the Company
and its Services business and to evaluate those bids against
other possibilities, including remaining a standalone entity.
Having decided to solicit bids, the Board went beyond the
parties who had submitted unsolicited expressions of interest
by identifying three additional strategic buyers. The Board's
financial advisors approached all of the potential bidders on
equal terms, and all knew that the Board was conducting a
sale process and so faced the prospect of competition when
formulating their offers.
The petitioners have argued that although the Board may
have set out to generate competition, its efforts failed because
Altisource decided not to bid. They say that this left Fidelity
without any competition as the only strategic bidder for the
whole Company. It is possible that a single-bidder process,
even one that would be defensible from a fiduciary duty
standpoint, could be unpersuasive for purposes of price
discovery for an appraisal. In CKx, for example, the court
relied exclusively on the market price, but stressed that the
case involved meaningful pre-signing competition and was
not one in which “the only evidence that a merger price
was the result of ‘market’ forces was a post-signing go-
shop period (which failed to produce competing bids) ....”
2013 WL 5878807, at *13. Likewise in Orchard Enterprises,
the court declined to give weight to the merger price in an
appraisal action where “the trial did not focus extensively
on the quality of marketing ... or the utility of the ‘go shop’
provision in the merger agreement, which could obviously
have been affected by [a large stockholder's] voting power and
expressed interest to acquire all of [the company] for itself.”
2012 WL 2923305, at *5.
Importantly, however, if bidders perceive a sale process to be
relatively open, then a credible threat of competition can be
as effective as actual competition:
Even when there is only one buyer, that buyer could feel
compelled to act as if there were more. In a perfectly
contestable market, competitive pressures exerted by the
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perpetual threat of entry (as well as by the presence
of actual rivals) induce competitive behavior. Free entry
is a sufficient condition for a market to be perfectly
contestable. ...
Aktas et al., supra, at 242–43. Consequently, “competition
need not be observed ex post for the M & A market
to be efficient.” Id. at 242. “Competition, or the threat
of competition, is a strong incentive for buyers to make
higher bids for sellers.” Bulletproof, supra, at 884 (emphasis
added); see also id at 879–80 (surveying literature on auction
theory and concluding that “[t]he two key insights are that
competition, or the threat of competition, will lead to a price
closer to the buyer's reservation price and that the price effect
of one additional competitor is greater than the price effects
attributable to bargaining”).
During the pre-signing phase, Fidelity and THL did not know
that Altisource had dropped out. They instead knew that the
Company was conducting a sale process involving multiple
parties, and they also knew that the merger agreement that
they had negotiated with the Company in 2012 and planned to
use as the framework for their 2013 deal included a go-shop,
which could create a path for post-signing competition by a
strategic competitor.18 In this case, the Company established
the presence of a competitive dynamic during the pre-signing
phase that that generated meaningful price discovery.
*19  Reinforcing the threat of competition from other parties
was the realistic possibility that the Company would reject the
Fidelity/THL bid and pursue a different alternative. Fidelity
and THL had approached the Company previously in 2010,
2011, and 2012. Each time, the Board had declined to pursue
a transaction. In 2012, the Board had rejected premium
bids of $26.50, $28.00, and $29.00 per share, choosing
instead to continue operating the Company on a stand-alone
basis. In early 2013, the Board also rejected Fidelity/THL's
preliminary indication of interest of $30.00 per share. The
Board's track record of saying “no” gave Fidelity/THL a
credible reason to believe that the Board would not sell below
its internal reserve price. See Tr. 483 (Carpenter) (“And I
might add that [Fidelity] had learned in prior times that we
would walk away when they didn't raise their bid.”).
By citing the involvement of multiple, heterogeneous bidders
during the pre-signing phase, this decision is not suggesting
any legal requirement to engage with multiple bidders.
There may be sound business reasons for not doing so,
and “[n]othing in our jurisprudence suggests that an auction
process need conform to any theoretical standard.” CKx, 2013
WL 5878807, at *14. As this court has observed, “a multi-
bidder auction of a company” is not a “prerequisite to finding
that the merger price is a reliable indicator of fair value.”
Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *21. The point of citing
the involvement of multiple bidders in this case is more
limited. It is simply that because the Company contacted a
reasonable number of heterogeneous bidders during the pre-
signing phase, its argument for reliance on the deal price (all
else equal) is more persuasive.19
b. Adequate And Reliable Information During The Pre–
Signing Phase
Another factor supporting the effectiveness of the sale process
in this case was that adequate and reliable information
about the Company was available to all participants, which
contributed to the existence of meaningful competition.
Delaware cases have questioned the validity of a sale
process when reliable information is unavailable for reasons
that have included regulatory uncertainty20 and persistent
misperceptions about the corporation's value.21 A company
also can create informational inadequacies by providing
disparate information to bidders. See Goeree & Offerman,
supra, at 600. If a seller only makes information available to
one bidder, then the seller has given that bidder a subsidy.
See id. The effect of disparate information is greater in a
common value auction than in a private value auction.22
Strategic buyers, who have their own private sources of value
and trade-based informational advantages, are less affected by
information disparities than financial buyers, who are more
susceptible to the winner's curse. See Dell Fair Value, 2016
WL 3186538, at *42; Denton, supra, at 1546.
*20  In this case, all bidders received equal access to
information about the Company. All had the opportunity
to conduct due diligence before submitting their bids, and
several did so. There is no evidence in the record suggesting
that the Company or its advisors provided any particular
bidder with informational advantages. This is also not a case
where the size of the Company or the nature of its business
made it difficult to understand and assess. Cf.  Dell Fair
Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *40–41. Every bidder who
submitted an indication of interest, including Altisource in
early 2013, identified a limited amount of time for conducting
due diligence, typically four weeks.
- 270 -
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Services, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2016)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16
The record in this case lacked persuasive evidence of
factors that would undermine the reliability of information
that bidders received, such as a regulatory overhang or a
significant disconnect between the Company's unaffected
market price and informed assessments of fair value by
insiders. Compare DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at
*21; Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *32–36.
The petitioners have pointed to the legal uncertainty that
surrounded the Company and the proximity of the sale
process to the settlements that the Company announced
in January 2013. They argue that stockholders did not
sufficiently understand the Company's significant value
once its legal risk had been addressed. It is true that
there was a regulatory overhang from the investigations
in the Company's involvement in robo-signing and related
stockholder litigation, but the settlements cleared up those
issues. The weight of the evidence at trial indicated that the
settlements made the Company easier to understand, and the
Company's stock price increased substantially following the
announcement of the settlements.
The record in this case lacked persuasive indications of
irrational or exaggerated pessimism, whether driven by short-
termism or otherwise, that could have anchored the price
negotiations at levels below fair value.23 A variety of factors
indicated that the market price was providing a reliable
valuation indicator. Management believed that its efforts
to educate the market had succeeded, that the Company's
stockholders understood its business, and that they were
focused on its long-term prospects. Since 2011, analysts had
established a pattern of accurately predicting the Company's
performance. The valuation ranges that the Company's
advisors generated in 2012 and 2013 using DCF analyses
were also generally consistent with market indicators. See JX
33 at 17.
c. Lack Of Collusion Or Unjustified Favoritism Towards
Particular Bidders
*21  A third factor supporting the effectiveness of the sale
process in this case was the absence of any explicit or implicit
collusion, whether among bidders or between the seller and
a particular bidder or subset of bidders.24 Under Delaware
law, only an “arms-length merger price resulting from an
effective market check” is “entitled to great weight in an
appraisal.” Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden
Telecom I), 993 A.2d 497, 508–09 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine,
V.C.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). A common risk in
corporate sale processes is the possibility that management
will favor a particular bidder for self-interested reasons, even
if the favoritism does not rise to the level of an actionable
breach of duty; a reliable sales process avoids that taint.25
*22  The Merger was not an MBO. To the contrary, the
Company's management team believed that Fidelity would
not retain them if it acquired the Company. This gave the
management team a powerful personal incentive not to favor
Fidelity and not to seek (consciously or otherwise) to deliver
the Company to Fidelity at an advantageous price. Instead it
gave the management team an additional incentive to seek out
other bidders and create competition for Fidelity.
The petitioners have pointed to ties among Fidelity, THL, and
members of the Board which they say undermined the sale
process in general and the price negotiation in particular. It is
true that there were relationships among Fidelity, THL, and
members of the Board, in large part because of the Company's
history. Recall that Fidelity purchased the Alltel financial
division that eventually became the Company in 2003,
reorganized it as part of FNF Services, then spunoff FNF
Services in 2006. FNF Services in turn spun off the Company
in 2008. The Company's CEO, Harris, had consulted for
Fidelity and THL on the Alltel acquisition and managed FNF
Services from 2002 through 2006. Kennedy, the Company's
Chairman, had served as CEO of FNF Services from 2006
through 2009, and during that time Foley, the Chairman of
Fidelity, was Executive Chairman of FNF Services. Hunt,
another outside director, served as an officer of one of THL's
portfolio companies. The Company and Fidelity also shared a
common business campus in Jacksonville, Florida (although
they occupied separate office buildings).
These relationships warranted close examination, but they
did not compromise the sale process. Harris interacted with
Fidelity and other bidders in his capacity as CEO, but he
recused himself from deliberating as a director during the
2013 sale process. Hunt also recused himself. Kennedy
participated only after the Board determined that he did
not have a conflict. All of the members of the Board and
management were net sellers in the deal, and they collectively
expected to receive approximately $100 million from the
Merger in stock-based compensation. See JX 260 at 91–99;
Tr. 784 (Hausman). Harris in particular had an incentive to
maximize the value of his shares, because he planned to retire.
As noted, the management team as a whole believed that if
Fidelity acquired the Company, they would not retain their
positions, meaning that maximizing the value of the merger
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consideration was the best way for them to obtain value from
the deal. There also was a history of competition between
Fidelity's ServiceLink business and the Company, and during
the sale process management resisted providing sensitive
information to what it regarded as its closest competitor. See
JX 46.
The petitioners complain the loudest about the call that
Foley made to Kennedy, where Foley proposed consideration
of $33.25 per share, essentially splitting the difference
between Fidelity's offer of $32 per share and the Company's
counteroffer of $34.50 per share. Although the Company's
bankers made one more try to get more consideration, the
headline price term was effectively set during that telephone
call, and negotiations from that point on revolved around the
collar and other aspects of the deal. The petitioners seem to
believe that during that call, Kennedy committed to $33.25
per share, ending the negotiations at a point below where they
would have ended up otherwise. But Kennedy did not have
authority to lock the Board in to $33.25 per share, and the
Board in fact had its bankers push back once more. Nor is
it clear that the negotiations would have ended in a different
place if Fidelity's banker had responded to Credit Suisse, as
the petitioners would have preferred.
*23  More importantly, the record indicates that even at
$33.25 per share, the deal price included a portion of the
synergies that Fidelity and THL hoped to achieve from
the transaction, including revenue synergies from combining
the Company's Services business with Fidelity's ServiceLink
unit. Assuming for the sake of argument that a negotiator
without a historical relationship with Foley might have
extracted more than $33.25 per share, the record indicates that
the additional amount would have represented a portion of the
combinatorial value of the Company to Fidelity, not increased
going concern value to which the petitioners would be entitled
in an appraisal. “A merger price resulting from arms-length
negotiations ... is a very strong indication of fair value,” but
it “must be accompanied by evidence tending to show that
it represents the going concern value of the company rather
than just the value of the company to one specific buyer.”
M.P.M., 731 A.2d at 797. “The fact that a board has extracted
the most that a particular buyer (or type of buyer) will pay
does not mean that the result constitutes fair value.” Dell Fair
Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29. Likewise, the fact that a
negotiator has failed to extract the most a particular buyer (or
type of buyer) will pay does not mean that what the negotiator
obtained did not already exceed fair value. In Dell, the former
was true. In this case, the latter was true.
d. Conclusion Regarding The Initial Merger
Consideration
The evidence at trial established that the Initial Merger
Consideration is a reliable indicator of fair value as of the
signing of the Merger Agreement. The evidence indicating
that the transaction price included synergies suggests that the
fair value of the Company as of the signing of the Merger
Agreement would not have exceeded the value of the Initial
Merger Consideration. The valuation date for purposes of
an appraisal, however, is not the date on which the Merger
Agreement was signed, but rather the date on which the
merger closes.
3. Evidence From The Post–Signing Period
Over seven months elapsed between the signing of the
Merger Agreement on May 27, 2013, and the closing of the
merger on January 2, 2014. The parties have to address this
temporal gap, because “[t]he time for determining the value
of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger
transaction ‘on the date of the merger.’ ” Appraisal Rights A–
33 (quoting Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Consequently,
if the value of the corporation changes between the signing of
the merger and the closing, the fair value determination must
be measured by the “operative reality” of the corporation at
the effective time of the merger. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc. (Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996).
Neither side presented analyses of the potential for valuation
change between signing and closing. Neither analyzed
changes in value of market indices or (arguable) peer
companies. Neither attempted to use these metrics to bring
the Company's market price forward, as parties sometimes
historically did under the Delaware Block Method. See
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A–58 (collecting cases). The
petitioners pointed to the existence of the temporal gap as a
reason not to rely on either the deal price or market-based
metrics associated with the signing of the deal. They argued
that in light of the temporal gap, the court should construct its
own valuation as of the closing date.
The respondent approached the temporal gap differently.
They argued that (i) the failure of a topping bid to emerge
between announcement of the deal and the stockholder vote
validated the deal price, (ii) the Company's performance
declined during the gap period, and (iii) Fidelity's stock traded
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up, resulting in the Company's stockholders receiving the
higher Final Merger Consideration. The respondent argued
that the Final Merger Consideration therefore exceeded fair
value, particularly because of evidence that the deal included
combinatorial synergies.
Taken as a whole, the evidence at trial established that the
Final Merger Consideration was a reliable indicator of fair
value as of the closing of the Merger and that, because
of synergies and a post-signing decline in the Company's
performance, the fair value of the Company as of the closing
date did not exceed the Final Merger Consideration.
a. The Absence Of A Topping Bid
*24  During the seven-month period between signing and
closing, no other bidder submitted an indication of interest
or made a competing proposal. During the first forty days of
the post-signing period, the Company conducted a go-shop.
After that, until the meeting of stockholders on December 19,
2014, the Company was free to respond to a topping bid that
constituted a Superior Proposal. The time leading up to the
meeting of stockholders amounted to a five-month window-
shop.
A go-shop period is less common in deals involving strategic
buyers like Fidelity than in MBOs involving private equity
sponsors.26 MBOs in which a management team has affiliated
with an incumbent financial sponsor rarely generate topping
bids, particularly from other financial sponsors.27 It is not
clear how a go-shop in a deal with a strategic acquirer would
affect the behavior of other strategic bidders. It seems logical
that relative to a deal without a go-shop, a strategic buyer
would be more likely to compete when a deal involved a go-
shop.
In this case, however, several factors undermined the efficacy
of the go-shop. First, it was not part of the bankers' plan
for the sale process. The parties appear to have kept the go-
shop because of legal advice indicating that it would help
mitigate litigation risk in the event a stockholder sued the
board for breach of fiduciary duty. The bankers gave no
advice regarding the timing or structure of the go-shop, and
the respondent's counsel invoked the attorney-client privilege
to block discovery into discussions regarding the go-shop.
The go-shop appears to have been a lawyer-driven add-on.
Second, the quality of the contacts during the go-
shop is suspect. It is true that the Company's financial
advisors contacted twenty-five potential strategic buyers and
seventeen potential financial buyers, which are impressive
headline numbers. The bulk of those companies, however,
already had demonstrated that they were not interested in
acquiring the Company, had been ruled out by the Board and
its bankers as unlikely transaction partners, or were “the usual
opportunities.” Carpenter Dep. 129–30.
Only Altisource and two financial buyers expressed interest
during the go-shop period. Neither bid. One could view the
lack of interest and absence of bidding during the go-shop
phase as providing support for the proposition that the Initial
Merger Consideration equaled or exceeded fair value. See
Highfields Capital, Inc. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 62
(Del. Ch. 2007) (“The more logical explanation for why no
bidder ever emerged is self-evident: MONY was not worth
more than $31 per share.”). The more logical explanation
on the facts of this case is that potential overbidders did
not see a realistic path to success. To make it worthwhile to
bid, a potential deal jumper must not only value the target
company above the deal price, but also perceive a pathway
to success that is “sufficiently realistic to warrant incurring
the time and expense to become involved in a contested
situation, as well as the potential damage to professional
relationships and reputation from intervening and possibly
being unsuccessful.” Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at
*39. The lack of a realistic path to success explains why a
bidder “would choose not to intervene in a go-shop, even if
it meant theoretically leaving money on the table by allowing
the initial bidder to secure an asset at a beneficial price.” Id.
*25  In this case, the most persuasive explanation is that
the existence of an incumbent trade bidder holding an
unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent
other parties from perceiving a realistic path to success.28
Put differently, for another bidder to warrant intervening,
the bidder would have had to both (i) value the Company
more highly than $33.25 per share and (ii) believe that it
could outbid Fidelity, recognizing that Fidelity could achieve
synergies from acquiring the Company and therefore would
be likely to be able to outbid any competitor that lacked
similar access to synergies or a comparable source of private
value. Without the second half of the equation, an overbidder
could force Fidelity to pay more, but it could not ultimately
prevail. Without a realistic path to success, it made no sense
to get involved.
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At first blush, Altisource's decision not to bid during the
go-shop phase appears to suggest that the Initial Merger
Consideration exceeded fair value. Altisource was a trade
bidder and therefore might have been expected to generate
synergies from a transaction with the Company. If so, and
if the Initial Merger Consideration was equivalent to or less
than fair value, than Altisource could have contested Fidelity's
position. But there is also evidence in this case that because
Altisource competed with some of the Company's clients,
Altisource actually faced revenue dis-synergies as part of a
potential deal, and that those dis-synergies would outweigh
any cost savings that Altisource might achieve.
On the facts presented, the probative value of the go-shop
is inconclusive. The same is true for the post-signing period
between the end of the go-shop and the stockholder vote.
During that nearly six-month period, the Company could no
longer solicit additional bids, and the termination fee doubled
from $37 million to $74 million, but otherwise the Company
could entertain a bid that qualified as a Superior Proposal.
Just as during the go-shop period, however, a topping bidder
needed a realistic path to success to make it rational to
intervene. The marginally greater impediments to a topping
bid made that path less realistic, rather than more realistic,
than during the post-go-shop phase.
b. Post–Closing Performance And The Operation Of The
Collar
*26  Immediately after the announcement of the Merger,
Fidelity's stock price rose. It continued to rise during the post-
signing period. Due to the collar, these increases caused the
value of the merger consideration to increase. Fidelity twice
exercised its right to increase the cash component, resulting
in the Final Merger Consideration of $37.04 per share.
During the same time period that Fidelity's stock price was
going up, the Company's financial performance was going
down. In October 2013, the Company announced that quarter
over quarter, revenue had declined by 10.6% and EBITDA by
18.4%. Compared to the Updated Base Case's projections for
FY 2013, actual revenues were down 7.8% and EBITDA was
down 16.2%.
The petitioners might have sought to address these issues.
They might have attempted to show by reference to other
companies or indices that but for the Merger, the Company's
stock price would have risen as well, perhaps even more than
Fidelity's. Or they might have sought to show that the declines
in the Company's performance resulted from the Merger itself
and therefore should be excluded as a valuation consideration,
perhaps because the sale process diverted management's
attention and harmed employee morale. They petitioners did
not advance these or other arguments, which they would have
had to support with persuasive evidence. The record rather
indicates that Fidelity's performance improved, causing an
increase in the value of the merger consideration, while the
Company's performance declined.
Instead, the petitioners argued the declines in the Company's
performance post-closing did not require any adjustments
to the Updated Base Case and that management reaffirmed
the Company's belief in the reliability of its projections.
Accepting that as true, it suggests that the going concern value
of the Company did not change such that the Initial Merger
Consideration remained a reliable indicator of fair value and
the Final Merger Consideration established a ceiling for fair
value. See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 343 (relying on merger price
in appraisal case despite six-month lag between signing and
closing because “nothing occurred between the signing of the
Merger Agreement and the effective date of the Merger that
resulted in an increase in the value of UFG”).
A final factor pertinent to the Company's post-signing, pre-
closing performance is the extensive evidence indicating
that the Initial Merger Consideration included a portion
of the value that Fidelity and THL expected to generate
from synergies. The Final Merger Consideration logically
incorporated an additional portion of this value because
of the component consisting of Fidelity stock, which drew
some (admittedly unquantified) portion of its value from the
synergies that Fidelity and its stockholders would enjoy. The
existence of combinatorial synergies provides an additional
reason to think that the Final Merger Consideration exceeded
the fair value of the Company.
B. The DCF Analysis As Evidence Of Fair Value
Both the petitioners and the Company submitted valuation
opinions from distinguished experts. The petitioners' expert,
Professor Jerry A. Hausman, used a DCF analysis to opine
that the Company's fair value at closing was $50.46 per share.
The respondent's expert, Daniel Fischel, used a DCF analysis
to opine that the Company's fair value at closing was $33.57
per share. The Final Merger Consideration was $37.14 per
share.
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*27  “[T]he DCF ... methodology has featured prominently
in this Court because it is the approach that merits the
greatest confidence within the financial community.” Owen v.
Cannon, 2015 WL 3819204, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015)
(quotation marks omitted).
Put in very simple terms, the basic DCF method involves
several discrete steps. First, one estimates the values of
future cash flows for a discrete period .... Then, the value of
the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end
of the discrete period must be estimated to produce a so-
called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth
model. Finally, the value of the cash flows for the discrete
period and the terminal value must be discounted back ....
Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640,
at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (footnote
omitted). This decision does not exhaustively describe the
DCF methodology; it only addresses the areas of substantial
disagreement between the experts.
1. The Projection Period
The first issue for any DCF analysis is to determine the
appropriate forecasts to use for the projection period. Both
experts used the Updated Base Case with minor adjustments.
Hausman added back deferred income taxes and subtracted
accounts payable, accrued liabilities, and other liabilities for
2014. JX 297 ¶ 67. Fischel added back deferred tax income
and other investments. JX 296, Ex. 23. Neither provided
a detailed explanation for their adjustments. This decision
adopts the Updated Base Case and averages the adjustments
that the experts made.
2. The Terminal Period
The next challenge for a DCF analysis is to extend the
forecasts beyond the projection period to derive an estimate of
cash flows during the terminal period. The experts disagreed
on two aspects of the calculation.
The experts disagreed initially over the level of
capital expenditures needed to sustain the Company's
business during the terminal period. Over the long run,
capital expenditures should equal depreciation. Robert W.
Holthausen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporation Valuation
Theory, Evidence & Practice 232 (2014). In the last year
of the projection period, however, the Updated Base Case
contemplated an amount for depreciation that exceeded
capital expenditures. To bring the two into harmony,
Hausman assumed that capital expenditures would exceed
depreciation over time by an amount sufficient to cause
net amortizable assets to grow at the Company's long-term
growth rate. Fischel chose to increase capital expenditures
to equal depreciation. The record shows that the Company
historically had high levels of depreciation relative to capital
expenditures, so it is more reasonable to assume depreciation
would decrease during the terminal period to match capital
expenditures. This decision adopts that approach.
The experts also disagreed over the perpetuity growth rate.
Hausman used 3.4%, which he derived from the projected rate
of loan originations. Fischel used 2.2%, equal to the long-term
rate of inflation.
“This Court often selects a perpetuity growth rate based
on a reasonable premium to inflation.” DFC Glob., 2016
WL 3753123, at *17. This is because “[i]n a steady state,
it is typically assumed that future business growth will
approximate that of the overall economy.” In re Trados
S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 73 (Del. Ch. 2013). “[O]nce an
industry has matured, a company will grow at a steady rate
that is roughly equal to the rate of nominal GDP growth.”
Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 511. The risk-free rate is a
viable proxy for expected nominal GDP growth. See DFC
Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *17.
*28  The Company was a mature firm, so ordinarily it would
grow at a rate approximating GDP growth. The Company's
operative reality on the closing date, however, included the
Services business, which had declining prospects, and a
smaller Analytics business, which was growing. Given this
business mix, the Company should grow over the long-term at
a rate between inflation and nominal GDP that is closer to the
latter. Hausman's rate of 3.4% better fits the operative reality
of the Company, so this decision adopts his figure.
3. The Discount Rate
The final issue is the appropriate discount rate, which
the experts derived by calculating the Company's weighted
average cost of capital (“WACC”). They disagreed on
virtually every input except the appropriate tax rate, where
they both used 37%.
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Hausman used a capital structure consisting of 81.1% equity,
relying on the Company's financial statements from 2013
and the equity value implied by his DCF analysis. Fischel
used a capital structure consisting of 70% equity, relying on
the Company's pre-announcement debt-to-equity ratio. This
decision adopts Fischel's approach, which is consistent with
precedent and avoids the circularity in Hausman's method.
Hausman opined that the Company's cost of debt was 5.0%
without citing any support. Fischel used a cost of debt of
5.02%, explaining that the Company's was rated BB+ from
2008 through 2014 and that the yield to maturity of a BB-
rated bond index as of January 2, 2014 was 5.02%. Fischel
provided a better justification for his number, so this decision
uses it.
The experts disagreed about the risk-free rate. Hausman used
3.63%, which was the return on a 20–year U.S. Treasury bond
as of December 2013. Fischel used 3.68%, which was the
return on a 20–year U.S. Treasury bond as of January 2, 2014.
Fischel's measurement was closer to the closing date, so this
decision adopts it.
Both experts used the supply-side equity risk premium.
Hausman used 6.11%, which he obtained from Ibbotson's
2013 Valuation Yearbook. Fischel used 6.18%, which he
obtained from the 2014 Duff & Phelps Valuation Handbook.
Fischel's figure better captures the Company's operative
reality on the closing date. See Ancestry.com, 2015 WL
399726, at *21 (rejecting argument that court should have
used 2012 Ibbotson Yearbook instead of 2013 Yearbook for
merger that closed on December 28, 2012, because the 2013
Yearbook would not have been available to investors yet when
the merger closed).
The experts chiefly disagreed over beta. Hausman derived a
beta of 0.845 from five years of daily observations. Fischel
used a beta of 1.395, which represented the average of (i)
a beta derived from five years of monthly observations and
(ii) a beta derived from two years of weekly observations.
The beta drives the bulk of the valuation difference between
the experts. Inserting Hausman's beta into Fischel's model
generates a value of $51.18 per share.
“Beta, like cost of capital itself, is a forward-looking concept.
It is intended to be a measure of the expected future
relationship between the return on an individual security
(or portfolio of securities) and the overall market.” Duff
& Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook: Guide to Costs of
Capital 5–3 (2015). The Company's performance during
the measuring period therefore should match, to the extent
possible, the anticipated performance of the Company going
forward. The financial literature indicates that using a five-
year measurement period is both acceptable and common,
but that a shorter period should be used if a five-year look
back encompasses significant changes in the macroeconomic
environment29 or the company's business.30 In this case, five
years covers the Great Recession and attendant housing crisis,
which benefitted the Company and caused it to outperform the
S & P 500. Company management and BCG anticipated that
the Company would perform going forward at substantially
lower levels. Looking back five years also covers a period
when the Company was more dependent on Services, while
going forward the Company will rely more on Analytics.
These factors counsel in favor of using a two-year period as a
better predictor of the Company's operative reality at the time
of the Merger.
*29  Discarding the five-year betas leaves Fischel's
measurement of 1.503, which relied on weekly observations.
The financial literature supports using a two-year beta
with weekly observations, so this decision could adopt this
estimate.31 Fischel, however, used a lower beta of 1.395. By
doing so, Fischel favored the petitioners. That fact enhances
the credibility of his selection, so this decision uses his figure.
The last input is the size premium. Hausman added a size
premium of 0.92%. Fischel did not add a size premium,
arguing that there “is no consensus in the academic literature
as to whether such a premium still exists.” JX 296 ¶ 113
n.163. Adding a size premium increases the discount rate and
lowers the value of the Company. As with his estimate of beta,
Fischel's judgment favored the petitioners, so this decision
uses it.
These inputs result in a WACC of 9.56%, which this decision
adopts. Adding a size premium of 0.92% to the cost of equity
would increase the WACC to 10.2%.
4. The DCF Valuation
A DCF valuation using the foregoing inputs produces a value
of $38.67 per share, which is 4% higher than the Final Merger
Consideration of $37.14 per share. Using a WACC of 10.02%
would produce a value of $34.50 per share, or 8% less than
the Final Merger Consideration. These figures bracket what
the stockholders received. Nevertheless, the figure of $38.67
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per share is my best estimate of the fair value of the Company
based on the DCF method.
B. The Weight Given To The Methodologies
When presented with multiple indicators of fair value, the
court must determine how to weigh them. “In discharging
its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has discretion
to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general
framework or to fashion its own.” M.G. Bancorporation,
737 A.2d at 525–26. “The Court may evaluate the
valuation opinions submitted by the parties, select the
most representative analysis, and then make appropriate
adjustments to the resulting valuation.”32 The court also may
“make its own independent valuation calculation by either
adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the parties'
experts.” M.G. Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 524. “When ...
none of the parties establishes a valuation that is persuasive,
the Court must make a determination based on its own
analysis.”33
*30  Delaware law does not have a rigid hierarchy of
valuation methodologies, nor does it have a settled formula
for weighting them. “Appraisal is, by design, a flexible
process.” Golden Telecom II, 11 A.3d at 218. The statute
“vests the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with significant
discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine the
going concern value of the underlying company.” Id. (quoting
8 Del. C. § 262(h)).
In a series of decisions since Golden Telecom II, this court has
considered how much weight to give the deal price relative to
other indications of fair value. In five decisions since Golden
Telecom II, the Court of Chancery has given exclusive weight
to the deal price, particularly where other evidence of fair
value was unreliable or weak. In five other decisions since
Golden Telecom II, the court has declined to give exclusive
weight to the deal price in situations where the respondent
failed to overcome the petitioner's attacks on the sale process
and thus did not prove that it was a reliable indicator of fair
value.
CKx was the first post-Golden Telecom II decision to rely
exclusively on the merger price. The court found that “[t]he
company was sold after a full market canvass and auction,”
the process was “free of fiduciary and process irregularities,”
and “the sales price [was] a reliable indicator of value.” 2013
WL 5878807 at *1. By contrast, the parties' experts in CKx did
not establish the reliability of their methods. The court found
that (i) the company lacked sufficiently comparable peers
and (ii) that “the evidence [was] overwhelming” that a key
element of management's projections “was not prepared in the
ordinary course of business” and “was otherwise unreliable.”
Id. at *10. “In the absence of comparable companies or
transactions to guide a comparable companies analysis or
a comparable transactions analysis, and without reliable
projections to discount in a DCF analysis,” the court relied
“on the merger price as the best and most reliable indication
of [the company's] value.” Id. at *11. The court stressed that
the “conclusion that merger price must be the primary factor
in determining fair value is justified in light of the absence of
any other reliable valuation analysis.” Id. at *13.
In Ancestry.com, the court again relied exclusively on the
merger price. The court found that the company was sold
after an “auction process” which involved “a market canvass
and uncovered a motivated buyer. 2015 WL 399726, at *1.
The court concluded that the sale process “represent[ed] an
auction of the Company that is unlikely to have left significant
stockholder value unaccounted for.” Id. at *16. As in CKx,
there were “no comparable companies to use for purposes of
valuation.” Id. at *18. The court also had “reason to question
management['s] projections, which were done in light of the
transaction and in the context of obtaining a fairness opinion,”
and where “management did not create projections in the
normal course of business.” Id. at *18. The court prepared its
own DCF analysis, which it regarded as a reliable indicator of
value, but the answer was reasonably close to the deal price.
That outcome gave the court “comfort that no undetected
factor skewed the sales process.” Id. at *23. The court found
that “fair value in these circumstances [was] best represented
by the market price.” Id.
In AutoInfo, the court again relied exclusively on the merger
price. The company conducted an extensive sale process in
which its financial advisor contacted 165 potential strategic
and financial acquirers, seventy signed NDAs, ten submitted
indications of interest after conducting due diligence, nine
received management presentations, five submitted verbal
valuations or written letters of intent, and the company
ultimately negotiated exclusively with the highest bidder.
2015 WL 2069417, at *3–6. The court concluded that
“evidence regarding AutoInfo's sales process substantiates
the reliability of the Merger price.” Id. at *11. The court later
reiterated that “the sales process was generally strong and
can be expected to have led to a Merger price indicative of
fair value.” Id. at *14. The expert's valuation methodologies
lacked similar persuasiveness. Management had prepared
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projections as part of the sale process, but management had
never prepared projections before, and the court found them
unreliable. Id. at *8. The court also found that there were
no comparable companies that could be used for valuation
purposes. Id. The court rejected both sides' valuation analyses
as unreliable, but as in Ancestry, prepared its own DCF
analysis. Id. at *16. Despite noting that the “[u]nder Delaware
law, it would be appropriate to provide weight to the value
as implied by the Court's DCF analysis,” the decision elected
to put “full weight” on the deal price as “the best estimate of
value.” Id.
*31  In Ramtron, the court once again relied exclusively
on the merger price. The company conducted a “thorough”
sale process in response to an unsolicited tender offer. 2015
WL 4540443, at *1. The company rejected the hostile bid
on multiple occasions and “actively solicited every buyer it
believed could be interested in a transaction.” Id. at *21.
The company ultimately agreed to a transaction with the
unsolicited bidder only after extracting five separate price
increases. Id. at *24. As in CKx, management's projections
were “not reliable,” and the parties' experts agreed that there
were “no comparable companies.” Id. at *1, *18.
In BMC, the court relied exclusively on the merger price yet
again. The company engaged in “a thorough and vigorous
sales process” that involved outreach to financial and strategic
buyers. 2015 WL 6164771, at *1. The court found that
the merger price was “sufficiently structured to develop
fair value” and hence a reliable indicator of value. Id. at
*16. The court also constructed a DCF analysis based on
a set of management projections, which the court believed
represented “the best DCF valuation based on the information
available to me.” Id. at *18. The court nevertheless declined
to give weight to the DCF valuation, reasoning as follows:
My DCF valuation is a product of a set of
management projections, projections that in one sense
may be particularly reliable due to BMC's subscription-
based business. Nevertheless, the Respondent's expert,
pertinently, demonstrated that the projections were
historically problematic, in a way that could distort value.
The record does not suggest a reliable method to adjust
these projections. I am also concerned about the discount
rate in light of a meaningful debate on the issue of using a
supply side versus historical equity risk premium. Further, I
do not have complete confidence in the reliability of taking
the midpoint between inflation and GDP as the Company's
expected growth rate.
Taking these uncertainties in the DCF analysis—in light
of the wildly-divergent DCF valuation of the experts—
together with my review of the record as it pertains to the
sales process that generated the Merger, I find the merger
price ... to be the best indicator of fair value. ...
Id. at *18.
In five other decisions since Golden Telecom II, the Court
of Chancery has considered the deal price, but has either not
relied on it or given it limited weight. In Orchard Enterprises,
the court declined to give weight to the merger price in
an appraisal proceeding that followed a merger between a
corporation and an affiliate of a large stockholder, observing
that “the trial did not focus extensively on the quality of
marketing ... or the utility of the ‘go shop’ provision in the
merger agreement, which could obviously have been affected
by [a large stockholder's] voting power and expressed interest
to acquire all of [the company] for itself.” 2012 WL 2923305,
at *5. Similarly in 3M Cogent, the court gave no weight
to a deal price of $10.50 per share where the respondent
corporation did not seek to have the court award that amount
as fair value and relied instead on its experts' opinions that
proposed a fair value award of $10.12 per share. Merion
Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at
*5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013). The court also noted that the
respondent corporation and its experts had not made any
attempt to adjust the merger price for synergies or similar
elements of value that arose from the merger.34
*32  In Dell, I gave limited weight to the deal price, finding
that the respondent corporation “did not establish that the
outcome of the sale process offer[ed] the most reliable
evidence of the Company's value as a going concern.” Dell
Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *44. I nevertheless found
that the market data was sufficient
to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners'
expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23
billion. Had a value disparity of that magnitude existed,
then [a strategic bidder] would have emerged to acquire
the Company on the cheap. What the market data [did] not
exclude is an underpricing of a smaller magnitude.
Id. A confluence of multiple factors caused me not to give
greater weight to the deal price, including (i) the transaction
was an MBO, (ii) the bidders used an LBO pricing model to
determine the original merger consideration, (iii) there was
compelling evidence of a significant valuation gap driven by
the market's short-term focus, and (iv) the transaction was
not subjected to meaningful pre-signing competition. See id.
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at *29–37. Although the deal price increased as a result of
post-signing developments, the pattern of bidding by financial
sponsors during the go-shop reinforced the conclusion that the
consideration did not represent fair value, and the petitioners
proved that there were structural impediments to a topping bid
on the facts of the case, particularly in light of the size and
complexity of the company and the sell-side involvement of
the company's founder. See id. at *37–44. I relied instead on
a DCF analysis to determine fair value. Id. at *51.
More recently, in DFC Global, the court gave equal weight
to the deal price, the court's DCF valuation, and one
of the expert's comparable companies analysis. 2016 WL
3753123, at *23. The court found that the merger giving
rise to the appraisal proceeding had been “negotiated and
consummated during a period of significant company turmoil
and regulatory uncertainty, calling into question the reliability
of the transaction price as well as management's financial
projections.” Id. at *1. The company's competitors faced
similar challenges, and the resulting uncertainty undermined
the projections. Id. at *22. It also meant that the company
was sold during a valuation trough, which suggested that
“the transaction price would not necessarily be a reliable
indicator.” Id. The court also noted that the financial sponsor
who acquired the company had focused “on achieving a
certain internal rate of return and on reaching a deal within
its financing constraints,” which could generate an outcome
different from fair value. Id. To a lesser degree, the uncertainly
also undermined the multiples-based valuation, because that
valuation relied on two years of management projections. The
court concluded that “all three metrics suffer from various
limitations but ... each of them still provides meaningful
insight into [the company's] value.” Id. at *23. The court
also observed that “all three of them fall within a reasonable
range.” Id. The court therefore elected to weight them equally.
Most recently, in Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp
of Western Pennsylvania, Inc., 2016 WL 6651411 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 10, 2016), the court declined to rely on the deal price
where a controlling stockholder set the exchange ratio for a
stock-for-stock transaction between the company and another
entity controlled by the same family. The decision noted that
(i) “the Merger was not the product of an auction,” (ii) no third
parties were solicited, (iii) a controlling stockholder stood
on both sides of the deal, (iv) although a special committee
negotiated with the controller, the record did “not inspire
confidence that the negotiations were truly arms-length,” and
(v) the transaction was not conditioned on a majority-of-
the minority vote. Id. at *7–8. The only surprising aspect of
Dunmire is the respondent argued in favor of deference to the
deal price.
*33  This case is most similar to AutoInfo and BMC. The
Company ran a sale process that generated reliable evidence
of fair value. The Company also created a reliable set of
projections that support a meaningful DCF analysis. Small
changes in the assumptions that drive the DCF analysis,
however, generate a range of prices that starts below the
merger price and extends far above it. My best effort to
resolve the differences between the experts resulted in a DCF
valuation that is within 3% of the Final Merger Consideration.
The proximity between that outcome and the result of the sale
process is comforting. See S. Muoio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark
Entm't Invs. Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9,
2011) (“[W]hat you actually like to see when you're doing
a valuation is some type of overlap between the various
methodologies.” (quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 35 A.3d
419 (Del. 2011) (TABLE).
As noted, a DCF analysis depends heavily on assumptions.
Under the circumstances, as in AutoInfo and BMC, I give
100% weight to the transaction price.
C. Whether To Make An Adjustment For Combinatorial
Synergies
The Company argued belatedly that the court should make
a finding regarding the value of the combinatorial synergies
and deduct some portion of that value from the deal price to
generate fair value. That is a viable method. See, e.g., Union
Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 n.26; Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61. In this
case, however, the Company litigated on the theory that the
Final Merger Consideration represented the “maximum fair
value” of the shares. JX 296 ¶ 128. In his expert report, Fischel
declined to offer any opinion on the quantum of synergies
or to propose an adjustment to the merger price. Id. At trial,
Fischel affirmed that he did not have any basis to opine
regarding a specific quantum of synergies. Tr. 982 (Fischel).
Having taken these positions, it was too late for the Company
to argue in its post-trial briefs that the court should deduct
synergies.
III. CONCLUSION
The fair value of the Company on the closing date was $37.14
per share. The legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly,
shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until
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the date of payment. The parties shall cooperate on preparing
a final order. If there are additional issues that need to be
resolved before a final order can be entered, the parties shall
submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them
and recommends a schedule for bringing this matter to a
conclusion, at least at the trial court level.
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improving efficiency is an increase in competition: expected efficiency and expected revenue increase with each extra
bidder. In the limit when the number of bidders goes to infinity, an efficient allocation again materializes. Interestingly, the
effect of more competition on efficiency and revenues is stronger than the effect of information provided by the auctioneer.
When the seller has the choice between finding more interested bidders or providing information about the value of the
commodity, she should choose the former.”); Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Auctions Versus Negotiations, 86 Am.
Econ. Rev. 180, 180 (1996) (conducting empirical study and concluding that “a single extra bidder more than makes up
for any diminution in negotiating power” such that “there is no merit in arguments that negotiation should be restricted
to one or a few bidders to allow the seller to maintain more control of the negotiating process, or to credibly withdraw
the company from the market”); cf. Nihat Aktas et al., Negotiations Under the Threat of an Auction, 98 J. Fin. Econ.
241, 242 (2010) (finding that “that target-initiated deals are more often auctions while negotiations are more frequently
initiated by bidders”).
9 Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. Corp. L. 691, 691 (2003) (quoting
Author's Interview with Martin Lipton, Senior Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, in New York, NY (June 14, 2000)).
10 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (giving weight to deal price where sale process “involved DFC's advisor
reaching out to dozens of financial sponsors as well as several potential strategic buyers”); BMC, 2015 WL 6164771,
at *14 (giving exclusive weight to merger process where the company conducted “a robust, arm's-length sales process”
that included “two auctions over a period of several months” and involved both financial sponsors and strategic buyers);
AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *3 (relying exclusively on deal price where financial advisor contacted 164 potential
strategic and financial acquirers, approximately 70 signed NDAs and received a confidential information memorandum,
interested parties received several weeks of due diligence, ten bidders submitted indications of interest, and nine moved
on to a second round); Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *23 (relying exclusively on deal price where financial advisor “(1)
contacted twenty-four third parties ...; (2) sent non-disclosure agreements (‘NDAs’) to twelve ...; (3) received executed
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NDAs from six ...; and (4) remained in discussions with [three]”); Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at *3 (relying exclusively
on deal price where process that involved discussion with fourteen potential bidders, including six potential strategic
buyers and eight financial sponsors); CKx, 2013 WL 5878807, at *4–5 (relying exclusively on deal price where sale
process in which sell-side financial advisor reached out to multiple financial and strategic buyers). Compare Dell Fair
Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *7–10, *29, *36–37 (giving limited weight to deal price where pre-signing phase involved no
strategic bidders and only two financial sponsors, one of which dropped out, as did the firm invited to replace it).
11 A common value auction is one in which “every bidder has the same value for the auctioned object.” Peter Cramton &
Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 75 L. Econ. & Org. 27, 28–29 (1991). A private
value auction is one in which “the value of the auctioned object differs across potential acquirers.” Id.
12 Jeremy Bulow & John Roberts, The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions, 97 J. Pol. Econ. 1060, 1065 (1989); accord
Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 13 J. Econ. Survs. 227, 230 (1999).
13 See Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1399, 1399–1400
(2006); Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory and Standstills: Dealing with Friends and Foes in A Sale of Corporate
Control, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 521, 529 (2013).
14 See Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *30 (“[T]he outcome of competition between financial sponsors primarily
depends on their relative willingness to sacrifice potential IRR.”); see also Povel & Singh, supra, at 1399–1400. See
generally Paul Gompers, Steven N. Kaplan, & Vladimir Mukharlyamov, What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?, 121
J. Fin. Econ. 449, 450 (2016) (noting predominance of similar techniques and strategies across private equity firms). An
exception would be a financial buyer with a synergistic portfolio company, which would provide a source of private value.
15 Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic & Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions, 69 J. Fin. 2513, 2514
(2014); see id. at 2532 (finding that the “average valuation of a strategic (financial) bidder of an average target is 16.7%
(11.7%) above its value under the current management”); id. at 2538 (“Not only do strategic acquirers pay, on average,
higher premiums than financial acquirers, but the maximum premiums that they are willing to pay are considerably
higher.”); Mark E. Thompson & Michael O'Brien, Who Has the Advantage: Strategic Buyers or Private Equity Funds?,
Financier Worldwide (Nov. 2005) (“Strategic buyers have traditionally had the advantage over private equity funds,
particularly in auctions, because strategic buyers could pay more because of synergies generated from the acquisition
that would not be enjoyed by a fund.”).
16 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. Econ. Perspectives 121, 122
(2009) (“[T]here is also evidence consistent with private equity investors taking advantage of market timing (and market
mispricing) between debt and equity markets particularly in the public-to-private transactions of the last 15 years.”); id.
at 136 (“[P]rivate equity firms pay lower premiums than public company buyers in cash acquisitions. These findings are
consistent with private equity firms identifying companies or industries that turn out to be undervalued. Alternatively, this
could indicate that private equity firms are particularly good negotiators, and/or that target boards and management do not
get the best possible price in these acquisitions.”); id. at 135–36 (“[P]ost–1980s public-to-private transactions experience
only modest increases in firm operating performance, but still generate large financial returns to private equity funds. This
finding suggests that private equity firms are able to buy low and sell high.”).
17 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *22; Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29; see also Joshua Rosenbaum &
Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions 235–36 (2009) (explaining
that a sponsor's ability to pay in a leveraged buy-out is constrained by “leverage capacity, credit market conditions, and
the sponsor's own IRR hurdles”).
18 See Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *36 (“[T]he prospect of post-signing competition can help raise the price
offered during the pre-signing phase.”); Brian JM Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard, 38 J. Corp.
L. 835, 844 (2013) (“[K]nowing that a transaction will include a go-shop, wherein the seller will treat the initial bidder as
a stalking horse to generate an active post-signing auction, may incent initial bidders to offer a preemptive bid to deter
subsequent bids. In that view, the prospect of competition, even if no competition subsequently emerges, should be
sufficient incentive for a bidder to shift transaction surplus to the seller.”).
19 The focus is on a reasonable number of bidders, rather than all potential bidders, because as the number of bidders
increases, the marginal value of each additional bidder declines. “At about 10 bidders, you'll get 85% of the revenue that
you could expect to get from an auction with 50 bidders.” Guhan Subramanian, Negotiation? Auction? A Deal Maker's
Guide, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/12/negotiation-auction-a-deal-makers-guide.
20 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21.
21 See Dell Fair Value, *32 (“A second factor that undermined the persuasiveness of the Original Merger Consideration as
evidence of fair value was the widespread and compelling evidence of a valuation gap between the market's perception
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and the Company's operative reality.”). In the Dell Fair Value decision, the misperception resulted from “(i) analysts' focus
on short-term, quarter-by-quarter results and (ii) the Company's nearly $14 billion investment in its transformation, which
had not yet begun to generate the anticipated results.” Id.
22 J. Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go–Shops & Auction Theory, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1529, 1536 (2008) (citing Jeremy
Bulow, Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 427, 430 (1999)). In an ascending
private value auction, the winning bidder is more likely to have prevailed because it has a greater private value than the
next highest bidder. See Denton, supra, at 1536. In common value auctions, the prospect of information asymmetries
drives the winner's curse. See Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *42; Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with
Asymmetric Bidders, 19 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1399–1400 (2006).
23 See Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *33–36 (explaining why record supported existence of significant valuation
gap, driven by short-term pessimism, that depressed the market price and anchored price negotiations below fair value);
Malcom Baker, Xin Pan, & Jeffery Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. Fin.
Econ. 49, 50 (2012) (finding the “26–week high price [of a particular stock] has a statistically and economically significant
effect on offer prices [in mergers and acquisitions], and the 39–, 52–, and 65–week high prices also have independent
explanatory power” and speculating as to the causes of this reference point effect); id. at 64–65 (finding that deals with
higher premiums tend to close more often, which is “consistent with reference point behavior.”); Inga Chira & Jeff Madura,
Reference Point Theory and Pursuit of Deals, 50 Fin. Rev. 275, 277, 299 (2015) (“Our analysis reveals that a higher
target 52–week reference point, relative to the target's current stock price, ... increases the likelihood of a management
buyout (MBO).... Overall, the results from our analyses offer strong evidence that target and bidder reference points
serve as potent anchors that shape the outcomes and structures of mergers.”); Sangwon Lee & Vijay Yerramilli, Relative
Values, Announcement Timing, and Shareholder Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions 2 (January 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (adopting finding of Baker, Pan, & Wurger, supra, that “key decision makers in the bidding and target firms
and investors are likely to use recent prices as reference points”). See generally Guhan Subramanian, Negotiauctions:
New Dealmaking Strategies for a Competitive Marketplace, 16–18 (2010) (explaining that anchoring “works by influencing
your perceptions of where the [zone of possible agreement] lies”).
24 See M.P.M., 731 A.2d at 796 (“A merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of
collusion is a very strong indication of fair value.”); Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, 16 J. Econ.
Persp. 169, 170 (2002) (citing “the risk that participants may explicitly or tacitly collude to avoid bidding up prices”).
25 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (giving weight to deal price where “[t]he deal did not involve the potential
conflicts of interest inherent in a management buyout or negotiation to retain existing management”); CKx, 2013 WL
5878807, at *13 (giving exclusive weight to sales process where “[t]he record and the trial testimony supports a conclusion
that the process by which [the company] was marketed to potential buyers was thorough, effective, and free from any
spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”). For these and other reasons, “the weight of authority suggests that a claim that
the bargained-for price in an MBO represents fair value should be evaluated with greater thoroughness and care than,
at the other end of the spectrum, a transaction with a strategic buyer in which management will not be retained.” Dell
Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186548, at *28. See Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1285, 1320 (2016) (discussing factors that undermine pricing efficiency in the market for corporate control when the
transaction is an MBO); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process
and Management BuyOuts, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 849, 862 (2011) (“There is a more concrete argument against MBOs on
fairness grounds. It is the prospect that management is utilizing inside information when it arranges an MBO. Management
by its inherent position has in its possession non-public knowledge of the corporation, and management can use this
informational asymmetry between itself and public shareholders to time the buy-out process. MBOs can thus be arranged
at advantageous times in the business cycle or history of the corporation.” (footnotes omitted)); Marcel Canoy, Yohanes
E. Riyanto & Patrick van Cayseele, Corporate Takeovers, Bargaining and Managers' Incentives to Invest, 21 Managerial
& Decision Econs. 1, 2, 14 (2000) (“Long-term investments, such as R & D investments, are slow yielding and more
difficult to be evaluated by the market, despite the fact that they could generate higher profits. Consequently, firms
investing heavily in long-term projects may be more susceptible to a takeover attempt. ... If being taken over is better than
taking over [for target management] ... then obviously, [management] would like to overinvest to facilitate a takeover ....”);
Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 517,
536 (1988) (explaining that overhang from past acquisitions may artificially depress a company's stock market price and
make the buyout price appear generous); James R. Repetti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and
Soft Information, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 121, 125 (1988) (“Other methods for management to realize large gains in management
buyouts are not as innocuous as the use of leverage or as apparently innocuous as increasing cash flow. Management
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may actively depress the price of the shares prior to the management buyout in order to reduce the price they have to
pay. Management may accomplish this by ... channeling investments into long-term projects which will not provide short-
term returns.”); James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189,
1202–03 (1964) (“Far more difficult is ensuring to departing stockholders the benefit of improved prospects, where, at
the time of appraisal, the evidence of improvement is more intuitive than tangible. ... The appraisal process will tend
to produce conservative results where the values are speculative, and the majority's power to pick the time at which to
trigger appraisal may encourage them to move when full values may be temporarily obscured.” (footnote omitted)); see
also Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. Legal Stud. 351, 356 (1996) (“With respect
to timing, the firm could initiate a freeze-out (i) before it invests effort, (ii) after it invests effort but before the value of the
firm conditional on effort is revealed, or (iii) after the value of the firm is revealed but before earnings are realized. We
generally assume that the firm would wait until point iii because waiting in the model is costless but produces gains: were
the firm to initiate a freeze-out before it learns its value, it might have to pay too much.”).
26 See JX 296 ¶ 79 (finding that a merger agreement contained a go-shop in only 4% of sample of transactions that involved
a strategic entity buying a publicly traded U.S. target for a deal price above $100 million); id. ¶ 80 (finding that only 1%
of transactions had an auction and a go-shop where strategic buyers acquired a U.S. publicly traded target for a deal
price above $100 million).
27 See Denton, supra, at 1547 (“In the sixty-three deals that utilized go-shop provisions, there have been nine deals with
jump bids. Furthermore, there were jump bids in none of the MBOs containing go-shops .... Of the nine jump bids that
were made, strategic buyers made seven.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1549 (“[G]o-shops have structures that discourage
bidding wars between financial buyers. Management involvement with the initial private equity bidder only increases the
advantages that are given to the initial bidder, since it gives the initial bidder better information about the value of the
target. Despite appearing to encourage additional bidders and a post-signing auction, go-shop provisions are structured
in a way that discourages financial buyers from bidding for the company.”).
28 A matching right is the functional equivalent of a right of first refusal and can foreclose a topping bidder from having a
realistic path to success. See Bulletproof, supra, at 870 (“The presence of rights of first refusal can be a strong deterrent
against subsequent bids. ... Success under these circumstances may involve paying too much and suffering the ‘winner’s
curse.’ ”); see also Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Diary Of A Wary Market: 2010 In Review And What To Expect In 2011,
14 M & A Law. Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 1 (“Match rights can result in the first bidder ‘nickel bidding’ to match an interloper's
offer, with repetitive rounds of incremental increases in the offer price. ... Few go-shops are successful as it is ... and match
rights are just one more factor that may dissuade a potential competing bidder from stepping in the middle of an already-
announced transaction.”); Marcel Kahan & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, First–Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and
Rights of First Offer, 14 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 331, 331 (2012) (finding “that a right of first refusal transfers value from other
buyers to the right-holder, but may also force the seller to make suboptimal offers”); David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of
First Refusal, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 20–21 (1999) (discussing how a right of first refusal affects bidders); cf. Steven
J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in M & A Auctions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 873, 879 (2014) (“The potential
for a bidding war remains unless interlopers are restricted-say, to one topping bid, which then can be matched.”).
29 Duff & Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook, supra, at 5–7 (“If a fundamental change in the business environment in which an
individual company (or even an industry) operates occurs, the valuation analyst should consider whether using historical
data from before the change should be included in the overall [beta] analysis.”). As an example, the Duff and Phelps 2015
Valuation Handbook cites the effect of the Great Recession on the financial sector, suggesting it would not be appropriate
for an analyst to include pre-crisis data. Id.
30 Holthausen & Zmijewski, supra, at 300 (“Using more recent data might better reflect a company's current (and more
forward-looking) systematic risk. Betas can shift because of changes in capital structure or because of changes in the
underlying business risk of the company, or because of fundamental changes in the market. ...”); Tim Koller, Marc
Goedhart & David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies 247 (5th ed. 2010) (advocating
for five-year monthly but noting that “changes in corporate strategy or capital structure often lead to changes in risk for
stockholders. In this case, a long estimation period would place too much weight on irrelevant data”); Shannon P. Pratt
& Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 208 (5th ed. 2014) (“Most services that calculate
beta use a two- or five-year sample measurement or look-back period. Five years is the most common ... But if the
business characteristics change during the sampling period ..., it may be more appropriate to use a shorter sampling
period. However, as the sampling period used is reduced, the accuracy of the estimate is generally reduced.”); see DFC
Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *10 n.124 (“[L]ong estimation period may be inappropriate when analysis of the five-year
historical chart shows changes in corporate strategy or capital structure that could render prior data irrelevant.” (citing
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Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, supra, at 247)); see also James R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models
256 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that in measuring closely-held companies, sources “use anywhere from a two- to five-year
period to measure beta, with the five-year period being the most common”).
31 John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig Mackinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets 184 (1997); Holthausen
& Zmijewski, supra, at 301 (noting that Bloomberg's default is to use “104 weeks of weekly observations or two years of
data”); id. at 300 (“The most commonly used intervals for estimating betas are monthly, weekly, and, to a lesser extent,
daily returns. The precision of regression parameters tends to increase with more observations; hence, all else equal, we
prefer to use more observations.”); id. at 302 (“When using daily beta, a common rule of thumb is to use one to two years
of data .... When using weekly data, it is a fairly common practice to use two years of data ....); see also Hitchner, supra,
at 256 (noting that in valuing closely-held companies, “the frequency of the data measurements varies, with monthly data
being the most common, although some sources use weekly data”).
32 Appraisal Rights, supra, at A–31 (citing ONTI, 751 A.2d at 907) (basing fair value calculation on one expert's valuation,
“modifying it where appropriate by the primary adjustment claims asserted by [the company]”); Kleinwort Benson Ltd.
v. Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (“I will not construct my own DCF model. From the
evidence presented by [the] experts, I will choose the DCF analysis that best represents Silgan's value. Next, ... I will
scrutinize that DCF analysis to remove the adversarial hyperbole that inevitably influences an expert's opinion in valuation
proceedings.” (citation omitted))).
33 Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 WL 208763, at *8; accord Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., 898 A.2d at 310–11 (“I cannot
shirk my duty to arrive at my own independent determination of value, regardless of whether the competing experts have
provided widely divergent estimates of value, while supposedly using the same well-established principles of corporate
finance.”).
34 Id. If the respondent corporation had relied affirmatively on the deal price and made some attempt to deal with synergies,
it seems likely that the court would have given the deal price at least some weight. The transaction resulted from a process
that involved a pre-signing outreach to twenty-five potential strategic and financial partners, followed by competition
among four strategic bidders to acquire the company. See id. at *2–3. Using a DCF analysis, the court ultimately
determined that the fair value of the company as $10.87 per share, just above the deal price. Id. at *26. If the respondent
had made a different tactical decision, the 3M Cogent court could well have relied on the deal price.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
NOBLE, Vice Chancellor.
*1  Petitioners Merlin Partners LP and AAMAF, LP are
former common stockholders of Respondent AutoInfo, Inc.
(“AutoInfo” or the “Company”). Pursuant to 8 Del. C. §
262, they demanded appraisal of their shares in connection
with a merger (the “Merger”) whereby AutoInfo's common
stockholders were cashed out at a price of $1.05 per share.
This memorandum opinion sets forth the Court's post-trial
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. AutoInfo's Business
At the time of the Merger, AutoInfo was a public non-asset
based transportation services company operating through two
wholly-owned subsidiaries.1 It did not own any equipment
and provided brokerage and contract carrier services through
a network of independent sales agents in the United States
and Canada. AutoInfo and its agents split fees generated
by freight transportation transactions.2 The agents developed
and maintained all important client relationships.3
The Company also provided support services to its agents.
Its assistance was primarily financial, such as making long-
term loans and short-term advances. AutoInfo also supplied
non-financial services, such as training, marketing assistance,
market segment data, and business analysis tools.4
The Company's 100% agent-based model distinguished it
from many others in the transportation logistics industry that
rely on a “company store” model. While AutoInfo's brokers
were independent contractors, “[b]rokers [in a company store
model] are direct employees of the company.”5
B. AutoInfo's Board and Management
AutoInfo's management (the “Management”) consisted of
Harry Wachtel (“Wachtel”), the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”); Michael Williams (“Williams”),
the President, Chief Operating Officer, and General Counsel;
William I. Wunderlich (“Wunderlich”), an Executive Vice
President and the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”); Mark
Weiss (“Weiss”), an Executive Vice President; and David
Less, the Chief Information Officer and Vice President.
Throughout the sales process, and at the time of the Merger,
AutoInfo's board (the “Board”) consisted of five directors.
Two, Wachtel and Weiss, were inside directors. The others,
Peter Einselen, Thomas C. Robertson, and Mark K. Patterson
(“Patterson”), were outside directors. Wachtel served as the
Board's chairman.6
C. The Merger
1. AutoInfo Considers Strategic Alternatives
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During a regularly scheduled meeting in the first
quarter of 2011, the Board discussed AutoInfo's financial
results, budget, business, and financial prospects. It was
concerned that the market undervalued AutoInfo relative
to comparable agent-based, non-asset based transportation
services companies. Part of the problem was that the
Company was small, thinly traded on the Nasdaq Over–the–
Counter Bulletin Board, and did not receive much analyst
coverage. The Board decided that exploring strategic options,
including a potential sale, was in the best interests of
AutoInfo's stockholders.7
*2  The Board was not the only AutoInfo constituent
disappointed with the Company's stock price. Around
this time, Patterson (a Board member) was contacted by
Kinderhook, LP (“Kinderhook”), a stockholder with which
he had a relationship.8 Kinderhook believed that AutoInfo's
stock price failed to reflect its financial performance.
Although it did not push for a sale of the Company, it
encouraged the Board to develop a strategy to increase the
stagnant stock price, which was then trading in the $0.50–0.60
per share range.9
2. AutoInfo Retains Stephens
In summer 2011, Patterson contacted Stephens Inc.
(“Stephens”), an investment bank with experience in the
transportation industry, to explore AutoInfo's strategic
options. Stephens prepared and presented on July 29,
2011, a Strategic Initiatives Overview, outlining avenues
for enhancing stockholder value.10 While AutoInfo had
“built a solid legacy within the transportation and logistics
industry,” it “consistently traded at valuation multiples well
below its peer group due to the Company's relatively small
scale and corresponding lack of interest from the investment
community.”11 Stephens believed that if the Company
could grow its market capitalization from $20 million to
approximately $400–500 million, then it would gain greater
Wall Street attention and access capital at a lower cost.12 The
investment bank concluded that AutoInfo might need to alter
its strategy to achieve the necessary growth.13
Stephens thus proposed strategic alternatives, including
organic projects, shareholder distributions, and
acquisitions.14 It identified pros and cons for each option.
For example, it suggested that “[e]xecution risk,” related to
Management's ability to execute, would be a concern should
the Company decide to pursue an organic project.15 Stephens
also preliminarily valued the Company within a range of
$0.59 to $1.76 per share.16 The average of its valuations
was $0.98 per share, above the Company's then-current $0.60
price.17
In August 2011, after considering its various options, the
Board began reaching out to potential purchasers.18 Patterson
contacted parties that were active in mergers and acquisitions
in the transportation industry. While there was some interest,
AutoInfo could not reach a satisfactory agreement.19
Several months later, in November 2011, activist hedge funds
Baker Street Capital L.P. and Khrom Capital Management,
through affiliated entities (“Baker Street”), acquired a 13%
equity interest in AutoInfo.20 Baker Street began expressing
its desire that AutoInfo be sold. According to Patterson, those
demands did not impact the Board's sales process, which was
already underway.21
In early 2012, after interviewing several investment banks,
AutoInfo formally retained Stephens to run a sales process.22
The parties agreed to an incentive-based fee structure
whereby Stephens would be paid 2% on the first $54 million
of a transaction price and 5% on any additional value23
Stephens had extensive industry experience; Michael Miller
(“Miller”), who worked on AutoInfo's engagement, had
focused on the transportation logistics space since 2002.24
3. Management's Financial Projections
*3  To implement the sales process, Stephens asked
Management to prepare a bottoms-up five-year financial
forecast (the “Management Projections”).25 Stephens
specified that because they would be used to market
the Company, the projections should be optimistic.26
Management had never prepared multi-year projections
before and its first attempt fell largely on Wunderlich's (its
CFO) shoulders.27 Internally, Management doubted its ability
to forecast the Company's future performance accurately and
perceived its attempt as “a bit of a chuckle and a joke.”28
It questioned how to go about a process it had never before
attempted.29
Recognizing that the Management Projections would be
used to shop the Company, Wunderlich focused on painting
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an “aggressively optimistic” picture.30 Williams, AutoInfo's
President, helped develop the forecast by projecting agent
revenue.31 He started with each agent's historical revenue and
“took the most optimistic view of [the] agents' performance
in the marketplace....”32 He categorized agents by size and
assumed that larger agents would grow at a lower percentage
than smaller agents.”33 Williams testified that there “was no
science” behind those assumptions.34 He also looked at agent-
by-agent historical results and predicted, based on knowledge
of the individual agents, how much the agent's business could
grow during 2012–2013.35 Those growth assumptions were
extrapolated to later years.36 The Management Projections
also included estimates of how successfully the Company
would recruit new agents.37
4. Comvest Emerges as the Highest Bidder
In the spring of 2012, Stephens contacted 164 potential
strategic and financial acquirers, focusing on those most
interested in the transportation space.38 Approximately
seventy bidders signed non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”)
and received a Confidential Information Memorandum
(“CIM”).39 Those interested were provided several weeks
for due diligence before a deadline to submit an indication
of interest (“IOI”).40 By the end of May, ten bidders had
presented IOIs, with bids ranging from $0.90–$1.36 per
share.41 Nine moved on to a second round of the sales process,
at which point they attended Management presentations and
received access to an electronic data room.42
*4  On June 28, 2012, the Board formed a special committee
(the “Special Committee”) to evaluate the competing offers.
The Special Committee consisted of the three outside
directors, with Patterson serving as chair.43 It proceeded, with
the assistance of a legal advisor and a financial advisor, to
review the bids.44
By July, three would-be acquirers had submitted written
letters of intent (“LOI”) and two others had presented verbal
valuation ranges.45 After receiving legal advice regarding
its fiduciary duties, the Special Committee weighed the
proposals as against each other and the alternative option of
foregoing a sale at that time.46 It decided to continue with the
sales process and instructed Stephens to negotiate with the
bidders over price.47
Later that month, Stephens updated the Special Committee
with final terms for the written bids. HIG Capital (“HIG”)
had made the highest offer at $1.30 per share.48 The Special
Committee determined that the highest offer was also the best
and recommended that the Board pursue a transaction with
HIG. The Board accepted this determination and on August
14, 2012, executed an LOI at the $1.30 per share price, which
provided for a forty-five day exclusivity period to negotiate
and perform further due diligence49
HIG conducted due diligence for the next thirty days but
by mid-September, it decided not to proceed with the
purchase.50 HIG's lead partner on the deal had left the
firm, apparently due to various disagreements with his
colleagues, including whether HIG should decrease its offer
for AutoInfo.51 After that partner's departure, HIG opted
against pursuing AutoInfo.52 The parties terminated their
LOI, and AutoInfo decided to continue with the sales process.
Stephens contacted previously interested parties, as well as
others it recommended to AutoInfo.53
By October 2012, two interested parties had submitted written
LOIs and two others had indicated interest verbally. The
highest offer came from Comvest Partners (“Comvest”) and
valued the Company at $1.26 per share.54 The others were
substantially lower, ranging from $1.00–$1.07 per share.55
After determining that Comvest's offer was the best, the
Special Committee recommended that the Board pursue that
transaction. The Board unanimously agreed and on November
12, 2012, AutoInfo executed an LOI with Comvest at $1.26
per share with a thirty day exclusivity period.56 Comvest
then hired accounting, legal, industry, and other advisors to
conduct due diligence.57
5. Comvest's Due Diligence Process
Comvest hired L.E.K. Consulting (“LEK”), a strategy
consultant, to assess AutoInfo's competitive positioning in the
trucking freight brokerage market.58 LEK evaluated growth
trends and dynamics in the brokerage market generally, as
well as concerns associated with AutoInfo's agent-based
business.59 Comvest considered LEK's findings as very
positive.60
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*5  LEK's analysis came relatively early in the due diligence
process, and as that process evolved, Comvest learned
of potential issues associated with AutoInfo's business.61
For example, AutoInfo's infrastructure for recruiting new
agents, which represented the lifeblood of the Company, was
lacking.62 Comvest determined that it would need to address
that deficiency, and others, before it could effectively recruit
agents and grow AutoInfo's business.63 Its biggest concerns,
however, arose during its accounting due diligence.
Comvest retained McGladrey LLP (“McGladrey”) to perform
financial due diligence; its work included conducting a
quality of earnings analysis to test the accuracy of the
Company's stated historical earnings and its ability to achieve
projections.64 McGladrey began its review in November
2012, with Wunderlich, AutoInfo's CFO, serving as its
primary Company contact. McGladrey was immediately
taken aback by the poor quality of AutoInfo's financial
records, which were unusually bad for a publicly traded
company.65 The state of the financials caused the due
diligence process to be more difficult than McGladrey had
anticipated.66
McGladrey was surprised that AutoInfo used QuickBooks,
accounting software popular among small businesses, but
rarely employed by public companies.67 Also troubling
to McGladrey was the fact that a Florida-based public
company would engage a one-office, Connecticut-based
accounting firm as its outside auditor.68 More importantly,
McGladrey believed that some of AutoInfo's accounting
practices violated generally accepted accounting principles.69
McGladrey raised these concerns with an increasingly
troubled Comvest.70
In December 2012, McGladrey reported its findings
to Comvest (the “McGladrey Report”).71 AutoInfo's
Management had estimated the Company's 2012 adjusted
EBITDA as $10 million.72 McGladrey concluded that $7.7
million was an appropriate estimate, representing a 23%
reduction.73 Comvest considered the McGladrey Report a
“huge problem” with the potential to “blow[ ] up” the
deal.74 Not only was AutoInfo's EBITDA apparently much
lower than initially assumed, but there was “a whole
series of weaknesses in the company's financial reporting
practices....”75
AutoInfo responded to the McGladrey Report through
a memorandum prepared by Wunderlich.76 McGladrey
considered the rebuttal unconvincing.77 At the beginning
of January, Wunderlich, Wachtel, and a representative from
Stephens met with a Comvest representative to discuss
the McGladrey Report and AutoInfo's response.78 While
Comvest listened to AutoInfo's arguments, it remained
convinced that the McGladrey Report raised valid issues and
McGladrey did not change its conclusions.
After that meeting, Comvest lowered its offer to $0.96 per
share and AutoInfo countered at $1.15.79 During ensuing
negotiations, Comvest learned that AutoInfo had guaranteed
some loans, the existence of which had been undisclosed
and unreported. Some of the borrower's creditors had filed
an involuntary bankruptcy petition and AutoInfo was facing
the possibility of having to satisfy the guarantees.80 Comvest
was concerned not only by AutoInfo's increased liabilities,
but more importantly, it was troubled by the fact that the
guarantees had not been properly identified in the first
place.81 Its confidence in the quality of AutoInfo's financial
information and controls further deteriorated.82
*6  On January 18, 2013, the Special Committee and
Comvest agreed to a new price of $1.06 per share.83 Comvest
had successfully negotiated for Wachtel (AutoInfo's CEO)
to roll over $500,000 and for Weiss (another executive) to
roll over 25% of his deal proceeds.84 The deal process then
resumed, until discovery of another accounting deficiency.
AutoInfo had improperly booked a transaction, worth
approximately $1,000,000 in EBITDA, in the third quarter
of 2012 before the deal had closed.85 Comvest was shocked
at this revelation and was worried that AutoInfo would
need to restate its financials. Characterizing his reaction,
John Caple, Comvest's lead partner on the AutoInfo deal,
testified, “As much as I had seen financial weaknesses in
the business, the fact that the company could book a million
dollar transaction that hadn't actually happened, I've just never
seen that before in any business I've worked with, public
or private.”86 AutoInfo determined, after an approximately
two week review, that its financials would not need to be
restated.87 Nonetheless, Comvest was “disturb[ed that the
error] could have happened at all, particularly given the size
and the impact of the transaction.”88 Comvest's already low
confidence in AutoInfo's Management and internal controls
eroded further and it revised its offer to $1.00 per share.89
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On February 28, 2013, after additional negotiations, the
parties ultimately reached an agreement at $1.05 per share,
with Wachtel entering into an indemnification agreement
for potential breaches of AutoInfo's representations and
warranties, whereby $500,000 of his proceeds would be held
in escrow.90 The Board approved the Merger pursuant to the
Special Committee's unanimous recommendation. Stephens
had provided a fairness opinion and presentation to the
Special Committee. AutoInfo announced the Merger on
March 1, 2013.91
On April 25, 2013, AutoInfo's stockholders approved the deal
and the transaction closed later that day. No topping bids had
emerged between the deal's announcement and closing.92
II. THE PARTIES' COMPETING VALUATIONS
Both parties retained well-qualified experts to opine on the
fair value of Petitioners' stock as of the date of the Merger.
Petitioners' expert, Donald Puglisi (“Puglisi”), suggests that
AutoInfo's fair value was $2.60 per share. He places equal
weight on three valuation calculations: a discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) analysis, and two comparable companies analyses,
one using a historical based multiple and the other a forward
looking multiple.93
AutoInfo's expert, Mark Zmijewski (“Zmijewski”), submits
that AutoInfo's fair value on the date of the Merger was $0,967
per share. Unlike Puglisi, Zmijewski does not believe that
a DCF or comparable companies analysis can be reliably
performed with available data. Instead, he analyzed the
Merger price and the market evidence regarding the strength
of AutoInfo's sales process. He concluded that the Merger
price, minus cost savings arising from the Merger, is the best
available evidence of the Company's fair value on the Merger
date.94
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Appraisal Statute
Under 8 Del. C. § 262, stockholders who elect against
participating in certain merger transactions may petition the
Court to determine the fair value of their stock.95 Assuming
all procedural requirements are satisfied, the Court
*7  determine[s] the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be
the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court ...
take[s] into account all relevant factors.96
“Fair value” represents “the value to a stockholder of the
firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm's value
in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.”97 To
discharge its statutory responsibility, the Court independently
evaluates the evidence concerning fair value and does not
presumptively defer to any particular valuation metric.98 The
Court may consider “any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court....”99 Depending on the
case, a DCF analysis, a comparable transactions analysis, a
comparable companies analysis, or the merger price itself
may inform the Court's determination.100 “[A]n arms-length
merger price resulting from an effective market check” is a
strong indicator of actual value.101
In a Section 262 appraisal proceeding, “both sides have the
burden of proving their respective valuation positions by a
preponderance of the evidence.”102 The Court may select
one of the parties' valuation models, make adjustments to a
proffered model, or fashion its own framework.103
B. Puglisi's DCF Analysis
Puglisi bases his valuation of AutoInfo in part on a DCF
analysis. “DCF, in theory, is not a difficult calculation to make
—five-year cash flow projections combined with a terminal
value are discounted to their present value to produce an
overall enterprise value.”104 However, when reliable inputs
are unavailable, “any values generated by a DCF analysis are
meaningless.”105 Puglisi used the Management Projections
in his DCF calculation. The first question is: are those
projections reliable?106
The Court will often give weight to management projections
made in the regular course of business because “management
ordinarily has the best first-hand knowledge of a company's
operations.”107 Nonetheless, “management projections [may
be disregarded] where the company's use of such projections
was unprecedented, where the projections were created in
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anticipation of litigation, or where the projections were
created for the purpose of obtaining benefits outside the
company's ordinary course of business.”108 If management
had never prepared projections beyond the current fiscal year,
the Court may be skeptical of its first attempt.109
*8  Here, Petitioners have failed to establish that the
Management Projections can be relied upon.110 Management
prepared them at Stephens's request and with the guidance
that they “need[ed] to be optimistic” to maximize the effort
to market the Company.111 Management had never prepared
anything resembling the Management Projections before and
“hadn't analyzed the business historically in a way that would
allow [it] to predict the future.”112 Stephens had advised,
“You're trying to sell the business. You need to paint the
most optimistic and bright current and future condition of the
company that you can. All positive. Let's get the most interest
by painting the most positive picture of this business.”113
As discussed in Section I.C.3 above, the Management
Projections were indisputably optimistic.114 Puglisi,
Petitioners' own expert, testified that he would have implied
a discount factor to back out the optimism if the record had
provided a basis for calculating one.115 Even if Management
had not been motivated to paint a bright picture, its projections
would have been unreliable. Again, Management itself had no
confidence in its ability to forecast.116 If Management could
not have been trusted to produce credible projections in the
ordinary course of business, the projections it created during
the sales process deserve little deference. Because Petitioners
have failed to establish the credibility of a key component in
their expert's DCF analysis, the Court gives that analysis no
weight.117
C. Puglisi's Comparable Companies Analyses
Puglisi performed two comparable companies analyses, one
using a 2012 EBITDA figure derived from AutoInfo's 2012
10–K, and the other using an estimated 2013 EBITDA created
by modifying the Management Projections. To perform a
comparable companies analysis, one must first identify a set
of actively traded public companies sharing similar business
characteristics with the subject company. Using available
information, one then derives a valuation multiple that, when
multiplied by a relevant financial performance metric, such
as EBITDA, provides an estimate of the value of a company
as a whole.
The Court may credit a comparable companies analysis
in an appraisal proceeding; however, “[t]he utility of the
comparable company approach depends on the similarity
between the company the court is valuing and the companies
used for comparison.”118 Petitioners bear the burden of
proving that Puglisi's “comparables are truly comparable.”119
Because they fail to meet their burden, the Court gives no
weight to Puglisi's comparable companies analyses.120
1. AutoInfo is Significantly Smaller than Puglisi's Supposed
Comparables
*9  The Court may reject comparable companies analyses
based on purported comparables that differ significantly in
size from the company being appraised.121 It is undisputed
that Puglisi's comparables are all significantly larger than
AutoInfo. As of the Merger date, their market capitalizations
ranged from more than twice, to more than 300 times,
AutoInfo's size.122 All but two of Puglisi's comparables
had a market capitalization more than ten times AutoInfo's.
While recognizing this fact, Petitioners argue that size, while
relevant in other contexts, is not a determining factor here.
Puglisi testified that he did not observe a meaningful
relationship between a company's size and its multiple among
his comparables. He could not recall “ever discriminating
inclusion in comparable companies based on company size ...
[because] size itself should not have an impact on the ultimate
valuation.”123 Although there may be little theoretical basis
for discriminating comparables based on size, doing so has
empirical support and is common both in practice and in this
Court.124 Zmijewski suggests that it would be inappropriate
to select comparables without regard to relative market
capitalization without otherwise controlling for risk and other
differences.125
All else equal, smaller firms are riskier and thus face higher
costs of equity capital. This higher cost of capital leads to
lower market multiples.126 Miller, Stephens's representative,
suggests
Typically in this sector, small cap companies tend to
be valued at lower multiples. That's generally been the
case in the ... dozen years that I've spent covering this
sector. The market tends to ascribe premium multiples to
companies that are larger ... [and] are considered more
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stable businesses. And therefore, investors are willing to ...
afford those companies ... a higher trading multiple.127
*10  Before delivering its fairness opinion, Stephens
performed a comparable companies analysis. Based on its
experience in the transportation services industry, Stephens,
unlike Puglisi, did not rely on the median multiple of its
comparables. It selected a lower multiple range, based on
differences between AutoInfo and the comparables, including
size, business model, and the quality of management.128
Stephens grouped its comparable companies by size, which
showed a relationship between size and multiples.129
While Petitioners criticize Stephens's size grouping as
arbitrary and self-serving, in its initial July 29, 2011, Strategic
Initiatives Overview presentation to AutoInfo, Stephens
highlighted the fact that AutoInfo had “consistently traded
at valuation multiples well below its peer group due to
the Company's relatively small scale....”130 Petitioners have
failed to show that the size difference between AutoInfo and
Puglisi's supposedly comparable companies is immaterial.131
2. AutoInfo's 100% Agent–Based Model
Puglisi did not consider the differences between freight
brokerage businesses that use the company store model and
those that employ an agent-based model as important for
valuation purposes.132 As described in Section I.A above, in
a company store model, “[b]rokers are direct employees of
the company,” while in an agent-based model, the brokers
are independent contractors.133 According to Miller, who has
years of experience in the transportation sector, “agent-based
models ... are generally less desirable. They're perceived as
riskier. The company does not have control over the customer
relationship. The agent does. And so the agent-based models
are generally ... less desirable and generally they tend to trade
at lower multiples than the company store models.”134
That the market perceives the agent-based model as
inferior was corroborated by the reaction that one AutoInfo
stockholder received while soliciting topping bids for the
Company. That stockholder learned that “the agent-based
model with no company-owned locations, especially in
important shipping hubs, was a bigger deal to potential
acquirers than ... [initially] realized.”135 AutoInfo's 100%
agent-based model was a “problem” for potential buyers.136
*11  At trial, Puglisi, who lacks Miller's experience in
the freight brokerage sector, could not identify which of
his comparable companies used which type of business
model, but suspected that the majority were agent-based.137
Miller testified specifically regarding the business models
of Stephens's comparables and explained that they mostly
use company store models.138 In its fairness opinion,
Stephens had taken advantage of its industry experience
and its knowledge of AutoInfo's business to select a below-
median multiple for its comparable companies analysis.139
Petitioners have not established that the differences between
AutoInfo's business model and those of Puglisi's comparable
companies are unimportant.
3. Summary of Puglisi's Comparable Companies Analyses
Because the weight of the evidence suggests that size and
business model affect the multiples at which companies
trade in the freight brokerage industry, Puglisi's comparable
companies analyses are not reliable indicators of value. The
Court's confidence in this conclusion is bolstered by the facts
that (i) all of the bids received by AutoInfo during the sales
process implied market multiples well below Puglisi's, and (ii)
AutoInfo ultimately sold, through a thorough sales process,
at a price less than half of Puglisi's comparable companies
valuations.140 The Court was unable independently to derive
in any reasoned manner a valuation multiple from the
purported comparables. Accordingly, the Court gives no
weight to any comparable companies analysis.
D. Merger Price
Zmijewski, AutoInfo's expert, relies on the Merger price as
a reliable indication of AutoInfo's fair value at the time of
the Merger. “[W]here no comparable companies, comparable
transactions, or reliable cash flow projections exist, ... the
merger price [may be] the most reliable indicator of value.”141
Nonetheless, the Court will give little weight to a merger price
unless the record supports its reliability.
The dependability of a transaction price is only as strong
as the process by which it was negotiated.142 For example,
a transaction that implicates self-interested parties or an
inadequate market check may generate a price divergent from
fair value. Conversely, where a company “was marketed to
potential buyers ... [through a process that was] thorough,
effective, and free from any spectre of self-interest or
disloyalty,” the outcome of that process is significant.143
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Petitioners argue that the Merger price deserves no weight
because (i) the Merger price is not a business valuation
methodology, (ii) the Court cannot rely on the price if no
business valuation methodology, e.g., a DCF analysis, was
performed to corroborate the price, and (iii) even if the
Merger price could be considered, AutoInfo's sales process
was deficient.
Petitioners' first two contentions are easily dismissed. As
discussed, this Court can, and has, relied on a merger price
when appraising a company. When it is the best indicator of
value, the Court may assign 100% weight to the negotiated
price.144 Although the Court may not presumptively defer
to price, no particular valuation methodology must provide
corroboration. Rather, the Court may, in its discretion, look
to any “evidence tending to show that [the merger price]
represents the going concern value of the company rather than
just the value of the company to one specific buyer.”145 Here,
evidence regarding AutoInfo's sales process substantiates the
reliability of the Merger price.
*12  The manner by which AutoInfo was sold is described
in Section I.C. above. This case does not involve self-interest
or disloyalty; nothing like a controlling stockholder's freezing
out the minority is at issue. The Merger was negotiated
at arm's length, without compulsion, and with adequate
information. It was the result of competition among many
potential acquirers. However, Petitioners argue that the sales
process was flawed and cannot be expected to have produced
a price representative of value. Based on the evidence, the
Court concludes that Petitioners' objections, discussed next,
are either unwarranted or overblown.
1. Lack of Analyst Coverage
AutoInfo was thinly traded and lacked financial analyst
coverage. Petitioners contend that the market underpriced
the Company because it was ignorant of its potential. While
“[t]he court cannot defer to market price as a measure of
fair value if the stock has not been traded actively in a
liquid market,”146 the Merger price does not reflect the value
that a potentially uninformed market attributed to AutoInfo.
The Merger price represented a 22% premium to AutoInfo's
average stock price during the six months before February 28,
2013, the last trading day before public announcement of the
Merger.147 At no time in the two years before the Merger's
announcement had the market price for the Company's stock
reached $1.00.148 Further, the Merger price exceeded the
highest price that AutoInfo stock had reached during the
previous five years.149
To shop the Company, AutoInfo retained an experienced
investment bank with knowledge of the transportation
industry. Stephens's fee had an incentive-based component,
which allowed the bank to earn a higher percentage fee the
larger the deal.150 Stephens reached out to and provided
information on AutoInfo to many potential bidders. Part of
the reason for hiring the bank would have been to educate
the market and assure the Company that it was not leaving
value on the table.151 The Board formed a Special Committee
to pursue the sales process. Ultimately, AutoInfo was sold at
a premium to market. Despite attempts by a stockholder to
solicit interest, no topping bid emerged during the time frame
between announcement and closing of the Merger.152 While
the market may have been uninformed about AutoInfo before
the sales process, it subsequently gained ample information.
2. Alleged Pressure from Large Stockholders
Petitioners contend that large stockholders pressured the
Board to sell quickly. Approximately 31.4% of AutoInfo's
voting power was held by Baker Street and Kinderhook.153
According to Petitioners, those hedge funds sent a clear
message that if a liquidity event were not achieved, then they
would get active and Management would potentially face a
control contest.
*13  Baker Street purchased its stake in the Company
in November 2011. By that time, AutoInfo had already
begun to consider strategic alternatives, including a potential
sale. The Board had reached out informally to potential
purchasers months before Baker Street became a stockholder.
Stephens's July 29, 2011, presentation to AutoInfo had
indicated “that now is an opportune time to explore initiatives
to maximize shareholder value, including ... [a c]hange of
control transaction.”154 By the time Baker Street arrived on
the scene, AutoInfo was already contemplating the selection
of a bank to lead the formal sales process.155
Unlike Baker Street, Kinderhook was not adamant that
AutoInfo be sold. Rather, like the Board, Kinderhook desired
change to address AutoInfo's low stock price.156 Patterson,
the Special Committee's chair, testified that neither Baker
Street nor Kinderhook impacted the sales process. Before
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retaining Stephens, the Board had received early indications
of interest and “absolutely” could have sold quickly if the
terms had been right.157 Instead, the Board retained Stephens
and embarked on a sales process lasting over a year. Near
the end of that process, Patterson told the rest of the Special
Committee “I plan to tell [Comvest] to pay $1.06 or walk
away.”158 If necessary, the Special Committee was prepared
to “regroup, push some changes through and clean up” for
a future sale.159 Based on the evidence, neither Baker Street
nor Kinderhook appear to have materially impacted the sales
process.
3. Negotiations with Comvest
Petitioners next argue that Comvest completely overwhelmed
AutoInfo's Management and Board during negotiations. More
specifically, they contend that Comvest commissioned the
McGladrey Report as a tool to drive down the Merger
price. According to Petitioners, AutoInfo was incapable of
adequately responding to that report.
Hiring an accounting firm to conduct due diligence is standard
practice for Comvest.160 While due diligence sometimes
flags issues, in other cases, the process is positive and the
accounting firm concludes that the target company is actually
a better deal than Comvest initially believed.161 McGladrey
was not the only outside firm hired to conduct due diligence.
For example, Comvest engaged a strategy consultant, whose
review of AutoInfo's business was very positive.162
It is mostly undisputed that AutoInfo's CFO was below-
average, the Company used relatively unsophisticated
accounting software, and its accounting records contained
errors discovered throughout negotiations. There is room to
debate whether all of McGladrey's adjustments to AutoInfo's
financials were necessary. However, the record does not
support the notion that McGladrey's auditors would have
sacrificed their professional independence to benefit Comvest
on this one particular transaction. AutoInfo did attempt
to rebut the McGladrey Report, but many of McGladrey's
findings “were valid issues.”163 Because AutoInfo had
sub-par accounting and financial controls, McGladrey was
understandably alert to potential problems, and Comvest
was understandably concerned by the issues raised. Comvest
viewed the agreement it eventually reached with AutoInfo as
inferior to the deal it had initially anticipated.164 The record
does not support the allegation that McGladrey was a hired
gun employed to overwhelm AutoInfo.165
4. Stephens's Process
*14  Petitioners suggest that (i) Stephens's market canvas
was unfocused, (ii) Stephens improperly suggested a
valuation of AutoInfo to some bidders, (iii) Stephens did not
provide a formal valuation of the Company until the Merger
was negotiated, and (iv) the Board did not adequately oversee
the sales process.
The sales process is described supra Section I.C. The weight
of the evidence discredits Petitioners' stated concerns. The
Court concludes that the sales process was generally strong
and can be expected to have led to a Merger price indicative
of fair value. Accordingly, it deserves weight in the Court's
valuation.
E. The Court's Determination
Any real-world sales process may be criticized for
not adhering completely to a perfect, theoretical model.
Nonetheless, AutoInfo's process was comprehensive and
nothing in the record suggests that the outcome would
have been a merger price drastically below fair value, as
Petitioners' expert suggests. Placing heavy weight on the
Merger price “is justified in light of the absence of any other
reliable valuation analysis.”166 Not only are other credible
valuations unavailable, but the record also contains evidence
corroborating the Merger price's reliability. Even Petitioners'
expert agrees that AutoInfo was “shopped quite a bit” and that
the sales process was arm's length.167 The Merger was the
result of “an adequate process.”168 The Merger price is thus
a strong indicator of value.169
Before placing full weight on the Merger price, the Court
performed its own DCF analysis. Having rejected the
Management Projections, the Court relied on financial
projections that Comvest had prepared for internal use in
evaluating the AutoInfo deal.170 In a February 25, 2013,
Investment Committee Memo, Comvest projected five-year
financials for AutoInfo based on both a base case (the
“Base Case Projections”) and a downside case scenario.
Comvest's projections were prepared during due diligence
to provide more detail than the Management Projections.
They represented Comvest's then-current belief regarding
AutoInfo's likely future performance.171 After Comvest's
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investment committee requested “a number of alternative
scenarios below the down side case,” a revised downside case
and a “shock case” were also produced.172
When preparing his expert report, Zmijewski considered
using the Base Case Projections in a DCF valuation. While
he concluded that those projections would not yield a reliable
indication of fair value, he did use them to conduct a
DCF analysis included in his rebuttal report. AutoInfo has
argued that Comvest's projections are a better forecast of the
Company's future performance as of the date of the Merger
than are the Management Projections.
In his rebuttal expert report, Puglisi analyzed the Comvest
Base Case Projections. He considered them reasonably
reliable, observing that
after months of due diligence and hundreds of thousands
of dollars spent, up until days prior to the stockholder
vote on the transaction, Comvest continued to focus its
internal investment committee presentations on its Base
case projections, including in its closing memo, noting
the Company's strong 2013 first quarter results, and
highlighting that the Company had outperformed revenue
and gross margins stated in its Base case projections.173
*15  Because the Base Case Projections are the most reliable
forecast in the record, the Court employed them in its DCF
analysis. The Court generally adopted the DCF framework
used by Zmijewski in his rebuttal expert report.174 However,
as explained in Section 3.F below, the record does not support
Zmijewski's decision to remove $1,449,000 per year (before
tax) in purported merger cost savings. The Court added back
that value to arrive at a corrected estimate of AutoInfo's
forecasted free cash flows. The Court otherwise credited the
uncontroversial assumptions underlying Zmijewski's model,
as well as his use of 17.57% as AutoInfo's weighted average
cost of capital (“WACC”).
The parties disagree on AutoInfo's WACC, which is used
in a DCF analysis to discount cash flow projections and a
terminal value to estimate the Company's enterprise value
as of the Merger. Zmijewski used a WACC of 17.57%,
while Puglisi used 11.30%. The difference stems entirely
from debate regarding the appropriate equity size premium
to be added to AutoInfo's cost of equity.175 The most
common method for estimating a company's cost of equity,
and the method employed by both experts, is application
of the capital asset pricing model (the “CAPM”). Because
empirical evidence suggests that the CAPM understates small
companies' costs of equity, valuation professionals often add
a size premium, based on historically observed data, to a
CAPM-derived cost of equity.176 Zmijewski and Puglisi each
added a size premium to AutoInfo's CAPM-based cost of
equity; Zmijewski used 11.65%, and Puglisi selected 3.81%.
Following standard practice, both experts derived the size
premium using data from Ibbotson Associates (“Ibbotson”).
The 2013 edition of Ibbotson breaks down publicly traded
stocks into deciles based on market capitalization.177 It
further breaks down the 10th decile, which includes the
smallest companies, into four subdeciles. Subdecile 10z
subsumes the smallest companies in Ibbotson's data set.
Puglisi chose the size premium for Ibbotson's micro-cap
category, which includes the 9th and 10th deciles, i.e.,
companies with market capitalizations ranging from $1.139
million to $514.209 million. Zmijewski looked to the
10z subdecile, which consists of companies with market
capitalizations from $1,139 million to $96.164 million. At the
time of the Merger, AutoInfo had a market capitalization of
approximately $30 million. AutoInfo thus fell comfortably
within subdecile 10z based on its market capitalization. For
several reasons, the Court relied on the 10z size premium.
First, Puglisi testified that he “would have used [a size
premium] close to the 10z category, if not 10z itself,” had he
not believed it necessary to strip out a marketability factor.178
Puglisi's adjustment to the size premium runs counter to
Delaware law.179 In Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., this Court
“decline[d] to reduce the Company's size premium to less
than what is implied by its actual size.”180 In that case,
as here, the parties agreed as to which Ibbotson subdecile
applied based on size alone, yet petitioners' expert used a
lesser size premium to “eliminate[e] the ‘well-documented
liquidity effect’ contained within the size premium.”181 The
Court rejected the adjustment “because the liquidity effect
at issue relate[d] to the Company's ability to obtain capital
at a certain cost, ... [and was therefore] related to the
Company's intrinsic value as a going concern and should be
included when calculating its cost of capital.”182 Petitioners
attempt to distinguish between a marketability discount
and an illiquidity discount, which may represent distinct
concepts in a separate context. However, AutoInfo's cost of
capital directly affects transactions between the Company
and providers of capital, and is thus part of its value as a
going concern. Because in these circumstances there is an
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insufficient factual basis for doing so, the Court declines to
depart from the size premium implied by AutoInfo's actual
size.183
*16  The Court also considered the fact that Stephens, when
valuing AutoInfo, used a size premium and WACC even
higher than what Zmijewski recommends. Stephens believed
that AutoInfo would need to significantly increase its market
capitalization to benefit from a lower WACC.184 Perhaps
most importantly, relying on Puglisi's WACC produces an
estimate of fair value completely divorced from the negotiated
Merger price (and the other bids offered for the Company).
The discrepancy between Puglisi's estimates and the market's
valuation of AutoInfo cannot be explained by anything in the
record.185
Using a WACC of 17.57% and the Base Case Projections, the
Court performed a DCF analysis that resulted in a fair value
determination of approximately $0.93 per share on the date of
the Merger.186 Under Delaware law, it would be appropriate
to provide weight to the value as implied by the Court's DCF
analysis.187 Nonetheless, because the Merger price appears to
be the best estimate of value, the Court will put full weight
on that price.188
F. Must the Merger Price Be Adjusted for Cost Savings?
While the Merger price was the baseline for Zmijewski's fair
value opinion, he adjusted that amount downward to account
for the portion of the price that he deemed attributable to
the consummation or prospect of the Merger.189 In this, as
in any appraisal action, the Court must value Petitioners'
shares “exclusive of any element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger....”190 AutoInfo
argues that two categories of cost savings, which increased
the price that Comvest was willing to pay for it, must be
backed out of the Merger price to arrive at AutoInfo's fair
value as a going-concern as of the Merger date. Those
categories are (i) public company costs that Comvest could
eliminate once AutoInfo ceased trading as a public company,
and (ii) executive compensation costs that Comvest planned
to eliminate. AutoInfo bears the burden of showing that
adjustments should be made to the Merger price.191
Zmijewski suggests backing out these cost savings because
AutoInfo's stockholders likely captured 100% of the value
created by those savings and, thus, the value is embedded
in the Merger price.192 He cites academic literature that
concludes that target firms capture virtually all of the value
created by corporate combinations through the price paid by
the acquirer.193 Because the $1.05 price would be expected
to reflect anticipated cost savings, Zmijewski adjusted the
Merger price downwards to account for Merger-related
effects on the stock's value.
This Court only excludes from an appraisal award value that is
merger-specific.194 An appraisal award does not include “the
amount of any value that the selling company's shareholders
would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject
company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part
of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be
extracted.”195
*17  Zmijewski based his calculation of cost savings on
adjustments that Comvest made to AutoInfo's earnings when
preparing the Base Case Projections. Comvest apparently
anticipated savings related to public company costs and
executive compensation. It assumed that the savings would
not grow over time and would persist into perpetuity.196
In Huff Fund, the respondent company urged the Court to
subtract $0.29 from the merger price to arrive at fair value.197
Its rationale was that prior to the merger, the acquirer had
identified $4.6 million in annual cost savings that it hoped
to realize by converting the target from a publicly held
corporation to a privately held firm.198 The evidence for those
anticipated cost savings was an investment memorandum
that the acquirer had prepared. The Court did not need to
“reach[ ] the theoretical question of under what circumstances
cost-savings may constitute synergies excludable from going-
concern value under Section 262(h)” because the record did
not establish that the acquirer had based its bid on cost savings
that the target could not have itself realized had it continued
as a going concern.199
Accepting Zmijewski's adjustments would appear to require
the Court to reduce for cost savings the fair value established
in an appraisal proceeding through reliance on the transaction
price. Allowing a near automatic reduction in price would
reverse the burden that is on the party arguing that adjustments
are warranted. Zmijewski derived his cost savings figures
from three lines of data included in Comvest's development
of its Base Case Projections.200 The Court does not know
how Comvest arrived at its numbers or even what it included
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as “public company costs.” Unlike the Merger price, which
was corroborated by a thorough and public sales process, the
reliability of the purported cost savings has not been tested.201
AutoInfo has thus failed to establish that any downward
adjustment to the Merger price is warranted.202
IV. CONCLUSION
Where, as here, the market prices a company as the result of a
competitive and fair auction, “the use of alternative valuation
techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily a second-best
method to derive value.”203 The result of a DCF analysis
depends critically on its inputs. For example, small changes to
the assumed cost of capital can dramatically impact the result.
*18  AutoInfo's expert, a tenured professor at the University
of Chicago Booth School of Business, concluded that there is
no reliable data to input into a DCF or comparable companies
model. He determined that the process by which AutoInfo was
marketed and sold would be expected to have led to a price
indicative of the fair value of the Company's stock. The Court
has independently reached these same conclusions.
For the reasons set forth above, the fair value of one share of
AutoInfo at the time of the Merger was $1.05. Petitioners are
entitled to interest at the legal rate. Counsel are requested to
confer and to submit an implementing form of order.
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*1  This appraisal proceeding arises from the merger of a
Delaware corporation with and into a subsidiary of its parent
company, which owned 78% of the corporation's outstanding
stock at the time of the merger. Following the announcement
of the proposed merger, certain holders of the corporation's
stock filed a breach of fiduciary duty action against the
corporation, its directors, and its parent in March 2009.
Those parties entered into an agreement of compromise and
settlement to which the petitioners in this action objected.
The merger was consummated on May 29, 2009. This Court
ultimately approved the class action settlement over the
petitioners' objections, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The
petitioners now seek appraisal of their shares pursuant to 8
Del. C. § 262.
The petitioners maintain that the merger consideration of
$4.80 per share substantially underestimated the value of
their shares. They presented evidence from an industry expert
and a valuation expert in support of their position. The
petitioners' valuation expert assessed the fair value of the
petitioners' shares to be between $11.05 and $12.12 per share.
The respondent defended the merger price. It also retained
an industry expert and a valuation expert. The latter expert
opined that the fair value of petitioners' shares was in a range
of $3.40 to $5.29, and suggested that the Court select the
midpoint of that range, $4.28 per share, as the fair value of
the petitioners' shares on the merger date. Having carefully
considered the evidence presented at a four-day trial and the
parties' extensive briefing and post-trial argument, I conclude
that the fair value of petitioners' shares on the merger date is
$5.75 per share.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Each petitioner was a holder of Cox Radio, Inc.'s (“CXR”
or the “Company”) Class A common stock when, on
May 29, 2009, Cox Enterprises, Inc. (“CEI”), through
its wholly owned subsidiary Cox Media Group (“CMG”),
acquired the publicly held stock in CXR. The petitioners
are Towerview LLC (900,000 shares),1 Hartz Capital
Investments, L.L.C. (125,000 shares), Metropolitan Capital
Advisors, L.P. (100,000 shares), Metropolitan Capital
Advisors International, Ltd. (55,400 share), Jeffrey E.
Schwarz (25,000 shares), and Metropolitan Capital Advisors
Select Fund, L.P. (19,800 shares) (collectively, “Petitioners”).
Respondent is CXR, a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Atlanta, Georgia. CXR engaged in the radio broadcasting
business. It owned, operated, or provided sales and other
services for eighty-six stations clustered in nineteen markets.
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B. Evidentiary Objections
Before reciting the facts of this case, I briefly address several
evidentiary objections raised by Petitioners. Specifically,
Petitioners complain that Respondent impermissibly relied
on post-merger data and hearsay and that Respondent
did not follow the agreed-upon practice for exchanging
demonstratives. For the most part, I overrule Petitioners'
objections. The Court will consider the evidence adduced by
the parties and will attribute to it the weight the Court deems
appropriate based on the credibility of the source and the
relevance and probative value of the evidence.2
*2  I will address, however, a few of Petitioners' specific
complaints. First, Petitioners object to a PowerPoint
presentation apparently created by Petitioners' industry
expert, John Chachas, and two others that is marked joint
exhibit (“JX”) 307. Under Rule 703 of the Delaware Rules of
Evidence (“D.R.E.”):
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the
opinion or inference to be admitted.3
The fact that an expert may rely on a specific document,
however, “does not mean that it would be admissible; to
the contrary, a reliability analysis under Rule 703 is not a
substitute for a hearsay ruling.”4 Thus, the admissibility of all
documents objected to on hearsay grounds, even those relied
upon by experts, “turns on whether it is admissible as non-
hearsay or, if it is hearsay, if it qualifies for one of the hearsay
exceptions.”5 A document may be considered nonhearsay
if it is admitted as “basis evidence” to “help the factfinder
understand the expert's thought process and determine what
weight to give to the expert's opinion.”6
Petitioners argue that because JX 307 “was not part of the
discovery record or presented in any way at trial,” it should be
excluded as unsponsored hearsay.7 Although JX 307 appears
on the pre-trial exhibit list, Chachas did not refer to the
document in his expert report or testify about it at trial or
in his deposition. Hence, there is no basis for treating the
document as admissible as nonhearsay to support Chachas's
expert opinion under Rule 703. The document, therefore, is
hearsay and Respondent has not argued that it qualifies for
admission under any hearsay exception. Therefore, I sustain
the objection to JX 307 and hold that it is inadmissible to the
extent that Respondent relies on it for its truth.
Petitioners also object to the admissibility of certain analyst
reports. They do not dispute that such reports are the type
of evidence on which the experts in this case may rely.8
Rather, Petitioners contend that Respondent is attempting
to introduce the analyst reports as expert testimony in
their own right. Petitioners also maintain that the reports
are unreliable because the analysts are not independent.
Respondent disagrees, arguing that this Court has admitted
similar reports in past appraisal proceedings and that such
reports are admissible to demonstrate, at least, the state of
mind of analysts at the time of the merger.9 In addition,
Respondent notes that Petitioners relied on similar reports,
including reports from credit rating agencies such as Moody's
and Fitch.10 Petitioners counter that reports from credit
rating agencies are more reliable than analyst reports because
those agencies are the industry's independent arbiters who
reach their conclusions with inside information from CX R's
management. Petitioners also emphasize that the reports they
cite properly were introduced through their experts' reports
and testimony. More importantly, perhaps, Respondent did
not object to Petitioners' use of analyst or credit rating agency
reports.
*3  The Delaware Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he
danger exists ... that Rule 703 can be used as a ‘back door’
hearsay exception—a crafty litigant could give hearsay to
its expert for the purpose of having the expert refer to it
as a basis for the expert's opinion.”11 This danger does not
appear to exist here. Petitioner tacitly has accepted the fact
that analyst reports are proper evidence for the experts to
consider; thus, the experts on both sides have discussed
analysts' observations and quoted from analyst reports at
length in their expert reports.12 Instead, Petitioners appear
to object only to the use of analyst reports not brought into
evidence through an expert report or expert testimony.
As to analyst reports not used in the context of an expert
report or expert testimony, the report would be admissible if
it is “non-hearsay or, if it is hearsay, if it qualifies for one of
the hearsay exceptions.”13 The analyst reports arguably are
nonhearsay to the extent the parties offer them to help the
Court “understand the expert's thought process and determine
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what weight to give to the expert's opinion.”14 To the extent a
party relies on these reports as substantive evidence, they are
hearsay. Thus, the Court's consideration of analyst reports will
be limited (1) to considering the analyst reports identified in
the exhibit list prepared in connection with trial and discussed
by an expert in their expert report or at trial, a use which is
unchallenged here, and (2) to assist the Court in evaluating
the experts' opinions.
Lastly, Petitioners seek to limit use of Respondent's industry
expert Bishop Cheen's testimony and rebuttal report to
rebuttal only and to preclude its use in CX R's case-in-
chief. Petitioners' argument in this regard is unpersuasive.
Petitioners rely on two federal cases for the proposition that
“rebuttal evidence may be used to challenge the evidence or
theory of an opponent [but] not to establish a case-in-chief.”15
But, both those cases are distinguishable.16 Petitioners also
rely on the April 20, 2012 Stipulated Scheduling Order which
states: “The scope of a party's rebuttal expert report shall be
limited to rebutting positions taken in an opposing party's
opening expert report.”17 The Scheduling Order also sets
forth when the parties were to exchange their list of fact
witnesses and states that “[t]hose listings are being provided
to help avoid the need for depositions of fact witnesses after
the close of discovery, and are made without prejudice to later
modification; the definitive list of trial witnesses shall be as
set forth in the Joint Pretrial Order.”18 The November 5, 2012
Joint Pre–Trial Order states that CXR plans to call “valuation
expert Rajiv B. Gokhale and industry expert Bishop Cheen
as live witnesses.” The Order does not distinguish between
witnesses being called in the parties' case-in-chief and being
called as rebuttal witnesses.
*4  Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, Respondent identified
its valuation expert on August 10, 2012 and reserved
“the right to call any additional rebuttal experts necessary
to address any non-valuation subject matters on which
Petitioners intend to call an expert at trial.”19 On September
14, the date on which rebuttal expert reports were due to be
exchanged, Respondent submitted Cheen's rebuttal report and
the materials upon which he relied. Petitioners deposed Cheen
on October 11, 2012.
In the context of this appraisal proceeding, Respondent
reasonably could have expected to call a valuation expert
and to reserve judgment on whether to call an additional
expert until the necessity of rebutting a position advanced
by Petitioners arose. The opening expert reports identified
what would become a main issue: what kind of an economic
rebound would have been expected at the time of the Merger.
Petitioners submitted a report not only of their valuation
expert, but also of an industry expert, John Chachas. The
latter report provided Chachas's opinion on the radio industry
environment and the prospects for a recovery of the industry
in general and for CX R in particular. Although Cheen's
rebuttal report served to rebut Chachas's opinions, it also was
consistent with opinions already presented by Respondent's
valuation expert in his expert report. Thus, Respondent was
not hiding the ball and was not dilatory in presenting its
case. Both parties have the same burden of proof in an
appraisal proceeding. After Petitioners came forward with
both a valuation expert and an industry expert, it was not
surprising that Respondent elected to present an industry
expert as well.
In addition, Petitioners had adequate time to respond to
Cheen's opinions. Petitioners deposed Cheen and cross-
examined him at trial. Thus, I perceive no material prejudice
to Petitioners if, in rebutting Chachas's opinions, Cheen's
opinions also served to support Respondent's case-in-chief.
In these circumstances, Petitioners have presented no good
reason to limit Cheen's testimony as they suggest.20 Thus, I
reject Petitioners' argument that Cheen's trial testimony and
report should be admissible only for the purpose of rebutting
Petitioners' case.
Having resolved the various evidentiary matters presented, I
turn to my findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case.
C. The Facts
1. The Merger
On March 23, 2009, CEI announced a tender offer to acquire
the publicly held stock of CXR for $3.80 per share. At that
time, CEI indirectly owned 78.4% of CXR's outstanding
shares and indirectly controlled 97% of CXR's voting power.
On April 29, 2009, the tender offer price was increased
to $4.80. After satisfaction of a majority of the minority
condition of the tender offer, a short-form merger under 8 Del.
C. § 253 was consummated on May 29, 2009 (“the Merger”).
After the Merger, CX R became fully consolidated with CEI
subsidiary CMG.
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At the time of the tender offer and Merger, CXR's board
consisted of eight directors: six who were affiliated with
CEI or its subsidiaries and two who were not. The
nonaffiliated directors served as a two-member special
committee (the “Special Committee”) that evaluated the
Merger and ultimately concluded that the offer price was fair
to the stockholders and recommended that the stockholders
accept the offer and tender their shares.21 The Special
Committee's financial advisor was Gleacher Partners LLC
(“Gleacher”). CEI's financial advisor was Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. (“Citi”).
2. Management team
*5  Robert Neil was CXR's chief executive officer (“CEO”)
at all times relevant to this action. Neil Johnston was CXR's
chief financial officer (“CFO”) until the end of 2008 when
he became the CFO of CMG. In January 2009, Charles
Odom replaced Johnston as CXR's CFO. Lauren Tilson, a
CXR accountant and manager of financial reporting, worked
with Odom.22 Eventually, Johnston changed roles at CMG to
become the executive vice president of strategy and digital
innovations and Odom became CMG's CFO.
3. Management's projections: long-range plans and
current year forecasts
Every year, CXR management created bottom up five-
year financial projections with input from regional
managers. Management called these five-year projections
the Company's long range plan, or “LRP.” The LRPs were
carefully prepared and thorough. They were submitted to
and approved by the board of directors at the end of each
year. Of the five years projected in the LRP, management
considered the first year's forecast a “budget.” That forecast
includes monthly numbers. The four years that follow are
the “out-years” and are considered at a higher level.23
When examined retroactively, the LRPs consistently were
overoptimistic, especially as to the out-years.24 In addition
to creating the LRPs annually, management routinely created
monthly forecasts for the current year.25 These monthly
forecasts typically would provide new estimates for the next
several months of the current year.
In December 2008, CXR's board of directors approved
management's long range plan for the years 2009–2013
(“2009 LRP”). In somewhat of a departure from the
Company's general practice, management also created a
current year forecast in January 2009. This forecast received
particular emphasis because, in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, the Company had experienced a dramatic decrease in
revenues since the 2009 LRP was approved in December
2008. Therefore, rather than forecast only the next few
months, as was management's normal practice, management
forecasted the entire year.26 Management updated the current
year forecasts again in February, March, April, and May.
The most recent forecast before the Merger was the forecast
created on May 20, 2009 (“the May Forecast”).27 The
monthly forecasts were not vetted and approved by the board.
These forecasts, however, were prepared in the normal course
of business and there is no evidence that they were not as
thoughtfully prepared or as reliable as the board-approved
LRPs.
4. Economic environment at the time of the Merger
*6  At the time of the Merger, the United States was
experiencing the worst recession since World War II (“the
2008/2009 Recession”).28 By May 2009, it had become the
longest recession since World War II. The radio industry, like
all U.S. industries, was experiencing a deep contraction.29
“[T]he downturn that gripped all ad-driven media beginning
in 2008 was among the worst in 50 years.”30 On average,
U.S. advertising revenues in the radio industry had declined
by 29% between 2005 and 2009.31 The 10–year compound
annual growth rate (“CAGR”) for the industry was –2.0%.32
a. Prospects for economic recovery
In March 2009, Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve
announced that they would begin quantitative easing.33
The Federal Reserve's injection of $1.75 trillion into the
financial system helped to spur the beginning of an economic
recovery.34 By March 2009, the economy and the radio
industry were experiencing some recovery.35
b. Expected robustness of the radio industry's recovery
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The parties advanced widely divergent views on the prospects
for recovery in the radio industry, generally, and at CXR, in
particular, as of May 2009. The differences between those
two views present the main issues in this appraisal case.
In the years leading up to the 2008/2009 Recession, the
radio industry had been experiencing fragmentation with
increased competition from new media such as MP3 players,
satellite radio, general digital media such as iPods, and
internet radio.36 The industry had lost pricing power. To
maintain their sell-through rates for advertising, radio stations
reportedly had lowered prices.37 Analysts worried that these
rates “would not recover due to the intense pressure on public
radio companies to discount rates in order to get business.”38
Even in early 2009, however, CXR's management touted
the Company's future prospects to shareholders and industry
analysts.39 Management observed that radio audiences were
growing40 and that CXR had the best management in the
radio industry.41 At a March 4, 2009 earnings call, CXR
CEO Neil stated that although “the near-term outlook on the
economy remains very difficult, we continue to be optimistic
about both the prospects of [CXR] and the radio industry in
general.”42 Regarding media fragmentation, Neil remarked:
“Actually, I'm pretty optimistic on the listener's side. For all
of the baloney that we heard about satellite radio five, six,
seven years ago, it certainly is dubious at best as to whether
that really is a business.”43
*7  In addition to CXR's management's views, rating
agencies such as Moody's and Fitch considered the downturn
in the radio industry to be cyclical and expected CXR
to “improve to levels consistent with an investment-grade
rating.”44 Analysts covering the radio industry and other radio
station companies, however, expressed concerns about the
increased pressure on advertising.45 They recognized that
the industry was in a cyclical downturn but also mentioned
that secular trends presented challenges to the industry's
recovery.46
CXR had cut its expenses slightly in response to the
2008/2009 Recession; its expenses were down by 1%
in 2008.47 But, the Company refused to make any
drastic across-the-board cuts. CXR was unique in its peer
group in publicly rejecting major cost reductions such as
reducing its workforce.48 After CXR management made
this pronouncement in the March 2009 earnings call, the
Company's stock price dropped sharply from the $5–$6 range
to a low around $3 per share.49 Other causes of the drop in
CXR's stock price in March 2009 included a Goldman report
that put a sell on the stock at a $3 target and the fact that CXR
stock was being shorted.50 Notably, however, radio insiders
and owners, in addition to CEI, were making investments in
radio industry businesses in early 2009.51
5. Management projections: May Forecast
*8  As noted, by early 2009, CXR's management's
expectations for 2009 had plummeted compared to the 2009
LRP. The January reforecast showed projected revenues
and operating cash flow (“OCF”) down by 14.7% and
37.6%, respectively, compared to the 2009 LRP.52 By
May, management's projections for 2009 departed negatively
from the 2009 LRP by 16.8% in revenue and 40.1 % for
OCF.53 Although the 2009 numbers diverged dramatically
from the 2009 LRP forecasts, management continued to
look to the 2009 LRP to some extent. For example, Bond
& Pecaro54 made use of the 2009 LRP in its Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (“FAS 142”)
valuation report as of December 31, 200855 and in its
ongoing appraisal process for 2008.56 Bond & Pecaro did
not simply incorporate management's projections into its
valuation models, but apparently considered the 2009 LRP
as one of many documents it referred to in creating its own
projections.57
CXR management also continued to circulate the 2009 LRP in
early 2009, sending it to at least three people. First, Odom sent
the 2009 LRP as background information to Grace Huang, the
new senior director of corporate strategy at CMG, on January
8, 2009.58 Odom's email responded to a request from Huang,
which stated that she was “trying to get up to speed on the
businesses and [was] looking for overall financials; budget/
board presentations that can help provide a quick snapshot
of the Radio business.”59 Odom attached “a couple of files
that should be helpful,” including a PowerPoint presentation
created in 2008 regarding CXR's “2009 Budget Meeting”
and two additional documents entitled “November Financial
Package” and “November One Sheet.”60 The 2009 Budget
Meeting PowerPoint contained sixty slides, several of which
summarized or discussed the 2009 LRP.61 Odom informed
Huang that “the 2009 budget presentation ... gives a good
- 307 -
Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2013)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
strategic overview of the company and lays out our strategy
for 2009.”62 One slide entitled “Radio Strategic Review”
set forth CXR's strengths. They included that radio usage
was growing, that radio was attractive to advertisers because
the medium is personal and targeted, and that radio was
resilient.63 After briefly describing the other two documents
he attached, Odom told Huang that “the combination of these
items should give you a good overview of the company.”64
Second, on March 26, 2009, Odom sent nine documents,
including the 2009 LRP, to Harry Bond at Gleacher.
According to Odom's transmittal email, he simply was
attaching information Gleacher had requested.65
Third, in an email dated April 28, 2009, CXR accountant
Tilson sent the 100–page version of the 2009 LRP to
Kimberly Smith, a junior auditor at Deloitte and one of the
people that Odom and Tilson regularly dealt with regarding
FAS 142 issues.66 Tilson's email, however, did not contain
any subject reference or any text.
6. The Tilson Memo
*9  Tilson sent another email that has become a central point
of dispute in this action. On May 15, 2009, Tilson sent an
email, with a copy to Odom, regarding “FAS 142” to Deloitte
auditors Barry McLaurin and Charles Crawford. The email
included an attached memo, the “Tilson Memo,” dated May
11, 2009. Earlier, on May 1, Odom had sent Tilson a request:
Please draft a short memo that discusses why we didn't
do a FAS 142 analysis at the end of Q1 ... in short
the reasons are: [1] When the 12/31/2008 valuation was
performed, current business conditions existed and the
weakness that we're currently experiencing was anticipated
and incorporated into that valuation ... [2] Tender offer ...
although offer prices reflect a lower value than our
12/31/[ 08] valuation ... due to current depressed market
outlook ... this is an ongoing process ... no assurance that
the current price is actually what the ultimate price will
be ... Etc.etc ...67
Thereafter, Tilson and Odom exchanged several drafts of such
a memo. By May 15, the Tilson Memo had been finalized.
The final memo states, in part:
[CXR] believes that deteriorated first quarter 2009 results
are for the most part already included in the year-end model
due to the timing of the test and management's knowledge
of this continuing deterioration. As such, the deteriorating
environment currently impacting [CXR]'s stock price and
market cap are taken into account in management's
projections at December 31, 2008. Furthermore, any
revenue declines greater than those projected are largely
offset by expense recoveries such that net cash flows are
comparable. Lastly, [CXR] also believes that future years'
growth is attainable due to recovery in the industry. In
regards to Bond & Pecaro's analysis of historical private
radio market values, although public market values have
declined, private market values have not ever declined
(even during prior recessions) to the level currently
reflected by the public markets.68
This language ignited several rounds of fireworks in this
litigation. Based on it, Petitioners moved to reopen this
Court's judgment approving the class action settlement in
May 2010,69 and requested leave to file a breach of fiduciary
duty complaint. Petitioners accused CXR of withholding
from the Special Committee, from this Court, and from
the Delaware Supreme Court management's beliefs that the
2009 LRP remained relevant and that the radio industry was
recovering. I considered and denied that motion.70 In arguing
the motion, the parties discussed FAS 142 testing extensively.
For purposes of this appraisal action, a brief summary should
suffice.
FAS 142 analysis involves the valuation of a company's
intangible assets. FAS 142 goodwill impairment testing
assumes that the company will sell the groups of assets
being valued to a buyer “for their highest and best use.”71
Odom likened FAS 142 valuations to a private-market value:
“They have attributes of a private-market value, which is very
different and has different assumptions than publicly valuing
a company as a going concern.”72 According to FAS 142,
intangible assets should be tested for impairment once per
year or more frequently if changes in circumstances indicate
that the assets may be impaired.73 The company that owns
the intangible asset in question has the discretion to decide
whether to conduct an interim impairment test. One indicator
of impairment that might lead to an interim test is a decline
in a company's stock price and market capitalization. CXR
experienced such a decline in early 2009.
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*10  Consistent with Odom's initial email to Tilson, the
Tilson Memo purports to explain why CXR elected not to
perform an interim impairment valuation of CXR's FCC
licenses and goodwill as of March 31, 2009, notwithstanding
the decline in the Company's stock price and market
capitalization. Odom explained at trial that, although Bond &
Pecaro's FAS 142 valuation was for the year 2008, it was not
finalized until the middle of February 2009.74 According to
Odom, between February and March 31, 2009, “[t]he private-
market valuation ha[d] been stable and ... ha[d] been within
this band for years and years and years.... And so that would
indicate that the FAS 142 valuation would be substantially
the same.”75 Thus, CXR determined that an interim test was
unnecessary and denominated the Tilson Memo as a memo
“To: File” to document that conclusion and the fact that
management had considered the issue.76
Although the parties strenuously contest this issue, the Tilson
Memo's reference to “management's projections at December
31, 2008” apparently was an ambiguous reference to Bond &
Pecaro's projections, and not to the 2009 LRP. Odom credibly
testified that the disputed reference pertained to the Bond &
Pecaro projections as of December 31, 2008.77 He described
the projections Bond & Pecaro prepared regarding its FA
S 142 valuation. Moreover, his explanation is corroborated
by the Bond & Pecaro report itself, entitled “Fair Market
Valuation of Cox Radio, Inc. as of December 31, 2008” (the
“FAS 142 Analysis”).78 Using sources like Miller Kaplan or
SNL Kagan, Bond & Pecaro assessed how it thought industry
revenues, in the markets CXR operates in, would perform in
the future. In addition, using sources such as Arbitron, Bond
& Pecaro considered what percentage of audience shares the
Company's stations could garner in those markets. Based on
the percent of audience shares a company could secure, the
company would get that percentage of projected revenues.79
The FAS 142 Analysis provides the following explanation of
how Bond & Pecaro arrived at its cash flow projections:
The assumptions used in the cash flow models reflect
historical performance and trends in the [CXR ] market
clusters, as well as industry norms for similar stations.
These assumptions, especially those pertaining to station
revenue shares and operating profit margins, are, in part,
reflective of the actual and forecast performance of [CXR]
as station owner. However, based on radio industry data,
the revenue shares and operating margins used in the cash
flow models all fall within a reasonable range of what could
be expected from a typical market participant.80
In addition to the explanation Bond & Pecaro provided in
its report, Petitioners' expert, D r. Samuel Kursh, opined
in his report that the reference in the Tilson Memo to
“management's projections at December 31, 2008” referred to
“Bond & Pecaro's DCF.”81 At his deposition, Kursh testified
that he was not aware of anything in Bond & Pecaro's FAS
142 Analysis that was predicated on the 2009 LRP, but he
backtracked at trial. On the witness stand, Kursh asserted
that Bond & Pecaro did use the 2009 LRP in its FAS 142
Analysis.82
As noted above, Bond & Pecaro had access to the 2009
LRP when it created its projections. In fact, CMG's Amended
and Restated Offer to Purchase for Cash All Outstanding
Shares of Class A Common Stock, disclosed that Bond &
Pecaro's valuation was “based, in part, with consideration of
the Long Range Plan.”83 In addition, Bond & Pecaro's FAS
142 Analysis explicitly states that its assumptions “especially
those pertaining to station revenue shares and operating profit
margins, are, in part, reflective of the actual and forecast
performance of [CXR] as station owner.”84 Thus, I find that
Bond & Pecaro did use the 2009 LRP to some extent in the
FAS 142 Analysis.
7. Expert valuation reports
a. Petitioners' expert Kursh
*11  Both parties retained proficient experts. Petitioners'
valuation expert, Kursh, provided an expert report and
rebuttal report.85 In his expert report, Kursh relied solely on a
discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis. Kursh used the May
Forecast to project cash flows for 2009 and the 2009 LRP
to project cash flows for years 2010–2013. Because the May
Forecast reflected the current economic crisis and recession,
Kursh anticipated an eventual recovery to the levels projected
in the 2009 LRP for the out-years. Specifically, he projected
that CXR's OCF would return to the levels projected in the
2009 LRP after eighteen months. Based on an equation that
took into account inflation, population growth, and increased
productivity, Kursh chose a terminal growth rate of 2.5%.
Petitioners characterize this choice as conservative in light of
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CXR's strong position in the radio industry and its operating
leverage.86
With these inputs, Kursh determined a fair value for CXR
of at least $11.05 per share. Kursh also identified certain
adjustments to the 2009 LRP that he believed represented
appropriate additions to the cash flow projections. On that
basis, Kursh opined that the $11.05 value he obtained in
his DCF should be increased to reflect those adjustments.
The items of potential additional value include CXR's
retained cushion and omitted deferred taxes.87 Based on these
suggested adjustments, Kursh increased his per-share value
by $1.07 to a total of $12.12 per share.
b. Respondent's expert Gokhale
Respondent's expert is Rajiv B. Gokhale. Gokhale also relied
primarily on DCF analyses. He performed two. In his first
analysis, Gokhale used the May Forecast to project 2009
cash flows and he estimated 2010–2013 cash flows using
the actual EBITDA CAGR CXR experienced in the four
years following the 2000/2001 recession (“May Forecast
DCF”).88 In his second analysis, he constructed projections
for 2009–2010 based on a combination of consensus analyst
EBITDA estimates for CXR and, to project cash flow in
years 2011–2013, Gokhale used the actual EBITDA CAGR
CXR experienced in the three years following the 2000/2001
recession (“Third–Party DCF”).89 Gokhale determined not to
use projections from the 2009 LRP because, by May 2009,
he believed that both CXR management and analysts had
lowered their projections significantly for 2009 and later
years. He did use some inputs from the 2009 LRP in his DCF,
however, such as depreciation and the projected expenditures
for the long-term incentive plan (“LTIP”).90
*12  Gokhale calculated a weighted average cost of capital
(“WACC”) using the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”)
to determine the cost of equity. Gokhale's model yielded a
range from 5.81 % to 7.65%, if he excluded a small stock
premium, and 7.03% to 9.27%, if he included such a premium.
He ultimately used a WACC of 8.0% to discount CXR's
unlevered free cash flows. Gokhale also selected a perpetuity
growth rate of 1.25% based on analyst projections that ranged
from negative 1 % to positive 2%.
Gokhale performed a comparable companies analysis, but
found that it was of limited value because market values of
debt were unavailable for all but one comparable company.
Furthermore, due to the economic and financial slowdown in
2008, the book values of debt did not provide a good proxy
for market values. Consequently, Gokhale concluded that the
multiples obtained by a comparable companies methodology
were unreasonably high and that using those multiples would
overstate the value of CXR shares. He did not attempt
a comparable transactions analysis because there were no
North American radio broadcasting merger and acquisition
transactions between July 2008 and the end of 2009.
D. Procedural History
After the initial tender offer, holders of CXR stock filed a class
action complaint in this Court alleging direct and indirect
breaches of fiduciary duty against CXR, its board, CEI,
and CMG in connection with the proposed Merger. Those
holders agreed to settle that case and filed a stipulation for
compromise and settlement on September 4, 2009. Petitioners
filed their petition for appraisal on August 14, 2009 (the
“Petition”). They also objected to the class action settlement.
Notwithstanding Petitioners' objection, the Court approved
the settlement on May 6, 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Court's ruling on November 22, 2010. As noted earlier,
Petitioners later filed a motion for leave to file their own
breach of fiduciary duty complaint that this Court denied on
October 26, 2012.
A four-day trial was held on the appraisal Petition on
November 13–16, 2012. After full post-trial briefing, I
heard the parties' final arguments on March 6, 2013. This
Memorandum Opinion constitutes my post-trial findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the Petition. For the reasons
that follow, I conclude that the fair value of CX R stock on
the date of the Merger was $5.75 per share.
E. Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that, at the time of the Merger in May
2009, participants in the radio industry, including CXR
management, expected the industry to snap back from the
low the industry was experiencing in early 2009. According
to Petitioners, CXR was the star of the industry. Petitioners
contend that CXR, therefore, was poised to achieve the
best recovery in the industry once that recovery inevitably
occurred. Thus, Petitioners assert that the Court reasonably
can assume that CXR would have rebounded relatively
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quickly to the 2009 LRP. According to Petitioners, the
evidence demonstrates that management continued to rely
on and disseminate the 2009 LRP throughout early 2009.
This, they argue, indicates that management believed that
“recovery” meant an eventual return to the 2009 LRP
projections. In Petitioners' view, the sole question to be
answered here is when one would have expected that cyclical
recovery to occur. Petitioners contend that Kursh's valuation
used proper standards to provide an answer to this question.
Hence, Petitioners aver that Kursh's valuation is appropriate
and urge this Court to adopt his conclusion as to the fair value
of CXR stock on May 29, 2009.
*13  The Company paints an entirely different picture of
the expectations of CX R management and others, such as
industry analysts, in early 2009. Respondent contends that,
when the Merger was completed on May 29, 2009, the 2009
LRP no longer provided a realistic set of financial projections.
According to Respondent, CX R management had rejected
the 2009 LRP and did not expect the radio industry to recover
to pre-recession levels. Although management expected to
achieve some cyclical recovery, Respondent denies that
management foresaw a return to the 2009 LRP projections
within a relevant time horizon. Secular changes in the industry
that pre-dated the 2008/2009 Recession and that Recession
itself, according to Respondent, set a new baseline for the
radio industry.91 Based on its premise that the 2009 LRP
was obsolete, Respondent argues that Gokhale appropriately
relied on CX R's historical recovery from the 2000/2001
recession to estimate CXR's 2010–2013 performance and that
the Court should adopt his value conclusion.
II. ANALYSIS
Under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
stockholders who meet certain requirements are entitled to an
appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of their
shares of stock.92 During such an appraisal proceeding, the
Court of Chancery
shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.93
The Court's task is to perform an independent evaluation
of “fair value.”94 “It is within the Court of Chancery's
discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as
its general framework, or fashion its own, to determine fair
value in the appraisal proceeding.”95 Fair value in the context
of an appraisal proceeding is the “value to a stockholder
of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm's
value in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.”96
“Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from
the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger,” that
is, any synergistic value, should be excluded from a fair
value calculation on the date of the merger.97 “One of the
most important factors to consider is the very ‘nature of the
enterprise’ subject to the appraisal proceeding.”98
In an appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of
proving their respective valuations by a preponderance of the
evidence.99 If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
Court must use its own independent judgment to determine
the fair value of the shares.100 The Court may consider
“proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court.”101 Among the techniques
that Delaware courts have relied on to determine the fair value
of shares are the DCF approach, the comparable transactions
approach, and comparable companies analyses.102
A. The Parties Rely on DCF Analyses
*14  Both experts relied primarily on a DCF analysis.103
The experts agreed that both a comparable transactions
and a comparable companies analysis would be unreliable
for various reasons.104 Kursh also noted that CXR and
CEI “routinely commissioned other valuation experts to
perform valuations for [CXR] for various purposes, and these
consultants, like Bond & Pecaro, relied on DCFs.”105 In
addition, this Court routinely has relied on DCF analyses as a
reliable valuation method in appraisal proceedings.106 Thus,
I find that a DCF analysis is the best valuation method by
which to value Petitioners' CXR stock.
The three main inputs into a DCF analysis are: (1) the OCF
projections; (2) a discount rate; and (3) a terminal value.
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1. OCF projections
The disparity in the experts' value conclusions mainly
results from the differing cash flow projections chosen by
each expert. Pre-merger management projections are an
appropriate starting point from which to derive data in the
appraisal context because they are not tainted by post-merger
hindsight and usually are created by an impartial body.107
Management also is in the best position to forecast the
company's future before the merger.108 Nevertheless, “[i]f
Management forecasts are prepared a significant period of
time before the merger, it may be necessary to make minor
changes to them reflecting actual results as of the merger
date.”109 Here, the 2009 LRP reflects management's thorough
pre-merger five-year projections. The reliability of the 2009
LRP, however, is severely undermined by the changes that
took place in the economy and the radio industry between
the creation of the LRP projections in October 2008 and
the Merger date of May 29, 2009. Significantly, CXR's
management itself recognized these changes and considerably
reduced projections for 2009 in the months leading up to the
Merger.
*15  Both Kursh and Gokhale agree that the May Forecast,
which is management's last forecast before the Merger, is an
appropriate starting point for a valuation of the Company.
The May Forecast projects 2009 only. From there, the experts'
views diverge widely: Kursh assumes that CXR will return
to the 2009 LRP projections sometime between the end of
2010 and 2013. Once CXR's revenues return to the level
specified in the 2009 LRP, Kursh assumes that thereafter
revenues will conform to the projected values in the 2009 LRP
from that time until the end of 2013. In contrast, Gokhale
does not expect CXR's OCF to return to the 2009 LRP levels
at any time before 2013. Nor does he project any dramatic
upswing after the significant decline CXR experienced in the
recession, as reflected in the May Forecast for 2009. Instead,
Gokhale projects that cash flow in 2010–2013 will grow at
a steady rate derived from averaging the EBITDA CAGRs
that CXR experienced in the three or four years after the
2000/2001 recession.
The differences between the approaches of the two experts
are illustrated graphically in the figure below. The solid line
that depicts OCF starting at approximately $160 million in
December 2007 and ending at $138 million in 2013 represents
the 2009 LRP. The dotted line depicts the adjusted forecast
for 2009, i.e., the May Forecast, that both experts adopted.
The line that begins at the low point of the May Forecast,
representing December 2009, and extends to December 2013
with a very modest positive slope, reflects the projections
Gokhale used in his DCF model.110 The steeper dashed lines
leading to the 2009 LRP line show each of four recovery
scenarios Kursh considered. Ultimately, Kursh based his
valuation on the second of those lines, which roughly depicts
a return to the 2009 LRP OCF levels by December 2011.
Tabular or graphic material set at this point is not displayable.
The primary issue I must decide in this appraisal case,
therefore, is how quickly, if at all, the radio industry in
general, and CXR in particular, would have been expected to
recover to pre-recession expectations, i.e., to the 2009 LRP in
the case of CXR. Kursh, on the one hand, assumes a recovery
to the 2009 LRP within eighteen months.111 Gokhale, on the
other hand, assumes no “recovery” from the contraction the
radio industry experienced in 2008 and 2009. In Gokhale's
view, the combination of the secular decline that had been
plaguing the industry for several years and the 2008/2009
Recession had created a new baseline for the industry from
which CXR would have been expected to grow at a steady
rate.
The models Kursh and Gokhale use vary slightly in several
other ways as well. The two experts disagree on inputs such as
LTIP payments, debt, retained cushion, deferred taxes, capital
expenditures and depreciation, and the number of CXR shares
outstanding. I consider first how to project free cash flow and
I then consider the other inputs.
a. Economic recovery; a return to the LRP?
In the months leading up to the Merger, CXR management
believed that the Company would experience some
recovery from the recession.112 CXR believed that the
Company was “well positioned to benefit as the economy
begins to recover.”113 Audiences were growing.114 CXR
management's belief in a “recovery” and a “bright future,”
however, does not necessarily justify an inference that the
Company reasonably would have been expected to be able to
achieve the projections in the 2009 LRP.
*16  The radio industry had undergone, and continued in
early 2009 to experience, a secular decline.115 It had been
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experiencing a steady decline in revenue and stock price since
around 2004 based, in part, on new competition. Notably,
however, the secular concerns began as early as 2006.116
The 2009 LRP was prepared in October 2008 and approved
by the board in December 2008. Therefore, the 2009 LRP
already would have accounted for this secular decline in the
industry to some degree. But, the rapid decline in revenue and
OCF the industry experienced in the early months of 2009
was unanticipated: “the depth of the erosion in the 2008/2009
recession was unusually swift and severe.”117 The severity
of the decline had changed the landscape for CXR.118 By
May 2009, management had reduced its projected EBITDA
for 2009 by 41% compared to the 2009 LRP, and its OCF by
40%.119
In addition, Respondent provided some evidence that CXR's
long range plan was consistently over-optimistic as to the
out-years.120 Comparing, for example, management's LRP
projections in 2002 and 2003 regarding the out-years 2007
and 2008, respectively, the actual EBITDA for 2007 and 2008
was 35% and 43% lower than management had projected
it would be in the 2002 and 2003 LRPs.121 Reducing the
2013 EBITDA figure in Kursh's model of $124 million, which
equals the 2009 LRP projection, by 35% or 43% lowers that
figure to $80.6 and $70.68 million, respectively.122 These
numbers are generally in the same range as the 2013 EBITDA
numbers Gokhale used in his May Forecast DCF model
($76.12 million) and in his Third–Party DCF model ($84.17
million).
Considering the severe 2008/2009 Recession and economic
uncertainty in early 2009, I am wary of accepting Petitioners'
position that a valuation on May 29, 2009 would anticipate
a near-term return to even the 2009 LRP's 2011–2013
cash flow projections. In an appraisal case, this Court is
charged with the difficult task of putting itself back in
time to consider without the benefit of hindsight what the
company's fair value was in light of its “operative reality”
at the time of the merger.123 A valuation in early 2009
inevitably would account for a certain degree of uncertainty
about the future. Indeed, CXR's management's expectations
for the immediate future had plummeted.124 I give some
weight to these sobered expectations and, to a lesser extent,
to the hindsight observation that management's out-year
projections perennially tended to be optimistic. At the same
time, however, I am cognizant of the fact that the percipient
witnesses, e.g., Johnston and Odom, worked for Respondent
both at the time of the Merger and at the time of their
testimony and that their current memories of the relevant
period may be less probative than what CXR's management
actually stated in early 2009. At a minimum, I take with
a grain of salt the clarity with which Respondent's fact
witnesses now claim to have appreciated CXR's prospects in
early 2009. In any event, and notwithstanding the 2008/2009
Recession, Petitioners advanced three main reasons why,
based on all factors known or knowable at the time of the
Merger, a valuation as of May 29, 2009 should be premised
on an eventual return to the 2009 LRP projections. I consider
each argument in turn.
i. Plucking theory
*17  First, Kursh relied on Milton Friedman's “plucking
theory” for the proposition that a “large contraction in output
tends to be followed on the average by a large business
expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild expansion.”125
Based on this theory, Kursh assumes that the steep recession
the radio industry experienced in 2008 and 2009 would
be followed by a steep recovery. Kursh argues that, in
the previous ten business cycles, dating back to 1948, the
economy returned to pre-recessionary real gross domestic
product (“GDP”) levels during the first three quarters of their
recovery, with the two longest recessions of sixteen months
obtaining pre-recessionary real GDP levels in less than three
and two quarters, respectively.126
Kursh conceded, however, that a recession coupled with a
financial crisis, like the 2008/2009 Recession, would show a
sluggish recovery.127 Moreover, the plucking theory relates
to recessions and recoveries in terms of a nation's GDP. Kursh
relies on a correlation between real GDP and advertising
revenue in the radio industry to support his assumption that
the radio industry and CXR, like the economy in general,
would experience a steep recovery, and, thus, would return
to the 2009 LRP. Kursh, however, failed to prove that
a correlation between GDP and radio advertising revenue
exists. He did not address this correlation in his expert or
rebuttal reports. Moreover, Gokhale testified to the contrary.
Gokhale asserted that in the 1990s and early 2000s there
was some correlation between GDP growth and advertising
growth, but that the correlation had broken down by about
2001.128
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In response to Gokhale's criticism, Kursh presented two
articles at trial to support the alleged correlation: an
article from the Journal of Marketing Research which
studied advertising expenditures in business cycles129 and
a document from the White House website, apparently
drafted by the Obama administration's Council of Economic
Advisers.130 Kursh asserts that the Journal of Marketing
Research article indicates that for every 1 % of GDP growth,
radio advertising revenues will grow by 1.69%.131 H e
then used an equation from the White House document
to conclude, based on a 4.69% decline in real GDP from
2007 to 2009,132 that it would have been reasonable in May
2009 to expect 17% growth in nominal GDP in the two
years following the recession.133 From this projected growth
in nominal GDP, Kursh calculated that radio advertising
revenues would have been expected to grow 28.7% by 2011.
Applying this growth rate to the May Forecast's 2009 revenue
projections, Kursh asserts that he would have expected CXR
to have 2011 revenue of $434 million. The 2009 LRP
projected CXR's 2011 revenue of $425.9 million. Thus,
according to Kursh, these articles support his conclusion that
one calculating the fair value of CXR shares in May 2009
should have expected CXR's financial situation to recover to
the 2009 LRP projections by the end of 2011.
*18  There are several problems with Kursh's presentation.
First, the cited White House document does not provide
clear support for a growth rate of 17% in nominal GDP
and there is no additional support for such a growth rate in
the record. The White House document itself projects GDP
growth rates around 2%, significantly less than the rate Kursh
purports to derive from a regression formula presented in that
document.134 Second, Petitioners failed to prove a correlation
existed between GDP growth and advertising revenue growth
as of May 2009. Indeed, one document that Kursh relied
on in his rebuttal report states that “[i]n recent years, the
relationship between advertising growth and GDP has broken
down.”135
Furthermore, Kursh did not reference the Journal of
Marketing Research or White House articles, the underlying
data, or the analysis he proffered at trial in his expert or
rebuttal report. These belatedly introduced documents do
not constitute credible evidence for the propositions for
which Kursh uses them. Although Kursh identified these
sources after completing his expert and rebuttal reports,
he attempted to use them to demonstrate an important
assumption underlying the valuation reflected in his reports.
As previously noted, the documents themselves do not clearly
support the steep growth rates that Kursh advocates. Thus,
even if I accepted the plucking theory, i.e., that real GDP
would be expected to return to pre-recessionary levels in three
quarters, Petitioners have not shown that radio advertising
revenues would grow apace with GDP, let alone at a rate
of 1.69% for every 1% of GDP growth.136 Therefore, I am
not persuaded by Petitioners' plucking theory argument. That
is, I consider it unlikely that in May 2009, a 17% nominal
GDP growth rate would have been expected for 2009 and
that this projected GDP growth rate would have supported a
reasonable belief that CXR's advertising revenues would have
grown nearly 29% between 2009 and the end of 2011 to put
CXR back on track thereafter to achieve the revenue and cash
flow projections for the remaining out-years in the 2009 LRP.
ii. Management's emails
Petitioners' second argument in support of a return to the 2009
LRP projections is that CXR's management continued in early
2009 to believe in the validity of the 2009 LRP as evidenced
by their dissemination of that LRP to auditors, lenders,
appraisers, and controlling stockholders in the normal course
of business. According to Petitioners, this demonstrates
management's belief that these projections remained accurate.
For this assertion, Petitioners rely on three emails sent by
CXR management. The first is from Odom to new CMG
employee Grace Huang;137 the second is from Odom to Harry
Bond, a representative of the Special Committee's financial
advisor Gleacher;138 and the third is from Tilson to Kimberly
Smith, an auditor at Deloitte.139
*19  In the first email, Odom sent the 2009 LRP and
two other documents to CMG's new employee Huang on
January 8, 2009 to give her a strategic overview of the
Company. Notably, the 2009 Budget Meeting PowerPoint,
which discussed the 2009 LRP, was created in October 2008
as an update to the 2009 budget. The other two documents
appear to have been prepared in November 2008. Odom sent
the January 8, 2009 email to Huang before management had
performed its first reforecast for 2009 on January 27, 2009.
According to Petitioners, at least, Huang was CMG's new
senior director of corporate strategy.140 Nevertheless, both
the timing of this email and its purpose, i.e., providing a new
employee a high-level overview of the Company's strategy,
undermine its probative value as evidence of management's
beliefs about CXR's expected financial performance around
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May 29, 2009. At most, Odom's email demonstrates that
management believed in early January 2009 that its opinions
regarding the budget and strategic plan at the end of 2008
still provided a viable basis for communicating “a good
strategic overview of the company” to a new CXR insider. It
provides scant support for an inference that in May 2009, after
management had adjusted the 2009 LRP's projected OCF
downward by 40%, CXR's management expected to recover
to the 2009 LRP levels in the near future.
Odom's March 26, 2009 email to Gleacher representative
Bond likewise gives no indication that, by attaching the 2009
LRP, Odom was advocating its continued applicability. The
2009 LRP was one of nine documents attached to the email.
Odom stated that he would send several more emails to
Bond, presumably with additional attachments. In the Special
Committee's review of CXR's intrinsic value, it is hardly
surprising that the Committee and its investment banker
would request the 2009 LRP. Ultimately, however, the Special
Committee concluded that the 2009 LRP was “no longer
reflective of [CXR]'s current intrinsic value.”141
According to CXR's April 3, 2009 Schedule 14D–9, shortly
after Odom's email to Bond, on March 31, 2009, the Special
Committee, its outside counsel, and Gleacher met with Odom
and Neil and received “an update on the company's current
results of operations as well as an overview of management's
assumptions and qualifications underlying the projections
that management provided to Gleacher.”142 Thereafter, the
Committee concluded that “the decline in the Company's
value is not temporary and, as a consequence, the historical
valuations of the Company are no longer reflective of
its current intrinsic value.”143 In reaching this conclusion,
the Special Committee noted that management prepared a
forecast in February 2009 that reflected estimated 2009
EBITDA of 48% and 55% less than actual EBITDA in 2008
and 2007, respectively.144
Odom credibly testified that he thought the Special
Committee's conclusions were appropriate.145 Management's
communications with the Special Committee and Gleacher
in April and May 2009, therefore, comport with the
position they now take, i.e., that by early 2009 the 2009
LRP no longer represented CXR's future prospects. Based
on the contemporaneous evidence that management had
communicated its decision not to rely on the 2009 LRP to the
Special Committee and the Committee's financial advisor, I
do not consider Odom's failure expressly to disclaim the 2009
LRP in his email to Bond to suggest that Cox management
expected that CXR would return to the 2009 LRP.
The last email, an April 28, 2009 email from Tilson to Smith,
contained no subject line and had no content. Consequently,
Petitioners and this Court can only speculate as to why Tilson
emailed the 2009 LRP to this Deloitte auditor in April 2009.
Without more, the email does not indicate that management
was advocating the accuracy of the 2009 LRP in April 2009.
The emails to Huang, Bond, and Smith, therefore, do not
demonstrate that management believed that the Company
would recover to the 2009 LRP projections.
iii. The Tilson Memo
*20  Lastly, Kursh relies on the Tilson Memo in his
expert report to conclude that “Radio management believed
that the 2009 LRP remained a reliable basis by which
to value the Company as of March 31, 2009.”146 I am
not convinced, however, that the opinion expressed in the
Tilson Memo means that management believed the 2009
LRP provided a reliable basis for valuing the Company as
of May 2009. Indeed, around this time, management was
reforecasting 2009 with revenues dropping by 17% and
EBITDA projections dropping by 41 % compared to the 2009
LRP.147 Management's significantly lower projections in the
May Forecast severely undermine the continued viability of
the 2009 LRP, a point Kursh ignores in his expert and rebuttal
reports.148
Furthermore, the Tilson Memo addressed FAS 142 valuation.
Odom credibly explained the context of the statements made
in the Tilson Memo. In addition, Odom testified that the
reference to “management's projections at December 31,
2008” referred to Bond & Pecaro's projections.149 Although
Bond & Pecaro had access to the 2009 LRP, it produced
its own projections for purposes of the FAS 142 valuation.
Bond & Pecaro's projections were, in fact, notably lower
than the 2009 LRP projections in every market cluster except
one.150 In addition, Odom explained that although the FAS
142 valuation was done “as of December 31, 2008,” the
valuation was not finalized until February 2009, long after the
2009 LRP was created and after CXR had begun to experience
dramatic decreases in revenues in early 2009. Thus, although
the Tilson Memo states that the “deteriorating environment
currently impacting [CXR]'s stock price and market cap are
taken into account in management's projections at December
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31, 2008,” it is likely that the Bond & Pecaro projections
also accounted for the deteriorating environment in January
2009.151
In sum, Petitioners have proven that a recovery was expected
for the industry and that management believed that CXR had
a bright future.152 Even considering management's expressed
optimism, however, I do not consider it reasonable to base
a determination of the fair value of C R as of May 29,
2009 on the assumption that the Company would recover
in the near term to levels reflected in the out-years of the
2009 LRP, which Respondent persuasively has demonstrated
no longer was reliable.153 Rather, the record indicates
that projections based on the depressed environment that
management recognized in the May Forecast for 2009 and
a modest recovery after that, rather than what was reflected
in the five-year 2009 LRP projections, would represent best
CXR's operative reality and perceived prospects.
*21  Thus, the May Forecast provides an appropriate starting
point for projecting CXR's operating free cash flows after
December 2009. I find that, in the circumstances of this case,
a valuation of CXR should include some recognition of a
limited cyclical recovery from the deep low CXR experienced
in early 2009 and that was reflected in the May Forecast. In
this regard, Gokhale's approach provides a more appropriate
starting point. Kursh's approach, which predicts a return to
the 2009 LRP by the end of 2011, is too optimistic and is not
supported by the record. Therefore, I begin with Gokhale's
model as a general framework.154 I consider next Gokhale's
projected recovery scenarios.
b. Gokhale's cash flow projections
As noted previously, Gokhale used two sets of projections.
The first set of projections incorporated the May Forecast for
2009 EBITDA and then estimated 2010–2013 using the actual
EBITDA CAGR that CXR experienced in the four years
following the 2000/2001 recession.155 Gokhale's second set
of projections uses consensus analyst EBITDA estimates for
2009 and 2010 and estimates for 2011–2013 based on the
annual EBITDA CAGR that CXR experienced in the three
years following the 2000/2001 recession.
The number of analysts following the radio industry in early
2009 was approximately three to six.156 With such a low
number of analysts, the accuracy of the analysts' forecasts
is questionable.157 Furthermore, I already have determined
that the May Forecast for 2009 reflects management's best
projections at the time of the Merger and should be used as
a starting point for the DCF analysis.158 Therefore, I adopt
Gokhale's May Forecast DCF as a starting framework.159
*22  Before turning to Gokhale's May Forecast DCF, I
note that Kursh and Petitioners criticized Gokhale's model in
several respects. I carefully considered Petitioners' criticisms
and will address two of them here. First, in his growth rate
calculations, Gokhale evaluates 2001 on an annual basis
rather than a quarterly basis. Kursh asserts that by doing
so, Gokhale understated the recessionary impact because the
2000/2001 recession occurred during only the middle eight
months of 2001. In the other four months, CXR experienced
two months of a “normal” expansionary economy and two
months of a “high-growth” economy in recovery.160 Kursh
did not identify, however, what adjustments, if any, he would
make to Gokhale's growth rates to address his criticism.
Additionally, Gokhale responded to Kursh's criticism at trial:
“It wasn't clear what Dr. Kursh was suggesting [ ] to do with
that information, we tested what happens if you tried some of
the data he had in his table, and it didn't seem to affect my
conclusions.”161 Thus, I reject Kursh's objection to the way
in which Gokhale evaluated the 2001 results.
Second, Petitioners criticize Gokhale for not including a
revenue line in his DCF analyses. Gokhale focused instead
on operating free cash flow. Gokhale asserts that he used
the same “bottom up” approach that CXR's management
used.162 In challenging that approach, Petitioners cited
a reputable valuation treatise by Bradford Cornell.163
Specifically, Petitioners note that, in item “1” of his “Cash
Flow Forecasting Checklist,” Cornell states: “1. The sales
forecast is generally the most critical element of a cash flow
forecast.”164 Cornell goes on to explain that:
Wherever possible, historical data, either for the firm or its
industry, should be examined to assess the reasonableness
of the sales forecasts—which leads to the second point on
the checklist.
2. The sales forecast should be consistent with the firm’s
historical performance and the historical performance of
the industry. While it is always possible that a company
will develop in unexpected ways, so that the future does not
resemble the past, this is not the best way to bet. Appraisals
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based on forecasts that depart markedly from historical
patterns are suspicious165
Although a sales forecast “generally” may be the most
important element in a cash flow forecast, Gokhale's
approach appears reasonable in this case. His model is
based on management's full projections, which included
their sales forecasts. Consistent with management's own
bottom up approach, Gokhale's model begins with OCF from
management's projections and grows them at a rate that
is based on CXR's historical performance. Thus, although
Gokhale's approach may not be warranted in every case, I find
it to be supported adequately by his credible explanations and
by the valuation literature.
Turning now to Gokhale's DCF, the May Forecast DCF begins
with the 2009 OCF projections from the May Forecast and
grows them at a rate of 4.6% each year until 2013. This growth
rate finds support in the record. For example, in the 2009
LRP, management had projected OCF values for 2010–2013
with annual growth rates ranging from 3.4% to 4.1%, and it
projected EBITDA for 2010–2013 with annual growth rates
ranging from 1.4% to 2.7%.166 In addition, the J.P. Morgan
report that both parties relied on projected a 2010 EBITDA
growth rate for CXR of 5.1%.167 Gokhale's steady growth
rate, however, does not factor in any significant recovery
from the depths of the recession which caused management
to adjust its 2009 EBITDA down by 41%.
*23  After the 2000/2001 recession, CXR's OCF grew by
9.28% in 2002, 0.44% in 2003, 5.18% in 2004, and 4.06% in
2005.168 That recession was mild compared to the recession
that affected CXR in 2009.169 Implicit in Gokhale's use
of a steady growth rate of 4.6% for the years 2010–2013
is his apparent assumption that there would be virtually
no cyclical aspect of the recovery commensurate with the
depth or severity of the 2008/2009 Recession compared to
the 2000/2001 recession. He justified this approach largely
based on alleged secular challenges facing CXR and the radio
industry. The evidence supports Respondent's position that
secular concerns existed in the radio industry in May 2009
and that those concerns, among other things, would have
tempered any projected recovery. The record also suggests,
however, that the 2008/2009 Recession was attributable to
cyclical factors or to matters affecting the economy generally,
such as the financial crisis. Relying on the plucking theory,
Petitioners' expert opined that the rebound in CXR's EBITDA
in 2010 would have reflected an increase of 37.6%. I believe
that is too high, but find that some increase in the degree of
projected initial recovery is appropriate. Thus, I conclude that
an appropriate recovery in this case would include a growth
rate comparable to the rate of growth CXR experienced in the
first year after the 2000/2001 recession with growth thereafter
returning to the steady rate of 4.6% that Gokhale projected.
Gokhale identified the recovery CX R experienced after the
2000/2001 recession as an appropriate point of comparison
to evaluate what CXR's expected recovery would be after
the 2008/2009 Recession. Even in the milder 2000/2001
recession, CXR's OCF grew in 2002, the first year coming
out of the recession, by approximately double the rate at
which it grew in the following years when it returned to a
lower somewhat steady rate of growth. Consistent with what
occurred in 2002, I find that some bump in growth would
have been expected in 2010, the first year coming out of the
2008/2009 Recession. The growth rate in 2002 was 9.28%.
This rate is significantly higher than the growth rates in 2003
(0.44%), 2004 (5.18%), and 2005 (4.06%). I recognize that
the 9.28% rate already is factored into Gokhale's CAGR of
4.6% and that that rate would be lower without the first year's
9.28% growth rate. Nevertheless, I find that it is reasonable
to expect that the 4.6% steady growth rate that Gokhale used
would follow some uptick in 2010 to account for the cyclical
aspect of the 2008/2009 Recession.170 Thus, although it may
be an imperfect model,171 I conclude that adopting a 2010
OCF growth rate of 9.28% followed by 4.6% growth in years
2011–2013 appropriately accounts for CXR management's
optimism and the expectations of population growth in its key
markets without resorting to the 2010 growth rate of 37.6%
and the 2011 growth rate of 27.3% that Kursh advanced and
that I find to be unsupportable.172
Gokhale's 4.6% growth rate is higher than the annual growth
rates projected in the 2009 LRP. Thus, a 9.28% rebound
in 2010 followed by steady growth at that rate comports
with some degree of optimism about CXR's future, while
remaining generally conservative. In addition, I make no
adjustments to projected expenses in 2010 related to the
higher growth rate because CXR's projected expenses were
fairly stable due to its relatively high fixed cost base.173 Thus,
any decrease to OCF from a proportional increase in expenses
would be minimal. Based on the complete record, I find these
assumptions to be appropriate and, thus, I adopt the growth
rates indicated.
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c. Other DCF analysis inputs
i. LTIP
*24  Kursh assumes no LTIP payments in 2009–2013
and a $4 million payment in the terminal period.174 The
2009 LRP that Kursh relies on, however, includes LTIP
expenses of approximately $50 million between 2009 and
2013. Management's May Forecast also includes a 2009 LTIP
expense of $3.604 million.175 Kursh explained that he did
not expect CXR to incur any cash expenditure under the
LTIP plan because “[a]ctual LTIP payments over the 2009
LRP period, however, are zero; all grants though 2007 are
projected to be ‘under water.’ ”176 Gokhale, on the other hand,
started with the LTIP payments projected in the LRP and
proportionally scaled them down based on the lower EBITDA
that he projected.177
The record supports Gokhale's approach. Kursh did not
explain sufficiently why he would not expect management
to be compensated with LTIP payments when his models
projected strong performance, e.g., a 2009–2013 EBITDA
CAGR of 16.5%. In contrast, Gokhale began with
management projections and accounted for his projected
decrease in revenue and EBITDA by decreasing LTIP
payments proportionally. In addition, Gokhale's assumptions
better align with management's projections for 2009. For
these reasons, I adopt Gokhale's projected LTIP payments.
ii. Debt
Kursh uses a net debt figure of $380.1 million, which
Petitioners assert was CXR's net debt on the date of the
Merger.178 Gokhale used a slightly higher debt figure of
$385.6 million, but the source of Gokhale's figure is not clear.
He relied either on the Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Index
or on an internal CXR financial document as of April 30,
2009.179 I also note that Gokhale did not criticize Kursh's use
of $380.1 million. Therefore, I have used $380.1 million as
the amount of CXR's net debt on the date of the Merger.
iii. Retained cushion and deferred taxes
In Kursh's report, he suggests two items of potential additional
value: retained cushion and deferred taxes. But, Kursh did
not adjust his DCF model to demonstrate any changes he
advocates based on these two items.180 Instead, he provides a
number that he opines should be added to the per-share value
derived from his DCF calculation. As for the retained cushion,
Kursh relies on a statement by Odom that management
decreased revenues by $2 million and increased expenses by
$2 million each year to manage CEI's expectations. Kursh
argues that this $4 million dollar figure should be added to
a final fair value calculation. At Kursh's suggested discount
rate of 8.1%, the retained cushion represents additional value
of $0.62 per share.
The evidence Petitioners present, however, does not provide
clear support for adding back their suggested $0.62 per
share of retained cushion. Kursh relies on Odom's deposition
testimony in which Odom states that “on occasion we would
either soften the revenues or add additional expenses in
our consolidation to lower the expectation that we would
communicate to [CEI].”181 Odom explained that the purpose
of this adjustment was because the numbers they received
“from the field ... tended to be overly optimistic.”182 Based
on this testimony, I am not persuaded that the May Forecast
OCF is low by $4 million dollars and that, consequently, it
would be appropriate to add $0.62 per share to a fair value
calculation of CXR stock. That is, Petitioners have not met
their burden of proof on this point. I therefore have not added
any value to the final fair value calculation based on the so-
called retained cushion.
*25  As to the second item, deferred taxes, the add-back
suggested by Kursh for 2009– 2024 is $0.45 per share
assuming an 8.1 % discount rate. Kursh relies on documents
drafted by Gleacher in late March and early April 2009 to
explain this adjustment.183 One of the documents shows
declining deferred taxes from 2014 to 2018 with a net deferred
tax amount of $13.5 million in 2014, $6.9 in 2015, $0.1 in
2016, $0.0 in 2017, and ($0.2) in 2018.184 Kursh admits that
Odom could not explain the offsets that were not CXR's work
product.185 Kursh also stated that the worksheets he relied
on were created later than the 2009 LRP but had “nothing
to do with the LRP other than the deferred tax issue.”186 In
addition, Kursh did not discuss the context of the Gleacher
documents or explain why it would be appropriate to use them
instead of management's projections in his DCF analysis.
Indeed, Kursh admitted that he was “less firm” on the item
of omitted deferred taxes because his valuation was based on
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the 2009 LRP and this change would be a modification to the
LRP.187
Having considered the relevant evidence and arguments
of the parties, I am not convinced by Kursh's report and
testimony that the deferred tax figures Gleacher projected
in its documents support making any change to the deferred
taxes projected by CXR management in the 2009 LRP. Hence,
Petitioners have not proven that $0.45 per share should be
added to the fair value of CXR based on omitted deferred
taxes.
iv. Capital expenditures and depreciation
Gokhale used depreciation figures from the 2009 LRP and
set capital expenditures equal to depreciation.188 Kursh made
the assumption that depreciation would be higher than capital
expenditures into perpetuity. Kursh acknowledged that this
approach was problematic.189 He stated, however, that the
problem did not affect his valuation because the effect this
assumption had on his projected share price was offset by
the value of a tax benefit that he did not include in his
DCF.190 Both parties, therefore, reasonably accounted for
capital expenditure and depreciation projections. Because I
have adopted Gokhale's model as a general framework, I
adopt his treatment of capital expenditures and depreciation,
as well.
v. Number of shares outstanding
Petitioners assert that CXR had 79.1 million shares
outstanding on the date of the Merger, and Kursh used this
number in reaching his conclusion on fair value. The basis
for the Petitioners' number, however, is not clear. According
to Gokhale, CXR had 79.5 million shares outstanding on the
date of the Merger.191 In addition, CXR's 14D–9, dated April
3, 2009, states that CXR had 79.5 million shares outstanding
as of that date. Based on this evidence, I find that the actual
number of shares of CXR stock outstanding as of the Merger
date was 79.5 million.
Gokhale added 4.5% to this number to account for the
dilution that would occur because of shares awarded under the
LTIP.192 Thus, he used 83.07 million as the number of shares
outstanding. Kursh objected to this dilution, arguing that it
was inconsistent with Gokhale's valuation and that it was
inappropriate to divide CXR's value as of May 29, 2009 by the
number of shares that might be outstanding at some undefined
date in the future.193 Indeed, neither Gokhale nor Respondent
explained why it would be appropriate to adjust the value
of CXR shares as of May 29, 2009 based on a potential
future share dilution. Petitioners also highlight that Gokhale's
approach is too speculative “given the LTIP's opacity and the
extremely vague deposition testimony about how it worked
in practice.”194 I find, therefore, that Respondent has not
demonstrated that a deviation from the actual number of
shares outstanding on the Merger date is appropriate here.
Therefore, I will use the figure of 79.5 million shares to value
CXR's stock.195
2. Terminal value
*26  In calculating terminal value, the parties dispute the
appropriate terminal, or perpetuity, growth rate. Kursh opined
that a terminal growth rate of between 2% and 3% would
be appropriate. He used a 2.5% rate in his DCF analysis.
Gokhale chose a perpetuity growth rate of 1.25%. Both
experts expected inflation of around 2–2.5%.1196 “[T]he rate
of inflation is the floor for a terminal value estimate for a
solidly profitable company that does not have an identifiable
risk of insolvency.”197
Respondent argues that the perpetuity growth rate for CX
R should be less than inflation because CXR “was not
a mature, stable company.”198 This argument is without
merit.199 The evidence shows that CXR faced certain secular
challenges around 2009, but there is no evidence that it faced
an identifiable risk of insolvency. Even Respondent's expert
projected a stable future for the Company. Additionally,
to support his proposed growth rate of 1.25%, Gokhale
cites industry analysts and financial advisors who projected
perpetuity growth rates between negative 1% and positive
2%, either for the radio industry in general or, in two of
Gokhale's three sources, in valuing CXR's equity specifically.
Notably, however, two of the three sources Gokhale cites
applied perpetuity growth rates around the expected rate of
inflation of 2%.200
Kursh asserts that his rate of 2.5% is conservative based on
an inflation rate of 2%, an assumed long-term growth rate of
1.7%, and productivity of about 1%.201 According to Kursh,
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these inputs support a “generally regarded” historical growth
rate of 4%–6%.202 Kursh also observed that Bond & Pecaro's
2008 enterprise valuation applied a 2.5% OCF growth rate
from 2014 through 2018.203 Gokhale counters, however, that
Bond & Pecaro used long-term growth rates that ranged from
1.0% to 2.5%, and did not simply apply a 2.5% growth
rate as Kursh suggested.204 In addition, Gokhale asserts that
Kursh's rate is unsupportable and is based on a finding that for
every one percent of revenue growth, CXR's free cash flow
will grow by two percent into perpetuity, an assumption that
Gokhale argues is unreasonable.205 Kursh responds that his
assumption stems, in part, from CXR's operating leverage,
stating that “if revenues simply kept up with inflation, the
fall to the bottom line would be a little bit higher because of
operating leverage, the fall of the free cash flow.”206 A more
reasonable assumption, according to Gokhale, is that free cash
flow would grow at the same rate as revenue indicating that
CXR is stable and maintaining its margins into perpetuity.207
In this regard, Gokhale notes that Kursh's implied expected
revenue growth rate of 1 % to 1.5% is in line with the
perpetuity growth rate of 1.25% that Gokhale applies.208
*27  As noted, the rate of inflation generally is the “floor for a
terminal value.”209 “Generally, once an industry has matured,
a company will grow at a steady rate that is roughly equal to
the rate of nominal GDP growth.”210 Some experts maintain
that “the terminal growth rate should never be higher than
the expected long-term nominal growth rate of the general
economy, which includes both inflation and real growth.”211
Moreover, both experts in this case acknowledged that the
expected long-term inflation rate in 2009 was 2%–2.5%.
There also was some evidence that the expected rate of real
GDP growth was between 2.5% and 2.7%, but this evidence
was not particularly reliable.212 I find that the radio industry
is a mature industry and that CXR was a solidly profitable
company. Thus, a long-term growth rate at least equal to
expected inflation is appropriate here.
The question remains whether the growth rate should
exceed the rate of inflation to some extent. In that regard,
like Respondent, I question the reasonableness of Kursh's
apparent assumption that free cash flow will grow at double
the rate of CXR's revenues forever. Indeed, the radio industry
was experiencing increased competition and fragmentation
in 2009. Thus, I am not willing to use Kursh's 2.5% rate.
Petitioners have demonstrated, however, that, because of
CXR's operating leverage, an increase in revenue would lead
to a slightly higher increase in OCF. In addition, I note that the
increase in the 2010 growth rate from 4.6% to 9.28% leads to
about a 1 % increase in OCF margins using the assumptions
in the demonstrative Petitioners' presented during Gokhale's
cross examination.213
Having carefully considered the parties' competing positions,
I find that it is reasonable to apply a terminal growth rate
of 2.25%, which may be slightly higher than the inflation
rate.214 This number comports with the experts' inflation
expectations and the weight of the other relevant evidence in
the record. I therefore adopt a 2.25% perpetuity growth rate.
3. Discount rate
Petitioners and Respondent virtually agree on the appropriate
discount rate, using rates of 8.1 % and 8.0%, respectively.
This variance of 0.1 % is relatively minor. Because I have
used Gokhale's analyses as a general frame of reference
and because the lower discount rate used by Gokhale favors
Petitioners, I find Respondent's discount rate of 8.0% to be
reliable and I adopt it here.
B. Statutory Interest
Kursh calculated prejudgment interest at the legal rate
compounded quarterly, assuming a placeholder award date
of December 31, 2012. Respondent does not oppose Kursh's
method of calculating the interest due. Therefore, interest is
awarded at the legal rate compounded quarterly.215 Kursh's
calculation should be updated to the date of the final judgment
entered pursuant to this Memorandum Opinion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, I adopt
Gokhale's May Forecast DCF analysis as a general framework
for determining the fair value of CXR. I further find that the
following changes should be made to his calculations: (1)
the number of outstanding shares should equal the number of
shares of CXR stock outstanding on the Merger date, i.e., 79.5
million; (2) CXR's debt should be equal to $380.05 million;
(3) the perpetuity growth rate should be 2.25%; and (4) the
growth rate for OCF should be 9.28% in 2010 and 4.6% in
2011–2013. With these adjustments, the Court determines that
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Petitioners are entitled to receive $5.75 per share of CXR
stock, plus interest as stated above from May 29, 2009 to the
date of judgment. Counsel shall work cooperatively to prepare
and file promptly a proposed form of final judgment.
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59 JX 596 at 45409.
60 Id.
61 Tr. 592 (Odom).
62 JX 596 at 45409.
63 Id. at 45426
64 Id. at 45409.
65 JX 152.
66 See JX 417; Tr. 638–39, 602 (Odom). There were several iterations of the 2009 LRP.
67 JX 90 (ellipses in original).
68 JX 95 (emphasis added).
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69 In re Cox Radio S'holder Litig., WL 1806616 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2010), aff'd, 9 A.3d 475, 2010 WL 4721568 (Del.2010)
(ORDER). The Tilson Memo was not produced in the limited discovery that took place related to the settlement but was
produced in discovery during this appraisal action.
70 See Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc., C.A. No. 4809–VCP (Nov. 7, 2012) (TRANSCRIPT), Docket Item Number 88.
71 Tr. 536 (Odom).
72 Id.
73 See JX 95; Tr. 530 (Odom); JX 393 ¶ 6.
74 Tr. 539 (Odom explained “that the business conditions we were seeing in the first quarter, or in January, even, were
discussed with Bond & Pecaro” and that those conditions “were considered in [Bond & Pecaro's] 12/31/08 valuation”).
75 Id.
76 Tr. 535 (Odom). The Tilson Memo contained the heading: “To: File[;] From: Lauren Tilson[;] RE: Impairment Testing
Under FAS 142.” JX 95.
77 Tr. 541
78 See JX 214 at 3–4.
79 Tr. 540 (Odom).
80 JX 214 at 3 (emphasis added).
81 JX 480, Kursh Rep., at 11.
82 Tr. 258.
83 JX 385 at 30.
84 JX 214 at 3.
85 See JX 480; JX 482.
86 See JX 481 at 7 (“[T]he radio business typically run[s] at 35% to 45% operating margins.”). Petitioners assert that the 2009
LRP projected CXR OCF margins around 30% and EBITDA margins around 27%–28%. Tr. 729 (Gokhale) (discussing
Petitioners' calculations on cross examination).
87 JX 480 Ex. G.
88 The only difference between operating cash flow and EBITDA in CXR's financial projections is that the OCF projections are
slightly higher because they include the cost of the Company's noncash long-term incentive plan (“LTIP”). Tr. 497 (Odom);
see also Tr. 325–26 (Johnston). At trial, Gokhale used the terms EBITDA and operating cash flow interchangeably. His
DCF analysis applies historical EBITDA growth rates to project future operating cash flows. Gokhale explained that his
EBITDA numbers grew at a lower rate than his OCF numbers because he assumed LTIP payments would grow from
2009–2014. Tr. 730. Petitioners do not challenge specifically the reasonableness of Gokhale's application of historical
EBITDA growth rates, rather than OCF growth rates, to project future operating cash flows. Furthermore, the difference in
the two sets of numbers is relatively minor. Therefore, Gokhale's use of EBITDA growth rates appears to be appropriate.
See  Tr. 403 (Johnston) (“[E]ssentially, the terms operating cash flow and EBITDA are synonymous.”).
89 In his Third–Party DCF, Gokhale averaged only the first three years coming out of the 2000/2001 recession to calculate
the CAGR he used. As a result, Gokhale used a higher CAGR of 5.3% in the Third–Party DCF compared to the 4.6%
he used in the May Forecast DCF. See Tr. 668–69.
90 Tr. 659.
91 Tr. 37–38 (Cheen); Tr. 650–51 (Gokhale).
92 Del. C. § 262. There is no dispute that Petitioners are entitled to an appraisal under Section 262.
93 Id. § 262(h); see also Tri–Cont'l Corp. v. Battye,  74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del.1950) (“[M]arket value, asset value, dividends,
earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as
of the date of merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing the value.”).
94 Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, A.3d 214, 217 (Del.2010).
95 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., A.2d 289, 299 (Del.1996).
96 Golden Telecom, Inc., A.3d at 217.
97 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983); see also Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 299.
98 Rapid–American Corp. v. Harris, A.2d 796, 805 (Del.1992).
99 M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. LeBeau, A.2d 513, 520 (Del.1999).
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100 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., A.2d 357, 362 (Del.1997); Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Gp.,  2003 WL
21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003).
101 Weinberger, A.2d at 713.
102 See Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., WL 2271592, at *8 (Oct. 4, 2004); see also Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq.
Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (utilizing the DCF approach); Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc.,
2003 WL 1240504, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2003) (utilizing the comparable transactions approach); Borruso v. Commc'ns
Telesystems Int'l,  753 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. Ch.1999) (utilizing the comparable company approach).
103 Gokhale used a comparable companies analysis as a reasonableness check on the value he obtained through his DCF
analysis. He concluded, however, that “the comparable companies valuation is of limited use in determining the value
of CXR's Class A shares.” JX 392 at 12. Kursh concluded that neither a comparable companies nor a comparable
transactions approach would be reliable and, therefore, did not attempt either approach. JX 480 at 5.
104 See JX 392 at 10–12 (Gokhale: “[T]he EV/EBITDA multiples used in the [comparable companies] calculation above are
overstated because they are based on the book value of debt, and using these multiples would overstate the value of
CXR's shares.”); JX 480 at 5–8 (Kursh: “[Comparable publicly traded companies and transactions methods] observe and
apply market multiples, and their reliability hinges upon the ability to accurately estimate both the numerators (equity and
market values) and denominators (recurring earnings) of the multiples. [T]he industry focus and timing of this valuation
present challenges to such accuracy.”); see also Tr. 670–75 (Gokhale).
105 JX 480 at 8.
106 See M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, A.2d 513, 523 (Del.1999) (“The discounted cash flow methodology has been relied
upon frequently by parties and the Court of Chancery in other statutory appraisal proceedings.”); Ryan v. Tad's Enters.,
Inc.,  709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch.1996) (“The discounted cash flow valuation model is well-established and accepted in
the financial community.”), aff'd,  693 A.2d 1082 (Del.1997) (ORDER).
107 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2004).
108 Id. (citing Gilbert v. MPM Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 669 (Del. Ch.1997)).
109 Id.
110 Although the slopes from the 2009 LRP and Gokhale's projections after 2009 appear to be the same in this somewhat
simplified graph, they are, in fact, slightly different. Gokhale's projections reflect a CAGR of 4.6%, while the OCF growth
rates for 2010–2013 in the 2009 LRP ranged from 3.4% to 4.1 %.
111 Kursh reasons that expecting a recovery within eighteen months is reasonable because the recession lasted
approximately eighteen months. Tr. 220 (Kursh). He thus selected a return to the LRP in 2011 because 2011 would be
the first full year of recovery after the recession ended in mid–2009 plus eighteen months. Id.
112 JX 95 (“[CXR] also believes that future years' growth is attainable due to recovery in the industry.”).
113 See JX 171 at 34.
114 JX 481 at 6 (“One of the positive indicators sustaining the belief that radio ad revenue would recover was the measurement
of audience, which continued to grow.”); JX 398, Entercom Communications Corp. Reports Fourth Quarter and 2008
Annual Results, at 1 (CXR competitor Entercom Communications Corp.'s CEO stating “[a]t a time of unprecedented
change in media usage that is severely impairing a number of other media, radio posted an all-time record number of
listeners in 2008 and remains the most cost-effective major advertising medium in the nation”).
115 See JX 394 at 2; JX 392 at 3 (Gokhale observing in his expert report that “[i]n the two years prior to [CEI's] tender offer for
CXR's Class A shares, the economic fortunes and public market valuations of radio stations (and companies that owned
such stations) had been in steady decline”); Tr. 649 (Gokhale).
116 See JX 394 at 2; Tr. 37 (Cheen) (stating that the secular decline may have started as early as 2006).
117 JX 481 at 7.
118 JX 480 at 10 (“Standard [CXR] business practice provided for monthly forecasting of current year results, but this process
appeared to receive special attention in January 2009.”(emphasis added)); Tr. 501 (Odom) (“One thing [I did upon
recognizing that revenues were evaporating] is that I advocated that the company do a full and complete reforecast in
January. That would have been something a bit unusual for us because....”).
119 JX 212 at 6692.
120 Tr. 689 (Gokhale); Tr. 626 (Odom) (stating that he never communicated to CMG, outside auditors, or the Special
Committee that the LRP's projections for the out-years were consistently overly optimistic but that those circumstances
were “just factual”).
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121 LRP projections for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 showed similar trends. See Tr. 304 (Johnston) (stating that
“each year, as we got closer, our estimates got better,” but that in each succeeding year between 2002 and 2008, CX R
management lowered its out-year estimates but still missed its projected results).
122 Tr. 689 (Gokhale).
123 See Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., WL 1569818, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
124 See JX 212; Tr. 315–16 (Johnston) (“Given the numbers that we were seeing in January [2009], given my expectation
for the year, I realized that the out years would have no bearing on reality.”); Tr. 503–04 (Odom) (“There was no way
that the [2009] LRP, either the 2009 results or the out-year results, could be anywhere near reality. There is no way to
recover from this dramatic a drop and just bounce right back. It just is not reality. So I didn't believe that the [2009] LRP
had any validity.”); see also JX 180, CMG's March 23, 2009 offer to purchase CXR stock at $3.80 per share, at 11 (“[I]n
light of the continued decline in advertising revenue experienced by [CXR] in the first two months of 2009, as reflected
in the February Forecast, [CEI] and [CMG] senior management believed that the long range plan approved by the Radio
board of directors in December 2008 no longer accurately reflects the prospects of [CXR]. Senior management believed
that [CXR]'s prospects were better modeled using the growth expectations used for the long range plan and applying
those rates to the February Forecast as a baseline....”).
125 JX 482 at 4 (citing Milton Friedman, “Monetary Studies of the National Bureau,” The National Bureau Enters Its 45th
Year, 44th Annual Report 7–25 (1964)).
126 JX 482 at 5.
127 Tr. 281 (“Q. So prior to [Bordo and Haubrich's] test in June 2012, the conventional wisdom was that a recession coupled
with a financial crisis would show a sluggish recovery; right? A. And I effectively assumed the sluggish recovery. If the
longest recovery on record is four quarters and I go six, that's sluggish to me, because there are many recoveries that
occurred much quicker than that.”).
128 Tr. 684 (Gokhale). Petitioners' industry expert, Chachas, asserted in his report that “[t]he radio industry is cyclically highly
correlated to general GDP.” JX 481 at 8. He presented a chart depicting the growth in media and radio advertising versus
growth in nominal GDP between 1990 and 2009 to demonstrate this correlation. Id. at 9, Ex. 5. The chart depicts a
correlation of 80% between nominal GDP and radio revenue in this nineteen-year time span. Chachas's chart, however,
is consistent with Gokhale's testimony that a correlation existed between 1990 and 2001, but that by 2001 the relationship
changed, if not broke down completely.
129 See JX 507.
130 See JX 583.
131 Tr. 181–82 (Kursh).
132 See JX 584. This number is taken from a Bureau of Economic Analysis report.
133 Tr. 190–91.
134 See JX 583 at 1, 4 (stating that the Congressional Budget Office's forecasted GDP growth for 2010 is 2.6% and that
the Federal Reserve's “ ‘central tendency’ is 2.5%–2.7% for long-run growth” compared to the 13% real or 17% nominal
GDP growth suggested by Kursh); Tr. 686–88 (Gokhale).
135 JX 341, J.P. Morgan, Broadcasting/TV and Radio: Is it 2010 Yet? (Dec. 18, 2008), at 13896 (“In recent years, the
relationship between advertising growth and GDP has broken down—with annual ad spending lagging GDP in six of the
past ten years. While there are many potential causes for this (media fragmentation causing a shift to media outlets with
lower CPMs, weakness in the domestic auto business, etc.), the effect is what really matters—media companies have
become more competitive in the chase for ad dollars. For TV and radio in particular, industry revenue growth has lagged
GDP growth in recent years following a significant period of outperformance.”). But see Tr. 244–45 (Kursh) (observing
that the J.P. Morgan report reflects only one analyst's opinion).
136 Tr. 191–92 (Kursh).
137 JX 596.
138 JX 152.
139 JX 417.
140 Pet'rs' Opening Post–Trial Br. 20.
141 JX 153 at 10.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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144 Id. at 9. The Special Committee asked for, and management provided, operating performance and financial conditions
through March 2009. These results indicated that, although the operating environment was stabilizing, the actual March
2009 results were below what had been projected in the February forecast. Id. at 10.
145 Tr. 515–17 (Odom) (stating that he thought the Special Committee's conclusion was reasonable and that he did not recall
the Special Committee having a more bearish view of the future of CX R than management).
146 JX 480 at 10.
147 JX 212 at 6692; Tr. 233 (Kursh).
148 In describing management's budgeting process, Kursh stated: “[A]s the year turned, [management] would continue to
reforecast that particular year. And in our case, while that reforecasting of 2009 was going on, the long-range plan
was unchanged. So they continued to believe it or they didn't bother to change it.” Tr. 171–72. Petitioners provided no
evidence, however, that, historically, management had updated the out-years of its long range plan when it adjusted a
forecast for the current year. To the contrary, all evidence indicates that, in the ordinary course of business, management
regularly would update the current year's monthly budgets and, once a year, would create and present to the board of
directors between October and December a budget for the next year and high-level projections for the four following
years. See Tr. 501 (Odom). Thus, management's failure to update the 2009 LRP in the first or second quarter of 2009
is not inconsistent with Respondent's position that management would not have relied on that forecast in valuing CXR
in May 2009.
149 Tr. 539–41 (Odom).
150 See JX 214; JX 606 at 17–32. In Bond & Pecaro's FAS 142 valuation, it calculated an enterprise value using its DCF
model for each market cluster and then aggregated those values. Tr. 525–25 (Odom).
151 Tr. 528–29 (Odom).
152 See JX 341 (“There are several reasons to expect a nice rebound in 2010”); JX 592 (2008 CX R Letter to Shareholders
in which CXR President Neil states that he sees “a bright future for our industry in general and for [CXR] in particular”).
153 See Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) (finding from a review of all the
evidence that the company's five-year plan “does not provide a reliable basis for forecasting future cash flows,” including
“that management held the strong view that [its] projections should not be relied upon because the industry was so new
and volatile that reliable projections were impossible”).
154 I also find Gokhale's valuation approach to be more reliable generally. Gokhale's expert report not only explains the
calculations in his DCF analyses, but also includes the underlying formulas he used. Kursh's report, on the other hand,
did not explain clearly his calculations or how he arrived at his results. Indeed, Gokhale could not replicate Kursh's DCF
analysis exactly. See JX 393 at 10 n.35 (“Dr. Kursh does not fully explain his DCF calculations, and we did not exactly
replicate his DCF analysis. Our replicated numbers are slightly higher than those reported in Dr. Kursh's Exhibit H.”).
155 Gokhale testified that he used the CAGR for CXR from 2001–2005 to project OCF growth for 2009–2013 because it was
the most recent data of what growth rates looked like coming out of a downturn that would be reflective, in some sense,
of the secular shift that CXR and the radio industry were beginning to experience. Tr. 658; see also JX 481 at 3 (Chachas
likening the radio industry's share price contraction “during the recession following the bursting of the ‘tech bubble’ in
mid–2000” to the contraction the radio industry experienced in the 2008/2009 Recession”); Tr. 64 (Cheen) (discussing
the radio industry's recovery after the 2000/2001 recession).
156 Tr. 62 (Cheen) (number of analysts down to a half dozen or less); Tr. 432 (Chachas) (number of analysts covering the
radio broadcasting space was three or four in 2008 and 2009).
157 Tr. 176 (Kursh) (stating that in one of his valuation books, Damodaran asserts that the number of analysts is absolutely
critical and that if you have a small sample, you're probably not getting a very good result, and that analysts look short
term while valuation looks long term); JX 593, Bloomberg, Analysts' Accuracy on U.S. Profits Worst in 16 years  (Aug.
22, 2008); Tr. 431–32 (Chachas) (stating that analysts' recommendations are not good proxies for value because they
are inherently chasing data and moving as a group).
158 See Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., WL 1152338, at *5 (“Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based
on contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.”).
159 See JX 392 Ex. J.
JX 482
at 6.
 
Tr.
719.
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162 Tr. 662–63 (“I believe various gentlemen here from the company have described it as really a bottom's-up plan that led
to revenues and subtraction of profits. And then what I'm doing is taking the EBITDA, or operating cash flow, that comes
out of this pretty full plan, and growing that EBITDA at a rate that EBITDA grew in similar periods.”).
163 See Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making (1993).
164 Id. at 126 (emphasis in original).
165 Id.
166 JX 392 at 8 n.30.
167 JX 341 at 13950.
168 JX 602. CXR's revenues over the same period grew by 6.4% in 2002, 1.3% in 2003, 2.9% in 2004, and –0.1 % in 2005.
JX 603.
169 See JX 482 at 3–5.
170 See JX 482 Exs. L, M.
171 See Prescott Gp. Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., Inc., W L 2059515, at * 31 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (“[T]he task of
enterprise valuation, even for a finance expert, is fraught with uncertainty.”); Id. (“Experience in the adversarial[ ] battle of
the experts' appraisal process under Delaware law teaches one lesson very clearly: valuation decisions are impossible to
make with anything approaching complete confidence.”) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,  2003 W L 23700218,
at * 2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003)).
172 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) (The value of a corporation is not
a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task is to assign one particular value within this
range as the most reasonable in light of all of the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness); Tr. 484
(Chachas) (stating that he would classify a four or five percent revenue growth rate in 2010 as a snapback because
“[w]hen you've fallen 19 percent in the preceding year if you're up by 5 in the following, I think the performance is actually
very substantial”).
173 Tr. 324–25 (Johnston).
174 Tr. 222; JX 480 Ex. H.
175 JX 212.
176 JX 480 at 14.
177 Tr. 660.
178 See JX 480 at 19 (citing JX 411 at 17148).
179 Compare Resp't's Opening Post–Trial Br. 22 n.8 (“CXR's debt was not publicly traded, requiring Gokhale to use a proxy
for the cost of CXR's debt. As of May 29, 2009, CXR's credit rating was BBB-; therefore, Gokhale selected the Merrill
Lynch BBB Corporate Bond Index as the proxy.”) and JX 392 at 9 (“[T]he cost of debt we used is based on the yield on
the Merrill Lynch BBB Corporate Bond Index as of May 29, 2009) with Gokhale Dep. 141 (responding in the affirmative
to the question “You get that number [net debt of 385.6 million] from an internal financial document as of April 30, 2009,
correct?”).
180 Kursh and Gokhale both used the deferred tax numbers from the 2009 LRP in their DCF models: approximately $12.80
million for the remainder of 2009, $21.26 million in 2010, $20.79 million in 2011, $19.47 million in 2012, and $16.96
million in 2013.
181 Odom Dep. 302.
182 Id.
183 See JX 80; JX 428 at 17741
184 JX 80.
185 Tr. 219.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 219–20.
188 Tr. 669.
189 Tr. 208, 276.
190 Tr. 215–16.
191 Gokhale Dep. 144–45; see also JX 153 (stating that as of March 31, 2009, CXR had 20.8 Class A and 58.7 Class B
shares outstanding).
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192 Gokhale explained in a footnote that the 4.5% dilution “is based on the median historical percentage of shares available
for stock-based compensation to shares outstanding.” JX 392 at 10 n.38.
193 JX 482 at 11.
194 Pet'rs' Opening Post–Trial Br. 46.
195 Cf. Prescott Gp. Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., WL 2059515, at * 12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (declining to address the
petitioners' argument that three million shares of stock had been issued at an unfairly low price and should be disregarded
and using the actual number of shares outstanding as of the merger date in the appraisal proceeding).
196 See Tr. 663 (Gokhale); Tr. 197 (Kursh).
197 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., A.2d 497, 512 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010).
198 Resp't's Opening Post–Trial Br. 42.
199 See JX 394 at 13 (Respondent's expert referring to the industry as a mature industry); JX 481 at 35 (“[CXR] was a
premium asset in the industry.”); id.  at 7 (“Unlike newspaper publishers, which were perceived to be rapidly losing their
base of customers, radio had not only retained its audience but it had continued to grow listeners.”).
200 JX 392 at 9 (stating that, in DCF analyses of CX R equity, Citi applied a perpetuity growth rate of 1 % to 2% and Gleacher
used a rate of 2%).
201 Tr. 198–99 (Kursh); JX 568 (presenting historical projected population growth for CXR's five largest markets).
202 Tr. 198.
203 JX 480 at 15.
204 JX 393 at 10–11.
205 Id. at 11.
206 Tr. 198–99.
207 JX 393 at 11.
208 Tr. 694.
209 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., A.2d 497, 512 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010).
210 Id. at 511; see also Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 146–47
(1993).
211 Shannon P. Pratt & Alina V. Niculita, Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 248
(5th ed.2008).
212 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
213 See Tr. 727–31; JX 602; JX 603.
214 See Tr. 297–98 (Johnston).
215 See Del. C. § 262(h) (“Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for good cause shown, interest from the
effective date of the merger through the date of payment of the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue
at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as established from time to time during the period
between the effective date of the merger and the date of payment of the judgment.”).
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Opinion
PER CURIAM.
*1  In this appeal, we consider a variety of issues in this long-
standing oppressed shareholder suit. Concluding that the trial
judge erred in not applying a marketability discount and that
he may have double-counted by adhering to an error made
by one of the experts, but finding no other error or abuse of
discretion, we affirm in part and remand in part.
This suit, involving various disputes among shareholders in
National Retail Transportation, Inc., a close corporation once
equally owned by three siblings, was commenced in the
Chancery Division on September 21, 1995, nearly eighteen
years ago. The action was commenced by plaintiff Patricia
Wisniewski against her brothers, Norbert and Frank Walsh,
regarding the company's acquisition of certain property. On
January 31, 1996, Norbert filed a complaint against Patricia
and Frank, alleging their attempts to oust him from the
company made him an oppressed shareholder entitled to
the remedies outlined in N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7; Patricia filed
a counterclaim, seeking similar relief. These actions were
consolidated and, to preserve the status quo during the
litigation, the Chancery judge at the time appointed an
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attorney as special agent and later as provisional director, to
monitor the company and mediate any disputes among the
parties that might arise during the ordinary course of business.
In 2000, following a lengthy trial, the Chancery judge
rendered a decision (the Phase I decision), finding that
Norbert was the oppressing shareholder and that his actions
harmed the other shareholders but not the company. On March
21, 2000, the judge ordered Norbert to sell his one-third
interest back to the company, or to Frank and Patricia, at fair
value to be determined after receipt of expert reports. The
judge set the valuation date at January 31, 1996, to coincide
with the date Norbert filed his complaint.
The parties later submitted their expert reports regarding
valuation. Without conducting a hearing, the judge issued
an opinion on November 7, 2001 (the Phase II decision),
by which he fixed the fair value of Norbert's interest in the
company at $12,400,000. Final judgment was entered on
January 3, 2002, followed by a series of amended judgments,
the last of which was entered on April 25, 2002. Pursuant
to these orders, the parties had a closing on the purchase
of Norbert's interest, which called for a down payment and
a four-year note for the balance secured by mortgages on
company-owned real property; the closing occurred without
prejudice to the parties' right to appeal the final judgment.
An appeal was filed, and on March 23, 2004, we reversed
the Phase II decision and remanded for reconsideration of
the valuation date and the fair value of Norbert's interest at
an evidentiary hearing. Wisniewski v. Walsh, No. A–3477–01
(App.Div. Mar. 23, 2004).
Pursuant to our mandate and with the retirement of the first
judge, a different Chancery judge conducted an eleven-day
evidentiary hearing on sporadic days between February 24,
2005 and June 9, 2005. On November 15, 2005, the judge
fixed a valuation date of November 29, 2000, the day Norbert
departed the company.
*2  The judge then conducted a twelve-day hearing on the
question of valuation that ended on February 28, 2007; he
issued decisions on October 11, 2007 and July 22, 2008,
which explained why he determined that the fair value of
Norbert's one-third interest was approximately $32,200,000.
He later heard testimony regarding the company's financial
circumstances and the propriety of proposed payment terms
over the course of a number of days between November 2009
and March 2010. An order was entered on June 30, 2010,
which fixed the payment terms, and a final judgment entered
on October 16, 2010.
Patricia and Frank's Estate1 appeal, and Norbert cross-
appeals. In her appeal, Patricia argues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
A MARKETABILITY DISCOUNT TO DETERMNINE
THE FAIR VALUE OF THE COMPANY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING
NORBERT WALSH'S EXPERT'S DEFINITION OF
FAIR VALUE AS BEING SYNONYMOUS WITH
“INTRINSIC VALUE.”
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ACCEPTING NORBERT WALSH'S EXPERT'S
UNRELIABLE INCOME (DISCOUNTED CASH
FLOW) APPROACH, INCLUDING SPECULATIVE
REVENUE PROJECTIONS AND THE
ERRONEOUSLY CALCULATED DISCOUNT RATE.
A. The Trial Court Should Have Rejected Trugman's
Speculative Revenue Projections.
B. The Trial Court Should Have Rejected Trugman's
Erroneously Calculated Discount Rate.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING
THE MARKET APPROACH AS A METHODOLOGY
INCON–SISTENT WITH FAIR VALUE.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ACCEPTED
NORBERT WALSH'S EXPERT'S ANALYSIS OF
EXCESS COMPENSATION PAID TO THE
SHAREHOLDERS/OFFICERS OF THE COMPANY.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
CORRECT UNDISPUTED ERRORS IN NORBERT'S
EXPERT REPORT, WHICH OVERSTATED THE
VALUE OF HIS INTEREST BY $1,321,000.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED INEQUITABLE
PAYMENT TERMS, INCLUDING TERMS
RELATING TO INTEREST, COLLATERAL, AND
PAYMENT FLEXI–BILITY.
A. Norbert Has “Adequate” Col-lateral Without
Junior Mortgages On Properties That Will Create
A Covenant Default By The Company Under Its
Existing Senior Mort-gages.
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B. The Trial Court Abused Its Dis-cretion By
Imposing Fixed Rather Than Flexible Payments.
Frank's Estate argues in its appeal:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEPARTING
FROM THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTIVE
VALUATION DATE AND SELECTING NOVEMBER
29, 2000 AS THE VALUATION DATE.
A. The Basis For Moving The Valuation Date
Proposed By Norbert And Adopted By The Trial
Court Is Legally Flawed, And Warrants Reversal.
1. Shareholder Status and the status quo orders do not
warrant a new valuation date.
2. Frank and Patricia did not act inequitably after
2000.
3. Norbert's alleged parti-cipation has been compen-
sated by other means.
B. Critical Findings Of The Trial Court Relevant To
The Valuation Date Are Barred By The Law Of The
Case Doctrine And Not Supported By The Record.
C. Using The Complaint Date Is Fair And Equitable.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING
THE DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR A CREDIT
TOWARD THE PURCHASE PRICE TO ACCOUNT
FOR $2,530,264 IN “NON–SHARHEOLDER
COMPENSATION” PAID TO NORBERT PURSUANT
TO THE REVERSED 2002 JUDGMENT.
*3  A. The Defendants Have Not Waived Their
Right To Seek A Credit For Non–Shareholder
Compensation Paid To Norbert.
B. The Non–Shareholder Compensa-tion Is
Unnecessary With The New Valuation Date.
C. Norbert Performed No Services For The Company
In 2000 And 2001 To Justify A Court–Awarded
$1,265,312 A Year Salary Enhance-ment.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING
THE DEFENDANTS' REQUEST TO ADJUST
THE PURCHASE PRICE TO ACCOUNT FOR
NORBERT'S SHAREHOLDER LOAN BALANCE.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
AWARDED NORBERT INTEREST, OR,
ALTERNATIVELY, ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
SETTING THE INTEREST RATE.
A. Norbert, An Oppressing Share-holder Who Was
Ordered To Sell His Interest In The Company For
Being A “Most Disruptive Factor,” Is Not Entitled To
Interests.
B. Alternatively, The Trial Court Abused Its
Discretion In Setting The Interest Rate.
And, in his cross-appeal, Norbert argues:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO ADD TO THE FAIR VALUE OF THE
COMPANY APPROXIMATELY $20 MILLION
IN IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO OGDEN II
TO CONSTRUCT A STATE OF THE ART
DISTRIBUTION CENTER, A PROJECT THAT
WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AS OF THE
VALUATION DATE, BUT NOT YET COMPLETED
AND FINANCED OUT OF CASH THAT
OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED
TO SHAREHOLDERS.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING
A SEPARATE 15% ”KEY MAN” DISCOUNT
TO REDUCE THE VALUE OF THE COMPANY
TO ACCOUNT FOR FRANK'S IMPORTANCE
WHEN THE COMPANY'S DEPENDENCE ON KEY
MANAGEMENT WAS ALREADY TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT IN THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW
VALUATION, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE
“FAIR VALUE” STANDARD BY VALUATING
NORBERT'S SPECIFIC SHARES INSTEAD OF HIS
PRO RATE INTEREST IN THE WHOLE COMPANY
AND DOUBLE PENALIZING NORBERT FOR
FRANK'S IMPORTANCE.
A. The Discount Rate Selected By The Trial Court
In Adopting Trug-man's Discounted Cash Flow
Valuation Already Adjusted Fair Value To Reflect
The Value Of Frank's Historical Contribution; Any
Additional Discount For The Same Factor Is An
Impermissible Double Counting.
B. The Law Does Not Support The Use Of A Key Man
Discount In An Oppressed Shareholder Case.
- 334 -
Wisniewski v. Walsh, Not Reported in A.3d (2013)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
C. In Any Event, Frank's Death Proves The
Inappropriateness Of The Use Of A Key Man
Discount.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO APPLY A 20% ”CONTROL PREMIUM” TO
THE VALUE OF THE COMPANY, THEREBY
FINDING THE VALUE OF A MINORITY INTEREST
AND NOT THE “FAIR VALUE” OF NORBERT'S
PROPORTIONATE INTEREST IN THE ENTIRE
COMPANY.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
POST–JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE ENTIRE
JUDGMENT AMOUNT, AWARDING IT ONLY ON
THE PRINCIPAL PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT
AMOUNT AND NOT ON THE PRE–JUDGMENT
INTEREST WHICH BECAME PART OF THE FINAL
JUDGMENT.
A. Post–Judgment Interest Is Awarded Under R. 4:42–
11 Essen-tially As Of Right.
B. Pre–Judgment Interest Is An Integral Element Of
The Final Judgment.
C. New Jersey Case Law Requires Post–Judgment
Interest Be Paid On The Pre–Judgment Interest Com-
ponent Of The Final Judgment.
*4  D. The Oppression Shareholder's Act Implicitly
Requires That Post–Judgment Be Paid On The Entire
Portion Of The Unpaid Purchase Price.
V. ONCE THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED
THE AMOUNT DUE NORBERT IN SEPTEMBER
2008, BUT HAD NOT YET SET THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF PAYMENT, THE COURT
ERRED IN AWARDING INTERIM INTEREST ON
ONLY THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT DETERMINED
OUTSTANDING AS OF NOVEMBER 2000 AND
NOT ON THE $12 MILLION OF INTEREST THAT
THE COURT FOUND HAD ACCRUED FROM 2000
TO THE COURT'S DETERMINATION OF VALUE IN
2008.
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING THE
POST–JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE AT THE CASH
MANAGEMENT FUND RATE PROVIDED BY
RULE 4:42–11(a) PLUS TWO PERCENT, INSTEAD
OF USING THE COMPANY'S BORROWING RATE
OF PRIME RATE PLUS ONE PERCENT.
The parties' arguments require our consideration of whether
the trial judge abused his discretion: (1) in departing
from the presumptive valuation date; (2) in rejecting a
market value approach; (3) in accepting Norbert's expert's
income approach; (4) in declining to apply a marketability
discount; (5) in declining to apply a control premium; (6) in
applying a key-person discount; (7) in failing to account for
improvements to property with funds that would otherwise
have been distributed to shareholders; (8) in failing to adjust
the purchase price for certain non-shareholder compensation
paid to Norbert pursuant to a judgment later set aside; (9) in
the manner in which he imposed payment terms; and (10) in
awarding interest.
Before examining these issues, we first outline the factual
circumstances and the nature of the hearings conducted in the
trial court.
The record reveals that each sibling owned one-third of the
company their father, Francis J. Walsh, Sr., founded in 1952
as a one-truck operation. The business has since expanded to
include such services as freight consolidation, line-haul, and
even dedicated fleets for retail stores throughout the country.
Frank, the oldest of the three siblings, joined the company in
1964 at age seventeen, and assumed leadership by 1973, the
same year the younger Norbert joined the company as a truck
driver. Frank continued to lead the company following his
father's death in 1978, although, by the time of this litigation,
Norbert served as an officer as well, along with Raymond
Wisniewski, Patricia's husband. Patricia never worked for the
company.
The company enjoyed considerable success over the years,
affording its shareholders generous distributions and loans,
though that success has not been consistent. The company
sought bankruptcy protection in the 1980s, and took several
years to reorganize. The company took yet another financial
downturn when Frank left in 1992 to serve a prison sentence
for commercial bribery and bank fraud, among other things.
He left Norbert in control during his absence, though Norbert
testified that he believed himself to have already been in
control of the company.
In any event, during that period, Norbert discontinued
payment of Patricia and Raymond's bills that the company
had routinely paid on their behalf, requiring them to take out
a second mortgage on their home and sell assets to meet their
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obligations. Norbert further ordered an accounting transfer of
billings from a company in which all parties had a nominal
interest to a subsidiary in which Patricia then had no interest.
He did this without consulting or compensating Patricia.
Norbert further attempted to exclude Patricia from a company
real estate deal until Frank objected, and then excluded both
by purchasing the property through an entity owned by his
immediate family. Those acts would later constitute the basis
of the trial judge's finding that Norbert was an oppressing
shareholder and that this oppression continued until Frank
returned and reacquired control of the company with Patricia
and Raymond's support.
*5  The parties substantially disagree about the extent of
Norbert's participation in the family business thereafter.
Norbert testified that his involvement in the company was
generally active until his departure in 2000. According to
Norbert, he maintained a separate office from Frank and
continued all of his duties during the litigation. He maintained
contact with customers, participated in contract negotiations,
including new contracts with K–Mart and Best Buy and
renewals with Marshall's and Federated Stores, and signed all
contracts as president. Moreover, he made tens of millions
of dollars in personal guarantees to obtain financing for the
company.
Frank and Raymond, on the other hand, disagree. Raymond in
particular testified that Norbert's involvement in the company
was minimal once Frank returned and only nominal once the
litigation began, asserting that all of the company's success
arose from Frank's development of relationships with its
major customers, that Frank was responsible for negotiating
all major contracts, and that the company suffered financially
during his absence. Even Norbert acknowledged that Frank
had secured many of the company's major customers.
Moreover, according to Raymond, once the litigation
began, Norbert's only role at the company was as an
obstructionist. For example, in one instance, Norbert refused
to cooperate with the company's efforts to redevelop a
parcel of property known as Ogden II near its North
Bergen terminal. Eventually, the company was able to
make scheduled improvements in accordance with the
state-approved redevelopment plan using funds ordinarily
distributed to the company's shareholders. It did so only
over Norbert's objection, but with approval of the provisional
director and the trial judge.
No party has contested the Phase I conclusions that Norbert's
conduct in withholding distributions from Patricia and
shifting the company's assets to her detriment constituted
oppressive behavior or that Norbert should be bought out as a
result. As noted earlier, however, we reversed the trial court's
Phase II decisions regarding valuation and the valuation date.
Wisniewski, supra, slip op. at 12. With respect to valuation,
we concluded that the trial judge should not have resolved
the issue, dependent on conflicting expert testimony, without
the benefit of a hearing to evaluate the relative credibility of
the experts. Id. at 8–11. As for the valuation date, though,
we concluded that, as a matter of equity, Norbert, whose
oppressive behavior occasioned this litigation but had not,
according to the trial court, harmed the company's success,
should not have been deprived of the benefit of the growth
of the company between the filing of his action and the end
of his involvement with the company, though we declined to
identify that date as an exercise of original jurisdiction. Id. at
7–8. On remand, the trial judge, based largely on Norbert's
testimony, concluded that Norbert, while perhaps not as key to
the company's success as Frank, had participated sufficiently
in the company to warrant extending the valuation date in the
interest of equity until November 29, 2000.
*6  At the valuation trial, Norbert elicited testimony
from Gary R. Trugman, president of Trugman Valuation
Associates. Trugman used a discounted-cash-flow approach,
which estimates the value of a company as the present
value of its expected future cash flow. To arrive at his
calculation, Trugman estimated the company's projected
revenues based on data of the growth of its key clients,
adjusted or “normalized” its expenses to eliminate items such
as excess officer compensation, and applied a discount rate to
the result to yield the present value of that income stream.
Defendants relied on Roger J. Grabowski, a partner and
managing director of Duff & Phelps, LLC, in Chicago.
Grabowski undertook a market approach to valuation,
estimating the value of the company as extrapolated from data
pertaining to sales of comparable entities.
Although not particularly trustful of either expert, concluding
that each had designed his valuation to exaggerate
the company's value in his client's favor, the judge
found Trugman's approach to valuation relatively more
reliable and more consistent with the applicable legal
standard, concluding that it was more conducive, under
the circumstances, to yielding the value of a closely-held
company for which there was no ready market. Nonetheless,
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the judge also credited Grabowski's testimony in certain
respects, including his analysis of the key-person discount
that Norbert disputes on appeal. All told, the judge fixed the
value of Norbert's interest in excess of $32,000,000.
I
Frank's Estate argues that the trial judge should not have
changed the valuation date from the date Norbert filed his
complaint, both as a matter of equity and because the judge's
choice of a later date conflicted with the findings in the first
proceeding that Norbert never challenged on appeal.
N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8) authorizes a court, within its sound
discretion, to order a sale of any shareholder's stock to the
extent fair and equitable under the circumstances. It specifies
that “[t]he purchase price of any shares so sold shall be their
fair value as of the date of the commencement of the action or
such earlier or later date deemed equitable by the court, plus
or minus any adjustments deemed equitable by the court.”
N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(a). That is, the suit's commencement
date is the presumptive valuation date, though a court may
select another date as demanded by fairness and equity. Musto
v. Vidas, 333 N.J.Super. 52, 60, 754 A.2d 586 (App.Div.),
certif. denied, 165 N.J. 607 (2000). Such a determination
should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See id.
at 64.
The first Chancery judge concluded that the statutory
presumptive date—the date that Norbert filed his complaint
—was the most appropriate date for valuation because neither
party presented any compelling reason for changing it. We
disagreed, noting that Norbert remained actively involved in
the company until he left in 2000, and concluded it would
be inequitable to deny him his proportionate share of that
growth:
*7  Since the trial court found that Norbert's oppression
had not had any adverse effects on the company, and
since he remained active until May 31, 2000, the equities
suggest that that date should have been the earliest one
chosen. Although we are satisfied that the trial court
abused its discretion in selecting January 31, 1996, as the
valuation date, rather than choose the date ourselves as an
exercise of original jurisdiction, we remand this issue for
redetermination.
[Wisnewski, supra, slip op. at 8]
In complying with our mandate, the second Chancery judge
credited Norbert's testimony and found he had actively
participated in the company's affairs until November 29,
2000, when he formally relinquished his job responsibilities
pursuant to a settlement. The judge noted that while Norbert's
role was “perhaps not as big as Frank's,” he had nonetheless
“contributed to the growth of the company.”
Notwithstanding our prior holding, Frank's Estate argues that
the trial judge should not have changed the valuation date
from the presumptive date absent exceptional circumstances,
relying in part on a number of out-of-state cases to that effect.
Our statute, however, explicitly permits such a change in the
interest of equity. N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(a). Indeed, in Torres
v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J.Super. 419, 437–38, 776 A.2d 915
(App.Div.2001), we approved the fixing of a valuation date to
a point prior to the filing of the complaint so the innocent party
would not be penalized for the company's decline following
his departure.
Frank's Estate argues that we have not previously authorized
the selection of a valuation date later than the presumptive
date, reasoning that such an unprecedented approach to
account for future growth of the company would double
count any growth already captured in the valuation, relying
on Musto, supra, 333 N.J.Super. at 63–64, 754 A.2d 586.
Frank's Estate misinterprets Musto. There, we warned against
double counting the company's growth by making equitable
adjustments to the valuation as of a given valuation date, not
in moving the date itself. Ibid. Since the income capitalization
approach used there already captured that growth in the fair
value reached, it would have been double counting to adjust
that value for the same growth. Ibid. The trial judge here made
no adjustment of the fair value at the presumptive valuation
date to account for growth, but instead concluded that equity
demanded a change in the date. It suffices here, as it did in
Musto, that the judge reached that conclusion on a thorough
consideration of the equities. Id. at 63, 754 A.2d 586.
We also reject Frank's Estate's argument because it was
considered and rejected in the earlier appeal. Wisniewski,
supra, slip op. at 7–8. We decline the Estate's invitation to
revisit that determination. See Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J.
517, 539–40 (2011).
II
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Patricia contends that the trial judge abused his discretion
in setting the value of Norbert's share of the company
by applying an incorrect legal standard in valuating the
company. Specifically, she asserts that the judge mistakenly
favored Trugman's discounted-cash-flow analysis, which
Patricia interprets as conflating “fair value” with the notion
of “intrinsic value,” while rejecting Grabowski's reasonable
market approach as inconsistent with that standard. Although
the judge found neither expert particularly credible, he
found Trugman's method relatively more reliable and
consistent with the applicable fair-value standard under the
circumstances. That credibility determination is entitled to
our deference. In addition, a review of the judge's decision
confirms that his consequent conclusions did not depart from
the applicable valuation standard.
*8  Valuation, particularly of a closely-held corporation, is a
fact-sensitive undertaking for which there is no single correct
approach. Steneken v. Steneken, 183 N.J. 290, 296–97, 873
A.2d 501 (2005). A judge may consider any evidence of fair
value “ ‘generally acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court,’ “ Lawson Mardon Wheaton,
Inc. v. Smith, 160 N.J. 383, 397, 734 A.2d 738 (1999) (quoting
1 John R. MacKay II, New Jersey Business Corporations ¶
s 9–10(c)(1) (2d ed.1996)), and may calculate an appropriate
value using any acceptable method, Torres, supra, 342
N.J.Super. at 434, 776 A.2d 915. The reasonableness of
any particular method depends “upon the judgment and
experience of the appraiser and the completeness of the
information upon which his conclusions are based.” Bowen v.
Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 44, 473 A.2d 73 (1984). The goal is the
fair value of the asset subject to valuation, which may obtain
whether or not any ready market for the asset exists. Brown
v. Brown, 348 N.J.Super. 466, 487, 792 A.2d 463 (App.Div.)
(quoting Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J.Super. 187, 193, 392 A.2d
621 (Ch.Div.1978)), certif. denied, 174 N.J. 193 (2002).
A court's determination of fair value is entitled to great
deference on appeal and should not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., 160
N.J. 352, 368, 734 A.2d 721 (1999). Any of the findings
of fact that underlie that determination are likewise entitled
to deference on appeal so long as they are supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record. Lawson Mardon
Wheaton, supra, 160 N.J. at 403, 734 A.2d 738; see also Rova
Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 483–84, 323
A.2d 495 (1974). That is particularly so where the findings
depend on the judge's credibility determinations made after a
full opportunity to observe the witnesses testify. Balsamides,
supra, 160 N.J. at 367–68, 734 A.2d 721. A judge may accept
or reject any expert testimony in whole or in part in evaluating
its relative credibility. Maudsley v. State, 357 N.J.Super. 560,
586, 816 A.2d 189 (App.Div.2003).
The trial judge found Trugman's discounted-cash-flow
approach relatively more reliable because he viewed that
approach as more conducive than Grabowski's to ascertaining
the company's “intrinsic value,” a term that Trugman had
used, albeit not as one synonymous with fair value. Patricia
seizes on the judge's choice of words, claiming that choice
demonstrates the judge departed from the fair-value standard
applicable in this action.
In such matters, “intrinsic value” is a term of art
referring to “an analytical judgment of value based on the
perceived characteristics inherent in [an] investment, not
tempered by characteristics peculiar to any one investor, but
rather tempered by how these perceived characteristics are
interpreted by one analyst versus another.” Shannon P. Pratt
et al., Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of
Closely Held Companies 31 (4th ed.2000). Particularly with
respect to an equity security, it is “ ‘the amount that an investor
considers, on the basis of an evaluation of available facts, to
be the “true” or “real” worth ... that will become the market
value when other investors reach the same conclusions.’ “
Ibid. (quoting W.W. Cooper and Yuri Ijiri, eds., Kohler's
Dictionary for Accountants 285 (6th ed.1983)). The resultant
value may or may not be consistent with the asset's fair value.
*9  The phrase “intrinsic value” has a colloquial meaning as
well and does not alone evoke a standard independent of the
statute's fair-value standard. Courts have often used the term
to describe the statutory standard. See, e.g., Tri–Continental
Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del.1950); see also Pratt,
supra, at 32 (observing that references to the phrase in case
law “almost universally ... do not define the term other than by
reference to the language in the context in which it appears,”
including “in cases where the statutory standard of value is
specified as fair value or even fair market value” (emphasis
deleted)). In Tri–Continental, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that
[t]he basic concept of value under [Delaware's] appraisal
statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that
which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate
interest in a going concern. By value of the stockholder's
proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is meant
the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been
taken by the merger. In determining what figure represents
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this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts
must take into consideration all factors and elements which
reasonably might enter into the fixing of value.
[74 A.2d at 72]
Delaware courts continue to follow this approach in
ascertaining fair value, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 713 (Del.1983), and our standard is consistent, see
Lawson Mardon Wheaton, Inc. v. Smith, 315 N.J.Super. 32,
47, 716 A.2d 550 (App.Div.1998) (noting that the purpose of
an appraisal is the determination of the intrinsic worth or fair
value of a shareholder's interest), rev'd on other grounds, 160
N.J. 383, 734 A.2d 738 (1999). Indeed, the trial judge cited
Tri–Continental in explaining that Trugman's discounted-
cash-flow approach, insofar as intended to yield the intrinsic
worth of an asset that may well have no ready market, was
generally more reliable. Despite Patricia's forceful suggestion
to the contrary, we do not interpret the judge's opinion as using
the phrase “intrinsic value” as defining a standard distinct
from the applicable statutory standard of fair value. The
judge did not apply an incorrect standard in arriving at its
determination of value.
Nor did the trial judge, as Patricia asserts, reject the
market valuation methodology as inherently inconsistent
with the applicable fair-value standard. Although the judge
stated his view that the discounted-cash-flow approach
should generally be preferred over the market approach
“in this type of litigation,” he never rejected the market
valuation methodology out of hand, but only found
Grabowski's approach less appropriate than Trugman's
under the circumstances. Moreover, the judge found that
Grabowski's decision not to perform a discounted-cash-flow
valuation to corroborate his market valuation demonstrated
that he “took somewhat of an ... ostrich approach,” avoiding
that methodology “for fear that the numbers [would] not be
suitable for what he was retained to do.”
*10  The judge's credibility determinations on these
questions, at which he arrived following a full opportunity
to observe experts from both sides testify, must be accorded
deference on appeal. Maudsley, supra, 357 N.J.Super. at
586, 816 A.2d 189. So, too, should the judge's correctly
identified and explained conclusion that Trugman's approach
to valuation was conducive to yielding a value more
consistent with the applicable legal standard.
III
Trugman's discounted-cash-flow approach required that he
project the company's anticipated cash flows, normalize its
expenses, and calculate the present value of the resulting
income stream by applying a discount rate appropriate to
the company. In first calculating the company's anticipated
future cash flows, Trugman extrapolated his projections from
data pertaining to growth of the company's key clients,
consistently with guidelines set by the American Society
of Appraisers. The judge faulted him for failing to meet
with the company's management to confirm the accuracy
of those projections, but noted the company had not made
any internal projections available to him for that purpose
and that Trugman had reviewed Frank's depositions and the
company's historical financial data. Based on that financial
data, Trugman concluded that the company was mature,
that its operations were consistent, and that its growth was
steady over the five-year period preceding the valuation
date. According to Trugman, that data demonstrated the
company had grown approximately 12.4% in 1996, 8.5%
in 1997, 4.1% in 1998, 10% in 1999, and 8.5% in 2000.
Consequently, he estimated the company's long-term growth
rate at approximately five percent, a figure the judge found
reasonable.
The trial judge, however, generally rejected Trugman's
approach to estimating the company's expenses. Trugman had
testified that expenses during the valuation year had been
higher than prior years, in part due to rising fuel costs, and
rejected the company's actual expenses that year in favor of
calculating an average of normalized expenses over the prior
three years; on the other hand, Grabowski testified that the
company's valuation-year expenses would be representative
of the company's current operations and should serve as the
benchmark. The judge found Grabowski's testimony on this
point more credible and adopted his approach to estimating
expenses.
Trugman arrived at his discount rate using the “build-up”
method, which yields a rate from the sum of a number of
components each measuring the risk associated with some
aspect of the entity being evaluated. He began with the long-
term treasury bond yield as of the valuation date and added a
seven-percent equity risk premium to account for the added
risk of holding a share of a company. He then added a size or
small-company premium of approximately 3.5% to account
for the added risk inherent in investing in a company of this
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size, and a specific-company risk premium of four percent
to account for the added risk entailed in holding an interest
in this particular company, including that attributable to its
reliance on Frank for its success. Reducing that, then, for the
cost of the company's cost of debt and estimated taxes, he
arrived at a final discount rate of twelve percent, which the
judge found reasonable as consistent with industry-wide data
on which even Grabowski had relied.
*11  Patricia takes issue with Trugman's projections of the
company's future revenue, relying largely on unpublished
authority declining to credit expert projections under the
particular circumstances of each case. But valuation is not an
exact science, and the reliability of any particular valuation
approach rests on the quality of the evidence supporting
it, subject, of course, to the court's relative credibility
determinations. Bowen, supra, 96 N.J. at 44, 473 A.2d 73.
Here, although Trugman had no access to any company-
prepared projections of future revenue for use in his analysis,
he calculated his own projections, extrapolating them from
available data relevant to the growth of the company's primary
customers. Given his explanation of the foundation of that
aspect of his analysis in available evidence on which he could
reasonably rely, his testimony was certainly not so speculative
as to be inadmissible. See Polzo v. County of Essex, 196 N.J.
569, 583–84, 960 A.2d 375 (2008).
Patricia does not argue that Trugman's testimony was
so deficient as to be inadmissible; she asserts the judge
should not have found it reliable. Indeed, the judge did
not find Trugman's analysis particularly credible, but he
generally found Trugman's methodology more reliable than
Grabowski's, and largely adopted it on that basis, revenue
projections and all.
A court must ultimately arrive at a fair value based on
the evidence that the parties present. However “speculative”
Patricia may view Trugman's analysis in this respect, the
judge was entitled to find it relatively more reliable than
the expert testimony defendants presented. The judge's
determination is entitled to deference on appeal. Balsamides,
supra, 160 N.J. at 367–68, 734 A.2d 721.
Patricia also argues Trugman calculated his discount rate
using an incorrect equity-debt ratio for the company.
Specifically, Trugman calculated a 40% equity to 60% debt
ratio justifying a discount rate of 12%, and Grabowski
testified that the very sources that Trugman used to perform
his calculations actually supported a 70% equity to 30%
debt ratio, warranting a much higher discount rate of
16.5%. Patricia argues that Grabowski's calculation was more
reliable.
The judge did not address the intricacies of those calculations,
but he found that Trugman's estimate was well within the
range calculated for a sampling of trucking companies in a
source on which Grabowski had relied in his analysis. We
must defer to the judge's finding that Trugman's estimate was
more reliable.
We also defer to the judge's finding that Trugman's analysis
of the excess compensation paid to officers of the company
was relatively more credible than Grabowski's, a conclusion
Patricia also contests. Trugman concluded, based on salary
data from comparable publicly-traded companies, that the
company could replace Frank, Norbert, and Raymond for
a combined salary of $1,047,000. Grabowski, on the other
hand, following an analysis undertaken in Exacto Spring
Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 196 F .3d 833,
838–39 (7th Cir.1999), concluded that the salaries were not
excessive in relation to the rate of return realized by the
company under their management. Again, the judge found
Trugman's conclusion relatively more credible, and there was
adequate support for his finding.
*12  Lastly, Patricia challenges the trial judge's failure
to correct certain miscalculations in Trugman's valuation.
Grabowski testified that, in consolidating the company's
financial statements, Trugman double-counted NRT's income
and included Ogden II's income without including its
operating expenses, decreasing the expense ratio and
increasing the resulting value of the company on both
counts. The judge rejected Grabowski's criticism but believed
his concerns would be eliminated by adopting his general
approach to calculating the expense ratio, using data from
the valuation year rather than an average of the prior three.
The judge agreed, and Norbert does not challenge, that
Grabowski's approach was the more appropriate one.
However, the judge later seemed to acknowledge that
Trugman had made the double-counting errors in his
calculations, although it is not entirely clear whether the judge
had actually earlier found the calculations inaccurate or was
merely acknowledging defendants' assertions that he had. The
judge ultimately maintained that his adoption of Grabowski's
general approach eliminated his concerns, but using only the
last year's worth of inaccurate calculations, rather than an
average of the prior three, does not resolve the inaccuracy.
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We remand for the judge's reconsideration of the argument
and for clear findings on this point. The judge's determination
that Trugman's testimony was relatively more credible than
Grabowski's is generally entitled to deference on appeal;
however, the conclusion that certain claimed inaccuracies in
Trugman's calculation of the company's expected expense
ratio were eliminated by adopting Grabowski's general
approach to calculating that ratio may be incorrect, and the
judge should further explore that issue on remand.
IV
Patricia contends that a marketability discount should have
been applied to the valuation of Norbert's interest in the
company. We agree.
A marketability discount adjusts the value of an interest in
a closely-held corporation on the understanding that demand
for such a relatively illiquid interest is limited and its
value consequently diminished. Lawson Mardon Wheaton,
supra, 160 N.J. at 398–99, 734 A.2d 738. In forced buy-out
circumstances, such a discount is not applicable except under
extraordinary circumstances. Brown, supra, 348 N.J.Super.
at 483, 792 A.2d 463. As we explained, “[t]he unfairness
of using [marketability] discounts lies in the potential for
depriving minority shareholders of the full proportionate
value of their shares and enriching majority shareholders by
allowing a buy-out of minority interests at bargain prices.”
Id. at 484, 792 A.2d 463. The determination of whether
circumstances exist to warrant application of the discount in a
particular matter must be guided by considerations of fairness
and equity. Balsamides, supra, 160 N.J. at 377, 734 A.2d 721.
Whether the discount applies is a matter of law subject to de
novo review on appeal. Lawson Mardon Wheaton, supra, 160
N.J. at 398, 734 A.2d 738.
*13  In Balsamides, as here, an oppressed shareholder was
ordered to acquire the oppressing shareholder's interest; there,
the competing shareholders were equal owners. 160 N.J. at
355 n. 2, 382, 734 A.2d 721. The Court observed that “where
the oppressing shareholder instigates the problems, ... fairness
dictates that the oppressing shareholder should not benefit
at the expense of the oppressed.” Id. at 382, 734 A.2d 721.
Further, any less solution would permit the statute to become
an instrument for oppression. Id. at 382–83, 734 A.2d 721.
In that light, the Court noted that, were the oppressed
shareholder ordered to buy out the oppressor at a value
without any discount for marketability, the innocent party
would inequitably be forced to shoulder the entire burden
of the asset's illiquidity. Id. at 378–79, 734 A.2d 721. The
oppressing shareholder, whose unlawful behavior occasioned
the forced sale in the first place would have received the
undiscounted proportional value of his share of the company,
while the oppressed shareholder would be forced to accept
a discounted price in any future sale to a third party. Ibid.
The Court concluded that equity demanded application of a
marketability discount to the purchase price to ensure that the
oppressing shareholder would not be rewarded at the innocent
shareholder's expense. Id. at 382–83, 734 A.2d 721.
Balsamides is directly applicable. Although the equities may
not be as suggestive of the discount here as in Balsamides—
for example, Norbert's actions, while oppressive, did not
actually harm the company, and, unlike the two veto-
wielding equal partners in Balsamides, Norbert was a
minority shareholder-the fact remains that Norbert should not
be rewarded when his conduct not only harmed the other
shareholders but necessitated this forced buyout. 160 N .J. at
383.
The judge's failure to apply an appropriate marketability
discount was erroneous. We remand for the application of
a marketability discount, although we do not foreclose the
possibility, which the judge should analyze on remand, that
such a discount might not already be embedded in the
discount rate used in the discounted-cash-flow valuation the
court adopted. In other words, absent a clear understanding
of whether a marketability discount was implicitly applied
through adoption of the discounted-cash-flow valuation
approach, the judge should reconsider the award through
application of an appropriate marketability discount.
V
Norbert contends that a control premium should have been
added to the value of the company. The judge rejected
this, concluding that the discounted-cash-flow approach that
Norbert's own expert used and that the judge largely credited
already yielded a fair value of a controlling interest in the
company without the need for an additional premium.
A control premium is the “added amount an investor is
willing to pay for the privilege of directly influencing the
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corporation's affairs.” Lawson Mardon Wheaton, supra, 315
N.J.Super. at 67, 716 A.2d 550. The objective of a valuation
is the fair value of the shareholder's proportional interest
in the entire entity as a going concern. Casey v. Brennan,
344 N.J.Super. 83, 113, 780 A.2d 553 (App.Div.2001),
aff'd, 173 N.J. 177, 801 A.2d 245 (2002); see also
Rapid–American Corporation v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802
(Del.1992). Application of a minority discount, which adjusts
the value of a minority interest for its lack of control,
would be counterproductive to that end absent extraordinary
circumstances insofar as either discount might “depriv[e]
minority shareholders of the full proportionate value of their
shares and enrich[ ] majority shareholders by allowing a buy-
out of minority interests at bargain prices.” Brown, supra,
348 N.J.Super. at 483–84, 792 A.2d 463. On the contrary,
application of a control premium-in some sense the opposite
side of the same coin as the minority discount, Lawson
Mardon Wheaton, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 67–insofar as
necessary to reflect market realities may be considered to
ensure that minority shareholders duly and proportionately
share in the fair value of the entire company. Casey, supra,
344 N.J.Super. at 112–13, 780 A.2d 553. Whether the
premium is applicable under particular circumstances is a
matter of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Lawson
Mardon Wheaton, supra, 160 N.J. at 398, 734 A.2d 738.
*14  While our courts have not dealt extensively with
application of the control premium, we have found Delaware's
jurisprudence instructive. See Casey, supra, 344 N.J.Super.
at 106, 112–13, 780 A.2d 553. As particularly pertinent
here, Delaware courts have usually rejected application of
the premium in a discounted-cash-flow analysis. Montgomery
Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 217 n. 19
(Del.2005). So long as such an analysis is designed to assess
a company's full value, no minority discount inheres in it
that would necessitate adjustment by a control premium. In
re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1013
(Del.Ch.2005). Shareholders, after all, are entitled to no more
than their proportional share of the company's value. Ibid.
The trial judge noted at the outset, relying on Toys “R”
Us, that a discounted-cash-flow method typically yields
the value of a controlling interest in an entity, eliminating
the need for a premium. The judge then considered, but
rejected, Trugman's testimony that his particular valuation
approach did not yield such an interest. Specifically, while
Trugman had acknowledged that his discounted-cash-flow
valuation included some control level adjustments to account
—for example, for excessive officer compensation—he had
maintained, with little elaboration, that application of an
independent control premium would nonetheless be justified
on the premise that a third-party buyer could plausibly run the
company with greater efficiency even beyond the adjustments
he had made. The judge found his assertions that a new owner
could cure those unspecified deficiencies in the company's
management incredible, particularly in light of Norbert's
own testimony that Frank had been managing the company
efficiently. The judge concluded that Trugman's approach had
already reached a control value and that no premium was
therefore appropriate. This conclusion was consistent with
applicable legal principles and adequately grounded in the
record.
VI
Norbert argues that a key-person discount should not have
applied. The judge determined that the company's singular
reliance on Frank for its success justified application of such
a discount here.
A key-person discount adjusts for the risk of holding an
interest in a company with an “unusually concentrated
dependence on one executive or on a small group of
executives.” Pratt, supra, at 431. We have not previously
addressed the applicability of this discount in a fair valuation
proceeding, but, as with other discounts or premiums, whether
a key-person discount applies under particular circumstances
is a matter of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Cf.
Balsamides, supra, 160 N.J. at 373, 734 A.2d 721.
The judge felt “quite strongly” that the discount should
apply here. He recognized the prior finding in the
Phase I opinion that Frank was uniquely responsible for
the company's success, as well as abundant testimony
regarding Frank's extensive relationships with customers, the
company's relatively poor economic performance during his
absence, and its growth since his return. The judge credited
Grabowski's testimony that any buyer would demand a key-
person discount under those circumstances, and adopted
the fifteen-percent discount Grabowski suggested would be
appropriate.
*15  Courts in other jurisdictions have often rejected
application of the discount. Such was the case in Hendley
v. Lee, 676 F.Supp. 1317, 1330–31 (D.S.C.1987), where
the court doubted the discount's general applicability to the
value of an asset subject to a forced sale, but concluded it
- 342 -
Wisniewski v. Walsh, Not Reported in A.3d (2013)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12
would be particularly inapplicable there, where the key person
remained employed with the company, and his departure
would likely not affect the efficient management of the
company. The Georgia Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion in Miller v. Miller, 288 Ga. 274, 705 S.E.2d 839,
844–45 (Ga.2010), adding that, where an income approach
to valuation is undertaken, application of the discount could
double-count the impact of the key person's loss insofar
as that impact is already accounted for in the calculation
of the capitalization rate. See also Hough v. Hough, 793
So.2d 57, 58–59 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (rejecting expert's
evaluation as artificially low where it both reduced expected
annual income and increased capitalization rate to account
for key person's good will). The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court found the discount particularly inappropriate
in Bernier v. Bernier, 449 Mass. 774, 873 N.E.2d 216, 231–
32 (Mass.2007), where evidence revealed that the individual
was neither crucial to the company's success nor, as here,
likely to leave the company in the near future. On the
other hand, in Nelson v. Nelson, 411 N.W.2d 868, 874–
75 (Minn.Ct.App.1987), a key-person discount was applied
in effecting an equitable distribution of the parties' marital
property.
Regardless of the view of some courts that the discount should
not be applied, ultimately its application or rejection turns on
what equity demands in a given situation. Here, Norbert does
not challenge the court's conclusion that Frank qualified as
a key person of the company, except to assert that Frank's
death nonetheless did not impact the company's success, as
even Raymond acknowledged, but that circumstance was not
knowable as of the valuation date and would be inappropriate
for consideration now. Moreover, Norbert acknowledges that
it was appropriate for Trugman to account for the company's
dependence on Frank by increasing the discount rate in his
analysis. He argues only that the trial judge should not have
applied a separate, independent key-person discount to the
valuation.
We find no merit in Norbert's argument and defer to
the judge's factual determination that the discount was
appropriate.
VII
Norbert argues that the trial judge erred by failing to add in
excess of $20,000,000 to the company's valuation to account
for improvements made to Ogden II during the litigation
with funds that might otherwise have been distributed to
shareholders. He asserts that, because the property had not yet
been fully redeveloped by the valuation date, its worth could
not be captured by Trugman's discounted-cash-flow valuation
and needed to be valued separately as if a non-operating asset
of the company.
*16  A non-operating asset is one that is “not necessary to
ongoing operations of the business enterprise.” Pratt, supra,
at 914. Insofar as such an asset “could be liquidated without
impairing operations,” it may be valued independently from
the rest of the business. Id. at 249–50.
The trial judge thoroughly recounted the company's history
of ownership of Ogden II, including its long use as a staging
area, as well as its redevelopment. The judge noted in
particular Norbert's own acknowledgement that the property
was “integral to the operations and growth of the company”
and concluded the property could not be classified as a non-
operating asset whose value could be separately calculated
and added to that of the company.
Norbert does not challenge the judge's finding that Ogden II
did not qualify as a non-operating asset. He argues only that,
due to the timing and circumstances of its redevelopment,
the revenue that the redeveloped property could expect to
generate could not have been ascertainable as of the valuation
date so as to be included in Trugman's discounted-cash-flow
analysis. He relies on Trugman's testimony to the effect that
treating the property merely as if it were a non-operating asset
would ensure that its worth would be adequately captured in
the valuation.
The judge did not explicitly address that colorable contention,
but generally found Trugman's testimony on the issue
incredible and “just not consistent whatsoever with the
evidence.” Moreover, the judge's thorough findings with
respect to Ogden II's history and operation amply demonstrate
the property's integrality to the company's business both
prior to its redevelopment, during years for which the
company's revenues were known and considered in both
experts' analyses, and would continue to be integral to the
company's expansion, which Trugman's valuation presumed.
The trial judge's conclusion that the value of Ogden II was
already adequately accounted for in that valuation was sound.
Insofar as Norbert's arguments may be taken to imply instead
that, as a matter of equity, he should be entitled to the value of
the withheld distributions, the company's decision to withhold
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those distributions was timely challenged by Norbert,
approved by the provisional director, and upheld by the trial
judge. Even if appropriate to now collaterally revisit that
long-resolved issue, it remains that the withheld distributions
funded an expansion of the company enhancing its value, for
which Norbert is already otherwise compensated. Indeed, had
the company instead made the distributions, the loans it would
have had to acquire to timely complete redevelopment of the
property would have affected the value.
VIII
Frank's Estate contends that defendants were entitled to
credits against the purchase price of Norbert's shares for
certain non-shareholder compensation that the company paid
him pursuant to the reversed 2002 judgment and for Norbert's
outstanding shareholder loan balance. The trial judge rejected
those arguments, concluding that defendants had waived the
first issue by failing to raise it in the prior appeal and that no
evidence in the record supported the second. The judge was
correct in both respects.
*17  In the first respect, the trial judge ordered the company
in the since-reversed judgment to pay Norbert $1,265,372
per year for 2000 and 2001 with interest for non-shareholder
compensation as a salary enhancement. While addressing
valuation issues, the judge allowed defendants a credit toward
the purchase price for shareholder distributions that the
company had made to Norbert since January 31, 1996, which
was then the valuation date applied, pursuant to Musto, supra,
333 N.J.Super. at 59, 754 A.2d 586. In so doing, the judge
credited Trugman's analysis of the excess distribution that
Norbert had received, and to which defendants were therefore
entitled reimbursement, by accounting for the difference
between Norbert's actual officer salary and that he would
expect as consistent with industry standards—two percent of
the company's gross sales. The judge used that figure not only
in calculating defendants' credit pursuant to Musto, but in
concluding Norbert was owed the difference between what
he should have expected his salary to be and the $500,000
actually paid in each of 2000 and 2001. That difference is the
sum Frank's Estate now disputes.
Frank's Estate admits that, although defendants raised the
issue in their notices of cross-appeal, they never actually
briefed it. On remand, the trial judge found defendants' failure
to brief the issue to constitute a waiver and that it should
not consider the issue on remand. In so doing, the trial judge
perceived no direction to the contrary in our prior opinion
by which we remanded the matter for a redetermination of
the valuation date and fair value of the company and, more
broadly, of “such other matters as may be required for full
determination of the rights and liabilities of the parties.”
Wisniewski, supra, slip op. at 12.
Frank's Estate, however, seizes on that language and argues
that we thereby intended to permit consideration of any issue
required for a full determination of the parties' rights. The
Estate contends that this issue was particularly appropriate for
consideration, because the valuation date changed on remand,
obviating any need for the credit that occasioned Norbert's
salary enhancement, and because Norbert never provided
any services to justify even the salary that he was paid in
the first place. Although Frank's Estate does not concede
defendants waived this issue, asserting that Frank “reserved”
it for remand without actually briefing it, the Estate argues
that the judge should have nonetheless considered the issue
to avoid an inequitable result.
Our rules require that an appellant identify and fully brief any
issue raised on appeal. R. 2:6–2(a). Consequently, a failure to
brief an issue will be deemed a waiver. 539 Absecon Blvd.,
LLC v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship, 406 N.J.Super. 242, 272 n.
10, 967 A.2d 845 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 541, 973
A.2d 945 (2009). An appellant may escape that waiver only
in the interests of justice. Otto v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 278 N.J.Super. 176, 181, 650 A.2d 832 (App.Div.1994).
*18  Defendants' conceded failure to brief the issue
constituted a waiver. And, although our prior mandate was
broad, we did not suggest that the trial judge was required to
consider this issue, which was initially asserted on appeal but
then waived. Norbert's award of an officer salary consistent
with industry standards was neither clearly inequitable nor
so inextricably entwined in the prior valuation decision as
to require reconsideration along with the valuation itself on
remand.
With respect to Norbert's shareholder-loan balance, the trial
judge had initially adjusted the purchase price to account
for that balance, but Norbert appealed that determination.
On remand, the trial judge noted the first judge's findings
that the company had made advances to Norbert during
the bankruptcy proceeding to facilitate reorganizing the
company. Specifically, two new entities were created to
acquire certain of the company's intangible property, and
Norbert, the sole shareholder of those entities—PDR, Inc.,
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and Global Transportation, Inc.—borrowed money from the
company and lent it to them for that acquisition. The judge
found that he had never personally used that money, but put it
back into the company and wound up with a disproportionate
loan balance. The judge also found no credible evidence
of Norbert's actual indebtedness for that balance, including
any interest paid or payment schedule set for his or other
shareholder loan and concluded that Norbert should not be
held responsible for the balance.
Frank's Estate acknowledges that a portion of Norbert's
balance is attributable to the loans the company made
him during its reorganization, but argues that most of it,
$6,422,046.28, is not, as demonstrated by the company's
records. The Estate emphasizes that the judge had ordered
the company to loan Norbert $615,000 as a condition of
permitting the company to lease a new facility during this
litigation. The Estate contends the judge rejected any credit
for the loan balance in reliance exclusively on arguments
in Norbert's brief about the loans' origins in the bankruptcy
proceedings, which were not competent evidence. Frank's
Estate asserts that, to the extent the judge considered the
matter disputed, it should have instead held a hearing.
Of course, courts should not resolve disputed issues of
material fact without a hearing. Williams Scotsman, Inc. v.
Garfield Bd. of Educ., 379 N.J.Super. 51, 62, 876 A.2d 877
(App.Div.2005), certif. denied, 186 N.J. 241, 892 A.2d 1288
(2006). Indeed, the first trial judge's earlier valuation decision
was reversed for precisely that reason. Wisniewski, supra, slip
op. at 10–11. But, several hearings were held in this matter and
the parties had ample opportunity to present evidence bearing
on this issue, and Frank's Estate points to no instance when
the court denied it that opportunity. The judge found, based on
the evidence that the parties did present, that there was never
any intention to hold Norbert accountable for his loan balance
and concluded that he should therefore not be responsible for
it now. We find no error or abuse of discretion in the judge's
conclusion.
IX
*19  Patricia argues that the court abused its discretion by
imposing inequitable terms for satisfaction of the judgment
that unduly rewarded Norbert, the oppressing shareholder, at
defendants' expense.
When a buy-out is ordered, N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(e)
authorizes a court to order payment “by the delivery of cash,
notes, or other property, or any combination thereof” and
entrusts the selection of the appropriate method of payment
under the circumstances to the court's sound discretion.
Specifically, the statute permits the court, where an immediate
cash payment is not feasible, to “determine the amount of the
cash payment, the kind and amount of any property, whether
any note shall be secured, and other appropriate terms.” Ibid.
The resultant order severs the selling shareholder's interest
in the company except the right to payment for the fair
value of the shares and any other amounts due, “provided
the corporation or the moving shareholders post a bond
in adequate amount with sufficient sureties or otherwise
satisfy the court that the full purchase price of the shares,
plus whatever additional costs, expenses, and fees as may
be awarded, will be paid when due and payable.” N.J.S.A.
14A:12–7(8)(f) (emphasis added).
Once valuation was determined, the judge heard again from
Trugman and from Bernard Katz, defendant's expert, as to the
economic circumstances of the company and the consequent
feasibility of the parties' proposed payment terms. In light
of that testimony, which the judge found credible, the judge
observed that the company's revenues were relatively healthy,
increasing considerably from 2001 to 2007 and dropping
only slightly in the following two years. The company had
distributed over $116,000,000 to its shareholders from 2002
to 2009, including more than $14,000,000 in 2008 alone and
another $3,700,000 in the beginning of 2009. It had increased
its holdings of fixed assets during the same period from
$146,000,000 to $264,000,000, acquiring in the prior three
years a $16,800,000 property in Savannah, Georgia, and the
“F–Yard,” an undeveloped $36,400,000 property adjacent to
the North Bergen terminal purchased with a loan secured
by mortgages on other company properties, so as to leave
it unencumbered. Moreover, the company saw substantial
revenue growth from its top five customers in 2009 from
$168,000,000 to $187,000,000, and its total revenues from
that year exceeded internal projections by about $4,000,000.
That growth continued despite the recession and despite
Frank's death, which, as confirmed by Raymond's testimony,
had no apparent impact on the company's relationship with
its customers. According to Katz, prospects for both the
company and the industry in general were set to improve in
the near future, as well.
Nonetheless, the judge developed an understanding during
the hearing “that there was a certain arrogance of the
- 345 -
Wisniewski v. Walsh, Not Reported in A.3d (2013)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15
company when it came to this judgment.” Despite the
company's economic success and its knowledge by 2008 of an
approximate $32,000,000 obligation to Norbert, it failed to set
aside any money to satisfy the judgment. In so doing, it even
defied Katz's recommendations to slow non-tax distributions
to shareholders for both the financial health of the company
and compensating Norbert.
*20  The judge had long advised the parties that it would
order a down payment, and so, notwithstanding the company's
“incomprehensible” failure to set aside any funds for that
purpose, he ordered defendants to remit Norbert a down
payment of fifteen percent and execute a ten-year note for
the balance of the judgment. The judge rejected defendants'
proposal to satisfy the note with flexible, periodic payments
of one-third the company's actual cash flows, which Katz
testified could be reliably extrapolated from the net income
reported on the company's year-end financial statement with
a widely-accepted formula for calculating debt capacity.
The judge instead favored fixed payments over the ten-year
duration of the note that would eliminate the need for its
continued involvement in this litigation to set payment terms
for an obligor that had shown little willingness to pay. The
judge further observed that defendants had already pledged
company stock and four mortgages on company-owned real
property as collateral pursuant to a consent order following
the earlier judgment, and ordered that they additionally pledge
mortgages on all company-owned property, including the
F–Yard, for that purpose, as well as other equitable relief
not challenged on appeal. The judge subsequently denied
defendants' motion to amend the final judgment.
Patricia takes issue with the trial judge's requirement that
mortgages on all company-owned real estate be pledged as
collateral, asserting this condition was excessive and in none
of the parties' interests. She argues that defendants' offer
to abide by the existing agreement and additionally pledge
as collateral a mortgage on the F–Yard, a property whose
value alone exceeded the judgment, would suffice to secure
the judgment. In her view, requiring anything more would
contravene the statute, which she interprets to require only
a pledge of “adequate” collateral, N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(f),
and would constitute an abuse of discretion. Moreover, she
contends, mortgages on the additional properties, particularly
the company's main terminal complex and Cinnaminson
terminal would provide Norbert with superfluous collateral
at the expense of endangering the financial well-being of the
company, whose existing bank mortgages on those properties
prohibit the acquisition of junior liens.
A court of equity generally exercises considerable discretion
in fashioning remedies, Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose,
134 N.J. 326, 354, 634 A.2d 74 (1993), and the statute
explicitly invests courts with discretion in this context,
N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(e). Pursuant to that statute, a court may
require the obligor to pledge collateral sufficient to “satisfy
[it] that the full purchase price of the shares, plus whatever
additional costs, expenses, and fees as may be awarded, will
be paid when due and payable.” N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(f).
In so doing, it may, but need not, accept any pledge barely
adequate to meet that obligation, as Patricia insists it must.
The judge thoroughly explained that the company's refusal
to set aside any funds to satisfy the judgment, including its
disregard of its own expert's advice in that respect, justified
setting less favorable payment terms than defendants would
have preferred. The judge's decision with respect to the
collateral required by those terms was adequately grounded
in the evidence and within his discretion.
*21  Patricia further argues that the judge erred in imposing
fixed, rather than flexible, payment terms. She asserts that,
while the company had diligently satisfied its obligation thus
far, an unfavorable shift in the economy could impact its
ability to continue making fixed payments over the course
of the ten-year payout and force the company to return to
court to seek a modification to avoid a default. Defendants'
proposal to pay one-third the company's actual cash flows, as
calculated by the formula that Katz explained, would leave
little room for the abuse that a flexible payment schedule
might otherwise present and be more equitable than the terms
the judge imposed.
Whatever the merits of that formula in calculating flexible
payment terms under other circumstances, the judge
determined, within his discretion, that the most appropriate
manner of ensuring a reliable, equitable payment schedule
under these circumstances would be to order fixed payment
terms. Patricia acknowledges that the company has diligently
observed the existing payment schedule thus far, presumably
without great detriment to its financial health, and remains
free to apply for a modification of that schedule in the interests
of equity should the company's financial circumstances
drastically change for the worse. But, the judge's decision
with respect to the terms for payment of the judgment was
within its discretion and we have been presented with no
principled reason for intervening.
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Frank's Estate and Norbert both challenge the interest rates
applied to the judgment. The trial judge awarded interest
primarily to provide an incentive for defendants to satisfy
an obligation that the judge perceived they were reluctant to
pay. Frank's Estate argues that interest should not have been
awarded at all as a matter of equity, while Norbert contends
that the rates were set too low. The judge's decision was within
his discretion.
N.J.S.A. 14A:12–7(8)(d) permitted the judge, in the exercise
of his discretion, to set interest “at the rate and from the
date determined by the court to be equitable.” A judge's
determination in that regard should not be disturbed absent an
abuse of that discretion. Musto, supra, 333 N.J.Super. at 74,
754 A.2d 586; Benevenga v. Digregorio, 325 N.J.Super. 27,
35, 737 A.2d 696 (App.Div.1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 79
(2000).
After the judge determined the fair value of Norbert's share
of the company, but before he could set payment terms, he
ordered defendants to remit monthly interest payments to
Norbert on the outstanding principal balance due. The judge
reasoned that the company had long had use of the money
that would otherwise have been due to Norbert, obviating
the need to borrow that money from a commercial lender.
Moreover, while Norbert's conduct was oppressive, it had no
adverse impact on the company's success and so should not
preclude an award of interest otherwise warranted as a matter
of equity. The judge set the interest rate at the prime rate
plus one percent, the rate at which Trugman had observed the
company could expect to borrow money.
*22  Later, when the judge fixed the final payment terms,
he also imposed a post-judgment interest rate. The judge
reasoned that he had not “one iota of proof that the company
had been interested in paying this judgment or setting aside
monies to pay” it, and concluded that an award of interest
would be necessary to encourage defendants to satisfy their
obligation. The judge set the interest rate at the State of
New Jersey Cash Management Fund rate plus a two percent
enhancement pursuant to Rule 4:42–11, rejecting defendants'
argument that the unenhanced rate would be a sufficient
incentive to pay the judgment. The judge specified, however,
that interest would be applicable only to the outstanding
principal balance, reasoning that awarding interest on the
already accumulated interest would be unnecessary and
inequitable.
Frank's Estate argues that, as a matter of equity, no interest
should have been awarded at all or at least should have been
set at lower rates, so that the judge might not unduly reward
the oppressing shareholder at the oppressed shareholders'
expense, but punish defendants with a superfluous incentive
to satisfy an obligation they already intended to pay. For
his part, Norbert argues, also as a matter of equity, that
post-judgment interest should have been set at a higher
rate, and that defendants should pay interest not only on
the outstanding principal balance due, but on accumulated
interest, as well.
The trial judge adequately explained the award of
prejudgment interest as warranted by Norbert's creditor
status and the award of post-judgment interest as required
to encourage defendants to satisfy an obligation that the
judge perceived, based on its review of the record and its
own firsthand observations of witness testimony, defendants
had not been taking seriously. The particular prejudgment
interest rate was grounded in evidence of the company's
expected borrowing rate, directly echoing the reasoning for
awarding that interest. The post-judgment interest rate was
presumptively appropriate because it is specified in the rules,
albeit for tort claims. R. 4:42–11. Both parties' reliance on
authority setting or rejecting particular rates under other
circumstances do not constrict the judge's discretion to set
equitable interest rates under these particular circumstances.
The judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding interest.
Any arguments we have not already discussed have
insufficient merit to warrant further discussion in this opinion.
R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(E).
We remand for the fixing and application of a marketability
discount to the extent not already subsumed in the judge's
findings, as explained in Section IV, for reconsideration of
the judge's adoption of alleged inaccuracies in Trugman's
estimates, as explained in Section III, and a modification of
the judgment to reflect any changes required by the results of
the remand proceedings.
Affirmed in part; remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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Footnotes
1 Frank died on February 24, 2009.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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